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PREFACE

As Deputy Chief of Staff of the HDF and Chair of the HDF General Staff Scientific Research Centre, I proudly present the latest special issue of our scientific journal, Defence Review, which is a young sprout of Honvédégi Szemle, and still is a very vivid professional English language forum on military and security policy topics. In this special issue we are presenting not only the studies of our military servicemen but also papers from research fellows and colleagues.

As the global crises reach the European continent, NATO and the European Union are called to prepare and present an appropriate response to these challenges. In the first section, our authors examine contemporary migration in a legal context, as István Harkai helps clarify all the terminology in the Hungarian and European legal systems in connection with the migration crisis. Radicalism is what inspired György Nógrádi and Álmos Péter Kiss to analyse the Balkans changes, and its effects on Austria. Bianka Speidl and Abdessamad Belhaj open a very interesting question examining the Shíi and Sunni clashes in Western Europe. As there is a serious conflict in our Eastern neighbourhood, Endre Szénási is summarizing the foreign fighters' role in the Russian-Ukrainian crisis.

There are many conflicts in – geographically – distant regions (such as Africa and the Middle-East) that might seriously influence the European security. I highly recommend the summary of the EU peacekeeping attempts in Africa written by Mariann Vecsey and a very well-based analysis of counterterrorism operations in North Africa by Carlos Ruiz Miguel. As we look to more distant shores, Csaba Barnabás Horváth, a research fellow of the General Staff Scientific Research Centre, presents an excellent report on Australian-Indian-Japanese-US international connections in the Asian region, as does Fruzsina Simigh on the Uighur question in China and its connections with the so-called Islamic State.

We should not ignore the results of the recent professional forums like CIOR, UN Chiefs of Defence Conference, or the NATO Warsaw Summit. Besides the short report of these events, we can read in-depth evaluations on the effects of these conferences.

Considering the wide-ranging content of the recent compilation, I am proudly presenting this issue and warmheartedly welcome all our colleagues' future papers on the topic of military science and security policy in order to enhance a more extensive professional discussion both at national and international levels.

Lieutenant General Zoltán Orosz
Deputy Chief of Defence, Hungarian Defence Forces
István Harkai:

BELIEFS AND MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE CONTEMPORARY MIGRATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE LAW ON REFUGEES

ABSTRACT: Contemporary migration is not unparalleled in history. Wandering into Europe challenges the host countries. The flux of immigrants encumbers the social and economic boundaries of the European countries and the asylum rules as well. How should we change these rules to grant protection for those who really stand in need? What are the obligations of the destination countries and where do transit countries stand in this relation? If we grant rights for a certain group of people, can we expect something in return? Can we establish obligations to the newcomers, or if they receive refugee status, are they going to be immune to the rules of the host countries? Is it a realistic expectation to integrate the newcomers into the European culture and system, or – as the tendencies show – can we consider them as a serious risk to European security? Are we allowed to stigmatize a group of people due to the behaviour of a few of them? Will different cultures and religions change Europe? The present essay tries to find answers, based on the literature, the legal background and personal experience, where and how we should reform the legal system regarding the law on refugees. How we could create a lawful but also enforceable legal regime on migration?

KEYWORDS: migration, Europe, migration law, law on refugees, refugee status, terrorism, human smuggling

A BRIEF HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION TO EUROPE

An analysis of the historical background is especially important in this matter. “Migrant crisis” and other similar terminologies are unable to correctly describe the real background and reasons of this phenomenon. To be objective is an important assumption not only for scholars but it has to be essential for legislators and even for average citizens. Yet, this essential element is a missing part in most of the cases. For this very reason we endeavour to present a few historical examples, which in some points, are similar to the recent situation.

Migration in the Carpathian Basin and in its close surrounding areas

The Carpathian Basin, surrounded with high mountains and crossed by rivers provides a natural and short route for those who would like to reach Western Europe across the Balkans. The problems of our modern days are not without examples as the migrants who wanted to enter Europe used the roads which were the most logical way in the geographical sense.

One of the first and highly protected borders in Pannonia was built by the Romans. It followed the line of the Danube. The limes and the river border, the so-called ripa, were constructed in order to encumber the invasion of barbarians. The Roman border protection system was breached in the 4th Century by the Quadis, then by the Sarmatians. After them Hun, Longobard, Avar, Slavic, Frank and Hungarian invaders conquered the province.

After the Magyars consolidated the Hungarian rule in the Carpathian Basin in the 9th Century, the immigration restarted and it was contiguous during the middle ages. Organised and spontaneous settling started in the 12th Century in the reign of Géza II. From Western Europe Walloon and Italian peasants arrived.²

Beside Latins, the biggest group of immigrants were the Saxons who moved in Hungary in the 12-13th Centuries. They settled in Southern Transylvania, in Beszterce, and in Northern Hungary.³ Before the Saxons, Székelys lived in Southern Transylvania but they had to move (internal migration)⁴ because of the Saxons, who received an autonomous territory and privileges from King Andrew II in the so-called Diploma Andreanum in 1224.⁵

The Cumans were forced to leave their former homelands when the Tartars attacked and defeated them in the first half of 13th Century. Subsequently they received asylum from King Béla IV. Their situation was similar to that of the Magyars, who had been attacked by the Pechenegs and forced to move into the Carpathian Basin.⁶

In some aspects, the history of the 13th Century is parallel with the modern era. There was a basic conflict, the attack of the Tartars, which forced the Cumans to move, who tried to seek asylum in a third country. After the Cumans moved in Hungary, the Tartars attacked Hungary as well, and not only slew a significant part of the population but also dislocated the people from their homelands. The Turkish soldiers in the age of the Ottoman conquest did the same.⁷ Nowadays the situation is almost the same in Syria, where 470 thousand people have been killed,⁸ and 4 million have fled. Another 6.36 million people have been forced to move somewhere else due to the war since 2011.⁹

From the way of armed conflicts civil population tries to run. It happened at the time of Hungarian-Turkish wars. Until the Kingdom was able to hold the frontline in the Southern valley of the Danube River, thousands of Serbs wandered into Hungary from the war-stricken neighbouring regions. In the 1480s, after Mehmed II died, the Hungarian army attacked occupied Serbia and brought several thousands of Serbs into Hungary.¹⁰

The geopolitical situation changed after 1526. When the frontline reached the internal part of the Kingdom, many people were forced to leave their homes. Historical regions, such as Syrmia, Bácska, Temesköz almost totally changed their population and ethnicity, and

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³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid. 91.
⁷ Ibid. p. 96.
in Transylvania similar process took place as a result of the so-called war for the castles and the Fifteen Years’ War.\textsuperscript{11}

Jumping almost 180 years in time, a large-scale exodus took place from the 1880s until 1913, when 1.3 million people left the Carpathian Basin and immigrated into the United States.\textsuperscript{12}

After the First World War broke out, 20 thousand Jewish people from Galicia arrived in Hungary.\textsuperscript{13} In 1916 100 thousand fled because of the first Rumanian offensive in Transylvania, then another 350 thousand refugees caused serious problems for the host country after the Treaty of Trianon. After the successful revision, 100 thousand Hungarian and Saxon people arrived from the Rumanian part of Transylvania, while numerous Rumanians left Hungary. At the end of the Second World War, 100 thousand citizens left Transylvania, while the communist government declared the German citizens collectively guilty and deported half of the Swabians,\textsuperscript{14} who arrived in Germany as refugees.

The last big exodus from Hungary took place after the Revolution of 1956, when more than 200 thousand people left the country in fear of retaliation.\textsuperscript{15} On the other hand, immigration to Hungary was at a much smaller scale. Greek refugees arrived after the civil war in Greece, then between 1988 and 1992 more than 200 thousand refugees arrived from Romania, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{16}

Wandering, migration

Wandering presumes spatial mobility which typically disregards administrative borders, whether it is a state border, county, district or provincial boundary. Nowadays wandering into Europe is \textit{external} and typically \textit{forced migration},\textsuperscript{17} because the people in the Middle East leave their residence due to the war. Beside forcibleness it is beyond doubt that the \textit{voluntary migration} is also present. The best example is Kosovo, where living conditions are poor indeed but we can hardly find factors – except for the blood-revenge in the mountain region or the recruiters of the Islamic State – which could force the population to leave the country in such high proportions.

There is a difference between \textit{collective} and \textit{individual migration}, \textit{legal} and \textit{illegal}, \textit{permanent} and \textit{temporary},\textsuperscript{18} \textit{inward} and \textit{outward}, \textit{economic}, \textit{political}, \textit{ecological}, and \textit{cultural} wandering.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
Law and migration

According to this categorization, the migration which is heading for the Schengen borders, is partly legal, partly illegal, permanent, collective and forced.

Similarly to irregular migration, regular migration is also an important factor. Within the framework defined by law it is possible to stay in a country for a certain period of time. We often think that the people crossing borders can only be citizens from a third country. But to cross a border is also possible inside Europe for a European citizen. If we say 'economic immigrant', we hardly think of those Hungarians who immigrated to Western Europe but we do refer to those who entered Hungary illegally across the green border. The word, 'migrant' has become more and more pejorative.

Migration and the law on refugees

We have to separate the wanderers into two groups: asylum-seekers and immigrants. Both are umbrella terms. The first one consists of persecutees who are forced to leave their motherland due to activities which fit the rules of the Refugee Conventions. The second group consists of those wanderers who live in a basically peaceful country but in substantially poorer living conditions. They try to settle in one of the European countries hoping for better life, healthcare, education or bigger income. Because these two types of migrants are wandering together it is easy and from a certain point of view useful to conflate them and use the terms immigrant, illegal migrant.

Legal framework and basic terms

About the legal status of the wanderers arriving in Hungary we have to look into the following three acts. Act I of 2007\textsuperscript{20} and Act II of 2007\textsuperscript{21} regulate the right of residence and the consequences of illegal stay. Act LXXX of 2007 dispose about the right to asylum. Beside the three Acts, several other international and European legal documents add important details. Article XIV of the Fundamental Law of Hungary rhymes with the terminology of the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. In the following we are going to demonstrate the rules of the abovementioned acts and conventions and try to apply them for the asylum-seekers.

In accordance with the Refugee Convention we have to consider a person a refugee who “as a result of events (...) and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reason of race, religion, nationality membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”\textsuperscript{22}

The terminology is quite broad and it was necessary to make some corrections. The 2001/55/EC Temporary Protection Directive provides temporary protection for the time of mass influx of displaced persons who had to leave their country of origin owing to armed conflict or endemic violence, or they are at serious risk of or have been the victims of sys-

\textsuperscript{20} Act I of 2007 on the Admission and Residence of Persons with the Right of Free Movement and Residence.
\textsuperscript{21} Act II of 2007 on the Admission and Right of Residence of Third-Country Nationals.
\textsuperscript{22} 15th Statutory Rule of 1985, Article 1 Point A Paragraph (2).
tematic or generalised violations of their human rights. This recognition is temporary, providing protection for one year. The Qualification Directive of the European Union created one more category. Subsidiary protection is granted for those third country nationals who do not qualify as refugees but if returned to their country of origin, or in the case of stateless person to their country of former habitual residence, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm. Such serious harm could be the infliction or execution of death penalty, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

**The following table lists all the above mentioned protection categories:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reasons</td>
<td>race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion, persecution or fear of persecution</td>
<td>armed conflict or endemic violence, they are at serious risk of violation of their human rights</td>
<td>infliction or execution of death penalty, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other elements, criteria</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other elements, criteria</td>
<td>outside the country of his nationality, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence</td>
<td>temporary protection: exceptional, immediate and temporary protection, in case of mass influx of displaced persons, if the asylum system will be unable to process this flux, mass influx: arrival in the Community of a large number of displaced persons from a specific country or geographical area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>duration: 1 year, may be extended for a maximum of one year.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 2011/95/EU Directive, Article 15.
4 Idem Point d).
5 Idem Article 4 Paragraph (1).

24 2004/83/EC Directive, and 2011/95/EU Directive on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast).
Refugees in the light of statistical data and personal experience

According to the estimation of the UNHCR, 59.5 million people have been forced to leave their country or place of habitual residence. In 2014, 20 Million of them were refugees, and 86% of them had been received by Third World countries. From Syria alone, 4,718,279 people have left as refugees since the civil war broke out. In the first phase most of them went to Turkey. Based on the most recent data, 2,620,553 million refugees are burdening the Turkish asylum system. The second biggest host country is Lebanon (1,067,785), and the third one is Jordan (637,859).

Because the host countries are unable or unwilling to grant the proper accommodation and rights for the asylum seekers, the masses of migrants who are already in motion will no longer stay calm but start to wander towards Europe. This migration is generated by the so-called pull factors. Among them the most important are security, family reunification, better living conditions, social security, better healthcare and education.

In 2015, 1,294,000 people sought asylum in Europe. Between March and December 2015, 1,105,820 people were first applicants out of 1,157,410. The number of second or third applicants was 51,950 (4.45%). According to the data of Eurostat, in January 2016 62,825 applications were received by the authorities. Beside Syrians, most of the asylum-seekers arrived from Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq, Albania, Pakistan, Eritrea, and Nigeria. Except for Kosovo and Albania, each state was a country of origin where, at least at regional level, the terms of refugees, established in the 1951 Refugee Convention, were realized. Until 2015 Syrians were recognised at the highest rate as refugees (94.8%). They were followed by Eritreans (88.5%), Iraqis (87.1%), Afghans (69.4%), Somalis (61.9%), Pakistanis (27.1%), while Albanians and people from Kosovo have been refused (93.6 and 91.8%). These numbers perfectly illustrate that people from the Middle East had a great chance to be recognised as refugees in one of the European countries.

Although these data are from 2014, it is also important, that from the people (626,000) who arrived in Europe in 2014, 70.3% was male and only 29.7% was female, and in the whole group the proportion of the underage juveniles (unaccompanied minor) who arrived either with their family or alone as an unaccompanied juvenile was significant. Their proportion among males was 21.4%, while among females it was higher: 35.5%.

25 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
30 Ibid.
In 2016 more children hit the dangerous road to Europe than ever. Their route to Europe across Turkey and Greece is extremely risky, because they have to cross the Aegean Sea. While in 2015 the child-adult rate was 1:10, in the first two months of 2016 three in ten refugees were children.

By the moment of this study’s being created, 121,967 migrants have arrived in Greece and Italy. 85% have come from the biggest countries of origin. The proportion of children was pretty high, 34%, while women gave 20% and men 47%. 410 persons have died or are still missing. Most people have arrived from Syria (41%), Afghanistan (27%), and Iraq (17%). The remaining 11% is divided among Iran, Pakistan (3-3%), Nigeria, Gambia, Guinea, Morocco and Senegal (1-1%).

Since the number of asylum-seekers was abnormally high in 2014 and in 2015, the procedure of decisions, made by the authorities on the submitted applications, was quite slow. In 2014 163,000 applications were processed, and 45% of them resulted in positive decisions. The number of approved applications is extremely different in the member states. Hungary was the most refusing country, where the authorities made positive decisions only in 9% of the cases. In Bulgaria this rate was 94%. The average proportion in the European Union was 45%.

In Hungary 42,777 asylum-seekers arrived in 2014. In 2015 this number was 177,135, which was a record in the past 20 years. The composition was the following: 36.74% Syrians, 26.35% Afghans, 13.97% Kosovars, 5.17% Iraqis, 8.54% Pakistanis, 2.29 Bangladeshis, 6.94% other. From 177,135 applicants only 146 were recognised as refugees, 356 as beneficiaries of subsidiary protection and 6 as ‘exiles’. 152,260 cases have been dismissed, 36,694 applications are still under reconsideration but the legal practise shows that only a few of them will end up with recognition.

In January 2016, 433 asylum-seekers arrived in Hungary. In February their number increased. The data from January were quite interesting in the light of the data of the previous years. 251 asylum-seekers fell in the ‘other’ category, coming probably from African countries. The number of Pakistanis was extremely high (85), while 29 people arrived from Afghanistan, 33 from Iraq, 11 from Kosovo and only 24 from Syria. Positive decisions were made in 7 cases out of 433. 34 people were recognised as beneficiaries of subsidiary protection and one person as an exile. Another 186 applications were refused.

On the basis of the numbers and the news releases we could assume a political will in the background of the refusals. Although it is a well known fact that most of the migrants arriv-

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ing in Hungary do not consider Hungary as a destination rather than a transit country. They also think about the asylum procedure as a mandatory formality. After registration, almost every applicant leaves Hungary as they are not willing to go to a refugee camp, or if they still go there, they spend there only a couple of days or weeks then they leave to an unknown place which is definitely somewhere in Western Europe so the application will be refused.

Before the asylum procedure is not completed, asylum-seekers cannot be considered as illegal migrants. They are residing lawfully on the territory of Hungary even if they crossed the border illegally without any valid documents. They are entitled to protection if they apply for asylum as for a reason which could fit under the term of misuse of rights. We have to consider their activity as a misuse of rights when they apply for asylum only in order to avoid the expulsion or detention during the immigration procedure.

Although a scholar always has to be objective or at least he or she has to aim to be, in this topic it is very difficult to fulfill this requirement because the literature and the legal background is shaded by and full of personal experiences. It is doubtless and beyond dispute, that most of the migrants who arrived in Hungary in 2015 are potential refugees so they have every right to stay and reside in our country and also to apply for asylum.

On the field-work it was observable that asylum-seekers established their strategy on partially true information provided by human traffickers and their fellow migrants. All they knew was that they had crossed the Schengen-borders, they were already inside the European Union, where they could move “freely” without internal border control and they could travel to their finaly destination which was typically Germany, Sweden, Austria, or Belgium. This system operated uninterruptedly until July-August 2015. Average EU citizens could easily experience it at train stations and on trains going to Budapest.

As the first migrants showed the way to the others, they also handed over the information about the procedure of the Hungarian authorities. Those who were caught inside of Hungary during their immigration proceedings said several times that neither in Greece nor in Macedonia or Serbia they had not applied for asylum, or even if they wanted to the authorities were not very co-operative. The interest of the countries in the Balkan Peninsula was to get rid of the migrants as soon as possible, so the wanderes firstly met appropriate procedure in Hungary.

As the pressure increased the rumor started to spread that the migrants would be deported back into that country where they first applied for asylum. More and more people started to refuse to give fingerprints, to co-operate with the authorities, or to withdraw their claims. By the end of the asylum procedure, their residence became illegal, and the immigration authority had to expel them. But the expulsion is only executable in accordance with a re-admission agreement. If it was not possible, a paradoxical situation evolved. The illegal and lawfully expelled migrant had to stay in Hungary, because their country of origin – Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq – was unsafe, therefore the principle of non-refoulment had to be applied and the immigration authority had to designate a place of residence. In fact it was a chance to escape. If the migrant was patient enough, he or she received subsidiary protection.

All in all, the stituation by the end of 2015 had become critical and created a stressful atmosphere in the host countries.

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ABOUT THE ASYLUM PROCEDURE IN NUTSHELL, THE LEGAL STATUS OF REFUGEES, THEIR RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

Principles

Principle of non-discrimination

The Hungarian Act on refugees does not contain it expressly, but it refers to Article 3 of the Refugee Convention, which states, none of the refugees shall be discriminated because of their race, religion or country of origin. The host country cannot select among the asylum-seekers on the basis of their actual health, qualification or social background.\footnote{Kende, T., Nagy, B., Sonnevend, P. and Valki, L. \textit{Nemzetközi jog}. 529.}

The principle of family unity

The unity of family is protected even if the members of a family are not entitled to be recognised as refugees. As the background rule of the asylum procedure, Act CXL of 2004 on the General Rules of Administrative Proceedings and Services defines the term of relative as follows: \textit{direct descendants and his or her spouse; adoptive and foster parents; adoptee and foster child; sibling; spouse, life partner; direct descendant of spouse or life partner; his or her sibling and the spouse of the sibling.}\footnote{Act CXL of 2004 Section 172 Point h).}

Hence it is unlawful to separate an asylum-seeker from his or her family, and during the procedure it is expected to facilitate the reunification of the divided families.

Prohibition of expulsion or return (refoulement)

In accordance with Article 33 of the Refugee Convention it is prohibited to send an asylum-seeker back to a country where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. This benefit shall not be applied if \textit{“there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to security of the country in which he or she is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.”}\footnote{1951 Refugee Convention Article 33 Paragraph 2.}

The enforcement of this principle is important not only during the asylum procedure. The immigration authority shall not expell a third-country national into a country which is not safe, where the third-country national is likely to be subjected to persecution or death penalty, torture or any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\footnote{Act II of 2007, Section 51 Paragraph (1).}

The immigration authorities shall take into account this requirement in any case.\footnote{Ibid. Section 52 Paragraph (1).}

The refugee authorities analyse whether the prohibition exists or not. During this procedure they use the so-called country-information database. This database categorises the countries according to the level of danger. The most dangerous ones are, for example, Syria, Ukraine, or Somalia.
Section 2, Points g)-i) of Act LXXX of 2007 explains the terms of safe country of origin, and safe third country. These are listed below in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin:</th>
<th>Safe country of origin:</th>
<th>Safe third country:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the country of nationality or for a stateless person, the country of habitual residence.</td>
<td>– it is on the minimum list of the European Union, – it is on the list of safe countries declared by the Hungarian Government, – it is a rebuttably presumption.</td>
<td>– the applicant’s life and liberty are not jeopardised, and the applicant is not exposed to the risk of serious harm, – the principle of non-refoulement is observed in accordance with the Geneva Refugee Convention.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From asylum-seeker to recognised refugee

The asylum procedure starts with the application (request) submitted by the asylum-seeker. Until his or her application is recognised, or the authorities make another decision regarding the status of the asylum-seeker, he or she is entitled to stay and reside on the territory of Hungary. He or she is also entitled to the provisions, benefits and accommodations and to work in the territory of the reception center.47

On the other hand, he or she is obliged to co-operate with the authorities, to reveal the circumstances of the flight, to communicate personal data, to facilitate the clarification of his or her identity, and to hand over the documents. He or she is also obliged to subject him- or herself to medical checkups and medical treatment in order to protect public health. To provide availability, he or she has to stay in the designated accommodation facility.48 If he or she leaves the facility without permission and he or she does not return within 48 hours, he or she has to be considered as someone who left for an unknown place and the refugee authority shall immediately discontinue the in-merit procedure.49

Most asylum-seekers in 2015 hardly fulfilled the above mentioned requirements. To ascertain their personal identity was only possible, if the migrant had a valid and genuine travel document. It often happened that if they had documents, those were forged, but in most of the time they did not have any kind of documents at all because they either destroyed or threw them away. The absence of documents is not every time the consequence of an unlawful activity.

If during the asylum procedure the refugee authority finds out that the applicant who is a non-Hungarian citizen “is being persecuted or having a well-founded fear of persecution in his or her native country or in the country of their usual residence for reasons of race, nationality, membership of a particular social group, religious or political belief, if they do not receive protection from their country of origin or from any other country” he or she will be recognised as a refugee, because his or her request was well-grounded.50

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47 Act LXXX of 2007, Section 5 Paragraph (1) Point a)-b).
48 Ibid. Paragraph (2) Point a)-e).
49 Ibid. Section 66 Paragraph (2) Point d).
50 Fundamental Law of Hungary, Article XIV.
Persecution and serious harm

According to Section 60 Paragraph (1) of Act LXXX of 2007 we have to consider acts as persecution, which are sufficiently serious by their nature, repetition or accumulation and violate the fundamental human rights. Typically actions which are directed against human life, and also torture, and slavery fall under this category.

These actions could be multivarious; they are summarized in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Persecution Section [60 Paragraph (2) Point a)-g)]</th>
<th>Serious harm [Section 61 Point a)-c)]</th>
<th>What is in the background [Section 62 Point a)-c)]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>– acts of mental or physical violence, including acts of sexual violence, – acts committed on account of sexual orientation, – acts committed in connection with the childhood, – legal provisions or administrative measures which are in themselves discriminatory or which are implemented in a discriminatory manner, – disproportionate or discriminatory measures implemented in criminal proceedings, including disproportionate or discriminatory punishment, – denial of judicial redress, – punishment for refusal to perform military service in a conflict, where performing military service would include crimes or acts falling under the exclusion clauses related to recognition as a refugee or as a beneficiary of subsidiary protection.</td>
<td>– threat of the death penalty, – application of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, – a serious threat to the life or physical integrity of a civilian person which is the consequence of indiscriminate violence used in the course of an international or internal armed conflict.</td>
<td>– the state from which the applicant was forced to flee, – a party or organisation controlling the state, – a person or organisation who or which is independent and unable or unwilling to provide protection against persecution or serious harm.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Act LXXX of 2007 specializes the term of refugee in Section 64 Paragraph 1 Point a)-e):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Membership of a particular social group</th>
<th>Political opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>– colour,</td>
<td>– theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs,</td>
<td>– nationality or its lack,</td>
<td>– members of that group share an innate characteristic, or a common background that cannot be changed, or share a characteristic or belief,</td>
<td>– opinion or belief on a matter related to the potential actors of persecution and to their policies or methods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– descent,</td>
<td>– participation in, or abstention from formal worship in private or in public either alone or in community with others,</td>
<td>– membership of a group determined by its cultural, ethnic linguistic identity, common geographical or political origins or its relationship with the population of another state.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– membership of a particular ethnic group.</td>
<td>– religious acts or expressions of view,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– forms of personal or communal conduct based on or mandated by any religious belief.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Persecution and serious harm in the light of examples**

If we have to find examples for the reasons of fleeing, it is regrettably Syria which comes to our mind first. *Mental or physical violence* is the most typical reason of fleeing. In early February the Russian Air Force, supporting the troops of the Syrian government, bombed the city of Aleppo, while the government forces started to encircle the city. Right after the attack, 10 thousand refugees tried to get into Kilis province in Turkey. After the first flux the Turkish authorities expected a further 70 thousand asylum-seekers.51

While in Aleppo the civil population suffer from the bombing of the Russian Air Force and the strikes of the Syrian government army, on the territories controlled by the Islamic State *sexual slavery* is a wide-spread practice. According to stories of the victims of *sexual violence*, in the state of terror 3.5 thousand women and children are detained and forced to do or endure sexual intercourses.52

From the acts committed in connection with *childhood* one of the best examples is the use of children for military purposes. In one of its propaganda videos the Islamic State presented a 4-year-old child who threatened the United Kingdom with terrorist attacks, while

in the background five prisoners were executed as suspects of spying.\textsuperscript{53} Although the data is quite old but it is still worrying. In 1988 more than 200 thousands child soldiers were kept count of worldwide. In 1986 the National Resistance Army in Uganda had 3 thousands child soldiers, among them 500 girls. The National Patriotic Front of Liberia had a separate unit for boys. Most of the children were orphans. In the first place they took up arms not because of the desire of killing but in the hope of survival, or as it happened in Cambodia in hope of food and protection. In Myanmar the parents themselves sent their children to the Karen rebel guerrillas, because there they received clothes and meal twice a day.\textsuperscript{54}

Using children for military purposes is not new. In the time of the Crusades thousands of children marched towards the Holy Land in 1212. Most of the deaths occurred because of undernutrition. Those who embarked in Southern France never returned. According to the rumors, some of them were sold into slavery; others were shipwrecked and drowned. In the last decades scholars proved that in the march of children during the 12\textsuperscript{th} century there were a lot of adult peasants and adventurers. But it is also a fact that in the Middle Ages the duty for boys started in their teenage years.\textsuperscript{55}

Iran is a perfect exampe of the *disproportionate or discriminatory measures implemented in criminal proceedings*. One of the reasons of the fleeing from Iran is that during the criminal procedure the custody is groundlessly long, or the detainees are being beaten during the time of custody.\textsuperscript{56}

Death penalty is still a legal way of punishment in Iran, which is a typical case of *serious harm*. The means of execution are diverse, hanging, execution by firearms or stoning are also common. Although according to a report, stoning has been erased from the Criminal Code by an amendment in 2013, Sharia still allows it.\textsuperscript{57} The Islamic Republic does not perform well on the stage of political rights. It is informative that the refugees coming from Iran are mostly journalists, human or political rights activist or belong to a persecuted religios group.\textsuperscript{58}

It is well-known that the Islamic State hates and persecutes homosexuals.\textsuperscript{59} In September 2015 correspondents reported that the members of the ISIS executed in public 10 people, one of them was a 15 year old boy, because it was assumed the victims were homosexual.\textsuperscript{60} To


\textsuperscript{54} “Children as soldiers”. http://www.unicef.org/sowc96/2csoldrs.htm, Accessed on 29 February 2016


punish or suppress sexual behavior there are softer ways beside death penalty. The criminal law regime of African states provides three solutions in this issue. There are countries where it is prohibited and punishable to act against the order of nature. In Algeria the punishment could be from 2 months to 2 years imprisonment or a fine from 500 to 2,000 Algerian dinars. In Angola the act is not criminalized expressly, but acting against the order of nature can be sanctioned in certain ways, including community work. One of the most radical solutions has been adopted in Benin, where homosexuals could be sentenced for 1 to 5 years imprisonment or fined from 200 to 1,000 Dollars. In the Central African Republic only the public exhibition of homosexuality is felonious, but based on reports, local police do not really take steps in order to force the law. In Ghana the Criminal Code namely sanctionizes sodomy but there is also the expression of act against the order of nature, which could easily refer to homosexuals. In Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire there is no legal sanction on sexual behavior.\footnote{“Laws on Homosexuality in African Nations”. The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Center. 2014. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/criminal-laws-on-homosexuality/homosexuality-laws-in-african-nations.pdf, Accessed on 01. March 2016.}

The reasons of fleeing from Eritrea are enforced military conscription, forced labor or the state of human rights. There is no constitution, no administration of justice, free elections or freedom of the press.\footnote{“It’s not at war, but up to 3% of its people have fled. What is going on in Eritrea?”. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/22/eritrea-migrants-child-soldier-fled-what-is-going, Accessed on 01. March 2016.}

In the background of persecution or serious harm there is the state or other entities. In Syria, Eritrea, or Iran, the state itself commits persecution or causes harm. Somalia lacks the state as an organizing power therefore the living conditions are among the worst worldwide. At Ghouta the Syrian government used weapons of mass destructions which are strictly prohibited by international law. In this attack 300-1,800 people died according to different estimations.\footnote{“Syria chemical attack: What we know”. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23927399, Accessed on 13 March 2016.}

If it is not the state that stands behind the atrocities, there is an armed group or organization which rules the whole or a part of the country. In Afghanistan and Pakistan this organization is the Taliban and the Islamic State, in Somalia the Al-Shabab, in Nigeria the Boko Haram which are responsible for the flux of refugees. In Syria and Iraq, which countries have already fallen apart, the Islamic State persecuted Christians because of their religion, and forced them to choose among conversion, paying tax, or flee.\footnote{“Islamic State’s position on Christians”. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31648888, Accessed on 01 March. 2016.} The atrocities committed against Yazidis and the Turkmen minorities in Iraq, classify as genocide.\footnote{“Islamic State committed genocide against Yazidi Christians in Iraq: report”. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/nov/13/islamic-state-committed-genocide-against-yazidi-ch/, Accessed on 01 March 2016.}

Cessation of refugee status; exclusion from recognition as a refugee

**Cessation of refugee status**

As every legal relation, the refugee status can also be ceased if some conditions occur. Section 11 Paragraph (1) Point a)-b) of Act LXXX of 2007 enumerates the following: the refugee acquires Hungarian nationality or the recognition is revoked by the refugee authority. The
recognition has to be revoked, if the refugee a) has voluntarily re-availed himself/herself of the protection of the country of his/her nationality, b) having lost his/her nationality, s/he has voluntarily reacquired it, c) has acquired a new nationality and enjoys the protection of the country of his/her new nationality, d) has voluntarily re-established him/herself in the country which s/he left or outside which s/he had remained owing to fear of persecution, e) the circumstances in connection with which s/he has been recognised as a refugee have ceased to exist, f) waives the legal status of refugee in writing, g) was recognised in spite of the existence of the reasons for exclusion, h) the conditions of his/her recognition did not exist at the time of the adoption of the decision on his/her recognition, i) concealed a material fact or facts in the course of the refugee procedure or issued an untrue declaration in respect of such a fact or facts or used false or forged documents, provided that this was decisive for his/her recognition as a refugee. The refugee authority shall revoke the recognition as a refugee if a court with a final and absolute decision sentences the refugee for having committed a crime which is punishable by five years or longer term imprisonment.66

Exclusion from recognition as a refugee

Article 1 Point F specifies the reasons of exclusion related to the illegal conduct of the asylum-seeker. Section 8 Paragraph (1)-(3) of Act LXXX of 2007, besides referring to the Geneva Convention, adds some extra criteria. The rules of the Convention and the Act are listed in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1951 Geneva Convention</th>
<th>Act LXXX of 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>– crime against peace, war crime, crime against humanity, serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge, guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.</td>
<td>– serious, non-political act: with regard to the totality of the circumstances, including the objective intended to be attained through the crime, the motivation of the crime, the method of commission and the means used or intended to be used, the ordinary legal aspect of the crime dominates over the political aspect and it is punishable by a five-year or longer term imprisonment according to Hungarian law acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations: acts of terrorism, financing terrorism, incitement of the previous criminal activities, presence on the territory of Hungary endangers the national safety and security.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Temporary and subsidiary protection

To grant the status of refugee is sometimes impossible but because of the principle of non-refoulement the asylum-seeker has to stay in Hungary. To solve this situation, legislators created temporary and subsidiary forms of protection.

Beneficiaries of subsidiary protection are foreigners who do not fulfil the requirements of refugee but there is a risk of serious harm in case of their return to the country of origin, and they are unwilling or unable to avail the protection of that country. This status has to

66 Act LXXX of 2007 Section 11 Paragraph (3).
be reviewed in every five years by the refugee authorities, whether the criteria still exist or not.\textsuperscript{67} Otherwise the beneficiaries have the same rights and obligations as the refugees.\textsuperscript{68}

\textit{Beneficiaries of temporary protection} are foreigners who belong in a group of displaced persons arriving in the territory of the Republic of Hungary en masse, fulfil the requirements of refugee or other beneficiaries based on the above mentioned rules of the European Union. Those who have been recognised by Hungarian Parliament because they were forced to leave their country of origin due to an armed conflict, civil war or ethnic clashes or the general, systematic or gross violation of human rights, are also entitled to temporary protection.\textsuperscript{69}

Although the Refugee Act does not provide for it, there is a third category which is very similar to the above mentioned types of protection. Those who have finally and absolutely expelled from the territory of Hungary, but their expulsion is inexecutable, are entitled to the \textit{admitted status} because there are no safe third countries which are willing to receive the foreigner. In that case, the immigration authority will recognise the foreigner as \textit{admitted} and issue a humanitarian residential permission.\textsuperscript{70}

\textbf{BACKGROUND POWER OR CONCOMITANTS?}

\textbf{Terrorism}

Mass media consequently consider every wanderer as an economic immigrant except for Syrians although this expression describes the situation of Kosovars, Albanians or other migrants arriving from a safe third country. Those who arrive from conflict zones are all potential refugees. Because the criteria of refugee exist on a geographic and time-horizon, refugees are forced to leave their native country more or less at the same time. This movement has a final destination, which is Europe. It is incorrect to claim that there is a sort of background power behind the scenes.

On the other hand it is also a fact that there are some factors which try to abuse the flux of migrants. The two most dangerous are: terrorism and mansmuggling. It is easy to get into Europe for those immigrants who are willing to commit an act of terrorism as it happened several times. One of the originators of the terrorist attack committed in the Bardo Museum in Tunisia was Abdelmajid Touil, who tried to get into and hide in Italy as a refugee.\textsuperscript{71} Egyptian citizen Ibrahim Hussein Idarus applied for asylum and was recognised as a refugee in 1996 in the United Kingdom. Later he took part in blowing up two embassies of the United States in Africa.\textsuperscript{72} Terrorists who committed the attacks in Paris in December 2015 included those who had come across the Balkans among refugees with fake documents.\textsuperscript{73}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{67} Act LXXX of 2007 Section 12-14.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid. Section 17.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid. Section 19.
\textsuperscript{70} Act II of 2007 Section 52/A.
\textsuperscript{71} Besenü, J. “Nem az ISIS találmánya – Terroristák a migránsock között”. \textit{Felderítő Szemle}, XIV/3. 2015. 20.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid. 26.
\end{footnotesize}
Mansmuggling

It is less perceptible than terrorism but is an even more dangerous phenomenon, which is also connected to a background power. But it is not true, of course. The phenomenon of mansmuggling only overlays on migration, in a business-like way it tries to benefit from migration. The number of refugees who arrived in Europe in 2015 is dwarfed by the amount of money earned by smugglers. Last year they received 1 billion dollars, which is really nothing compared with the 10 billion dollars earned by the criminal organizations since 2000.74

This income probably came from the private possessions, sold real estates, or earnings gained by work of the migrants and from the donations sent by their relatives living in European countries. It means that from the conflict zones not only the human resources but money also “migrates”. There is a good chance that the latter one falls into the wrong hands, enriching the black market and criminal organizations.

The sum to be payed for the services of the smugglers starts from 700 dollars and goes up to 277 thousand dollars. A “trip” from Afghanistan to London costs 25 thousand dollars, from Iran to the EU it is 25 thousand dollars, from Iraq to the United Kingdom it costs 10 thousand, while from Morocco to the EU the migrant has to pay 24 thousand.75 A place in a cockleshell from Turkey to the Aegean isles costs 1 thousand dollars. The much more dangerous travel from Lybia to Lampedusa is also 1 thousand dollars. Syrians have to pay a double fee. The smugglers ask 11 thousand Dollars for their help from Afghanistan to Hungary. The fee does not cover the extraordinaty dangerousness of the trip. The cost of the journey depends on the distance, the number of refugees, destination, difficulties, devices and vehicles in use and other supplementary services, such as fake passports, GPS co-ordinates, maps, and guidances.76

To retrace and explore the traffic-networks is rather hard because they are less hierarchi-cal, the subtask are done by recruiters, transporters, quarter-masters, and organisers. The authorities often take part in human trafficking activity, either as active or passive – but well-paid – observers.77

CONCLUSION

To stop the permanent flux of immigration is almost impossible but it is also necessary to handle and deal with it. Since the problem is decently complex, first it is practical to separate the part-problems and the answers from each other. Perhaps it would be wise to categorise the subtask according to how much they cost for the European Union and the host countries.

One of the typical examples of the low-budget, temporary or “deflector” solutions is the fence. After Hungary had built a fence along its Serbian and Croatian borders,78 the migrants

77 Ibid.
immediately changed the routes.\textsuperscript{79} To build a fence was a priority because it is not only a physical barrier but – with the legal aggravation – it helps to keep the flux under control. However, it is impossible to solve the problem with a fence because immigration is still persistent. Albeit after the fence was built, the officers and public servants of the Hungarian authorities finally had the possibility to respire in the early spring of 2016 – in spite of the fence – the number of asylum-seekers started to increase.\textsuperscript{80}

To control the sea-routes, to save the people in seas and to counter the mansmugglers is more expensive than building a fence, and it also requires closer co-operation from the EU member states. But it also has international legal barriers. The Aegean coastal states, Greece and Turkey are allowed to use force in their own territorial waters. On the other hand, other ships under foreign flags, in NATO or European convoys, are not allowed to act the same way. The Aegean region is not the first place in the Mediterranean region, where NATO takes part in missions against mansmuggling. On the migration routes from Libya to Italy the EU also tried to use naval forces. In operation Sophia, which replaces mission EUNAVFOR, the memberstates execute not only reconnoisance missions but they also intercept suspicious vessels, and they are allowed to step on the board, examine and even to confiscate the vessels. However, they are not allowed to use force against the smugglers.\textsuperscript{81}

The task of the new NATO mission in the Aegean region would be to trace the migrant routes and to eliminate the mansmuggling networks. The plans of the operation are still under development but it seems the main task will be similar to that of the mission in the Mediterranean Sea. The actual actions against the smuggling networks will be incumbent on the Turkish and Greek authorities. The smuggling vessels intercepted in the sea would be turned back to Turkey. With the mission the second NATO permanent maritime group will be mandated.\textsuperscript{82}

Against mansmugglers the international community can use not only military forces but the secret services and other international co-operation as well. Criminal networks try to launder the money earned from human trafficking and mansmuggling through different ways, from kebab restaurants to snooker saloons. The challenge is to explore and close the route of the money.\textsuperscript{83}

Those utopian solutions which are aimed at the pacification of the countries of origin or which try to keep the wanderers in those countries which hosted them on the first place are the most expensive, and they promise the least success.\textsuperscript{84} The second one is not only uncontrollable, but also inexecutable. For the first one, there is no political reality, since the Western countries are using only air forces and limited special, training troops, and beside


\textsuperscript{81} “Sophia: indul az emberscémpészek elleni újabb uniós hadművelet”. http://hvg.hu/vilag/20150928_sophia_emberscempeszek_hadmuvelet, Accessed on 13 March 2016


the arms shipments, they are not willing to get involved in the conflicts which had been caused partly by the previous Western interventions.

It also requires significant expenditures and years or decades to integrate the refugees in Western societies. Even if the flux is unstoppable, maybe it would be wise if the European countries tried to benefit from the phenomenon. The cultural and language differences could be overcome by strict and consistent integration policies even if it required some restrictions on the rights of the newcomers. It needs not only political but also voters’ will, and endless patience. The host countries need rules which are clear, well defined, rigorous but fair and enforceable with consequences. The effectiveness of integration requires regret, conformity from both parties in order to successfully incorporate quite different cultures. The host countries have to create the conditions while the newcomers have to accept the language, the culture, the traditions and the customs of their new home.

LITERATURE:


SOURCES FROM THE INTERNET:


LEGAL SOURCES:

1951 Geneva Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees

Fundamental Law of Hungary (25 April 2011)

Act I of 2007 on the Admission and Residence of Persons with the Right of Free Movement and Residence

Act II of 2007 on the Admission and Right of Residence of Third-Country Nationals
Act CXL of 2004 on the General Rules of Administrative Proceedings and Services
15th Statutory Rule of 1985 on the declaration of the 1951 Geneva Convention
2001/55/EC Temporary Protection Directive on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences
2004/83/EC Directive, and 2011/95/EU Directive on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast).
Péter Á. Kiss:

EUROPE’S SECOND FRONT: THE RISKS AND CHALLENGES OF THE BALKAN PENINSULA’S FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAMIST ORGANIZATIONS

ABSTRACT: The first front of the terrorist threat to Europe is sufficiently well known: second or third generation young Muslims who grew up in the European states, but are alienated from and hate their host societies, and adopted the radical ideology of political Islam. The second front – radical Islam in the western Balkans – has received less attention. There is a good reason for this: for the time being it is only a distant storm cloud on the horizon. However, it can strike without warning at any moment, like a tropical storm. This essay analyzes the origins of this threat, estimates its extent and seriousness, and recommends policies to prepare for it.

KEYWORDS: Salafism, jihad, Bosnia and Hercegovina, terrorism, Balkans

ISLAM IN THE BALKANS, 14TH THROUGH 20TH CENTURIES

Well before the Ottoman conquests Islam had already made its appearance in the Balkans through immigrants and merchants from the Middle East and Central Asia. However, it became the peninsula’s dominant religion only between 1352 and 1467, during the Ottoman Empire’s long march to the north and west. Tradesmen, merchants, bureaucrats of the state administration, as well as proselytizing movements followed the Ottoman armies, and the population began to convert to Islam in some areas. Most conversions occurred in Albania and Bosnia, due to the diligent proselytizing work of the mevlevi, kadirija and bektasi Sufi schools. Conversion was slow, even though converts enjoyed some advantages: they were free of the restrictions and obligations imposed on non-Muslim subjects (mandatory dress, unequal treatment in the courts, mandatory subservience to Muslims); they did not have to pay the jizya, the special tax imposed only on non-Muslims, and new career opportunities (e.g. military service) opened up for them. The imperial government did not urge conversion particularly: the jizya was an important source of the imperial revenue, and mass conversion would have caused financial chaos.¹

Forced conversions (although they did occur sometimes) were rare: the “peoples of the book,” the Jews and Christians, were allowed to live as second-class subjects (dhimmis) under the empire’s protection, as long as they accepted the restrictions and obligations imposed on them, and paid the jizya. Under the Ottoman millet system adherents of the various faiths enjoyed a certain personal and communal autonomy: they could practice their religion, live

according to their own customs, and resolve their disputes in their own courts. Disputes between litigants belonging to different faiths were adjudicated in the court of the aggrieved party’s millet – except when a Muslim was involved: such cases were always brought to the Muslim millet’s court. Only those Christians and Jews who sought their fortune beyond the confines of their village were at some disadvantage because some professions were closed to them. Nevertheless, many reached very high positions in the Empire’s administration – furthermore, some positions were filled almost exclusively by Christians or Jews.

The Ottoman Empire’s slow withdrawal from Europe (1800-1918) redrew the Balkan Peninsula’s demographic map. The Muslim communities suffered particularly heavy losses because the new, independent nation-states that appeared in the former Ottoman provinces strove for ethnic homogeneity, and were not particularly fastidious about the methods they used to achieve it. These early “ethnic cleansing” projects were generally successful: the ratio of Muslims within the population was significantly reduced everywhere. In some states the discriminative policies against Muslims – especially Turks – remained in effect until the end of the 20th century.

However, discrimination was not the only Muslim experience. During the decades of communist rule a more or less secular Muslim elite (physicians, engineers and other intellectuals) came into being throughout the Balkans. In the 1961 census in Yugoslavia the Muslims were allowed to declare themselves as a nationality (narodnost), and 10 years later as a nation (narod) – a concession that dangerously conflated the categories of nation and religion.

THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA

With the collapse of socialism, as new parties emerged, the new Muslim elites acquired a significant political role. Many of the new parties were organized on more or less openly ethnic or religious foundations, and the leadership of the Muslim parties with very few exceptions came from these Muslim/communist elites. More precisely, most of them were intellectual activists of the mass organizations of the former communist parties. For example, Ibrahim Rugova, the leading politician of the Kosovo Albanians had been the chairman of the Kosovo Writers’ Association. There was one organization that did not fit this generalization:

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2 The largest millets were the Muslim, the Rumi (Orthodox Christians), the Syrian Christians, the Jewish and the three Armenians (Catholic, Orthodox, Evangelical). Bieber. “Muslim Identity in the Balkans before the Establishment of Nation States”.


5 Bringa, T. R.: “Nationality Categories, National Identification and Identity Formation in “Multinational” Bosnia”. In The Anthropology of Eastern Europe, Vol. 11. No. 1-2. 1993. 80-90. The concepts of „nationality” and „nation” had constitutional significance in communist Yugoslavia. In very simplified terms, the nations (Jugoslovenski narodi) were the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia (Serbs, Croats, Macedonians, Slovenes, Montenegrins and after 1971 the Muslims), who had no homeland outside the country. The ten nationalities (Hungarians, Albanians, etc.) were the peoples whose homelands were nation-states on the borders of Yugoslavia, as well as minorities whose national origin was either indeterminate, or their numbers were very small (Greeks, Russians, Jews, etc.). There was no administrative distinction, but the nations had the right to secede from Yugoslavia, while the nationalities did not.
the Bosnian SDA (Stranka Demokratske Akcije – Party of Democratic Action) followed the pan-Islamic ideology, instead of the national-Islamic one. Its leader, Alija Izetbegović, was an active adherent of the pan-Islamic ideal; his views had landed him in Yugoslavia’s prisons several times. However, even the SDA had to accommodate former communist intellectuals in order to become a significant political force. Although in the first democratic elections these parties obtained the support of a significant majority of the Muslim communities, their support was far from unequivocal. Many voters in both the urban middle class and among the rural voters still supported the former communists. For example a large proportion of the Bosnian urban elite insisted on their Yugoslav identity; many were afraid of the effects of the economic reforms, or were afraid that they would have to surrender their land to the previous owner.

As a result, Islam became a vehicle of political maneuvering. Three easily recognizable trends can be identified:

1. Islam, as a tool of the ethnic minority. Islam is the common denominator of an easily identifiable ethnic minority, which not only distinguishes the minority from the dominant majority, but also tightens the bond among the members of the minority. Religion is not only a spiritual guiding light, but also a symbolic resource which provides authority to the leading figures of the community and legitimizes their client-building. In this trend there are commonly tight family bonds or close friendship between the religious and political leaders. The PPD (Partia për Prosperitet Demokratik – Party of Democratic Prosperity) of the Albanians in Macedonia, the DPS (Dvizhenie za Prava i Svobodi – Movement for Rights and Liberty) of the Bulgarian Turks, and the Albanian PDS (Partia Demokratike e Shqipërisë – Democratic Party of Albania) belong to this trend.

2. Islam as a vehicle of nationalism. Radical nationalists exploited Islam to compete with the dominant party or parties within the ethnic group. This was the course the PPDSH (Partia për Prosperitet Demokratik e Shqiptarëve në Maqedoni – Party for the Democratic Prosperity of Macedonian Albanians) chose in 1996, when it ran an imam against the PPD’s candidate. The Albanian PRK (Partia e Rimëkëmbjes Kombetare – Party of National Restoration) followed this course as well. Nationalist radicalization contributed to making Islam part of the national identity. At the same time, Islam became “national Islam.”

3. Islam, as the vehicle of the broader religious community. Islam is a religious community (umma), which is above and beyond national ties, but at the same time it is also a political project, whose goal is to Islamize the Muslims. In addition to the Bosnian SDA some smaller Islamist groups followed this ideology.

Islam became a truly significant political factor in the Balkans in the course of the civil war in Bosnia and Hercegovina. The Muslims insisted on independence but were unable to make their will prevail through parliamentary procedures. The Bosnian Croats’ goal was secession from rump-Yugoslavia, and in order to achieve it they allied themselves with

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Europe

the Muslims. The Bosnian Serbs insisted on Bosnia’s remaining part of Yugoslavia. The Muslim-Croat alliance forced a referendum through Parliament on the question of independence (February 29-March 1 1992). The Serbs considered the referendum unconstitutional and refused to participate in it. The referendum passed with nearly 100 percent support, but with the participation of less than two-thirds of the eligible voters. In spite of the low turnout and the questionable legitimacy of the whole process, independence was declared on March 3, and international recognition and UN membership followed, respectively, in early April and late May, while Bosnian Serb and Yugoslav forces mobilized to secure Serb areas.

In addition to nationalism, the Serbs’ stubbornness was also fueled by their experience of Muslim domination, which was far more recent (1941-1945) than in the rest of Europe. They wanted to avoid its repetition (which Bosnia’s demographic trends would have guaranteed sooner or later) at any cost. An obstacle to a peaceful solution was the fact that the goals and pan-Islamic views of Alija Izetbegović (the unquestionable leader of the Bosnian Muslims) had been generally known for over 20 years. During the war the international opinion makers and the press consistently described Izetbegović as committed to the idea of a multinational, secular, democratic Bosnia. However, a review of his career and writings makes it clear, that he saw Bosnia’s future in an Islamic republic in which the adherents of other religions would be tolerated, subjugated second-class citizens.

SALAFISM, WAHHABISM

A short detour is necessary here. As it was mentioned earlier, the Muslims of the Balkans have generally followed Islam’s moderate, mysticism-prone Sufi branches. However, the more austere, fundamentalist currents of Islam have also been present among them to a greater of lesser (mostly lesser) degree. These currents are generally labeled Salafism, after the first three generations of Muslims (al-salaf al-salih), who played a decisive role in the emergence and early triumphs of Islam, and with their austere lifestyle and piety showed an example to later generations of Muslims.

Fundamentalism is not a Muslim monopoly: we find it in Christianity and in Judaism, as well as in some far-Eastern religions. Fundamentalist ideologies tend to follow similar ones, are generally responses to crises in the faith, and to secular principles that threaten the faith or are incompatible with its basic tenets, and they tend to follow similar trajectories.

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9 The Serb objections were not without merit. The Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina had no authority unilaterally to change the status of the republic into that of a sovereign state, since that would also change the borders of Yugoslavia, and according to the 1974 federal constitution such a change required the consent of all federal republics. Furthermore, amendments in the early 1990s to the 1974 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina guaranteed the equality of the republic’s constituent nations and nationalities – a principle that was violated by the way the amendment resolution was forced through parliament over the objection of the Serbian deputies.

10 Serbian sources often bring up the fact that during World War II Izetbegović not only served in the SS Handjar Division, which had been raised in Bosnia, but also recruited fellow Bosnian Muslims to serve in the division. Since Izetbegović was in his late teens during the war (he was born in August, 1925), the extent of his prowess as a fighter, and his influence as a recruiter may be debatable. See for example Joksimovich, V. “Alija Izetbegovic”. http://www.srpska-mreza.com/Yugoslavia/views/alija3.html, Accessed on 20 December 2016. and “Ethnic Conflicts in Civil War in Bosnia – Political manipulation with term of “Genocide” Case Study: Srebrenica – Role of so called international media’s Photo documentations”. http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=/content/balkans/bosnia/srebrenica/bose13 incl, Accessed on 20 December 2016.

11 A careful reading of The Islamic Declaration makes this latter point quite clear.
Fundamentalists are engaged not in a simple traditional political struggle, but in a cosmic struggle between good and evil. In order to reinforce their besieged identity in this struggle they reach back to the “bases” – the practice and doctrines of the past, when the faith (and the faithful) were still pure. In order to avoid “contamination” they often retreat from the majority population and develop a sort of counter-culture – nevertheless, they are usually not impractical dreamers. They have internalized the pragmatic rationalism of the modern world, and by refining the “bases,” they create an ideology that shows the faithful how to struggle for renewed sacralization of an increasingly skeptical world. This description also applies to the majority of Islam’s Salafist currents. Most Salafists practice their faith in isolation from everyday life – and especially from politics. They may be openly contemptuous of the adherents of other faiths, their behavior may be unlawful, bullying, or annoyingly patronizing, but seldom threatening or violent.

Wahhabism – a subset of Salafism – is different. It is not just one of Islam’s many currents, but also the official ideology of Saudi Arabia – a powerful and rich state, whose government finances its propagation generously. This 18th century ideology was born in the isolated Najd region of eastern Arabia. According to its founder, Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab (1703–1792), unnecessary innovations and foreign practices had contaminated Islam. These harmful influences – especially particularly harmful Sufi practices, such as the veneration of saints – must be rooted out by violence, and the Muslims must return to the example and austere life of the Prophet and his immediate circle, in order to purify the faith. These ideas were not new: in the Middle Ages Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780–855), ibn Taymiyya (1263 – 1328) and ibn al-Qayyim (1292–1350) advocated similar doctrines, and close to Wahhab’s time strongly fundamentalist currents also appeared in India and Yemen.

The cornerstones of Wahhabist doctrine are a very strict interpretation of monotheism, the rejection of historically unwarranted innovations (e.g. theology, jurisprudence, the veneration of individuals), and a literal adherence to the guidance of the Quran and the Hadith. They follow (and wherever they can – enforce) strict code of dress and grooming (e.g. men must grow beards, women must be covered head to toe in public). They reject (and wherever they can – prohibit) modern inventions that the Quran would have banned if they had been invented in Mohammed’s time (photography, most forms of music, banking, elections, political parties, nation-states and state boundaries, laws made by men).

Following the example of ibn Taymiyya, Wahhab did not hesitate to label as heretics all who refused to accept his doctrines, and declare jihad against them. In turn, the religious scholars of the time outlawed Wahhab and his followers as heretics. However, Wahhab found a strong patron: in 1774 he concluded an alliance with Muhamad ibn Saud, chief of one of the Arab tribes. The combination of Wahhab’s religious legitimacy and ibn Saud’s military prowess proved to be enduring and successful, both in peace and in wartime. By subduing or expelling the neighboring tribes the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance extended its rule over a steadily increasing area of Arabia. It organized insurgencies in the Ottoman Empire,

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13 Ibn al Wahhab’s followers called themselves al-muwahiddin (the monotheists). Wahhabism is a label that was attached to them subsequently by others. Janková, V. “Wahhabism in the Balkans. The Case Study of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thesis”. Charles University, Prague, 2014. 46.
initiated destructive campaigns into Syria and Iraq, and with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire it has become the dominant power of Arabia (and of the Arab world).15

This picture is further complicated by the existence of jihadist-Salafist and takfiri currents. They concentrate on analyses of political reality, work out strategies and practice that may be suitable for changing that reality, and consider violence the best path to ”defend Islam” and to realise their goals.16 Takfiris take this ideological process to its logical conclusion: anyone who does not agree with their interpretation of Islam is either an apostate or an infidel. Although salafism has considerable traction in the Middle East, even most salafists consider the takfir ideology as going too far.17

A radicalization process that ends in worshipping unbridled violence seems to be inevitable in the fundamentalist streams of Islam. First of all, the authoritative texts (the Koran, which purports to contain the words of Allah himself, and the Haddith, which is a chronicle of Mohammed’s words and deeds) provide clear guidance to all Muslims on the proper way of life. However, these old texts are easy to misunderstand – or to misinterpret. Second, in Islam religious zeal depends on individual conviction: there is no objective yardstick by which excessive zeal can be identified.18 The adherents of radical ideologies follow the holy texts in their activities and find justification for even the bloodiest atrocities in the Koran or the Haddith. The followers of the less radical streams have no ideological arguments with which to rein in the radicals. If they still try, they cannot defend against the subsequent charge of being bad Muslims, because they do not defend the faith with sufficient vigor.19 The radicalization process that ends with the acceptance and positive affirmation of unbridled violence can be observed from 7th century Kharajites, through ibn Taymiyya, the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda, to the Islamic State, whose guiding ideology is takfirism. Salafists, Wahhabists, jihadi-Salafists manage to co-exist in great discomfort; they even support each other against other currents of Islam and against what they perceive as the “Crusader’s aggression” – but from time to time this “discomfort” erupts in violent showdowns.

THE BOSNIAN CIVIL WAR AND WAHHABISM

To return to the Balkans after this brief detour, during the wars that accompanied the dissolution of Yugoslavia – and especially during the civil war in Bosnia – those fundamentalist currents of Islam that have always been present were greatly strengthened at the expense of

15 Many authors – even some specialists, who ought to know better – use the terms Salafism and Wahhabism interchangeably. This is a mistake. The Salafists may wish for a dominant role of Islam in everyday life, but they generally ignore the restraints and constraints of the real world in their religious practice and do not entertain higher political ambitions that lead to militant jihad. Wahhabism, as a state ideology, cannot divorce itself from reality: in addition to religious matters, it must also support the interests of the state. Its followers are more likely to consider violence not just acceptable, but entirely justified in the defense and propagation of Islam, and in promoting Islam’s dominance. Janková. “Wahhabism in the Balkans”, 44-48.
18 After the death of Mohammed (632 AD) Islam divided into two main streams (the Sunni and the Shia), which subsequently further divided into countless currents. Similar schisms within the early Christian church were healed (at least temporarily) by the ecumenical councils of the 4th through 8th centuries, which imposed some unity and discipline on the various sects, and imposed constraints and restraints on the behavior of the devout. There were no similar reunification attempts in Islam.
the more moderate Sufi creeds. Wahhabism proved to be the most successful of them all. The conditions of the Bosnian civil war created the “perfect storm” for jihadist fighters to enter Europe in significant numbers, and spread their ideology:

- The Bosnian Muslims insisted on independence and were ready to fight for it, but did not have the necessary resources. They could not obtain any financial assistance or arms in Europe, so their only option was to turn to the Muslim world – notably Saudi Arabia.
- The Serbs were ready to fight in order to prevent Muslim dominance, and turned to Yugoslavia for financial and material support. However, Yugoslavia’s international prestige was at a very low ebb, due to its war against Croatia. Russia – the Serbs’ and Serbia’s traditional protector – was too weak to exert any influence.
- Although the governments of the United States and the western European nations approved of the creation of an (ostensibly secular and multi-national) independent Bosnian state, they were not prepared to impose it by force of arms, or support it by massive arms shipments. However, they were prepared to look the other way as funds and arms flowed in from other sources. They were also prepared to use a limited military force, in order to prevent a Serbian victory.
- The Saudi government – encouraged by the fact that Bosnia’s president was the most prominent Yugoslav champion of the ideology of political Islam – made available huge sums for the creation of an independent (Islamic) Bosnian state, and supported it throughout the war.
- In the eyes of the mujahedeen (the jihadist fighters) Bosnia was a direct continuation of the Afghan jihad, and they flocked to the country in significant numbers to fight “in the way of Allah.”

The flow of Saudi money was crucial for Bosnia, because the government had no other revenue to finance the operation of the state’s institutions and its arms purchases. Wahhabist charity organizations and non-government organizations (NGOs) opened offices in Europe’s major cities in order to manage the money flow from the Middle East. These organizations served as the intermediaries in the purchase and transportation of weapons, as well as the recruitment and compensation of the foreign fighters.20

The Muslim world contributed not only money and arms but also men to use them: foreign fighters. There is no reliable information available about their numbers. The estimates (in reality only guesses and propaganda statements) range from 300 to 6,000, but a few hard facts suggest that the higher number is more probable. The trial records of the international tribunal on war crimes in the former Yugoslavia mention units of 700 to 1,100 men, and independent subunits of 50 to 60 men; the research service of the US Congress also suggests that several thousand fighters were involved.21 The mujahedeen units were theoretically a part of the Bosnian army but in actual fact they were independent. Their role was not particularly useful from a military point of view, but their presence had a very high ideological and propaganda value. Their two most significant – and for Europe the most worrisome – contributions were proselytization among young Balkan Muslims, and the creation of a jihadist infrastructure. They built a network contact with individuals in the Wahhabist charities and foundations,

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the various national security organs, and the local Muslim communities. According to the provisions of the Dayton Agreement, which ended the war in Bosnia, the mujahedeen were supposed to leave the country, but many failed to do so. Some of them married local women and thus became eligible for Bosnian citizenship, others simply ignored the requirement and remained illegally. In many isolated villages the adherents of radical Islam created Wahhabist colonies, which subsequently served as recruiting stations and as sanctuaries for international jihad fighters. They also established small training camps, some of which still exist today. Throughout the western Balkans a network of mosques controlled by radical imams spread the radical ideology and served as clandestine bases for jihad fighters. A further element of this infrastructure was the network of printed press, bookstores and internet web pages. All this was financed by non-governmental organizations and charities, some of which maintained contacts with terrorist organizations or employed known terrorists.22

Saudi money had financed the Bosnian government’s operations and arms purchases during the war, and also played a decisive role in the reconstruction after the war. State organizations and private charities assisted restore damaged infrastructure, built schools, devoted a lot of resources to the reconstruction of mosques, provided relief to Muslim victims of the war, established foundations for Muslim war orphans, organized summer camps for young people, and offered scholarships to poor but talented young Muslims in the Arab world’s institutions of higher learning.

But the grants, scholarships and relief payments have a price. The mosques were restored in accordance with the austere, undecorated Wahhabist style, only Wahhabist imams are employed in them, and even the religious services were changed to conform to the Wahhabist ideology. Only Wahhabist teachers teach in schools, assistance is provided only to those who follow the Wahhabist rules in dress, behavior, and in family life: women are required to wear the headscarf, and children are expected to attend religious instruction. Wahhabist ideology has also influenced the school curricula. The traditional education system of the Bosnian Muslim community (Islamska Zajednica – IZ) has suddenly met a competing, parallel program of instruction. Moreover, after the trauma of war many young people have found Salafist teachings attractive, because it offered order.23

These developments – albeit under better cover, and to a lesser degree – have also occurred in Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania, and by the dawn of the new millennium the Salafist ideology has put down some deep roots throughout the western Balkans.24 As a result the “human terrain” of the western Balkans has changed. The tolerant, peaceful and more or less secular Muslim of the Balkans – a stereotype that had some validity in the late 20th century – has given way to the intolerant, impatient, violent, jihadist-Salafist Muslim. This is no less a stereotype, and for now perhaps it has somewhat less validity than the previous

one, but the trend is clearly towards a more radical, more aggressive, more confrontational, expansive Islam in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{25}

Following the events of September 11 2001 the United States and its European allies applied pressure on the various Bosnian governments to dismantle the Salafist infrastructure, but they achieved only limited results. The authorities carried out a few spectacular raids, confiscated some weapons, explosives and Islamist propaganda materials, and arrested some jihadist fighters. But the Salafists who had infiltrated the local government structures managed to sabotage the complete removal of the infrastructure: it still exists and supports the potential terrorists of the future.

In fact, this infrastructure has grown sufficiently to warrant revisiting the question of the “Green Corridor,” a concept that came to the fore over 20 years ago. It is supposed to be an Islamist project to unite the Muslim peoples of the Balkans into a contiguous chain of Muslim-dominated political entities from Turkey to the northwest tip of Bosnia.\textsuperscript{26} A look at the map shows that the western third (or maybe half) of the Green Corridor is already fairly close to realization: the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Kosovo, Albania, the Sanjak of Novi Pazar (the Serbia-Montenegro border region), and the west and northwest of Macedonia do not form a truly contiguous strip of Muslim-dominated territory, but the gaps are small. Longer gaps exist in the rest of Macedonia and in Bulgaria – and these may prove to be difficult to close. Unifying the Muslims is not a straightforward business either: common faith may be a unifying factor, but “common” does not mean “uniform.” The success of Wahhabism notwithstanding, the Balkan Muslims still follow various currents of Islam. In addition to religious doctrine, there are several other factors (e.g. ethnicity and economy) that drive apart, rather than draw together, the various Muslim nationalities.

Whether the Green Corridor is a consciously developed and tightly controlled political design pursued by Islamist decision-makers in Ankara, Riyadh, Qatar and (more recently) Raqqa, or it is just the vague outline of a goal the \textit{umma} should all strive for is unclear. Whether the project can be realized at all is not clear either. However, these questions are perhaps less important than the risk the project represents, and Europe’s response to the risk. The immediate results of the emergence of such a geopolitical and strategic block would be the fragmentation of the affected states, and the destabilization of an already unstable region. Sitting astride major communication routes, the block would cut Greece and Macedonia off from the rest of Europe.\textsuperscript{27} And a cause for concern is that Europe’s political elite is oblivious not only to the risk the Green Corridor represents, but to the very concept itself.

**FOREIGN FIGHTERS REDUX**

So far the Balkan threat to Europe has only appeared indirectly, as one thread in the fabric of terrorist attacks: the perpetrators had fought in the war in Bosnia, or the attack was planned there. However, some terrorist attacks in the United States (both failed and successful ones)

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\textsuperscript{25} Perino, V. \textit{L’islam in Bosnia: Da islam laico a fondamentalismo?} Torino: Università degli Studi di Torino, 2006.110-112.

\textsuperscript{26} Sherman, A. “Let’s Remove the Blinkers”. \textit{The Jewish Chronicle}, September 30, 1994.

were planned and carried out by young Balkan Muslims. Furthermore, just as Bosnia was a magnet for the jihadists from western Asia 20 years ago, so the Islamic State is attracting a steady stream of young Balkan Muslims today: there are close to 900 men from the Balkans fighting in the ranks of the Caliphate’s forces.

The Balkan volunteers follow the European foreign fighters’ usual career pattern, which consists of five stages:

1. In the first phase the new (but not necessarily young) Muslim decides to fight “in the way of Allah”: he will participate in the jihad, but instead of carrying out insignificant acts at home, he would fight in a real war on the side of the caliphate. This motivation may be real religious fanaticism but in many cases it is just a thirst for adventure or youthful rebellion. The immediate family and friends usually learn of the decision only when the would-be jihadist is already on the way to the combat zone.

2. The second phase – travel to the combat zone – is far simpler, cheaper and less time consuming that it was to Afghanistan or Chechnya. The journey can be organized through an ordinary travel agency, especially since the publication of a detailed guide (downloadable from the internet) on how to avoid the notice of international authorities and get to the Islamic State. While en route, the volunteer makes contact with the recruiters of the fighting groups (often this happens through acquaintances who are already in the combat zone, or just returned from there). The group that eventually accepts him will manage his further career.

3. During the third phase (training and combat) the volunteer becomes an experienced jihadist fighter. In the training camps team spirit develops in the callow youths, the brutality of combat tempers them, and they acquire some useful skills. Those volunteers who survive become members of an international jihadist network, and they return home with firm ideological convictions.

4. In phase four the volunteer returns to his original environment, where he is received with much respect, because he fought “in the way of Allah.” Due to the prestige and credibility he has acquired in combat he can start others on the path to radicalization.

5. In the last phase the jihadist gradually turns away from the distant battlefield and begins to focus on grievances and injustice at home: the statements of politicians and opinion shapers that insult Islam, the foreign forces that support the oppression of Muslims, the prejudice against Muslims. In order to avenge these injuries he begins to plot terrorist operations at home.


32 The Islamic State has grown out of the „terrorist“ category long ago: it controls a contiguous territory with a stable population, provides state services (education system, health services), performs state functions (public administration, justice), and collects taxes. Undoubtedly the standard of these functions and services – partly as a result of Salafist ideology, and partly due to limited financial resources – is often medieval. Nevertheless, it is a mistake to label IS as a large terrorist organization with some real estate, because it is far more – and far more dangerous – than that.
The problem of the returning foreign fighters causes deep (and fully justified) anxiety in the national security, law enforcement, and anti-terrorist organizations of the western world. For one thing, the sheer number of foreign volunteers\textsuperscript{33} is a problem even if their return home is just a slow trickle: returning individually or in small groups they have little difficulty avoiding official attention, and once they are at home, they can disappear in the Muslim communities of Europe or the United States.

Precisely these Muslim communities are a big part of the problem: uncommunicative and closed, they are huge haystacks in which the jihadists are the tiny needles. The communities welcome the returning mujahedeen with respect, they offer him sanctuary and support, and respond to the inquiries of the authorities with uncomprehending silence. In the Balkan states endemic corruption is a further protective mechanism: as little as 50 to 100 Euros may be enough to have the local authorities turn a blind eye to the returnees. This protective and permissive environment can be a hotbed for radicalization: for every returning jihadist there are fifty, or a hundred, or a thousand envious young Muslims who so far have only dreamed about fighting in the way of Allah.\textsuperscript{34} They can be easily inspired (or manipulated) by stories of heroism, self-sacrifice and camaraderie. The returnees can also put their dangerous skills into the service of their dangerous ideology at any time: they can organize, motivate and train small groups of their followers for terrorist attacks, or they can themselves carry out a lone-wolf operation against which the authorities are generally powerless.

In this latter respect the Balkan returnees represent a somewhat lesser threat than the French, British or Belgians, because they cannot enter travel freely throughout Europe. This does not mean that the national security organizations of Europe, and especially those of Hungary,\textsuperscript{35} do not have to pay attention to the Balkans. On the contrary: as visa requirements for citizens of the Balkan states are gradually eased the terrorist threat from the Balkans is likely to increase. Thus, Hungary, as well as the rest of Europe, has a chance, which will not last long, to prepare for the next terrorist wave – and prepare better than for the previous ones.

The first, most important – and perhaps most difficult – step of this preparation is political-ideological: the doctrines of boundless multiculturalism and political correctness must be rejected: the principles of respect for personal religious convictions and practice must be paired with the rigorous enforcement of secularism in the public sphere. Europe’s political and intellectual elites must face the fact that in many cases the local Muslim communities act as the enablers of terrorists: they provide (either willingly or due to coercion) the jihadist fighters with contacts, sanctuary and local infrastructure. This does not make every Muslim a potential terrorist – indeed, such an attitude on the part of the host society would drive all Muslims into the arms of the true terrorists. However, it does mean that the deferential treatment of the Muslim communities by the national authorities must come to an end. They must be made to realize that they cannot have it both ways – they cannot claim exceptionalism based on religion and abrogate their responsibilities when members of the community commit horrendous crimes. They must become part of the national body politic, live up to their responsibilities and not only enjoy the access to public goods, but also

\textsuperscript{33} The number of western volunteers fighting in the ranks of the Islamic State is somewhere between 2,000 and 4,000., Byman and Shapiro. \textit{Be Afraid. Be A Little Afraid}, 9., 11.

\textsuperscript{34} Byman and Shapiro, \textit{Be Afraid. Be A Little Afraid}. 9-11.

\textsuperscript{35} Due to the country’s geographic proximity to the Balkan states, as well as to Muslim (Ottoman) suzerainty in the 16th and 17th centuries Hungary is likely to become a target of Islamist terrorists sooner or later.
accept the burdens of citizenship, cooperate with law enforcement and cast out from themselves those who attack the host society.

Actually, the uncritical application of multiculturalism and political correctness has been more of a European than a Hungarian (or east European) problem. In the first place, most Hungarians, and perhaps most east Europeans, are deeply sceptical of these doctrines or reject them outright, and in the second, the Muslim communities are fairly small in these countries. However, as member states of the European Union, they cannot entirely disregard the views of the political and intellectual elite in the rest of Europe.

Immediately after this – and closely coupled with the first step – come legal and administrative steps. Strengthening the immigration control and border protection mechanisms on the periphery of the European Union, as well as within the member states, is only part of this picture. A crucially important part is a legal review: do the laws allow or hinder the swift neutralization of terrorists (whether foreign-born or home-grown, whether they operate as part of a team or as lone wolves)? Does the court system deal with terrorism offenses as strictly as society expects?

In asymmetric conflicts strategic communication is one of the most important factors – far more important, than battlefield successes. The non-state opponent understands this much better than the organs of the state, which are often hindered by bureaucracy, careerism and political correctness (again). In the interest of success the main communication themes (messages) supporting the European authorities’ intended response to the Balkan terrorist threat must be worked out. The most suitable communication channels and key communicators must also be identified well in advance. A further aspect of the strategic communication category is the psychological preparation of the citizens to the possibility (or likelihood) of a terrorist attack.

The driving force behind the successful resolution of every asymmetric conflict is the flow of accurate, timely, and actionable intelligence. Although it may be a repulsive idea to keep fellow citizens under surveillance based on their religious convictions, it is essential to recruit informant networks in the Muslims communities, which can serve as timely warning systems. Intelligence officers, fluent in the Balkan languages, able to move in Balkan society without arousing suspicion, and familiar with Salafist doctrines are also needed. Since it takes at least a year of very intensive study to acquire fluency in a Slavic language, there is no time to lose – preparations must start now. Intelligence coverage of the Muslim communities of the Balkans and thorough knowledge of the potential opponent’s language and ideology offer the Hungarian national security services the opportunity to meet the intelligence organizations of other nations as equals: when it comes to information exchange and joint operations, they will be able to make a positive contribution.

In sum, the threat from the Balkans is real, and affects Hungary, as well as the rest of Europe. There is no reason to be afraid of it – or rather, fear must be suppressed: fear means that the terrorist (without executing a single operation) is one step closer to his goal, the breaking of society’s will. There is good reason to pay close attention to the threat, and make full use of the months (or perhaps 1-2 years) to prepare, before the attention of terrorists is turned to Hungary.
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ABSTRACT: While assessing the level of security threats and researching the possibly increasing social tensions across Europe, we often concentrate on economically and politically leading states, even if the stability of the global system and the region’s safety depend on smaller or medium sized countries as well. Even though the Austrian answer to today’s tendencies – such as the migration wave of the recent years, the progress of radical Islamic groups and their successful recruitment – is the enhanced presence of law enforcement units and the introduction of corresponding legislation, the danger of radicalization itself and the inflow of international terrorism is still a challenge for the government. During the current migration crisis – originating mostly in the instability of the Middle East and some African regions – Austria mainly counts as a transit state, but along and after the Yugoslav crisis, major Austrian cities, such as Vienna, Linz or Graz were destinations for Bosnian migrants. Individuals from Bosnia and Herzegovina established several local Muslim communities – inter alia – in the abovementioned cities, which are still existing and operating today, providing a basis for Muslim migrants arriving in the country. The linked security threats, however, are requiring both local and national governments to give a comprehensive solution of these separate units, frequently questioning the positive effects of the inflow of workforce or the migration’s purely humanitarian point of view. This study aims to point out the deficiencies in integration of these Muslim communities, to highlight the influence of radicalized Bosnian individuals and terrorist cells in Austria, and aims to draw attention to the global connections between the radicalized Austrian units and terror organizations, thereby to present Austria’s level of security and mention some possible reactions to the endangering factors of current stability.

KEYWORDS: Austria, Islam, Yugoslav crisis, Bosnian radicalization, Islamic State, Vienna Wahhabis, Abu Tejma

INTRODUCTION – REMNANTS OF THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS

To be able to feature the risks of the radicalization in Austria, we first need to examine the regional consequences of the Yugoslav crisis, as the Bosnian Muslims who took part in the fighting were strengthened by foreign and local fundamentalists. Most of the immigrants in Bosnia and Herzegovina arrived militarily trained from states with Islamic majority, and there were several among them, who were dedicated to jihad, experienced fighting even in their states of origin.¹ Their number is between 300 and 1,700 but some studies suggest even

higher rates.\textsuperscript{2} The individuals arriving from the Middle East were followed by financial and technical support which reached the Balkans through Islamic aid organizations, as personal donations, or different, hardly traceable economical transactions.\textsuperscript{3} Favoring the radical groups, a concentration process started in many Bosnian settlements, which eventually resulted in cities with Muslim majorities or even homogenized Muslim communities. These areas, separating from the central government, built out a self-administration system based on the sharia law. The identification of these cities\textsuperscript{4} is also important in the case of Austria, taking that these radicalized areas can easily be the roots for those who are receptive enough to follow the teachings of radical imams, or the extreme ideology of some Muslim communities may result in potentially violent behavior.\textsuperscript{5} The uncontrolled migration of individuals liaising with the Al-Qaeda or other terrorist organizations\textsuperscript{6} from Bosnia to Western Europe after the Yugoslav crisis is an even bigger problem for Austria than the local engagement of Mujahedeen in the conflict, because it could easily result in setting up potential forward bases in Austria to spread the radical views (or even building and activating further Islamic cells in Europe.)

Similarly to surrounding countries, Austria also faced a large-scale immigration from Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995.\textsuperscript{7} Austria hosted the third biggest mass of asylum seekers from Bosnia-Herzegovina after Germany (320,000 individuals) and Sweden (90,000 individuals).\textsuperscript{8} In the examined period, 95,000 people arrived in the country, of whom after a four-year integration period\textsuperscript{9} 10,000 moved to Western Europe,
another 10,000 returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the remaining 70,000 received a long term residence permit and access to the Austrian labor market.10

CURRENT PROCESSES

Considering the global processes, the number of Bosnian migrants in 2010 was 1.4 Million (this means 38.9% of all migrants)11, in the same year, their main destinations were Germany and Austria. According to statistics from 2014, 386,000 migrants settled in Austria in the given time period (in 2014), which is about 22% of the whole Austrian population.12 This highlights the fact that the country is no longer a transit state while Hungary remained as such until today. In 2015, an amount of 88,000 individuals filed refugee applications.13

The social acceptance of Bosnian minority is proven by the fact that the square in front of the Austrian Bosnian Cultural Centre in Wels got named „Trg Bosnjaka“, Bosnian Square. Beside of members of the local Bosnian minority and provincial assemblies also magistrates of the Islam community, like Husein Kavazovic, Bosnian mufti, Mustafa Ceric, President of the Bosnian World congress, or Muammer Zukorlic, leader of the Serbian Islamic community participated at the grand opening. In their speeches they claimed the square is a symbol of recognition and appreciation of Austria toward Bosnian people who had suffered a lot during the last century, besides it represents the gratitude for those Bosnian soldiers who helped to win back the freedom of Austria.14

According to data from 2015, there are 155,000 Bosnian migrants living in Austria.15 Similarly to other countries, the migration rates are leading to a growing Muslim minority, which already takes up to 6-7% of the population.16 The Bosnian Muslim Community of Austria (Islamska Zajednica Bosnjaka u Austriji), located in Vienna, is running 25 official mosques along the country.17 The biggest Bosnian communities are located in the cities of Graz, Linz, Wels, as well as Salzburg, Villach and Vienna.18 Beside these cities a further Muslim group can be found in Meidling, which was connected to fundamentalist (mostly

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17 Islamska zajednica Bosnjaka u Austriji – IZBA website, http://izba.at/
Wahhabist\(^{19}\) organizations through the local radical imam, Abu Tejma’s network. The jihadist unit in Meidling worked in close cooperation with other radical groups in Vienna, which also proves the complex construction of the Austrian radicalism.

Even though there is no statistical data, how many of the abovementioned 70,000 migrants arriving to Austria under the Yugoslav crisis were radical, this analysis aims to prove that members of different terror organizations indeed managed to get through the security control before, and not only obtained citizenship, but also gained an advantage to sustain connection between European cells and terror groups by focusing on three main issues:

1. Introduction of planned or executed terror attacks of individuals, attempts to assist or support terror organizations by „lone wolves”\(^{20}\) of Bosnian origins, as well as mentioning first or second generation radicals of Bosnian origin in Austria.

2. Review of personal and financial basis of radical Islamic organizations operating in Austria, detecting their contacts to Bosnian cells or participants of terror groups with Bosnian origins.

3. Presenting propaganda or supporting processes that originate in Austria and aim to support Middle-Eastern radical organizations and their actions by various methods through Bosnian individuals, cells or connections (for example: foreign fighters, donor activity).

RADICALS OF BOSNIAN ORIGIN IN AUSTRIA

Even if the central government have not provided information on urgent threat, and also only \(17\%\)^{21} of the general public fears an eventual terror attack in Austria (in other studies this percentage can be up to \(40\%\))^\(^{22}\), a number of official studies had to highlight the importance of first- and second generation Muslim migrants and radical Bosnian migrants in the country. The influence of extremist groups demonstrably increased among the Muslim communities,\(^{23}\) this is also proven by the increasing number of travelers to Syria, which

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\(^{19}\) Wahhabism is a fundamentalist form of Islam mainly gaining followers in the Middle East and the Balkan. The gist of it is to enforce the studies of Coran in the most radical interpretation. Even though it is originated in Saudi-Arabia it is more determining in the Balkans now. Wahhabi center are located in the following regions: Serici, Zeljezno, Polje Pojska, Mehurici, Bocinja, Travnik, Gornja Maoca, Grmusa, Velika Kladusa and Debeljak villages. One of its more powerful actors is the radical Islamic organization called „Poziv u Raj” (Invitation to Heaven) operating in Bihac, Sanski Most, Maglaj, Zenica, Travnik, Tuzla, and Tesanj villages.


Europe has reached up to 300 individuals by 2015. Some sources mention another 70 individuals who are trying to make their way back from the front lines, most of them are of Chechen, Bosnian or Turkish origin.

In accordance with the global trends, the authorities manage to filter a growing number of individuals with terrorist backgrounds among migrants, before they could strengthen the bases of European radicalism. The enhanced law enforcement work is however not always enough to control every member of the arriving and settled segregated Muslim communities, which is why in many cases security breaches can only be detected when an extremist becomes active.

The tension between radical Muslims and the western governments and society could already be detected back in 2007, when on 1st October 42-year-old Bosnian Asim Cejvanovic tried to go through the security gate of the American Embassy in Vienna with an explosive charge in his backpack. Although he was not connected to any terror organizations, not even later on, his radical act was related to his war time experiences from the Yugoslav crisis. Cejvanovic’s mental instability was probably used by his Wahhabi neighbor of Bosnian origin, as he offered to pay Cejvanovic 20 Euros if he would successfully place the bomb inside the Embassy. Even if Cejvanovic is only a victim considering the actual terror plot both Bosnian men were members of the extremist group called the Vienna Wahhabis and were also connected to the later mentioned Muhhamed Porca.

The conversion of radical Muslims in Austria can also be traced back to a radical imam, to the earlier mentioned Mirsad Omerovic (aka Abu Tejma), who was born in Tutin, Serbia. In the area bordering Montenegro, the Sandzak region, a large number of Muslim Bosnians are settled, who are known to be concentrated in highly radical settlements (like the towns of Tutin, Novi Pazar, Sjenica or Prijepolje). The town of Tutin – besides Gjorna Maoca – is one of the most radical centers of Wahhabism in the Balkans. Between 2002 and 2008, Omerovic travelled to Mecca with a Saudi-financed scholarship, where he assumedly learnt about radicalism, built his connections to the Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. As he returned to Bosnia, he started to preach and recruit in the name of radical Islam. He settled in Austria with his wife and six children, and worked as the preacher (and radical leader) of the Altun Alem Mosque in Meidling. Tejma recruited most of the foreign fight-

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ers from Austria to Syria. His family currently lives in Vienna. The second center of the spreading radicalism in Austria is the Sahaba/Al-Tawhid Mosque, led by Muhamed Porca, at 61 Murlingengasse Vienna. Porca, a fundamentalist and recruiter was also the leader of the Wahhabi group in Vienna until his imprisonment in 2007. The recruitments of Vienna and Meidling are expanded by Safet Kuduzovic, the leader of the Bosnian Salafi group in Linz (Bosnian Salafist Kewser Dzemati) who urged on radicalization in his speeches as well as online, through the site of Studio-din. Husein Bilal Bosnic, former fighter among the Mujahideen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, also participated in the propaganda, he travelled to Austria to recruit, and widen his extremist beliefs many times.

In March 2016 the Austrian authorities captured also 49-year-old Fikret Begic of Bosnian origin (he moved from Konjic to Graz), a recruiter of the Islamic State, who also planned to join the fighting forces in Syria himself.

The case of 15-year-old Sabina Selimovic and one year older Samra Kesinovic was in the spotlight of the media for a long time. Their story also proved the instability of the Muslim minority of Bosnian origins. The two girls were recruited and strengthened in the ideology by Abu Tejma, which resulted in a planned trip to Syria in April 2014 so that they could participate in the fight by marrying members of the Islamic State. Both of them were born in Bosnia. Evidence also claims that Abu Tejma sent the young women to the frontline through the cell in Vienna. Both of them lived in Rakka until their death in 2015.

While encountering the radical Bosnian individuals, we have to take into consideration the role of radical Bosnian centers. As the most fundamentalist settlers, we can mention Gornja Maoca, Seici, Zeljezno, Polje Pojska, Mehirici, Bocinja, Velika, Kladusa and Debeljak, as well as Bihac, Sanski Most, Maglaj, Zenica, Travnik, Tuzla and Tesanj Pogo, cities of Reliva and Osve. The local Bosnian fighters joining the forces in Syria were mostly recruited by Nusret Sulejman Imamovic, a Sunni leader of the city, who is presently fighting along the Al-Nusra Front.

Concentrating on these fundamentalist black spots’ migrants and with increased monitoring of their background and networks, we may filter some of the radicals arriving in Western countries. For example, Nedzad Balkan (aka Ebu Muhamed) is originated from Gornja Maoca (where he used to teach Wahhabi views at the local school)
and travelled a lot between Vienna and the Bosnian radical village, along with Wahhabi and Salafi Ened Muhovic, Sabahudin Fljuljanin, Nevzudin Bajraktarevic and Sulejman Delic. All of them are connected to the spread of Bosnian fundamentalism and built relations between Vienna and terror organizations in the Middle East.40

Alen Rizvanovic, the designer of the terror attack on 20th June 2015 in Graz, was born in Bihac. As a follower of Wahhabi and Salafi ideology, he proved his commitment towards fundamentalist groups with an action resulting in 3 dead and 36 injured.41

Spreading fundamentalism at an international level, keeping up the commitment of already activated individuals, and building and stabilizing the network between actors, groups and cells are tasks for the recruiting imams and central propagandists like the reviewed Abu Tejma. Through this method, organizations are able to use radicalized Bosnians to initiate new cells in Western Europe, while the increased level of unchecked migration may lead to the boom in newly-established fundamentalist Muslim communities. The cases of the radicalized Bosnians in Austria shall prove that maintaining security requires stricter background checks for individuals coming from settlements with radical leaders when travelling to the West. Also, in order to limit their ability to persuade instable youth, local integration mechanisms of first and second generation of migrants are needed. Combining official programs with broadened open dispute about the aspects of radicalization may help in decreasing the number of radical Islam’s foreign followers.

ADVANCEMENT OF GLOBAL TERROR ORGANIZATIONS IN AUSTRIA

The importance of the advancement of the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda in terms of Bosnia was already confirmed in the earlier chapter of this paper, but besides the two reviewed mosques (Altun Alem Mosque and the Sahaba/Al-Tawhid Mosque) and many recruiters it is also of great significance to mention the organizations which serve as bases for the Middle Eastern and African terror groups in Europe, by building radical centers for these communities. In 2007 Mustafa Ceric, leader of Bosnian Islamic communities, declared that there are many terror groups with Islamic backgrounds in Vienna, which due to their connections are already wide spread in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well.42 This seems to be confirmed through the actions of Mevlid Jasarevic, who was radicalized by the group of Muhamed Porca in Vienna. He performed an attack on the American Embassy in Sarajevo in November 2011.

Fundamentalism in Austria is not entirely caused by the successful propaganda of the Islamic State and the Al-Qaeda. In the last decades, in accordance with global trends, the authorities had to face many diversified assault attempts in Austria. Even though the mentioned organizations are mostly in the spotlight of the media, many other groups, like Hamas, are trying to gain ground in the country.43 In July 2014 the Austrian Court of Justice had to

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recognize the presence of the Al-Shabaab terror group, as an Austrian citizen was sentenced to prison for participating in radical military trainings in Africa.\footnote{44} Some researchers assume that through hardly traceable financial support of the Muslim Brotherhood, or financial aids from Saud-Arabia, the radicalization of the next generation starts in moderate Muslim kindergartens or elementary schools.\footnote{45}

Beside the ‘Bosnian Salafi Kewser Dzemat’ unit, led by Safet Kuduzovic, we have to mention the influence of the ‘Vienna Wahhabis’ organization (led by Mirsad Omerovic, seated in Vienna), that played an important role in arranging and uniting the radical Muslims of Bosnian origin and then sending about 160 of them to the front lines in Syria.\footnote{46} Another radical organization that is uniting fundamentalist Austrians of Bosnian origin is the Poziv u Raj (Invitation to Heaven).\footnote{47} The Bosnian connections are supposedly deeper with this organization, taking that it was founded in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that its operations are mainly located there, Austria in this case may be mentioned as an ‘outsourced center’. The Vienna-based Kelimetul Haqq organization should also be mentioned, where Bosnian and Serbian Muslims provide the majority of the followers. This organization openly supports the Al-Takfir w’al-Hijra radical group (which can be connected to the Muslim Brotherhood and the Al-Qaeda) with online videos and radical Islamic propaganda.\footnote{48} According to data of the Combating Terrorism Center, many radical Bosnians joined the war in the Middle East through Austria\footnote{49}, this way they could not only reduce their traceability but for a limited amount of time they could enjoy the hospitality of radical centers in Austria.

**AUSTRIAN DONOR ACTIVITY**

While analyzing the growth of terrorism, not only its physical appearance or the active engagement of the radical communities should be reviewed, but there should be some light shed on the economic background and also on the influence of present propaganda and recruitment. Many sources prove that the Bosnian connections are also playing an important role in this process by helping radical Austrians participate in and support extremist organizations. In the last couple of years many sources confirmed that foreign donors with Bosnian connections support radical groups by financial means through Austrian institutes.\footnote{50}

The organization with mostly Chechen and Bosnian members, led by Mirdads Omerovic, also proves the existence of such transactions. The Vienna Wahhabis also functioned as a

logistical and financial center, offering support for different terrorist organizations (through its leading connections with the Islamic State), and it served as a connecting factor between Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the European cells.\textsuperscript{51} Omerovic himself also participated in the financial support of radical Islam. Through the organization called True Religion Salafi (Die Wahre Religion), together with Abu Dujana and Abu Abdullah, he not only took part in the anti-western propaganda but also travelled throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina many times and donated money to Middle Eastern Salafi purposes (like the organization Poziv u Raj).\textsuperscript{52}

Ayadi Shafiq Ben Mohamed, leading member of the Tunisian wing of the Al-Qaeda (AQIM in Tunisia) also had an Austrian and Bosnian citizenship, although he was of Tunisian origin. According to evidence, Shafiq supported many terror organizations through his Muwafaq Fund in Austria.\textsuperscript{53}

The Bosnian Islamic community already drew the attention of Austrian authorities to the individual donors and hidden transactions. They highlighted the work of Adnan Buzar, a Bosnian born Wahhabi imam living in Austria. He is related to the Palestinian Sabri al-Banna (aka Abu Nidal), who was one of the most feared terrorists in the 1980’s. Al-Banna died in 2002 whilst fighting in Iraq.\textsuperscript{54} Further evidence against the imam is that with Porca he was connected to the Wahhabi members of the al-Tawhid Mosque. The two men supported the Bosnian born Jusuf Barcic’s Wahhabi community in Bocinje not only with propaganda but also with monetary donations. Barcic’s group members were mostly Mujahedeen of Arabian origins who earlier fought in the Muslim forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Barcic also used to be a deputy of Zenica in the International Islamic Relief Organization (IGASA), which is located in Vienna. The organization was supposedly connected to Saudi-Arabian donors who would support the growth of the Wahhabi ideology on the Balkan Peninsula in many proven ways.\textsuperscript{55}

Beside the traceable transactions, the flow of financial means can also be detected between the two countries. A ‘supply route’ was built in the 1990s with an agreement, leading from Austria through Maribor, Slovenia, Split, Croatia to the Bosnian fighting areas.\textsuperscript{56} A proof of the connection is the arrest of Muhamed Rustempasic in October 2009 at the Bosnian border, who was caught transferring a supply of weapons along the route of Germany-Austria-Bosnia.

and Herzegovina while openly supporting radical units. Later on, his brother, in the company of three Mujahedeen, was also accused of terrorism and got arrested.57

The largest financial deal between the two states was carried out by the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA), located in Vienna. The transactions of the company were disclosed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).58 According to their research, between 1992 and 1995 the organization led by Elfatih Hassanein (aka Al-Fatih Ali Hassanein)59 donated over 2.5 billion dollars for the stabilization of Bosnia, out of which, 175 million dollars were spent on weapon transfers.60 These transactions are an even more complex issue after the end of the Yugoslav crisis, since the uncounted amount of equipment may easily flow across borders to the turbulent Middle-East.

Among the donations of Austrian institutes to Bosnia – we have to add, that in many cases, financial assets were only transferred through Austria, they originated mostly in Middle Eastern and African Muslim organizations (mainly from Saudi-Arabia, Iran and Pakistan) – some amounts of money can be traced back to connections with Al-Qaeda.61 According to experts, the volume of aids from Austria to Bosnia reached the amount of 500-800 million dollars between 1994 and 1995.62 Using the same network, further questionable processes functioned in the region, for example, during and after the Yugoslav crisis the Bosnian Embassy in Austria issued at least 300 official Bosnian passports to migrants out of Muslim countries, without any special obligations or criteria.63

Austria is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which aims to spot the financial supporters of terrorism by detecting the donors and freezing their accounts, as well as creating laws and documents that criminalize such actions (for example the use of untraceable financial transactions through NGOs to support radicalism). According to a FATF report of 2014, Austria passed the ‘Sanction Law’, which enables authorities to freeze accounts and to take further measures to fight terrorism.64

CONCLUSION

The relations of Austria and radicalism, as well as phenomenal changes in other Western countries became a central topic of studies. Even though social deficiencies do not primarily strengthen extremism, because of its strategic location and the widening Middle Eastern and Bosnian connections in the past decades, Austria has to handle the issue of the spreading radical Muslim ideology. The Western states are linked to Bosnia and Herzegovina through many proven examples of global terrorism, considering both micro- or macro-sized attacks, for example, executed attacks or terror plots, organizations and communities under the leadership of radical Bosnian imams, or the international financial transactions tracing back to Bosnia. This study reviewed how Austrian cells are backed by fundamentalists or members of associations of Bosnian origin. Considering the available information, we can claim, that their aims can be sorted into three main categories:

- Propaganda movements against Western states and their interests, recruitment, radicalization. In this case, the fundamental imams arriving from radical Bosnian areas (or getting educated or trained in Saudi-Arabia or other Muslim states), their activity and persuasion are of great significance. For instance, we can mention the influence of Mirsad Omerovic (Abu Tejma), who was able to expand the group of active followers of radical Islam with more than a hundred individuals in Austria.

- Securing the operation of Austrian cells by building and keeping connections and raising financial and personnel assets. In the process of recruitment, the communities run by the imams, and also foreign support are important. The construction of the organizations and the commitment of their members, such as the Vienna Wahhabis or Poziv u Rai, are clearly affected by the ideologies originating in Bosnia, and the motivation of global terrorist groups (such as the Islamic State or Al-Qaeda) sweeping through radical individuals or Bosnian cells.

- Money and weapon transfer crossing borders, transport of foreign fighters to the Balkans or the Middle East, in which companies as the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA) based in Vienna, or the International Islamic Relief Organization (IGASA) had a significant role by keeping the processes of supporting radicals between Austria and Bosnia Herzegovina undetectable.

There is a robust conflict in the relations between Austria and its Muslim minority, which seems to be difficult to ease, even though the legal changes of the last couple of years were correspondent to that situation. In addition to the increased international actions and the higher level of general security measures, Austrian law enforcement authorities are trying to fight radicalism with an enhanced presence and border security, and by raids both in Austria and Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to filter out potential or proven supporters of the Islamic State or those of any other terror organization.\(^{65}\) It is the question of the future

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whether their complex work will be sufficient to handle the international problem of extremism at least at a state level.

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FITNA RISING: THE SUNNĪ-SHI‘Ī CLASHES IN WESTERN EUROPE

ABSTRACT: This paper aims to present the recent clashes between Sunnīs and Shi‘a in the UK, which brought the Sunnī-Shi‘ī divide in Europe into the public attention as a potential threat to social cohesion. While these clashes could be considered, for the time being, as low intensity conflicts, the situation could change in the near future: the increasing number of Shi‘a in Europe and the escalating conflicts between Sunnīs and Shi‘a in the Middle East, fuelled by the Sunnī radicalisation on the rise and the expansion of Shi‘a networks, could involve Muslims in Europe in a confrontation. Other incidents in the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium attest to rising Sunnī-Shi‘ī sectarianism in Europe.

KEYWORDS: Sunnī, Shi‘a, sectarian conflict, radicalisation, Europe, fitna(sedition)

INTRODUCTION

Sectarianism is not a new phenomenon in Europe. Suffice it to refer the reader to Yugoslavia, which collapsed because of sectarianism leading to disastrous wars and crimes against humanity. However, the Sunnī-Shi‘ī sectarianism brings two particularities of sectarian violence into Europe. On the one hand, Muslim societies failed to secularize and build modern nations, and Sunnī-Shi‘ī sectarianism is but a symptom of this failure. In particular, Middle Eastern societies are interwoven with traditional ethno-religious identities, and the geopolitical opposition between Iran and Saudi Arabia profits from these internal divisions and pushes them to the extreme implications. On the other hand, some immigrant communities who live in visible and invisible ghettos in Europe maintain their traditional identities, reproduce religious, ethnic, social and political patterns, with the same religious rhetoric and around the same fault lines that exist in the Middle East. Moreover, immigrants are connected to transnational communities affected through media and personal links by the events and strategies of the states and actors involved in the Sunnī – Shi‘ī sectarianism.

The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we aim to identify the Sunnī-Shi‘ī clashes in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and the UK. Second, it is intended here to analyze the religious and political motivations behind the current clashes. Third, we illustrate the ongoing process from a less studied angle, highlighting the major venues of instrumentalising Shi‘ī identity by Iran. We argue that the ethno-religious-politics of the Middle East has direct impacts on the Sunnī-Shi‘ī divide in Western Europe, mirroring the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East. Importing and reproducing sectarianism in the already unstable European context severely reduces the chances of establishing the much desired social cohesion in European societies.
THE NETHERLANDS: A WAR OF WORDS

On 26 February 2006, Iraqi Shī’īa organized a manifestation in The Hague in front of the Dutch Parliament. The organizers described it as “a wave of tumultuous anger against the enemies of Shī’a and the disbelievers”\(^1\). At the manifestation the organisers read to the participants who came from the Netherlands and Belgium the declaration of al-Sistānī. This manifestation was a reaction to terrorist attacks in Iraq against Shī‘ī sanctuaries. However, the reaction of the Shī’a in the Netherlands actually imported the conflict to a peaceful European country, entangling Muslims in a vicious circle of violence. Diffusing the sectarian conflict in Iraq outside its geopolitical context, all the more that in the current circumstances it seems to be unsolved or unsolvable, is a psychological-political process that can be best expressed by the Arabic term fitna (sedition). It is through successive emotional reactions that sectarianism flourishes in Iraq, and elsewhere. Through the following statement, the organizers channelled Middle Eastern tension to the Netherlands:

The School of Ahl al-Bayt is the source of true Islam, which teaches us moderation and peace, love and goodness for all humanity, and this school is witnessing its history by calling for noble values and unity, tolerance and patience... The terrorists who committed the crime of the destruction of the sacred shrines of Imams proved with this heinous attack that they are not Muslims, although they claimed to belong to Islam and to be Muslims but Islam is innocent from them and they do not even belong to humanity, far from its values and principles. Therefore, we call upon the United Nations and the governments of the world and the institutions concerned to denounce this disgraceful crime strongly and help the Iraqi people, oppressed by all possible means in its response to terrorism and its quest to protect its children and their holy places... We announce from here our support for the blessed guidance in Najaf, led by the cleric Sayyed Ali al-Sistani, may he long live, and we call on our people, and our brothers in Iraq to abide by the guidance’s instructions and pay obedience and respect to him.\(^2\)

This declaration draws on some of the classic motifs of sectarianism: binary thinking (us and them), religious identities (Ahl al-Bayt), dehumanizing the others, loyalty to a charismatic figure involved in sectarian violence, etc. The importation and staging of these motifs increases the inevitable tensions between the Sunnīs and the Shī’a in the Netherlands. Recently, Yassin Elforkani a young Sunnī imam in Amsterdam confirmed the increasing tensions between the two communities in the Netherlands. He claims that “the growing differences between Sunnīs and Shī’a were intensified since the conflict in Syria has been going on (...) besides a theological difference, there is a political difference”.\(^3\) Both declarations, that of the Shī’a side and that of the Sunnī imam, fail to keep a distance from the Middle Eastern conflicts.

Another provocative and confusing manifestation has been organized by the Rotterdam Shī’a Muslim community against radicalization. Compared to the first manifestation the difference lies in Ḥussayn replacing al-Sistānī but the same manichaeism (Shī’a vs. salafism which is equalled with terrorism) and self-victimization are still central to the discourse.

\(^1\) Tażähura kabīra fī Hūlandā istinkārān li-jarīmat al-i’tidād ‘alā al-adriha al-muqaddasa fī Sāmarrā’ http://yazahra.org/1/samarraa/holland%20tadahora.htm
\(^2\) Idem.
\(^3\) “Jammer dat je een shi’iet bent” http://www.nrc.nl/handelsblad/2014/01/24/jammer-dat-je-een-shiiet-bent-1338210
Shiawaves, a Shi‘ī website, described the manifestation as follows:

The march was both in honor of Imam Hussein, peace be upon him, and in memory of the victims of terrorist attacks. The silent demonstrators marched from the Schouwburgplein, through the Hofplein, the Coolsingel and Meent and then back to where they started. By participating in such marches, demonstrators tried to distance themselves from Salafism. The demonstrators also marched for Imam Hussein, peace be upon him, whose ideology stand for justice, freedom, and equality.4

Demonstrating as Shi‘a, and not as Muslims, against radicalization is clearly a sectarian act and the underlying premise is that radicalization is a Sunnī problem. The march deliberately confuses past and present in order to extend the credit it mythically adduces to past (Hussayn) and present (current Shi‘a), thus presenting the Shi‘ī community peaceful while pointing at the Sunnīs as supporters of oppression and terrorism. This mythical selective-ness occults that Shi‘a political movements were the pioneers of Islamic radicalization in the eighties with Khumaynī, Ḥizbullāh, kidnapping westerners, committing suicide attacks and the aggressive sectarian policies of Iran. The self-victimization of Shi‘a as a minority is also a recurrent strategy: the same way Ḥussayn stood up against the injustice of the Umayyads (Sunnīs), the Shi‘a today have the legitimacy of fighting Sunnīs. It is implied also that Salafism and Sunnīs persecute the Shi‘a the same way the Umayyads oppressed Ḥussayn. The construction of the self as a victim is a well-known mechanism of perpetrators of crimes against humanity while, as it stands today, the Shi‘a are a majority in Iraq, supported by a Shi‘ī country, Iran, controlling most of the country with paramilitary groups conducting crimes against humanity. The parallel with Ḥussayn allows the Shi‘a ideologues and strategists to cover the extreme violence they are involved in both in Iraq and Syria. Sectarian movements construct false realities wrapped up in religious symbolism and linking past apprehensions to current politics in order to develop a strategy of radical change of borders and power balance.

BELGIUM: THE BURNT MOSQUE OF ANDERLECHT

On 12 March 2012, Rachid El Boukhari, a Moroccan of 35, living in neighbouring Belgium, set fire to the Reda mosque, located in the district of Anderlecht, Brussels. The fire caused the death of the imam of the Shi‘ī mosque, Abdellah Dahdouh, also of Moroccan descent, and led to the arrest of Rachid El Boukhari at the scene. The latter had explained his actions as “revenge against Shi‘ī Muslim leaders, he said, who committed crimes against Sunnī Muslims in Syria”.5 He made his decision to attack the mosque under the influence of images of the current situation in Syria broadcast by Arab media; as he put it, he “wanted to do something to scare the members of the Shi‘ī community which he considers responsible for the violence against Sunnīs in Syria.”6

6 “Mosquée Reda: Une haine qui brûle et qui tue” http://www.lalibre.be/actu/belgique/mosquee-reda-une-haine-qui-brule-et-qui-tue-51b8e72fe4b0de6db9c5d13e
This justification of the Sunnī-Shī‘ī conflict in Syria illustrates the fragility of borders between the Middle East and Europe once more. In Brussels the cafés and restaurants owned by Arabs constantly broadcast the violent manifestations of the Sunnī-Shī‘ī divide in the Middle East. In addition, both Iranian- and Saudi-backed websites spread hate speech in French. Above all, Sunnīs perceive the expansion of Shi‘ī propaganda among the Moroccan community as an aggression and treachery.

The Reda mosque is actually the Reda Cultural and Islamic Centre, founded in 1994. Beside its ritual function the Centre organizes conferences, offers religious courses and a social centre of the Shi‘ī community. The imam, Dahdouh converted in early 1980s, in the wave of the expansion of the Iranian Islamic revolution and Khumaynī’s propaganda. Dahdouh studied in Iran for several years. The discourse articulated by the Centre focuses on Ḥizbullah, religious nationalism, Khumaynism, and anti-Americanism. Members of the Centre manifest regularly in Brussels, carrying the flags of Ḥizbullah and Naṣrallah’s pictures.7

The jury of the Belgian court which judged Rachid El Boukhari declared him guilty with aggravating circumstance of homicide, sentenced him to 27 years, but acquitted him of the aggravating circumstance of terrorism. The jury stated that:

Terrorism is unfounded because it is not proven that the accused has seriously damaged Belgium or an international organization. Moreover, it does not appear that the accused is a religious fanatic. He is not a practicing Muslim and did not act on behalf of a particular ideology. He seems to have been inspired only by massacres in Homs in Syria, he saw on Al-Jazeera television channel.8

Isabelle (Soumaya) Praile, a high representative of Shi‘a in Belgium, being the only Shi‘ī member of the Muslim Executive of Belgium when the events happened, acknowledged the tensions between the two communities. However, she referred to the responsibility of Sunnī foreign imams who preach intolerance against other religious communities as the cause of the clash, accusing the growing influence of the Salafi trend, in Belgium, and calling the Executive and the authorities to reassure the Shi‘ī community.9 Praile asserted that “There is a strong sense of insecurity in the community and the attack on the Reda mosque can be a trigger of other incidents.”10

This attitude of victimization by the Shi‘a in Belgium cannot be sustained. If there is no clear separation from Iran’s or Ḥizbullah’s policies in the Middle East and the propaganda activities are not frozen, tensions will remain and other clashes are highly probable. The minister of the Interior J. Milquet was more prudent, compared to Praile, admitting that some Sunnī mosques that could be subject to retaliation for the death of Dahdouh were the subject of appropriate protective measures.11

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10 Idem.
11 Idem.
Conversations with the Sunnīs who live in the Muslim districts of Brussels and media reports show the aggressive campaign of converting Sunnī Moroccans to Shi‘ism. Independent Moroccan newspaper Assabah expressed deep concerns and spoke even of a “sweeping wave of shiittisation of Moroccans in Europe”\textsuperscript{12}. It estimates the number of Moroccan Shi‘a to 20,000 and the total number of Shi‘a in Belgium to 30,000, the majority of which live in Brussels.\textsuperscript{13} The two reasons of such active conversion are related to propaganda in favour of the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Shi‘ī da‘wa activities, through mainly associations, libraries and mosques.\textsuperscript{14} Sunnī Moroccans perceive this massive conversion as an act of destabilization of a community already fragile for social and economic reasons. It is also viewed as an infiltration to diminish the role of Morocco in Belgium and to increase the influence of Iran in Western Europe.

**GERMANY: ON BEING A SATELLITE**

The “Shi‘i Federation in Germany” (IGS) is the main organization of Shi‘a in Germany. It was founded in 2009, and represents the Shi‘ī communities of Iranian, Iraqi, Lebanese, Pakistani, Afghan, German and Turkish origins in Germany.\textsuperscript{15} In February 2015, it issued a statement expressing appreciation and gratitude to ‘Alī Khāmeneī and promised to transmit his message to both Muslims and non-Muslims in Germany. The statement reads as follows:

In the name of Allah the Merciful. Our peace and greetings to Your Eminence. Western nations recently received your bright and valuable letter, which is comparable to the Renaissance in Europe; for which the great thinkers and scientists in Europe fought for; that era that liberated peoples of the world from ignorance and perdition. The period of renaissance occurred thanks to the Muslims, and without them it could never been possible; your speech reminded us of this episode. We the peoples of Europe extend our sincere thanks to you for your great interest in our future and spiritual and social circumstances! Your concern for the generations living in very long distances from you and embracing different beliefs from yours shows how great you are and how extensive is your view about things! Today, as Muslims live in Europe in very difficult conditions, we would like to inform you that the Union of Shi‘a in Germany (IGS) is seeking on behalf of all the Shi‘a in this country to devote all its strength to remove suspicions about Islam, the religion of mercy and affection. We also try our best to get the support of political decision-makers in Germany to stop the extremist currents of racial discrimination against Muslims; and following the example of the Messenger of compassion Muhammad, we seek to promote unity between societies; your speech strengthened our resolve in this direction (…).\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{13} Idem.
\textsuperscript{16} Shi‘at Almāniyyā See: http://kayhan.ir/ar/news/14844
This statement shows clearly and overtly that the Shīʿī organization in Germany sees itself as a satellite of Iran’s supreme leader in Germany. Loyalty to Khāmeneī implies a series of important decisions: paying 20 percent of the income to him, which is a decent amount of Euros, providing information, appointing imams to the mosques who are faithful to Khāmeneī, supporting Iran’s policies, pressure on Germany, active propaganda, etc.

The support of Iran extends, naturally, to Ḥizbullah. In 2006 radical Shīʿa manifested against Germany’s support for the Israeli campaign against Ḥizbullah. In May 2014, radical young Shīʿites supporting Ḥizbullah opposed a manifestation against the regime in Syria, organised by Salafīs. The verbal violence of the young Shīʿa, well-showed in the video, illustrates their vulnerability toward the Shīʿī rhetoric of Iran and Ḥizbullah. Although Salafīs present themselves through sectarian ideology and acts by reacting violently, the Shīʿa display the same sectarian violence, and unveil the sectarian culture in which they are brought up, even if born and raised in Germany.

In Germany, the most important Shīʿī centre is The Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg (IZH, Islamic Centre in Hamburg). It is also a contact point for Shīʿī Muslims in Europe. Many other Iranian-backed facilities established in Berlin, Frankfurt am Main and Munich, are affiliated with the IZH. As the 2004 Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution by the Federal Ministry of the Interior of the Federal Republic of Germany says about the IZH: “It is the most active propaganda centre in Europe, providing a high-level point of contact to the highest spiritual revolutionary leader in Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei. The Iranian constitution envisages the world-wide spread of the so-called Iranian style Islamic system as founded by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 (…). The IZH is also the point of contact for Shiites from other countries, for example Turkey and Lebanon.”

According to the same report, Shīʿī propaganda actively uses the Internet. Thus Internet portal Muslim-Markt (www.muslim-markt.de) “is operated by Dr Yavuz Özoguz, a Shiite of Turkish descent. In connection with this activity he was given a three-month suspended prison sentence for incitement to hatred (…) Yavuz and Gürhan Özoguz, two brothers, revealed their close links to the Iranian Islamist government system in an interview in June, when they said that ‘only a theocracy has a true constitution’ and ‘Imam Khamenei instructs us’.”

Regarding Teheran’s hidden agendas realized through its Foundations such as the Ahlul Bayt, an earlier case back in 1992 is worth mentioning, when the assassination of four leaders of the Iranian Kurdish Democratic Party proved to be linked to the Imam ‘Ali mosque in Hamburg.

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18 See excerpts of these clashes in: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6PL7HWp21kw


20 Idem.

THE UK: VIOLENT DISORDER

Similarly to Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, the UK is the scene of three factors of clashes between Sunnis and Shi’a: the Shi‘ī active propaganda, the Middle Eastern context and acts of violence. Two figures of active Shi‘ī propaganda Sayed Ammar Nakshwani and Yasir al-Habib are worth mentioning here. Nakshwani, a Persian Iraqi, was well-known before 2014 for his violent speeches against “the enemies of Hussayn”, and has become even more famous as he has issued several videos against ISIS since 2014.22 Nakshwani’s provocative attacks on Sunnis led to a reaction from the other side. He left the UK, taking the Imam Ali Chair of Shi‘a Studies at Hartford Seminary in the USA. To justify this decision Nakshwani complained about death threats and acts of vandalism:

They would sometimes target my house and call me and say, ‘Hey rafidi, watch your back’. One time there was a call at midnight where they said your dad has gone out and we can see him at the supermarket. They had followed him and were watching him. (...) I made the decision to move to the US alone as I needed to get out and at least provide a safety net for my parents. The police didn’t really do anything — each time it was a case of ‘we will look into it’ (...) Most Sunnis are disgusted by ISIS and their actions but we have to ask serious questions of where this group has come from and which ideas have fed them.23

The very last sentence “Most Sunnis are disgusted by Isis and their actions but we have to ask serious questions of where this group has come from and which ideas have fed them” illustrates the false logic of sectarianism as in the last decade Nakshwani himself largely contributed to the sectarian setting in which young Shi‘a and Sunnis live in the UK. As a Shi‘ī leader’s, his statement is a clear accusation of Sunnism of being the hotbed of ISIS, which could only cause Sunnis to radicalize further. It is a sectarian argument against sectarianism. His moving to the United States with the same mind-set promises a bright future for sectarianism in the USA.

Another controversial and radical Shi’a preacher Yasir al-Habib, from Kuwait and based in London, exemplifies the high risks of sectarianism in the UK. Al-Habib sparked a controversy against ʾĀ’isha, Muḥammad’s wife, a highly respected figure of Sunnism, leading him to disputes in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. He opened a mosque recently named al-Muhassin in Buckinghamshire. Some of his declarations state that the Prophet Muḥammad was assassinated by his wives, ʾĀ’isha and Ḥafṣa, and companions, Abū Bakr and ʿUmar24. Consequently, Sunnis accuse al-Habib of being a “hate preacher” who makes ludicrously blasphemous remarks”.25 Here is an example of al-Habib’s ḥiṭna, calling to celebrate the death of ʾĀ’isha:

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22 See for example his violent video: The Origins of ISIS https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=orxVODpOL6s
23 Sectarian hatred at the heart of British Muslim community http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/faith/article4527003.ece
24 Meet the Controversial Cleric Threatening to Turn UK Muslims Against Each Other https://www.vice.com/en_uk/read/meet-the-controversial-shia-cleric-bringing-sectarian-tension-to-the-uk
When it was announced that Margaret Thatcher was dead, there were hundreds of people across the UK who celebrated her death, threw street parties and rejoiced over the news... We will [also] take such an event as a chance to present our case against Aisha, who we have evidence poisoned the Prophet. But it will not shift on the street level from our part and you may take that as a solemn commitment from us.26

Nakshawani and al-Habib entertain a political imaginary the consequence of which is violence. Thus, a group of salafis led by Anjem Choudary organized a protest in London against the Shi‘a’s support for the Syrian regime, leading to fights between Shi‘i individuals and salafis in the Shi‘i neighbourhood of Edgware Road. This incident was described as the “first case of Muslim sectarian violence in Britain”27 and the involved group of salafis was sentenced for “violent disorder”.28 The British press narrated the clash as follows:

That afternoon Mohammed El-Hariri, a Shia Muslim who has run a business in the area for 12 years, was walking along Edgware Road on his way to meet his friend, Fahad Fahad. He noticed a large group dressed in Islamic salafi dress. They were protesting against Shia Muslims, chanting sectarian slogans and carrying inflammatory banners. The banners were in Arabic and contained phrases including ‘Shias are unbelievers’ and ‘Shia will destroy Islam and Muslims.’ Other banners condemned Alawites, the Shi‘i denomination of the Syrian leader, Bashar Al-Assad. Mr El-Hariri started to talk to one of the group of protesters - in particular Horner, who he described as a white male with a shaved head and a ginger beard. As he did so he was attacked while another man poured water on him. He was then punched repeatedly by other members of the group...

Sectarianism is not caused by such clashes; it is a political-religious culture and action in which members of both communities dwell permanently. As a matter of fact, the idea of a “Shi‘i area in London”, is a symptom of sectarianism and the fact that the political tensions and conflicts of the Middle East appear in the streets of European capitals, questions the whole political culture of many immigrants who reside in Europe. Sectarian rhetorical violence lies at the heart of modern Shi‘ism and Salafism and creates conditions for escalating clashes. Additionally, sectarian identities, being primary among many Sunnis and Shi‘is, prevent any serious process of integration as European citizens.

IRAN AND THE SHI‘I SECTARIANISM IN EUROPE

The above mentioned examples attest to how Iran attempts to realize its political ambitions in the European context. Among security experts, there is consensus with regard to acknowledging that Iran uses Shi‘i Islam as a political instrument.29 However, regarding Teheran’s intentions, there are two opposing views: that it takes advantage of the actual political

26 Idem.
27 Radical Sunni Islamists face jail for attack on group of Shi’ites ‘in first case of Muslim sectarian violence in Britain’ http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2662726/Radical-Sunni-Islamists-face-jail-attack-group-Shiites-case-Muslim-sectarian-violence-Britain.html
28 Idem.
developments, which implies some degree of passivity, or that it – directly and actively – generates them. In our evaluation, the political use of confessional identities in itself – either as an action or as a reaction – is the chief source of conflict import that restrains Muslims in a vicious circle in their European country of residence.

Considering the venues of instrumentalising Shi‘ī identity we can identify 3 major areas:

1. Da‘wa, that is proselytising among Sunni Muslims in Europe;
2. Recruitment among local (European) Shi‘a for militias in the Middle East;
3. Importing the political conflicts (e.g. those of Syria, Iraq and the Gulf) by protesting with confessional slogans and by presenting themselves as natural allies against terrorism merely due to their Shi‘ī identity as a minority.

These fields, however, are interconnected. In the aftermath of the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the export of the ideology of the victorious Shi‘ī political Islam took various forms, among them proselytising among Sunni immigrants in Europe. It was considered as an instrument of al-madd al-shī‘ī (the Shi‘ī expansion) because it did not simply mean a change of rites but that of political allegiance.30

The large scale establishment of Shi‘ī mosques, schools, charity organisations and cultural centres started after the death of Khumaynī as part of a new, more tactful political and diplomatic strategy known as the siyāsat-i dast-i gol (policy of a handful of flowers).31 Iran is concerned with the preservation of a distinct Shi‘ī identity even in the remotest places, conducting in this regard an intensive theological-political da‘wa. A key actor in this enterprise is the al-Majma‘ al-‘ālamī li ahl al-bayt (The World Association for the People of the House of the Prophet), in addition to TV channels such as al-Manār (Lebanese) or al-‘Ālam (Iranian), and the Internet, all of which became instruments of spreading the Shi‘ī world view and the political messages of Tehran. Another organization, the Imam al-Khū‘ī Foundation, which is particularly active in the U.S. and Great Britain, received a General Advisory Status to the United Nations in 1997.32

Due to the developments in global and regional politics and in the changing climate from 2003 on, Teheran’s ambitions became more assertive.33 This means more explicit, politically loaded preaching, and even launching calls to action. In this framework the primarily non-political establishments became centres of political agitation and even recruitment.

Currently the European Ahlul Bayt organisation is one of the factors in maintaining the informal ties between prominent Shi‘ī organisations across Europe.34 Additional factors include: the transnational character of Shi‘ism, the emulation of various marāji‘a located in places distant from one’s country of residence, the highly emotional character of Shi‘ī religiosity, self-victimisation and identification with the oppressed. All these factors provide a fertile ground for a strategy of Iranian infiltration. This strategy uses the Shi‘ī communities residing in whatever corner of the world to realise Iran’s political ambitions and to hinder a serious and strategic co-operation among Muslims against terrorism.

The tendency to put in the foreground a sectarian Shi‘ī rhetoric loaded with stirred emotions and historical references is well exemplified by the call to action that appeared

30 Puelings, 31.
31 Puelings, 16.
32 Puelings, 33.
33 Puelings, 17.
on the website of the *Ahlul Bayt Islamic Mission* in 2014 following the attack of Samarra by the ISIS. The text refers to a statement by ‘Alī al-Sistānī. However, it significantly distorts the original message that avoided the use of sectarian expressions or ideas. (The highlights are kept from the original.):

Takfiri terrorists attacked the city of Samarra targeting the Shrine of Imamayn al-Askariyyaen (AS). …*The situation is so serious and threatening that … the grand Marlja’eat in Iraq has pronounced a statement demanding and commanding the obligation of believers to take arms in defense of Iraq, its citizens, and the holy shrines of our beloved Imams (AS). …The time for test has come for the believers who claim to love and follow Imam Husain (AS) and it is not a coincidence that the recent events have transpired in these auspicious days of 15th of Sha’ban where we celebrate the birth of our Living Imam (AFS) and yearn for his hastened reappearance while we are fed up with overwhelming injustices and oppressions of today. The Karbala of yesterday has emerged in our age in time and it is here today – in Iraq – and the enemy is none other than the ignorant Takfiris who blatantly condemn the followers of AhlulBayt (AS) and openly call for the shedding of their blood with the intent of eradicating us and expanding their rule in the region far and wide. How are they different than Yazid and Ibn Ziyad (LA)? They are one and the same, they are their extension living today who carry their evil and corrupted agenda and seek to put out the light of Allah (SWT) personified in the holy household of the Prophet (SA)…*The call of grand Ayatullah Sistani applies to all believers and not only the Mujaledeen (those who perform Taqleed) of his Eminence as the cause he is calling for is for the safety of Islam and the Muslims and our sacred mausoleums. At this stage where the declaration is Wajib Kefa’ee, perhaps not many of us are obliged to join the forces of defense. But surely, as believers we must brace ourselves in preparation to sprint for action and prepare ourselves mentally and practically to act if this declaration converts to Wajib Ayni (compulsory act which is obligatory on each and every individual). …Brothers and sisters, what are we waiting for? …We must be ready to sacrifice, leave everything behind us and run for the defense of truth and its supporters, representatives, and relics.*

This declaration calls the Shi‘ī communities for action; it is in line with the many calls to jihad by al-Sīstānī and the Iranian marja’ Nāsîr Makārim al-Shīrāzī, who declared a – global – war against “the Takfiri terrorists and their supporters from the Arab countries and America…[who will be] soon faced with an unprecedented multi-million army, the young lover of Islam and Ahlul-Bayt”. Following the publication of the call, emotions went uncontrolled among the Shi‘a of north-west London and people started booking flights to Iraq.

In fact, al-Shīrāzī’s statement is linked to the priorities of the Iranian leadership much more than it is a sign of concern and solidarity with their Iraqi brethren. Two years earlier, in 2012, Western intelligence officials warned that Iran’s supreme leader ‘Alī Khānemī stated that Iran’s national interests had been “threatened by a combination of the U.N. sanctions

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36 [https://archive.is/0hfz9#selection-713.340-713.480](https://archive.is/0hfz9#selection-713.340-713.480)


imposed over Iran’s nuclear programme and the West’s continuing support for Syrian opposition groups attempting to overthrow the Syrian government”. Therefore Iran “cannot be passive” in the conflict and “should demonstrate to the West that there were ‘red lines’ over what it would accept in Syria, and that a warning should be sent to ‘America, the Zionists, Britain, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and others that they cannot act with impunity in Syria and elsewhere in the region.” Khamenei allegedly ordered Qassem Sulaymānī, the Quds Force commander, to intensify attacks against the West and its allies around the world.39

In the same year, 2012, a grandiose mosque was inaugurated in Helsinki, financed by the notorious Ahlul Bayt Foundation,40 which back then had already run about 70 Shi‘ī Islamic centres worldwide. The project was the second in Scandinavia after a similarly oversized mosque had been constructed in Copenhagen, financed by the same resources.41 As we can observe on the basis of the mentioned warning examples, the current violence in the Middle East and the evolvement of radical salafi terror organisations, al-Qā‘īda and later ISIS, provide an opportunity for the revival of militant Shi‘ī Islamic ideology that Iran seems to be more than ready to put in use under the banner of fighting terrorism. As such, it opens the door for constant tensions since whenever the Iranian style Islamism clashes with ISIS sympathisers it is the confrontation of two, radical, transnational, apocalyptic ideologies which threatens social cohesion and security in Europe.

The fact that Iraqi soldiers in significant numbers are abandoning the battlefield and joining the migrant wave heading for Europe is more than worrying in this context. As the Reuters reported in September 2015 “fighters from the national army, police and special forces as well as Shia militias and Kurdish peshmerga have left in recent months or plan to go soon. A special operations member based in Ramadi said the elite unit alone had seen more than 100 fighters leave for Europe in the past six months.”42 Maintaining and intensifying a sectarian environment can prove to be highly dangerous once kin states, Iran or Saudi Arabia, decide to use these clashes to make pressure on European societies and states.

CONCLUSION

The roots of sectarianism lie in the way communities and identities are constructed and direct violence is but a spectacular way of letting out the inherent violence in the social structures (segregation, communities etc...) and allegiances (to Khāmeneī, etc.). This everyday symbolic and social violence can erupt whenever sectarian individuals or groups meet. Sunnī-Shi‘ī clashes in Western Europe indicate two threats to social cohesion: the vulnerability of identities and the infiltration of European societies by kin states. First, the vulnerability of individuals to ethnic-religious identities makes them loyal to the charismatic or traditional authorities in the kin state (Iran and Saudi Arabia) and untie their links, if

40 “First Mosque for Shia Muslims Opens in Finland”. http://en.abna24.com/service/europe/archive/2012/05/24/317240/story.html
41 “Disputed mosque in Copenhagen approved.” http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Andre_sprog/English/2011/08/26/082529.htm
they exist at all, to European citizens. Second, the strategies of infiltration and pressure on European states and societies by kin states intensify as Iran and Saudi Arabia ignite conflicts in the Middle East.

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FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN UKRAINE

ABSTRACT: According to international law, Western official positions etc. there is an amazing variety of existing interpretations regarding who should be considered a foreign fighter in Ukraine on Kiev’s or Moscow’s side. Whatever interpretation we might agree with, the account of “definitions” and their analysis contribute to understanding the complexity of the crisis in Ukraine. It leads us to the bizarre conclusion that if strictly referring to official opinions of the parties involved in the conflict virtually anyone could be considered a foreign fighter in Ukraine with the exception of truly local separatist fighters in Eastern Ukraine.

KEYWORDS: intervention, political correctness, extremism, foreign fighters, hybrid warfare, terrorism, NATO, Russia, Ukraine, US, West

WHO ARE FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN UKRAINE?

It is wrong to think that the determination of who might be foreign fighters is relatively simple. Not at all. Very much depends on the interpretation. In the next chapters we will investigate who could be considered foreign fighters in Ukraine. Such analysis is not based on speculation: references will be made to official positions of parties involved in the Ukraine crisis. We will come to the bizarre conclusion that virtually anyone could be considered a foreign fighter in Ukraine with the exception of truly local separatist fighters in Eastern Ukraine, strictly referring to the official opinions of the parties involved in the conflict.

There are two core parts of the analysis: (I) accounts of foreign fighters on Kiev’s side, and (II) those of the pro-Russian side. Within both core parts there are variations of who could be considered foreign fighters in Ukraine in one way or another.

FOREIGN FIGHTERS ON THE SIDE OF KIEV AND THE WESTERN WORLD

All the Armed Forces of Ukraine

The assumption to label the entire Ukrainian Armed Forces as foreign fighters in Ukraine sounds absurd, while it is not that absurd if we refer to their role the Russian way: the Ukrainian Armed Forces serve foreign interests against real national interests of both Ukraine and Russia. Russian president Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin called the Ukrainian Armed Forces (both regular and voluntary nationalist formations) fighting pro-Russian forces in eastern Ukraine – ultimately Russia – a “Foreign Legion.” “Putin had said those fighting against pro-Russia separatists in Eastern Ukraine were a mixture of Ukraine’s army and "voluntary nationalist battalions."..."In essence, this is not an army: this is a foreign legion - in this particular case NATO's foreign legion, which of course does not pursue the objective of serving Ukraine's national interests. There are completely different goals there," Putin said, saying...
they aimed to achieve "Russia's geopolitical containment." ... "NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg ... swiftly dismissed allegations made by Russian President."\(^1\)

Putin's statement phrases that there is a geopolitical game going on where the real purpose is not to serve Ukrainian interests but to contain Russia. We need to be clear: the Ukrainian Armed Forces – as a whole – are not literally foreigners in Ukraine, but since they serve foreign interests (as Putin says), they can be referred to as a “Foreign Legion”. In Stoltenberg's statement on the other hand there is a powerful example of “political correctness”. It is “politically correct” from Western – especially NATO – point of view, according to which:

- the Alliance has no spheres of influence,
- Russia follows outdated imperial policies when it takes into account spheres of influence,
- democratic nations, such as Ukraine, freely choose their partners and allies,
- no third parties could influence NATO enlargement,
- there are no geopolitical games, where an entire country could become a “tool” of a democratic alliance, such as NATO,
- even though the top leadership in Kiev is pro-Western, Ukraine is fighting her war against pro-Russian separatists and regular Russian Armed Forces for herself, to repel a Russian aggression, and serving foreign interests is not a part of the “game”,
- there is no such thing as encirclement and containment of Russia by NATO etc.

Interestingly, even if containment of Russia is not an official Western policy that is implemented regardless of Russian actions in Ukraine, Western threats to isolate Russia and Western economic sanctions against Russia are entirely official. “Russia should be clear that the deliberate escalation of this crisis will bring serious political and economic consequences.' NATO has also stepped up its rhetoric against Russia. Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen told a press conference ...: 'If Russia were to intervene further in Ukraine it would be a historic mistake. It would have grave consequences for our relationship with Russia and would further isolate Russia internationally.'”\(^2\) Economic sanctions and threats of isolation together are already synonymous with containment.

No matter whether we agree with certain points of the “politically correct” view, history books suggest that wars might not entirely serve “politically correct” aims throughout the entire history of mankind. Such “political correctness” could be an official policy but it is also a kind of an ideology in vacuum, making it difficult or even impossible to keep “political correctness” and meanwhile analyse true (unacknowledged) motivations behind conflicts from a scientific point of view.

At the beginning of the Ukraine crisis I consulted an unnamed senior Hungarian MoD\(^3\) official who confirmed, referring to the Ukraine crisis, that “the West should not allow Russia to become too powerful.” Such revelations behind closed doors make it clear that no

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3 Ministry of Defence (MoD)
matter whether someone is pro-US, pro-Ukraine or pro-Russia, there are \textit{unstated policies} on all sides and \textit{geopolitical realities} that are beyond official “political correctness”. Though scientists might be more-less free of the “\textit{mental handcuffs}” of “political correctness”, government officials are not. “Political correctness” does indeed limit government officials when analysing conflicts, often resulting in the production of classified documents that still tend to remain “politically correct”, though the whole idea of classification can be lost if the opportunity to tell the truth in classified documents is still limited by “political correctness”.

Accusations about operating “Foreign Legions” are quite symmetrical since Putin’s Russia is also accused of more-less the same thing.\footnote{Lazaredes, N. "Russia's foreign legion: Hundreds of fighters join pro-Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine". \textit{ABC News}, 22 September 2015. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-09-22/foreign-fighters-join-pro-russian-rebels-in-eastern-ukraine/6792696 (Accessed: 3 January 2016.)} The difference in this case is that \textit{not all} the Russian Armed Forces are accused of being a sort of a “Foreign Legion” against Ukraine.

\section*{Foreign combatants fighting on the side of Kiev}

Foreign combatants fighting on the side of Kiev come from several countries. Their motivation could be political. They might think that contemporary Russia is an enemy that deserves to be repelled from Ukraine and punished. They feel sympathy towards Kiev since Ukraine attempts to break out of Russian dominance. They might also think that Russia as an aggressor threatens entire Europe. As a minimum, Russia might threaten Eastern NATO members, especially the Baltic States, which were part of the former Soviet Union.

Foreign combatants might also be motivated financially. They might not have any other motivation at all, besides escaping unemployment. Private security companies are a perfect example of that. For them politics might be totally irrelevant.

This makes them very dangerous, since they would injure or kill whoever they are ordered to without feeling that they are killing their own people in a civil war in Ukraine. They are also dangerous because they are more difficult to be brought to justice when prosecuting war crimes. Clear legal requirements apply to militaries and civil citizens of states. Private security companies find themselves in a “grey zone” in terms of international law, which they are fully aware of. They often sign contracts hidden from the public of the state where they operate and get immunities from the state in case “something goes wrong”. Since they serve states or powerful interest groups, in most cases their immunities are powerful: they allow them to keep anonymity and escape punishment when they commit war crimes.

“...\textit{on the night of 2-3} (March 2014 – the auth.), \textit{the flight landed at the airport Borispol and Zhuliany, Ukraine} carrying many men in civilian clothes but carrying large bags (similar to type bag that \textit{the U.S. military} used to store equipment). All these people \textit{were identified as employees of private security companies Greystone Limited... Currently, the number of employees of this company in Ukraine is said to be up to 300 people}.\footnote{"Greystone Limited mercenaries operating in Ukraine". \textit{The Phantom Report}, 4 March 2014. http://www.phantomreport.com/greystone-limited-mercenaries-operating-in-ukraine (Accessed: 3 January 2016.)}

There are other private security companies employed in Ukraine on Kiev’s side, such as a successor of the notorious Blackwater\footnote{Ukman, J. "Ex-Blackwater firm gets a name change, again". \textit{The Washington Post}, 12 December 2011. https://www.washingtongpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/ex-blackwater-firm-gets-a-name-change-again/2011/12/12/gIQAXf4YpO_blog.html (Accessed: 3 January 2016.)} that proved to be scandalously aggressive and
murderous against civilians in Iraq: the Academi\textsuperscript{7} (Annex 1). \textit{``About 400 elite mercenaries from the notorious US private security firm Academi (formerly Blackwater) are taking part in the Ukrainian military operation against anti-government protesters in south-eastern regions of the country, German media reports...The American security company Blackwater gained worldwide notoriety for the substantial role it played in the Iraq war as a contractor for the US government. In recent years it has changed its name twice – in 2009 it was renamed Xe Services and in 2011 it got its current name, Academi. The firm became infamous for the alleged September 16, 2007 killing of 17 Iraqi civilians in Baghdad. The attack, which saw 20 others wounded, was allegedly without justification and in violation of deadly-force rules that pertained to American security contractors in Iraq at the time. Between 2005 and September 2007, Blackwater security guards were involved in at least 195 shooting incidents in Iraq and fired first in 163 of those cases, a Congressional report said at the time.''}\textsuperscript{8}

Annex 1. Gunmen of a private security company in action

Similarly to what Russia does when denying the involvement of Russian soldiers in the war in Eastern Ukraine, Western private security companies routinely deny their presence in combat zones in Ukraine as well.\textsuperscript{9}

According to Russian sources members of Western private security companies suffered heavy casualties in Eastern Ukraine when the war escalated. Their weaponry was sufficient when violence broke out, but proved \textit{inadequate} when the Ukrainian Air Force and Army became extensively involved in the conflict. I would argue that their role shrunk significantly in Ukraine since news about civil security companies almost entirely vanished both from Western and Russian media.

It can be debated whether \textit{secret service operatives} should be considered foreign fighters in Ukraine or not. Sometimes they are armed and operate in a combat zone. I would argue that members of secret services could indeed be classified as foreign fighters, when they are directly involved in military operations in a warzone. Their masters – governments – do not want to admit their possible failures, especially when it is widely published. Such practices


Europe

might not even allow a decent funeral of the secret service agents on the soil of the sending state, following the wishes of the deceased and their relatives. "A stunning Ministry of Defence (MoD) report circulating in the Kremlin today states that the United States has refused to repatriate the bodies of 13 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) military operatives killed when their helicopters were shot down by pro-federalist forces on the outskirts of Slavyansk, eastern Ukraine this past Friday. According to this report, on 2 May the Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion of the 25th Separate Dnipropetrovsk Airborne Brigade of the Ukrainian Army, which had defected to the side of the pro-federalists in April (2014 – the auth.), fired upon and downed two Russian made Mil Mi-17 transport helicopters belonging to the Ukrainian Air Force that had been attempting to land CIA military “command and control” operatives into the battle zone of Slavyansk.”

There are also internationally organised criminals who see looting and smuggling opportunities in the war: such motivations also boil down to financial gains.

FOREIGN FIGHTERS ON THE SIDE OF MOSCOW AND THE PRO-RUSSIAN POPULATION OF SOUTH-EASTERN UKRAINE

“Polite People” in Crimea

The expression “Polite People” was first used during the Ukraine crisis when mostly Russian Special Forces “facilitated” the self-determination of Crimea by surrounding and later occupying all Ukrainian military bases of the peninsula (Annex 2). The Russian intervention in Crimea took place under conditions when Russian soldiers wore no badges, had no licence plates or other numbers or symbols allowing the identification of individuals or military units. Since it led to Russian victory without a single shot, it could be considered extremely effective. Russia must have had operations plans for such an intervention for years before the conflict, but since such plans are secret it is quite difficult to prove that such plans had existed in advance. Russia executed the already existing operation plans taking a historical opportunity to reclaim Crimea that is considered Russian by official Kremlin opinion.

Annex 2. Youngsters watch pro-Russian soldiers as they block the entry of a Ukrainian forward military base in Balaklava, a small city near Sebastopol

Source: http://okok1111111111.blogspot.hu/2014/03/troop-pro-russian-protest-er-ukraine.html (Accessed on 03. 01. 2016)

We might think that the expression “Polite People” is an issue of the past since this method is no longer used in Crimea that is part of Russia according to the Russian Constitution. However, this expression is increasingly becoming a type of a symbol of the Russian Armed Forces.13

All Russian Armed Forces in Crimea

Russian troops used to station in Crimea (as Soviet troops) before Ukraine gained independence. When Ukraine got independent, Russian military presence remained in Crimea founded on interstate agreements. Both countries benefited from such agreements since Russia could use the naval base in Sevastopol that has exceptionally good conditions for stationing a fleet, even in hard winter conditions. Ukraine also benefited from the Russian military presence since Russia paid for it, also offering discounts on gas prices.

Today, according to international law, Crimea is still de jure part of Ukraine, not Russia. This coincides with Ukrainian law. According to the Russian Constitution, Crimea is de jure part of Russia. Needless to say that now, no matter whether we like it or not, Crimea is de facto definitely part of Russia. In such a situation a conclusion that Russia annexed Crimea illegally and all Russian Forces are occupation forces would be logical. Russia argues that Crimean people decided their own fate when voting to belong to Russia. If someone considers Russian Forces in Crimea as illegal occupation forces, it is evident to talk about foreign troops in Ukraine in case of Crimea. Russian troops could therefore be viewed as illegal foreign fighters.

„Non-existent“ Russian combatants or regular Russian military in Eastern Ukraine

According to the official opinion of Kiev the main reasons of the war in Eastern Ukraine are Russian incitement to separatism and Russian aggression against Ukraine. The separatists claim that the reasons of the war are (a) the forceful shift of power in February 2014, (b) the strengthened nationalism financed by Ukrainian oligarchs and (c) the fact that the central power in Kiev is unwilling to take into account the interests of South-Eastern Ukraine. According to the official position of Moscow Russia is not part of the conflict in Ukraine: all responsibility lies exclusively on the shoulders of the opposing parties.

Russian president Vladimir Putin stated several times that Russia is not fighting a war in Ukraine.14 However, the reality is that the de facto state sovereignty of the breakaway republics in Eastern Ukraine could not have been realised without Russian political, economic and military interference. The deliberately planned and executed wide range Russian intervention has so far created a stalemate when Ukraine’s Western integration is effectively blocked by Russia. When Russia supports the pro-Russia separatists in Eastern Ukraine she also generates a latent (deniable, not clearly evident) territorial dispute between Russia and

Ukraine. Even though the official position of Moscow denies that Russia is fighting a war in Ukraine, in reality Russia fights a proxy war against Ukraine, led by the current, nationalist and pro-Western, anti-Russian central power in Kiev.

- Russian military involvement in Eastern-Ukraine is managed in a much more covert and hidden way than in case of Crimea:
  - The presence of Russian soldiers is based on secret, voluntary contracts with the Russian state (the Russian Military). Russian soldiers sign up for full secrecy and breaking that is heavily sanctioned by the Russian state in various ways (demotion, loss of compensation, etc.).
  - The numbers of Russian peacetime casualties are reclassified as a state secret. Compensations for the families of “contract fighters” who got severely injured and declared invalids or have been killed in Eastern Ukraine had been accidentally leaked. “Putin decreed in May (2015 – the auth.) this year that all military deaths are to remain state secrets. In the past, only deaths in wartime were classified. At the time, Putin's spokesman Dmitry Peskov denied the decision was connected to fighting in Ukraine, simply stating that the law change was part of "the improvement of the state secret law." But this leaked information, subsequently translated by Forbes, reveals that families have been receiving three million rubles (£27,500) in compensation for an individual dying in military action, whilst those who are injured would be awarded one and a half million (£13,700). "A payment of 1,800 rubles is envisioned for contract "fighters" for every day of their presence in the conflict zone," Paul Roderick Gregory continues in his translation, "as of 1 February 2015, monetary compensation had been paid to more than 2,000 families of fallen soldiers and to 3,200 military personnel suffering heavy wounds and recognized as invalids."

- Participation of Russian soldiers in the war in Eastern Ukraine is an integral part of the Russian military career model, including the promotion system etc. Experience gained in a real war is valuable and accounts very positively in the evaluation of a professional or a contract soldier. This might apply to a smaller extent to those who do not choose to serve as professionals or contractors, or those retired from the Russian military, when continuation of their military career cannot be realistically expected.
  - Russian soldiers undergo thorough military training in Russia before being involved in operations in Eastern Ukraine. Because of this fact, their levels of training exceed the average Ukrainian levels by far.
  - Russian soldiers use weapons or weapon systems that are also used by Ukrainians. However, they are renewed and re-equipped in accordance with Russian standards that are significantly higher than the Ukrainian ones.

- The war in Eastern Ukraine is a perfect testing ground for the newest conventional Russian weaponry that has not yet been thoroughly tested in combat. The war in Syria is another perfect testing ground, even for the Russian Air Force that cannot be tested in war conditions in Ukraine. The reason is simple. If the Russian Air Force was deployed in Ukraine, it would be very difficult for Moscow to deny direct Russian military involvement in the war. New Russian weaponry is tested in Ukraine

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15 Segalov, M. "Russia 'accidentally reveals' number of its soldiers killed in eastern Ukraine. 2,000 are said to have died with over 3,200 Russian forces injured". The Independent, 26 August 2015. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/the-number-of-russian-troops-killed-or-injured-fighting-in-ukraine-seems-to-have-been-accidentally-10472603.html (Accessed: 6 January 2016)
in strict secrecy, since the Ukrainian side does not possess cutting-edge Russian military technology that would otherwise become a proof of direct Russian military involvement in Eastern Ukraine.

- Russian soldiers sometimes wear Ukrainian uniforms that are either trophies, or reconstructed to look identical. The reconstruction is most probably done in Russia, since it is easier to keep the production—as a project of the Russian Military—secret. On the other hand, private businesses do similar work with no cover at all: “Moscow maintains that it is not directly involved in the separatist conflict in Ukraine, but a steady flow of so-called volunteers from Russia are signing up to fight—and some businesses are also contributing to the war effort. In Yekaterinburg, a businessman has turned his clothing factory over to producing uniforms for Ukrainian separatists and their Russian allies.”16 Russian soldiers might also wear parts of Russian military uniforms (Annex 3).17 They might also wear uniforms purchased from military shops open for civilians (not exclusively for the military) or hunter shops open for all buyers (as long as they do not purchase weapons, because in that case licences are required). When such uniforms are mixed by individual soldiers and at unit levels, the Russian soldiers cannot be easily identified as Russians any more.

- Russian soldiers have false ID cards that are produced at state level in order to suggest that their owners are local residents in Eastern Ukrainian breakaway regions. It implies the involvement of Russian secret services, border guards etc.

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Annex 3. “Hundreds of foreign volunteers have reportedly joined the rebel ranks in a new fighting unit known as the Novo Russian Foreign Legion.”


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- Russia takes care of shifting her soldiers after their having served the pre-determined time in Ukraine. This is a probable reason of some unexpected disappearances of pro-Russian leaders, when they leave their positions. (It is not visible for the public when individual Russian soldiers of low ranks leave Ukraine.) Pro-Russian leaders do not admit publicly the real reason behind leaving their positions since they are obliged not to admit that their service in Eastern Ukraine has expired. Such an admission would be equal to saying that “yes, Russia is a warring party in a proxy-war in Ukraine” that Moscow officially denies and attempts to hide as carefully as possible.


Pro-Russian separatists – whoever they are – make sure that there are cover stories regarding the origin of their weapon systems. Such weapon systems can be trophies. Weapon systems are often captured from the Ukrainian military units that abandon their weapons when they retreat or when they are encircled and defeated. Abandoning weapons or weapon systems is often a pre-requisite determined by the pro-Russian separatists that allows Ukrainian soldiers to avoid a lengthy status of POW and freely return to their relatives or military units, respectively. (Once Ukrainian soldiers return to their units, they are often tried as traitors because of having left behind their weaponry to the “terrorists” without destroying it.)

At the beginning of the civil war in Eastern Ukraine, another cover story was widely published to explain how the pro-Russian separatists got virtually “endless” amounts of weaponry. It is the well documented capturing of a great Ukrainian repair base, with hundreds or armoured vehicles, including tanks, infantry vehicles, field artillery guns and even air defence weapons. All captured weaponry was degraded and unfit for service, many of them far-beyond cost-effective repair (Annex 4-6). It is by no mistake that they were stored at a military repairing base. However, vast amounts of weaponry were renewed very quickly, in a professional way to make them usable again.

Annex 4. Ukrainian military repair base captured by separatists supplied a quasi “infinite” amount of armour as a cover story (Military Unit No. A2730, Artemovsk, Donetsk region)


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19 Prisoners of War (POW)
fit for service. Even though the separatist-controlled regions in Eastern Ukraine have military armoured vehicle repairing factory capabilities, it can safely be assumed that without a decent help of either Moscow, or Kiev(!) they would have rapidly run out of spare parts. Since corruption in Ukraine is truly horrendous, it cannot be ruled out that through illegal channels the separatists get supplies not only from Russia but from Ukraine as well. The war in Eastern Ukraine is of strange and unusual nature indeed, since Donetsk, which fights Kiev, meanwhile supplies Kiev with coal, 


expect Kiev to pay pensions, 


and operate banking systems, etc. on separatist controlled territories (!).

- The other possibility is that vast amounts of trophy Ukrainian weapon systems are repaired and re-equipped by pro-Russian separatists and more importantly, Russian war factories only if that is technically and financially viable. Otherwise, weaponry is most likely to be taken to Russia in secrecy and later scrapped for metals. In some cases, Ukrainian weapons can also be “cannibalised” for spare parts, if they are in good shape.

- Pro-Russian rebels even made a very credible attempt to prove that they were about to lose the entire war in Eastern Ukraine when they abandoned Slavyansk and their situation further deteriorated. The separatists lost territories on a daily basis *fooling Kiev to get stuck in a war Ukraine cannot win*. The separatists retreated regularly to look weak; making the “tale of people’s uprising” credible. It made the Ukrainian
leadership believe that victory was close, luring them to advance. Later on Kiev learned the hard way that the entire Ukraine(!) cannot win a war against the separatists backed by Moscow. The war turned out to be disastrous for Kiev. An unnamed senior Hungarian MoD official told me when the separatists abandoned Sloviansk that “you would see that Russia would betray Russians”. I was told so behind closed doors, of course. I personally did not expect such a betrayal to happen, especially within the post-Soviet space under Putin’s power. The lack of proper understanding of Russian mentality often leads to similarly false conclusions. I still see no signs of Russia betraying Russians in Eastern Ukraine. I could be right at this point, since I have never heard the same or similar statements concerning Russian betrayal again.

There are military experts who think that Russia followed exactly the same strategy in the case of Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine. The only difference is that the Russian strategy worked in case of Crimea and did not succeed in case of Eastern Ukraine. Such an evaluation is based on significant misunderstandings.

In strict technical terms, Russia could declare Donetsk and Lugansk parts of the Russian Federation at any time. Russia could also do so regarding only the separatist-controlled parts of the two regions in Eastern Ukraine, but it would make less sense since in such a case the Russian actions are more difficult to justify. The reason is that Russia must come up with some credible explanation that could most likely be defending the population with Russian identity. It would be difficult to prove that the territory where the population with Russian identity lives exactly matches the territory controlled by separatist. Even if such Russian official explanation might occur, it would not be true at all. Donetsk and Lugansk are overwhelmed by population with Russian identity. Most people are well aware of that in Russia and in Ukraine as well, not to mention the local populations of the two breakaway regions in Eastern Ukraine. Therefore, such a scenario is highly unlikely. If Russia decides to take the two breakaway regions, she will have to take their entire territory to keep Russian ideology credible.

It is not difficult for Russia to defend territories officially belonging to Russia against Ukraine, since the Russian Armed Forces would be officially obliged to do so. That would allow Russia to fight openly and effectively, including the deployment of the most modern weaponry. Finally yet importantly, it would allow the free deployment of the Russian Aerospace Forces, as a whole. Russian satellite reconnaissance systems that constitute a part of the Russian Aerospace Forces are most likely to be already actively involved in the war in Eastern Ukraine. The opposite would be irrational and would require a powerful justification never seen. We have the knowledge to be sure: Russian spy satellite images were shown when Moscow explained the circumstances of the downing of the Malaysian aircraft in Eastern Ukraine. That is a definite proof of Russian Aerospace Forces involvement, even though Russia could argue, that they used civilian satellite information etc. However, the Russian Air Force is not involved in the current war in Eastern Ukraine because of its visibility and the need of official denial of Russian involvement.

The problem with such a course of events when Russia claims ever more Ukrainian territories would not serve Russian interests at all. On the contrary: it would go against Russian strategic interests. Russia wants entire Ukraine to return to her sphere of interests and thereby is not interested in further escalation of the war when Moscow would be clearly regarded as an aggressor and an invader. Russia is interested in maintaining a low-level conflict to weaken Kiev and keep deniability and ambiguity. If we agree that such Russian
policies are being implemented, we have to realise that such policies are entirely different to what happened in Crimea that was firmly and rapidly annexed by the Russian Federation.

If Russia had had the same strategy in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, it would have been easy to find justification for an open war between Russia and Ukraine because of Donetsk and Lugansk. The amount of casualties amongst the pro-Russian civilians could have served as a powerful pretext of such a war under the banner of “defending population with Russian identity”. The Russian State Duma authorised president Putin to deploy Russian Military in Ukraine if necessary,\footnote{Neumann, S. "Russia's Parliament Approves Putin's Call For Troops In Ukraine". NPR, 1 March 2014. http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/03/01/284345466/russias-parliament-prepared-to-authorize-crimea-intervention (Accessed: 25 December 2015)} that was later withdrawn, on the basis of the request of the Russian president himself.\footnote{Oliphant, R. "Vladimir Putin revokes Russia's mandate for use of military force in Ukraine, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko welcomes move to scrap controversial law authorising Russian use of force in country as a 'first step' towards peace". The Telegraph, 24 June 2014. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10922531/Vladimir-Putin-revokes-Russias-mandate-for-use-of-military-force-in-Ukraine.html (Accessed: 25 December 2015)}

We come to the conclusion that the Russian policies in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine are significantly different. Therefore we cannot talk about the success of the same policy in Crimea and its failure in Eastern Ukraine.

Russian policies in Eastern Ukraine could indeed include making the entire separatist regions part of Russia, but that would require a forced policy change on the Russian side. It could happen in case it becomes evident that Russia has no chance at all in medium and long term to bring entire Ukraine back to Russian orbit, and Ukraine’s NATO accession becomes imminent. Then Russia could take all those territories where the majority of the population supports Moscow, leaving behind those who do not. In this case, Ukraine would face an ever more severe territorial conflict with Russia that would most likely derail Ukraine’s NATO integration.

**CONCLUSIONS**

- There is a great variety of interpretations concerning the classification of foreign fighters in Ukraine that are all based on official points of view, not speculation.
- The analysis of who and based on what official views can be classified as foreign fighters in Ukraine helps us to understand the complexity of the crisis.
- We come to the bizarre conclusion that virtually anyone could be considered a foreign fighter in Ukraine with the exception of truly local separatist fighters in Eastern Ukraine, strictly referring to official opinions of the parties involved in the conflict.
- Civil security companies are in a legal “grey zone”, unlike soldiers or civilians of states where the armed conflicts occur.
- The weaponry of civil security companies proves to be inadequate when war escalates.
- The employment of civil security companies with a notorious background would most likely result in series or war crimes in conditions of civil war. Combined with undisclosed immunities from states or powerful interest groups such a legal status encourages aggression and war crimes, even against civilians.
European deployment of “Polite People” in Crimea and “non-existing” regular soldiers in Eastern Ukraine are tools of sophisticated policies.

Russian policies in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine have been significantly different since the very beginning of the Russian intervention in Ukraine. Therefore it is a grave misunderstanding to equal them and label the Crimean outcome successful and the Eastern Ukrainian outcome unsuccessful.

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ABSTRACT: 2016 and the Warsaw Summit have not brought anything new for the NATO-Russian relations which have been “frozen” since 2014. Although we cannot leave out of consideration the relations between the former strategic partners, especially when reading the adopted Warsaw Summit Communiqué in which – implicitly or explicitly – we can find many-many references on Russia and the threats coming from the East. By examining the relations between NATO and Russia we cannot forget the fact that the security of Europe and the entire Euro-Atlantic area cannot be separated from Russia. Moreover, the security challenges of the 21st century indeed make it necessary to involve such a meaningful actor as Russia. Nonetheless, common actions or ad hoc cooperation do not require or presume common political goals, similar values and processes. The parties have always been cooperating acknowledging these circumstances even if some actions or decisions by the other party surprise them sometimes. After the events in 2014 in Ukraine the relations reached a low point. Nowadays we can see a sort of “arms race”, a new-old “security dilemma” and we cannot predict how it will end.

KEYWORDS: NATO, Russia, conventional forces, military exercises, Warsaw Summit

UPS AND DOWNS – THE FIRST WAVES

As it is mentioned in the title, the relations between NATO and Russia can be best described as a roller-coaster, which has its ups and downs, fast phases upwards but also dangerous ways running in the deep to the point from which it is not easy to come back. The cooperation after the Cold War started slowly and uncertainly, but in the past 25 years there have been many changes. The relation of the two parties has not been smooth – not even in the „good old days”. In the middle of the political changes of the 1990s the „new” Russia tried to get up from the ruins of the Soviet Union and expected the „old” institutions of the previous era to come to an end as well. A new structure, a new initiative was supposed to get the main role in the Euro-Atlantic area: the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) supposed to fill this role according to the Russian point of view, which covers the Northern part of the globe from Vancouver to Vladivostok and in which both countries, both former superpowers, the USA and Russia are equal participants. Furthermore, as a cooperative security organization, the OSCE has a looser structure. This kind of Russian attitude has been determining these relations even nowadays.¹

On the contrary, NATO did not collapse but transformed, it was ready to respond to the changes of the international security environment and the Alliance took over new tasks. Russia did not consider the existence of a Cold War alliance as justified or legitimate in the post-Cold War era. Just like the Warsaw Pact, NATO was supposed to cease as well.\(^2\) When that did not happen, moreover, NATO started to build partnerships not only with the Eastern European countries but also with states in the Mediterranean area, Russia saw it as expansive efforts of the USA-dominated military alliance.\(^3\) For the Eastern European countries which had been led by the Soviet Union for decades NATO became more and more attractive. No one was surprised when these nations started to declare their intentions to join the „West”. But the former superpower being in an unstable and uncertain position did not want to simply accept these countries’ distancing.\(^4\)

In spite of all these factors, following the principle of „who falls behind is left behind”, Russia wanted to be part of the platforms where the decisions of the „Western World” are made. This is why it joined the Partnership for Peace program (PfP) in 1994 and the G8\(^5\) in 1997. Through these fora Russia expected to have the right and be able to influence and veto NATO’s decisions, affect the „West’s” understanding and operation. This was the way Russia handled and managed the cooperation.\(^6\)

In 1997 the NATO-Russian Founding Act was signed, which is an overarching political document introducing a framework for the parties’ cooperation. This cooperation exceeded the simple political principles and included common exercises as well. The Permanent Joint Council (PJC) was formed, which became the primary forum of the dialogue besides the PfP program. The parties, however, stated that the dialogue between them will not affect NATO’s and its member states’ or Russia’s internal affairs. Furthermore, the Act does not entitle the parties to exercise veto over the activities of the other, it will not restrict the parties’ decision making mechanisms. They reiterated that the Alliance has no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members – not at the time of signature or in the foreseeable future.\(^7\) Regarding the deployment of conventional forces NATO confirmed that in accordance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty – 1990) it will carry out its tasks (collective defense and other missions) transparently by reinforcing its forces in the current structure rather than permanently stationing further troops. The reinforcement - if necessary - will happen in harmony with

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\(^3\) Ponsard, L. Russia, NATO and Cooperative Security. Bridging the Gap. 17-18.

\(^4\) Russia created a particular „Monroe-doctrine”. In the countries, which Russia considers as “near-abroad”, there were 25 Million people with Russian origin. This fact provided the basis to keep these states really “near”.

\(^5\) The G7 (United Kingdom, USA, France, Italy, Canada, Japan, Germany) was an economic forum of 7 countries. Russia was invited to join in June 1997 and thus it became G8. See more: "Denver Summit of the Eight". http://www.library.utoronto.ca/g7/summit/1997denver/g8final.htm, Accessed on 5 August 2016.


\(^7\) It is often cited regarding NATO’s forward presence in the Eastern flank and building up NATO’s ballistic missile defense system.
the UN Charter and CFE Treaty. Russia agreed with this principle and stated that it will exercise similar restraints.\textsuperscript{8,9}

Besides the cooperative political declarations, Russia presumed adversary intentions behind NATO’s operations in the 1990s, as well, because this was the only way these out-of-area operations of a collective defense organization could be considered.\textsuperscript{10} During the operations in the Balkans the diplomatic relations broke off for a few months between Russia and NATO, but it was only a little political battle over the silent practical cooperation. Russia took part in the operations in the Balkans, but Russia - demonstrating its power and showing off its status and importance - definitely surprised the international community by occupying the Slatina Airbase (Kosovo) before the NATO forces (KFOR) arrived.\textsuperscript{11,12} Similarly to the “entée” in Kosovo, later on Russia did surprise NATO very often with its decisions, steps, and measures.

The common “enemy”, however, has been bringing the parties always closer. In 2001, after the terrorist attacks in the USA, NATO and Russia took actions together against terrorism. The common threats build bridges between them, so at that time both parties agreed to deepen their relations.\textsuperscript{13} We should not forget, that for the West this meant the acceptance of the Chechnyan Wars as anti-terrorist operations.\textsuperscript{14} The result of this course was the re-thinking of NATO-Russian relations, followed by a declaration at the Rome Summit in 2002 bringing a new quality into the relations between NATO and Russia.\textsuperscript{15} The focused cooperation areas were reflecting the new security environment and the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) as a new cooperation forum was formed, as well.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{8} The realization of this part has become very much questionable nowadays.


\textsuperscript{10} Ponsard, L. Russia, NATO and Cooperative Security. Bridging the Gap. 66-72.

\textsuperscript{11} On 15th June 1999 Russian forces (originally deployed to SFOR) occupied the Slatina Airbase as a pre-emptive action. Even though it was only a symbolic step considering the number of troops involved (200), but this made the Alliance think about the relations with Russia and how to react on these events because the parties were about to start a close cooperation in KFOR.


\textsuperscript{13} The war on terrorism and the policy of president Bush brought NATO and Russia closer and at the same time it caused a lot of stress within the Alliance. According to a statement attributed to Condoleeza Rice, American national security advisor, the Europe-policy of the USA was led by the aim of “punishing France, ignoring Germany and forgiving Russia”. See more: Gordon, Ph. H. „Punish France, Ignore Germany, Forgive Russia’ No Longer Fits” Brookings Institution. 2007. http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2007/09/europe-gordon, Accessed on 14 March 2014.

\textsuperscript{14} See more: Ponsard, L. Russia, NATO and Cooperative Security. Bridging the Gap. 77-85.

\textsuperscript{15} The Founding Act of 1997 remained still valid.

\textsuperscript{16} In the NRC Russia was not only an additional actor besides the NATO members as the Permanent Joint Council was designed by the Founding Act in 1997 but it was an equal member of this forum with the 19 NATO members at that time. (for further details see: Szatmári, L. „A NATO-Oroszország Tanács”. Hadtudomány. 2008. http://mhtt.eu/hadtudomany/2008/2008_elektroltrakus/2008_e_11.pdf Accessed on 27 September 2016) Thus, during the sessions of the NRC not the previously agreed (as Lord Robertson, former NATO Secretary General put it, the pre-cooked) NATO position met the Russian point of view, but there were possibilities for real discussions and substantial cooperation among the NRC members.
In the 2000s – as Lord Robertson, former NATO Secretary General put it – NATO and Russia learned how to be “capable of disagreeing without falling out, of having different opinions without walking out of the room”.17

BEYOND THE BILATERAL RELATIONS

During the last two and a half decades there were several areas where NATO and Russia cooperated in practice very well but we saw many disagreements and troubles between the parties, as well, which brought the cooperation down: the Alliance’s intervention in the Balkans; the Georgian war in 2008; deployment of NATO’s ballistic missile defense system; NATO enlargements; or the out-of-area operations are only a few examples. After all these events we arrived in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea, and with the support of Russian forces there has been ongoing fighting in Eastern Ukraine since then. NATO’s official response to the Russian aggression was clear and straightforward: the Alliance does not recognize the Ukrainian borders which were changed against the international law and calls for peaceful solutions. NATO suspended all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia but it is still open for political dialogue if it leads to a solution or any positive development in this situation. NATO reiterated that without a significant change of Russian behavior it will not go back to the “business as usual”.18

The events in Ukraine, however, bring us far beyond the change in NATO-Russian bilateral relations. The Alliance had to review not only its approach to Russia, but also its own situation after the “strategic surprise” in 2014. Although the three core tasks (collective defense, crisis management, cooperative security) defined in 201019 have not been changed, NATO’s member states undoubtedly turned back to the Alliance’s very fundamental function, to prepare for collective defense. The threat perception of the „Eastern flank”, especially of Poland and the Baltic states, is driving NATO towards strengthening its deterrence and defense capabilities and emphasizing its credibility. Important topics like political and legal consequences of territorial defense, necessary military (and non-military) capabilities, the old-new operational planning and resilience came up and highlighted NATO’s very serious problems in these fields. NATO at the Wales Summit in 2014 tried to find the way to solve all these issues. The Heads of State and Government adopted several short term and long term measures. In the short run NATO’s reassurance measures (including the Readiness Action Plan – RAP, enhanced NATO Response Forces - eNRF), common exercises, enhanced air policing and naval presence have to be realized. In the long run, the main goals are the adaptation to the emerging threats and changed security environment and finally the

transformation of the Alliance. We cannot forget however, that even if the Eastern threats were the catalysts in the decision making, NATO is going to use the same tools against the threats emanating from the South.

To sum up, the year 2014 and the Wales Summit were a turning point in the Alliance’s history, even if it made it harder than ever to achieve a consensus among the member states.

The threat perception of the “Eastern Flank” tried to lead the Alliance in the direction to strengthen its defense and deterrence capability and also to emphasize its credibility. In the last two years these issues remained in the focus of the Alliance. The most important question was how these decisions could be implemented. There were more and bigger military exercises than ever since the Cold War years. Although the numbers of exercises are not objective factors to describe the armed forces’ readiness or capabilities, still, they show the Allies’ intentions and the so-called “exercise-gap” which have been experienced between NATO and Russia since 2014. At NATO’s (and multinational) exercises transparency (the announcement of the exercises, invitation of international – including Russian – observers etc. in accordance with the Vienna Document of OSCE) is highly important for NATO. The Allies wanted to avoid any kind of conflicts and escalation because of misunderstandings or miscommunication. This is the reason why the Allies (especially the United States) see only the rotational presence as a possible solution on the territory of the eastern member states – in order to prevent the provocation of Russia. This way the strategic communication of NATO has nowadays probably a bigger role than during the Cold War.

Increasing the defense budgets of NATO countries could be the basis to realize the decisions made in Wales, which was also agreed by the Defense Ministers in September 2014. After the global financial crisis in 2008 the defense expenditure of NATO countries – contrary to the Russian military budget – faced drastic cuts, including that of the wealthy countries as well, which should be stopped by all means. Regarding the defense budgets, not only the quantity is important, but much more the issue how the money is spent. Most member countries were unable to maintain their armed forces or spend any money on developments. The defense investments a few years ago targeted mostly deployable and sustainable capabilities necessary for expeditionary operations (counterterrorism, peacebuilding, humanitarian intervention), while (more heavy) capabilities for territorial defense


23 It is worth to compare with related paragraphs about deployment of conventional forces in the NATO-Russia Founding Act 1997.

24 NATO countries expressed their intention with the “Defense Investment Pledge” to increase (or at least not decrease) their defense budgets in the coming years and thus to move towards the guideline of 2% of GDP within a decade. Furthermore they will make efforts to use 20% of defense budget for major equipment, research and development. At the very beginning many countries introduced certain measures in order to achieve this aim, however, it is doubtful how much of these will be realized in 10 years.
Europe did not have such an important role. Decreasing the manpower of the armed forces is not contributing to the development either.

It is not surprising that since Wales NATO’s main capability development goals have been almost the same as the Russian capability priorities. The biggest difference, however, is that the conventional Russian offensive capabilities did not go through such cuts and reductions as the European armed forces did. Moreover, the development of Russia’s armed forces continued even after the global financial crisis in 2008. After 2014 three new army divisions were established at the western borders (at the eastern borders of NATO). These units (together with the air and space capabilities) are fully manned and fully equipped. Certain combat support capabilities (like combat engineering, bridge construction units) disappeared during the 1990s, but they are needed again, just like urban warfare units. Some other capabilities are also very important priorities for Russia: CBRN defense, spetsnaz (special operations) capabilities, electronic warfare, heavy equipment and especially the JISR capabilities. Even if the Russian defense budget and the proportion of capability development is – in comparison to the sum of NATO countries – very small, the integrated development concepts, coordinated decisions and the possibilities of national defense industry bring Russia in a very advantageous position compared to the fragmented European efforts.

NATO’s priority is – besides the capability development – to increase the readiness and responsiveness of forces, especially because the decision making process of 28 countries and the decision about using/deploying armed forces cannot be as quick as in case of a single country. To realize responsiveness, the Alliance enhanced and renewed the NATO Response Force (NRF). The enhanced NRF (eNRF) with its approximately 40,000 troops has the following elements: a spearhead force – the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) with 2-7 days “notice to move” (NTM); the Initial Follow-on Forces Group (IFFG) with a bit lower readiness; and finally the Follow-on Forces Group with an NTM between 1-2 months.

The NRF concept is not a new initiative; there were similar examples in NATO’s history. The NRF concept was born in the early 2000s concentrating on out-of-area operations. This way it was the eNRF’s predecessor only by name. For a similar content we need to go back to the Cold War years. The multinational, rapidly deployable Allied Mobile Forces (AMF) was supposed to defend NATO’s flanks from 1960. The AMF consisted of enhanced infantry

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26 In order to turn back this process some nations, like Germany made a decision to increase their armed forces. Furthermore, Germany considers the possibility to recruit not German citizens into the Bundeswehr. See more: "Verstärkung für die Truppen". https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/bundeswehr-349.html Accessed on 30 July 2016. and Weissbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr, 2016. https://www.bmvg.de/resource/resource/MzEzNTM4MmUzMyMmUzMTM1MzMyMTM2MzIzMzMDMwMzAzMDMwMzAzMDY5NzE3Mz00Nzc2YzYyMzcyMDIwMjAyMDIw/Weissbuch2016_barrierefrei.pdf, Accessed on 15 September 2016.

27 Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear

28 Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

battalions whose task was primarily to defend Norway and Turkey in case of border violations and minor conflicts in the border areas.\textsuperscript{30}

The AMF concept was initiated by General Norstad\textsuperscript{31} (Supreme Allied Commander in Europe). The allies established a multinational, highly mobile, and high-readiness unit which consisted of ground and air forces in order to prevent the escalation of minor-scale local conflicts into a general war. These forces were not the main element of NATO’s defense but they meant to be a way to avoid the confrontation of the two superpowers on the flanks. The army element of the AMF was deployed at a military base in Germany (GDR), and the position of its commander was filled by the participating nations in rotation. The air force element, however, was only exercising together. The AMF troops in the highest readiness category were deployable in 72 hours, the whole AMF could have been in theatre of operations in 13 days with 7 days of supply. The AMF was not deployed at all during the Cold War. In the 1990s the possibility for a potential use of AMF increased. In 1995 the ground forces of AMF were transformed into Immediate Reaction Force (IRF), and the air force elements were disbanded. AMF Land was disestablished in 2002.\textsuperscript{32}

As the AMF, the eNRF is rather a political and symbolic tool than means of credible deterrence.\textsuperscript{33} If Russia were intended to, it could occupy the three Baltic States in 36-60 hours. NATO would be forced to overlook helplessly the Russian movements. This timeframe is far from enough for the Alliance to get the political authorization and continue with the actual military movements, redeployment of forces and equipment. The previous statement, which is not surprising at all, comes from Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, the Commander of United States Army in Europe.\textsuperscript{34} The only surprising factor is that in 2008 Alexander Motyl, a historian and political scientist at the Rutgers University, wrote about the occupation of Narva, a little (“negligible”) town at the Estonian-Russian border, by Russia in a (unexpectedly) negative


\textsuperscript{31} Lauris Norstad was a general of the United States’ Air Force, between 1956-1963. he was the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe

\textsuperscript{32} SHAPE. "The ACE Mobile Force, 1960-2002" 2012. 3340/SH-SPS-HIS/2012-08 (Gregory Pedlow)

\textsuperscript{33} The multinational forces embodied a strong link and close cooperation among NATO members, but exactly this multinationality carried with it such political difficulties and technical issues, which the former NRF concept did not show. Crossing the borders of NATO countries, movement and rapid deployment of forces and equipment are only a few of the questions which are mostly of a legal nature but strong political support is needed to solve them. The AMF from the 1960s had the same problems as the eNRF has nowadays. Although the standardization has reached a higher level in the last decades which make an effective cooperation among states easier, but the command and control (national vs. SACEUR’s responsibility), interoperability, cooperation of forces, rapid deployment and national caveats are still problematic. Not to mention all the other issues like enhanced exercise activity, operations, national obligations (in case of Hungary it is contribution to border control and migration) for instance which mean big burdens for the European armed forces and make it very hard to fill the long term rotation plan for eNRF. See more: Bieri, M. et al. "Die NATO und Russland: Verteidigungsplanung 2014-2016." ETHZ CSS. June 2016. http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/publications/publication.html/9b3ec631-1927-4b1e-98e2-be5b176a5b44 Accessed 1 August 2016.

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way, whereas nowadays the occupation of the three Baltic states are visioned similarly in case of a Russian aggression.35

These thoughts lead us to a much more serious question, which has been raised by more and more experts: is there a possibility that tactical nuclear weapons could be used in a conflict violating a NATO member’s territory? Fortunately, since the end of the Cold War nuclear issues have not been in focus unless it was about disarmament or reduction. Although the topic has been raised more and more often in connection with Russian war gaming. The annual military exercise, “Zapad” (West), always includes a nuclear scenario, but in a real situation the question of using sub-strategic nuclear weapons was never a crucial issue, not even in a political context. In 2013, exercise Zapad36 – most probably because of the sensitiveness of the current situation – did not include a nuclear scenario.37 Russia wanted to avoid bringing a nuclear scenario into the exercise in order to avoid misunderstandings and possible provocation or escalation, as well. Although it did not diminish the significance of the exercise, whose primary “addressees” were Poland and the Baltic states.38

NATO puts a special emphasis on transparency regarding military exercises, which is required also by OSCE in accordance with the Vienna Document39 adopted in 2011 (which is binding Russia, as an OSCE member as well). The Vienna Document obligates the member states to notify each other (42 days in advance) about exercises involving more than 9,000 troops. However, Russia did not communicate its exercises with 40-50,000 troops (with combat support and combat service support forces altogether some 90,000 troops were involved) to the international community as they would not have exceeded the limits described in the international agreement.40 Nevertheless, there is no question that NATO’s exercise activities are not comparable with the volume of Russian military exercises as it is depicted in the first figure.

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36 Most probably the Zapad 13 was the last exercise. In Russian and English language media there are references of an exercise in 2015, however, considering the international political and security situation it was apparently not executed. Many sources are mentioning the preparations for the exercise in 2017, though.


39 The Document obligates the OSCE member states to exchange information annually on their military forces, concerning organization, manpower, major weapon and equipment systems, defense planning, procurements, defense budget and certain military events if they involve at least 9000 troops including support troops. See more: "Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures". OSCE. http://www.osce.org/fsc/86597?download=true, Accessed on 30 September 2016, para 40.1.1.

40 According to Russia, they were not obligated to inform the OSCE countries. The rationale behind this was that the forces involved were organized in smaller units, battalion groups whose structure was flexible and of an ad hoc nature. In one particular military district the exercise involved less than 9,000 troops except one occasion when Russia avoided the applicability of the Document with the reasoning that the voluntary military forces did not leave the barracks at all, so officially they were not part of the exercise. The related forces were not subordinated to a central commander, so this condition did not activate the Document either – according to the Russian explanations. (for more details see Sutyagin, I. "Russia confronts NATO. Confidence Distraction Measures." RUSI, 6 July 2016. https://rusi.org/publication/briefing-papers/russia-confronts-nato-confidence-destruction-measures, Accessed on 1 August 2016.)
## Power Projection. Comparing Russian and NATO Military Exercises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Exercise Name</th>
<th>NATO Exercise</th>
<th>Russian Exercise</th>
<th>Number of Personnel</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Oct.-Nov. 2015</td>
<td>Trident Juncture</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 2015</td>
<td>Interaction-15</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 2015</td>
<td>Combat Commonwealth</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 2015</td>
<td>Rapid Trident</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2015</td>
<td>BALTOPS</td>
<td>5,600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2015</td>
<td>Steadfast Javelin</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2015</td>
<td>Noble Jump</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2015</td>
<td>&quot;Snap Exercises&quot;</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov. 2014</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 2014</td>
<td>Noble Justification</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 2014</td>
<td>ANAKONDA-14</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept. 2014</td>
<td>VOSTOK-14</td>
<td>355,000</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Sept. 2014</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2014</td>
<td>Noble Ledger</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 2014</td>
<td>Saber Junction</td>
<td>5,800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 2014</td>
<td>Joint Warrior</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Jun. 2014</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2014</td>
<td>Saber Strike</td>
<td>4,700</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>May 2014</td>
<td>Spring Storm</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar. 2014</td>
<td>Cold Response</td>
<td>16,000</td>
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<td>Mar. 2014</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov. 2013</td>
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<td>6,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept. 2013</td>
<td>Zapad-13</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul. 2013</td>
<td>&quot;Snap Check&quot;</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>May 2013</td>
<td>Spring Storm</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2013</td>
<td>Joint Warrior</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. *Russian and NATO military exercises in numbers of personnel 2013–2015*

The geographical location and concentration of Russian exercises are well illustrated in the second figure, in contrast to NATO’s activities, which were – in the spirit of political consensus and solidarity – much more divided between the Eastern and Southern regions.

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How do recent NATO exercises compare with Russian ones?

Figure 2. Russian and NATO military exercises compared by their location and size in 2013–2015

Even though military exercises are not objective measures of readiness and capabilities of armed forces, but these numbers are demonstrating very well the seriousness of intentions and the exercise-gap between NATO and Russia.

2016: ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK

The heads of state and government of NATO countries at the Summit in Warsaw in July 2016 discussed again the challenges, risks, and threats which the Alliance faces and where Russia has an important role. The main goal of the summit was to continue and further develop the decisions made two years ago in Wales. The countries’ representatives reiterated that NATO does not seek a confrontation and poses no threat to any country, including Russia, but they are ready to “deter and defend against potential adversaries and the full spectrum of threats that could confront the Alliance from any direction.”

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The adopted summit communiqué is (considering the high level of the summit) unusually long and detailed – 139 paragraphs. In 23 out of 139 Russia is explicitly mentioned besides the parts where collective defense, NATO’s resilience, and the decisions made in Wales are elaborated and which are doubtlessly responding to the threats posed by Russia.45

We can see interesting changes in the wording of these documents. The Communiqué uses the expression „potential adversary” many times. The 2010 Strategic Concept however uses the word „adversary” only one time, in the paragraph which reads „The alliance does not consider any country to be its adversary.” The Wales Summit Declaration in 2014 mentions Russia in 19 paragraphs, but does not use the word „adversary” at all. In these 19 paragraphs related to Russia international law, condemnation of the events in Ukraine, NATO’s concerns and avoidance of confrontation are in the focus.

Poland, the Baltic States, Romania and Bulgaria try to make the Alliance give priority to the eastern flank when deciding about NATO’s future steps. However NATO insists on its 360 degree approach. Regarding Russia, NATO’s main tools are transparency, predictability and foremost, avoiding misunderstanding and escalation. The Alliance after the Warsaw Summit continues its path started in Wales. The first core task, defense and deterrence, has grown in importance. The unity of the Allies on that is crucial, although, now it is more difficult to achieve than ever. Europe is facing many security challenges (terrorism, migration, etc.) nowadays, which are affecting the member states in different ways and to varying extent and which might not be answered by NATO. Accordingly, NATO members have different priorities. NATO continuously maintains its “dual-track” approach which means they will not get back to the former “business as usual” unless there will be a significant change in the Russian behavior regarding the situation in Crimea in order to solve the problems peacefully and in accordance with international law. NATO is still open for political dialogue, since this is the only way to find a solution together and make the situation better.46

The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) – after a two-year break – had two meetings this year, the first in April and the second one after the Warsaw Summit, in July. Nonetheless the very fact that the parties sat down to talk again can be seen as a step forward, but besides the maintenance of the dialogue there have been no significant results. In April the main topic of the NRC meeting was Ukraine and the implementation of the Minsk Agreement, in July they concentrated on NATO’s forward presence and talked about how to avoid the “incidents” in the border regions. Another important issue for the NRC is the situation in Syria or Afghanistan, both of them could be the basis of future practical cooperation.47 Not only the Alliance but Russia also took the initiative. The Russian Deputy Minister of Defense raised the issue during a meeting of foreign military attaches and offered a possibility for consultation to the Ministries of Defense of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden and Finland. He suggested managing together mutual concerns caused by military activities in


near-border areas and preventing air and sea “incidents”. It is too early to state whether or not this initiative will lead to a real cooperation or it is only a well communicated political maneuver of Moscow.

WHAT’S NEXT?

According to the researchers of the SWP institute in Berlin, the time of the NATO-Russian “strategic partnership” is over, it failed, and the future path for the development of these relations is very narrow. The experts described three possible scenarios for the near future. In the first scenario the two parties will confront each other as a result of misunderstanding, lack of trust, or escalation of miscommunication. The second possibility foresees ad hoc (practical) cooperation in some cases between NATO and Russia but they will not be able to solve the main issues. According to the third scenario they will be able to get over their differences, they will cooperate but at the same time it means they would de facto recognize and/or approve all the events and actions taken in the past.

In the author’s view (knowing the past of these relations) we cannot expect a long-term confrontation, as it would deliver too serious consequences for both parties. Furthermore, we should not forget that NATO members have different views regarding Russia. This was reflected among others in the speech of the French president, Francois Hollande in Warsaw: “NATO has no role at all to be saying what Europe’s relations with Russia should be. For France, Russia is not an adversary, not a threat. [...] Russia is a partner” The second and third scenarios could be both realized. However, if we take the Alliance’s “no business as usual” approach seriously (and NATO will go with it), we can count only on the second scenario to come true. Later (maybe after the elections in the United States) the international security situation may change and the cooperation between NATO and Russia may be needed and desirable again. This way the Alliance will justify implicitly and de facto recognize what happened in Ukraine, just like it did one and a half decades ago with the Chechen Wars.

SUMMARY

After all we can only predict that any prediction for the future would be irresponsible. The ongoing processes which we can observe nowadays are unprecedented in the post-cold war era, extraordinary and were unforeseeable. Russia’s role and behavior in international relations has not changed in the past decades, but the usual way how Moscow used “soft power” to push its interests (see the Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes) were altered surprisingly by

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engaging the country in military actions not only in Ukraine but in Syria as well. NATO has always been concerned about the Russian way of conflict management in Eastern Europe but the events in the last two years radically changed the tone. NATO was forced into a new situation, the Alliance's policy needed to be re-oriented, re-defined. If NATO insists on its approach and does not activate the cooperation with Russia nor diminish the Ukrainian situation for another issue (which could be seen as more important at the moment – may it be for fight against terrorism, for Syria or the Middle East), the currently frozen relations between them cannot be expected to change in the near future. From the Russian side there will be no new course of action because it would mean the loss of its prestige and position against the “West”, unless the Russian internal affairs do make it necessary.

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ABSTRACT: Islamist terrorism is currently present in North Africa, outside some isolated attacks, since the Algerian Army prevented the Islamists from seizing power in 1991. However, ten years later there were several warnings about real or just imagined terrorist (islamist) threats in other countries of the region. In the following years the warnings multiplied. Three attacks had a special significance: the attack on the Mauritanian Army in Lemgheity on 4th June 2005; the first kidnapping of three Spanish citizens in the Sahel region of the Sahara desert (Mauritania) on 29th November 2009 by a group known as “Al-Qaeda in the Lands of Islamic Maghreb” (AQLIM); and the kidnapping of two Spanish and one Italian citizens in the Sahrawi refugee camps of Tindouf (South-West Algeria) on 23rd October 2011 by a group called “Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa” (MUJWA or MUJAO).

In this paper, after making reference to (I) the methodological premise of this study, I will refer to (II) the dubious character of the islamist terrorism that prevailed in Algeria mainly in the 90s, going then to analyse (III) the situation outside Algeria before 2005, and then (IV) I will focus on the birth of AQLIM in 2006, a group which carried out several attacks, considering the thesis that it is an instrumental terrorist group serving certain State interests, and will end with (V) reference to another of those groups (MUJWA), that is also quite likely to serve State interests. The (VI) alleged transformation of the MUJWA in the group “Al Murabitoun” and its merge with AQLIM and its allegiances to ISIS and Al Qaeda offer a final clarification of these processes.

KEYWORDS: North Africa, terrorism, AQIM, Al-Qaeda, MUJAO

A METHODOLOGICAL PREMISE: TERRORISM AND COVERT OPERATIONS

The laws establishing or regulating intelligence services consider the fight against terrorism as one of their aims, as terrorism is considered a type of violence politically motivated to attack or destroy a certain Government or State. In this sense intelligence agencies are the “enemies” of terrorist groups.

However, since the very first moments of the history of terrorism there have been accusations or suspicions against the very nature of the terrorist attacks. One of the most famous episodes was the Reichstag fire, attributed to a Communist terrorist but executed by a secret cell of the German ruling party. During the Cold War there were numerous authors who denounced the complicity of the communist governments with extreme-left terrorist groups in Western Europe. Maybe the clearest, although not the only, example was the “Rot Arme Fraktion” which operated in West-Germany. After the Cold War terrorism became one of the selective means used by Islamists. Several leaks of confidential information, mainly (but not only) by Wikileaks, revealed that well-known Islamist terrorist groups had the support of certain State secret services. This finding has even a legislative recognition in the “28 pages”
of the report on the 9/11\textsuperscript{1} attacks declassified on 15\textsuperscript{th} July 20016, and through the passing of the “Justice against Sponsors of Terrorism Act” (JASTA) on 29\textsuperscript{th} September 2016. Then, it is an uncontested fact that there are certain states sponsoring the terrorism. This paper considers that some state or states may also sponsor factual or just presumed terrorism in North Africa and that the states which sponsor terrorism use their secret services (“deep State”) to do it. The rivalries between Morocco and Algeria, France and Algeria, and Morocco and the Frente Polisario, taking into account the positions of other neighbouring countries (Spain, Mauritania and Mali) constitute the soil for eventual covert actions.

THE DUBIOUS CHARACTER OF ISLAMIST TERRORISM IN ALGERIA

After the cancellation of the 1992 elections by the Algerian Army, which were to be won by FIS (Islamic Salvation Front), an Islamic terrorist group the GIA (Armed Islamic Group) arose, which launched at first a guerrilla war and then a terrorist war against the army and the population. The GIA provided itself with guerrilla fighters who had been part of anti-Soviet Islamic movements, financed and trained by the North-American CIA and the Pakistani ISI. Once the pro-Soviet government was overthrown, these guerrilla fighters were a source of instability for the country and the CIA pressed Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf countries to provide the guerrilla fighters with passports and send them away from that area. An estimated 900 joined the GIA ranks. In 1998, a GIA faction appeared, the GSCP (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat), which would progressively eclipse the first one. Terrorism was practiced in Algeria, although there were accusations that this terrorism was actually just a disguised instrument of state actors.

Some of the accusations pointed at the Algerian State itself. Those accusations were branded with the tag “Qui tue qui”. Shortly after the actions of the Army and the civil population against the guerrillas and Islamic terrorism started (from 1992), a thesis began to spread widely according to which actually the Algerian intelligence services were behind the Islamic terrorist groups. This so-called thesis (“who kills who?”) was developed in order to accuse the Algerian secret services (“DRS-Département de Renseignement et Sécurité”) of being those who were encouraging the Islamic terrorism that devastated the country mainly in the nineties. In my opinion, this thesis should be considered with scepticism for various reasons. First of all, the works supporting this thesis\textsuperscript{2} have been fought by their adversaries arguing that they provide data that are inaccurate\textsuperscript{3}. In the second place, it should be noted that the most active elements in its dissemination (Florence Aubenas and José Garçon, journalists of \textit{Libération}; Jean-Baptiste Rivoire, journalist at Channel\textsuperscript{+}; and other persons in the editorial world like François Gèze, owner of the publishing house \textit{La Découverte}) have been

\textsuperscript{1} Joint Enquiry into Intelligence Community activities prior and after the terrorists attacks of September 11, 2001. Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, December 2002. The “28 pages” declassified in September 2016 are 415-443.


accused of being linked to the French DGSE (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure), the foreign secret service of the power hostile to Algeria which is par excellence France. One of those journalists, José Garçon, was also accused of complicity with the Moroccan secret service after a certain “Chris Coleman’s” leak on Twitter of an important number of documents and emails of the Moroccan Secret Service and especially of the link between the Service and those journalists, according to the documents.

However, there have been other accusations, more solid in my view, which point at Morocco and France as the backers of Islamist terrorism in Algeria. As a matter of fact it is common knowledge that, after the Islamic rebellion started in Algeria, the Algerian fundamentalists enjoyed great freedom of movement in France, a country which did not hide its sympathy for the Islamic triumph in Algeria. There are several grounds for the thesis of the French and Moroccan support of the Algerian Islamists.

First of all, we have the concurring testimony of two central characters: Abdelhak Layada (“national emir” until 1994 of one of the Islamic terrorist groups preceding the so-called “AQLIM”, the Armed Islamic Group-GIA), and Dris Basri (Moroccan Minister for Home Affairs until 1999).

Layada confessed that he had received some aid from the Moroccan government and had met with Driss Basri, Minister for Home Affairs and the right-hand of the king, and with Hassán II himself. About his interview with the king, he only revealed that he had been blackmailed with regard to Western Sahara and even that the Moroccan government had suggested him to recruit members of the Polisario Front in order to be able to immediately incriminate them for their involvement in terrorist acts. On June 8th 2009, the BBC broadcasting station in Arabic questioned the current Moroccan minister of Foreign Affairs Taieb Fassi-Fihri about Layada’s statements and the Moroccan minister did not deny them, which led his interviewer to say that then the same had to be understood as certain.

Abdelaq Layada also confessed that he received support from France, doing very serious allegations, such as France helped GIA to organise a coup that was aborted; France supplied

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4 La Nouvelle République, “Terrorisme : la France et le jeu d’équilibre” (Terrorism : France and the balancing game), (4-VIII-2010); cfr.: http://www.djazaress.com/fr/lnr/92855; https://es.groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/sahara-info/conversations/messages/6917


weapons to GIA\(^8\); and the French secret services were behind the unlawful seizure of an Airbus by the GIA back on December 24\(^{th}\) 1994\(^9\).

As far as Dris Basri is concerned, we have his testimony in one of his last interviews where he said that the Moroccan government was not only aware of the fact that the Islamic terrorists who operated in Algeria were taking refuge in Morocco, but they did not even think about intervening to prevent it\(^{10}\).

Moreover, the analysis of what is certainly the most investigated GIA crime (the murder of seven French Trappist monks in Tibéhirine) is far from confirming the implication of the Algerian intelligence in such murder, notwithstanding the accusations made by the advocates of the “qui tue qui?” (“who kills who?”), and it rather allows to defend completely opposed theses\(^{11}\). The investigation of this crime led journalist Didier Contant to discredit several of the most relevant representatives of the thesis that accused the Algerian intelligence of complicity with the GIA, such as Abdelkader Tigha and Jean-Baptiste Rivoire. Contant, who came to the conclusion that there was no such complicity, was subject of a slandering campaign and was harassed by Rivoire. The outcome is that Contant died in not very clear circumstances. On November 26\(^{th}\) 2009, Rivoire was convicted by a Paris Court for having exerted premeditated violence against Contant, thus being given victory to the criminal proceedings initiated by Rina Sherman, the fiancée of the deceased Contant\(^{12}\).

**THE TERRORIST THREAT SPREADS OUTSIDE ALGERIA**

On October 30\(^{th}\) 2001, Morocco retired his Ambassador in Spain, as a reaction to the position of the Government of Spain and at the moment opposed to a solution to the conflict of

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\(^10\) Interview with Driss Basri in the *ABC* journal (30-V-2004):

“P.: Cuando Argelia ardía por el terrorismo, el gobierno de Argel acusó a a Marruecos de dejar pasar a su territorio a los terroristas para descansar después de cometer sus atentados en suelo argelino. ¿Era cierto aquello? (Q.: When Algeria was on fire because of the terrorism, the government of Algiers accused Morocco of letting the terrorists pass into its territory in order to take some rest after committing their attacks in Algerian soil. ¿Was that true?)

R.: Sí, estábamos al corriente, pero no podíamos hacer nada. Esos maquis atravesan la frontera para ver a sus parientes, y no siempre sabíamos quienes era. Aun si lo hubiéramos sabido, si no cometían ningún acto delictivo en nuestro territorio no teníamos motivo para intervenir” (cursivas mías) (A.: Yes, we were informed, but we could not do anything about it. Those guerrilla bands crossed the border in order to visit their relatives and we did not always know who they were. Even if we had known that, if they did not commit any criminal act on our soil, we had no reason to intervene. (The italics are mine). Cf.: http://hemeroteca.abc.es/nav/Navigate.exe/hemeroteca/madrid/abc/2004/05/30/011.html


\(^12\) http://www.lemidi-dz.com/index.php?option=voir_article&id_article=evenement%40art4%402009-11-29. https://es.groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/sahara-info/conversations/messages/6652
Western Sahara without holding a referendum for self-determination. In the context of such a crisis, on June 23rd 2002, Morocco detained three Saudi nationals accused of preparing attacks against the Sixth USA Fleet in the Straight of Gibraltar with “suicide-boats”. Just 3 weeks later Morocco invaded the small Spanish island of Perejil, in the Straight of Gibraltar, with the argument that it intended to prevent terrorist attacks in the zone. As I said at the very first moment, this “anti-terrorist” operation was just a swindle to justify the occupation of the Spanish Territories in Northern Africa off the Mediterranean coast. Notwithstanding, an author close to Spanish official bodies gave credibility to this operation, ignoring my opinion. However, there was no follow-up for this so-called threat after Spain liberated the island in a blitz operation.

On 16th May 2003 there were some suicide attacks in Casablanca (Morocco) although some of them were aimed at Spanish interests. At the time of the attacks on May 16th 2003, the question of their authorship was raised in Casablanca. Two theories were presented. According to the first one, which I defended, the attacks complied with Morocco’s internal dynamics. According to the second, the official one, the attacks had an external inspiration and specifically from a group allegedly connected to “Al-Qaeda”, the “Moroccan Islamic Combattant Group” (“GICM”). Notwithstanding the fact that it had not previously committed any attack, on October 10th 2002 (before the Casablanca bombings) the group was included, at the request of Morocco, in the terrorist organizations list created after Resolution 1333 (2000) of the Security Council concerning Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and their associates. The alleged “GICM”, the existence of which was asserted by the Moroccan government, was a little later declared as an existing “terrorist group” by the North American and the British governments, before the Casablanca attacks. It should be pointed out that when those attacks were performed the alleged “GICM” did not claim responsibility for such attacks.

17 So is said, for example, by Miguel Hernando de Larramendi, “Las relaciones con Marruecos tras los atentados del 11 de marzo” (The relationships with Morocco after the attacks of March 11), Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano (5-IV-2004). cf. http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielecano/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=elecano/elecano_es/zonas_es/terrorismo+internacional/ari+61-2004
18 The USA also listed this “group” before it committed any crime on November, 22nd 2002. The “group” was delisted on May 28th 2013.
19 Statement of December 5, 2002, Federal Register: December 17, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 242, 77311). The North-American statement only says that this group “has committed, or poses a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism”.

If “Al-Qaeda” had already been present in North Africa through that alleged “GICM” which, according to some people, was already bound with Bin Laden’s organization, why should a “franchise” for the whole Maghreb under the name of “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” been established? This issue is even more surprising when you consider that at the origin of this alleged “Al-Qaeda” there was another group (GIA-GSPC) which, according to the United Nations’ terrorist organization list, had already had connections with “Al-Qaeda”20. The fact is that the European Court of Human Rights has declared that the “evidences” obtained by Moroccan courts about the “GICM” have been obtained in clear violation of the right not to be tortured and therefore have no validity in European courts21.

Some Moroccan nationals were involved in the Madrid bombings on 11th March 2004. The attack presented some peculiar circumstances. The first and more important one is that it was not carried out by suicide-terrorists despite some misinformation at the first moment. The second is that several Moroccan nationals were involved in this attack, one of them, Said Berraj, the most important of all (considered as material author of the crime) fled, has never been captured and was suspected to work for the Moroccan Secret Service22. But the third and most important factor is that two high-ranking Spanish officials (one publicly, the other privately) acknowledged a link between this attack and the question of Western Sahara. On the one hand, Minister of Foreign Affairs Miguel Ángel Moratinos said on July 15th 2004, at a summer course organized by the University Complutense of Madrid, that an acceptable solution for the conflict of Western Sahara was vital for all the parties in the conflict, and also for the others, because otherwise “we will still have situations like the one in Madrid on March 11th”23. On the other hand, General Director for the Foreign Policy in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa Álvaro Iranzo Gutiérrez privately communicated with an USA official in the same direction in at least two cables released by Wikileaks. In a cable dated July 14th 2004 (that is, one day before the public statement made by the Spanish MFA) he said that “the GOS is concerned that failure in the Western Sahara would jeopardize the MINURSO mandate, radicalize Moroccans, and possibly increase illegal immigration and terrorism in Spain”24. In another cable dated three years later (October 1st 2007), the same Iranzo discussed “about Spanish concerns about terrorism coming from or through the Maghreb. “Western Sahara is our Iraq,” said Iranzo”25. It is worth mentioning that long before, at the time when Spain administered Western Sahara, according to another USA cable from 1973, the Moroccan MFA said that “if Spain intended to present Morocco with a

The Government just answered that the Government has no evidence about it
23 According to a dispatch of EFE, speaking about the Western Sahara conflict the Minister said: “la consecución de una solución acceptable para todos ‘es una necesidad objetiva y vital para ellos y, sobre todo, para nosotros, porque si no seguiremos viviendo situaciones como el 11 de Marzo’”.
The pages with this statement are almost all completely deleted in the web. It still can be found in https://es.groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/sahara-info/conversations/messages/2739 and http://www.libertaddigital.com/mundo/moratinos-dice-que-si-no-se-resuelve-el-conflicto-del-sahara-viviremos-situaciones-como-el-11-m-1276227945/
24 https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04MADR12659_a.html
25 https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07STATE138404_a.html
fait accomplice of referendum which would result either in a decision of continued association of Spanish Sahara with Spain or for independence, Morocco would create a situation of great insecurity for Spain in the Sahara and has means to do so”26.

On June 4th 2005, there was an armed attack that killed 15 Mauritanian soldiers in the north of Mauritania, at the Lemghity garrison (situated near the frontier between Mauritania and Mali and Algeria) and 400(!) kilometres away from the Western Sahara frontier. The responsibility for that attack was claimed by the Algerian group GSPC (“Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat”) so far operating inside the Algerian borders.

THE APPEARANCE OF THE AQLIM IN 2006

1.

The GSPC in 2006, under strange circumstances, decided to change its name into “Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb” (AQLIM) and allegedly took a pledge of loyalty to Osama Bin Laden. On a webpage no more existent (Magharebia) officially sponsored by the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) on North African issues, strange circumstances that gave rise to this “Al-Qaeda” were reminded:

“The relationships between (Abdelmalek) Droukdel27 (the supposed former AQIM leader) and (Abou Obeida) YouCEF 28 (the supposed new AQIM leader and previous head of the group’s “Council of Worthies”) have deteriorated ever since the 2006 announcement that the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) had become affiliated with the international Al-Qaeda network. The Council of Worthies was set aside and it was never consulted by the terrorist organization’s new leader (Droukdel)”29.

Such a rare form of “association” with Al-Qaeda led an Algerian newspaper, La Nouvelle République, to ask:

“Is GSPC affiliation with Al-Qaeda credible? Why not consider that it is a promoted, provoked, programmed announcement by those who consider us as their strategic enemy within the geopolitical area which the Algerian authorities do not give up declaring as their property?”30.

This group has been responsible for several kidnappings and assassinations since it was labelled as “AQLIM”. Those crimes were carried out against French, Spanish, Austrian, and British citizens, in Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Tunisia31. One of the more striking actions was the kidnapping of three Spanish citizens in Mauritania on November 29th 2009, shortly after the outbreak of the crisis in the “Haidar case” that made Spain confront with Morocco, shortly after Morocco illegally deported to Spain Saharawi citizen Aminatu Haidar, who had landed in El Aaiún, on November 14th. The Moroccan authorities took Haidar’s passport and deported her to Spain with the complicity of the Spanish authorities.

27 Also known as the alias of Abu Mussaab Abdelwadud.
28 “Abu Obeida Yusef” or “Yusef el Annabi” is the alias of Yassid Embarek.
29 https://es.groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/sahara-info/conversations/messages/6773 
30 La Nouvelle République (16-III-2010): https://es.groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/sahara-info/conversations/messages/6773
The deported then began a hunger strike at the airport of Lanzarote until she was allowed to return to her country, Western Sahara, something that only occurred on December 17th 2009. The webpage of the US Department of State considers that AQLIM was listed as a terrorist group on 27th March 2002\(^{32}\), however at that time AQLIM as such did not exist and it was the GSPC which was listed.

2.

There are several reasons to support the idea that “AQLIM” might be used as an instrument by one or several states. Several theses were devised in this regard: some of them bind “AQLIM” with Mali; others with Algeria; others with the Polisario Front and others with Morocco and France. Of course, if “AQLIM” is an instrument for covert operations it also might not be just ONE organization, but a set of two or more groups manipulated by different actors.

**AQLIM and Mali**

The bond between “AQLIM” and Mali, although it did not appear originally, has been denounced as an occurred fact. The argumentation turns around two ideas. On one hand, the surprising AQLIM freedom of movement in Mali, according to the testimony of Mustafá Chafi (a Mauritanian citizen, assistant and adviser of the former president of Burkina (Blaise Compaoré), who acted as a mediator in order to release some Spanish citizens who had been kidnapped by “AQLIM”), who admitted at an interview with the daily newspaper ABC that, during his intervention to make “AQIM” release three kidnapped Spanish citizens he went to “AQIM” bases in the North of Mali at least twelve times\(^{33}\). On the other hand, it has been stated that “AQIM” takes advantage of the passiveness or even of the complicity of certain Malian responsible agents belonging to the high spheres of the state\(^{34}\) or at least to corrupt spheres of the state\(^{35}\). A variation of this thesis binds “AQLIM” with Mustafá Chafi. According to the Algerian press, during the kidnapping of the Spanish citizens in 2009-2010 the Mauritanian govern-

\(^{32}\) [http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm; However, the Executive Order 13224 blocking Terrorist Property and a summary of the Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, considers that the GSPC was listed on August 21st 2002.](http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm)

\(^{33}\) “Mustafá Chafi told ABC how he managed to release the two aid workers”, *ABC* (24-VIII-2010). On the above mentioned reportage this textual phrase is assigned to the mediator: “During the nine months kidnapping, Chafi went up to the Camps of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb at least a dozen times and each time negotiated face to face with Mojtar Belmokhtar, the responsible for the cell that was detaining the Spanish citizens”. Cfr. [http://www.abc.es/20100824/espana/liberacion-201008240111.html](http://www.abc.es/20100824/espana/liberacion-201008240111.html)

\(^{34}\) This is asserted by the Algerian newspaper “Liberté” on its edition of 31-VIII-2010 in an article under the heading “Le Mali, une fausse note dans la lutte antiterroriste: ce pays est devenu une base arrière de l’islamisme armé” (Mali, a false note in the fight against terrorism: this country became a rear base of armed Islamism). In this article is affirmed that “everything is done under the planning of the State which takes advantage of the intermediaries who move around the Malian power” according to some persons close to the “AQIM” leader, named Belmokhtar, who kidnapped the Spanish citizens. The daily paper adds that a former comrade of Belmokhtar disclosed that he has seen responsible agents of the Malian government taking tea at AQIM camps in the desert on occasion of a courtesy call to a leader of the group”. cf. [http://www.liberte-algerie.com/edit_archive.php?id=141783](http://www.liberte-algerie.com/edit_archive.php?id=141783)

AQLIM and Algeria (and USA)

The thesis linking “AQLIM” to Algeria and the USA has its precedent in the “qui tue qui” accusations which bound the Algerian intelligence service with the Algerian Islamic terrorism before the appearance of “AQLIM”. Later has been supported by Jeremy Keenan as its most prominent upholder.

Keenan says that “the way in which this terrorism was fabricated is a very long narrative, (...) That whole long narrative was conducted by the Algerian secret military intelligence services — the DRS”. Keenan, has developed this thesis by adding a new argument: the USA became an accomplice of “AQLIM” kidnappings by providing intelligence and political cover to the operations of the Algerian secret services. The reason that led Washington to this cooperation was the purpose of fabricating a terrorist threat at the very heart of the Sahara in order to be able to immediately justify the USA military expansion in Africa with a view to control the oil and the natural resources of the continent, in particular those of the Sahara. It was this operation that provided the pretext for the launch of a new front on the War on Terror in Africa: the Sahara-Sahel front”. According to Keenan, on its part Algeria consented on this operation because it needed modern military equipment in order to put an end to the armed activities that arose after the military coup which prevented the Algerian Islamists to reach power in 1992.

However, Keenan’s thesis has some inconsistencies or weak points. Firstly, he assumes the thesis of “Qui tue qui?” (Who kills who?) to be true although there are good reasons to think that it may have been launched as a disinformation operation. Secondly, it is difficult to understand why Algeria would support the creation of a terrorist threat in Sahara-Sahel to obtain modern weapons meant to fight a group which is already a threat inside the country(!) and which ironically is said to be created and controlled by the Algerian secret service itself.

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Thirdly, it is unreasonable that the creator of such a terrorist group could be the very same country that doubtlessly fights it the most: the group’s leaders were tried and condemned (and put on the run in order not to be imprisoned); the government is against the payment of ransoms that will finance the group; finally, there is no doubt that Algeria is the country which eliminated several terrorists.

Nevertheless, it is also true that Keenan emphasized some very relevant facts. The most interesting one may be that as early as 2003 there was an attempt to link the GSPC leader (known as “El Para”) to Bin Laden through a video, although it appears that the video was a fraud\textsuperscript{38}.

\textit{AQLIM and the Polisario Front}

A less credible thesis, but the most insidious one, is the one that binds AQLIM with the Polisario Front and which was widely spread from publications to the environment centres of the Moroccan intelligence service. This thesis began to circulate as a result of the 2005 attack on the Mauritanian garrison of Lemghéity ascribed to GSPC\textsuperscript{39}, near the boundary of this country with Mali and later on it came up again on the occasion of the kidnapping of three Spanish citizens in Mauritania, in November 2009.

Just a few days after the Lemghéity attack on \textit{June 4\textsuperscript{th} 2005}, the disinformation machine of the Moroccan secret services entered into operation and daily paper “Makhzen” (“\textit{Aujourd’hui le Maroc}”), very close to the high spheres of the supreme Moroccan power, started the “mediatisation” operation with an article entitled “The Algerian trail becomes definite”, which reported the following:

“(…) One of the injured men at the Lemghéity attack has stated that, during the attack, he identified two “Land Rover” vehicles belonging to Polisario. The passengers of these vehicles who were present at the moment of the attack helped the terrorists to transport the communication equipment and weaponry, affirmed the injured man in a statement at the office of MAP (Moroccan official news agency) in Nuakchott (Mauritanian capital). The injured, whose state of health improved, added that the first groups of armed elements of the GSPC who arrived at the place of the attack were speaking fluently the “Hassaniya” dialect,

\textsuperscript{38} Keenan, J. “Conspiracy theories and ‘terrorists’”, cit., 5-6.
\textsuperscript{39} I pointed this idea in 2006, see “Implicaciones estratégicas de la nueva situación política en Mauritania” (12-I-2006) https://www.almendron.com/politica/pdf/2006/int/int_1719.pdf

However, there is an author (close to the Spanish Army and secret service) who repeatedly has tried to contest this opinion. According to his view the “first” time that Morocco tried to link the Polisario with the Islamist terrorism was in “2002” in a meeting of Mohamed VI with Donald Rumsfeld in “Ifran” (Morocco). Cfr. Carlos Echeverría, “La industria del secuestro en el escenario africano”, Ejército nº 850 (2012), 114. The same author exposed the same opinion in “¿Proyección limitada de Al Qaeda en las tierras del Magreb islámico (AQMI)?” (/13-XI-2010), http://www.onemagazine.es/noticia/3123/sin-especificar/proyeccion-limitada-de-al-qaeda-en-las-tierras-del-magreb-islamico-aqmi.html

However this thesis lack of any credibility at all for the very simple reason that there has never been a meeting between Mohamed VI and Rumsfeld in Ifran in 2002.
which leads one to believe that they were “Bidani”. On the other hand, he denied that these men were Mauritanian.40

This thesis was assumed by the “report” published in November 2005 by a Centre for Studies with headquarters in Brussels (ESISC) in order to discredit the Polisario Front, by stating that “it was not possible to reject” the thesis that Polisario was involved in that attack, given the fact that it was claimed by “certain witnesses”41. Well now, the “witnesses” are only “one”, the injured man mentioned by “Aujourd’hui le Maroc”. An injured man whose credibility is null and void not only for reasons we shall discuss later but also because the “Bidani” who speak “Hassaniya” are both the Saharawi and the non-black Mauritanian.

A few weeks before the publication of the ESISC report meant to discredit the Polisario Front in December 2005, the critical Moroccan weekly newspaper “Le Journal Hebdomadaire” published a special number on the same subject42. That special number reproduced numerous fragments of the mentioned report in order to explain the weekly newspaper’s theses which were structured into three articles. In one of them, it was said that ESISC was funded through the payment of orders for studies placed with them and that there were reasons to suspect that the report had been directly or indirectly financed by the Moroccan power. In another article it was stated that the report was “remotely controlled” by Rabat. Finally, in a third article, there was an interview with Bernabé López García, a well-known Spanish defender of Moroccan theses, who said that the report had been prepared “to please Morocco.”

A concurrent fact gave some credibility to the denouncement made by “Le Journal Hebdomadaire”. The Polisario Front sent ESISC a written response to the “report” dated December 29th 200543. To that official response the replies worked out by members of the Polisario Front in their personal capacity should be added44. ESISC has refused to publish it. Up to this day. Since that time the partiality in favour of the Moroccan power has no longer been a subjective issue but an objective one.

The special number of “Le Journal Hebdomadaire” has been quite a severe blow to the makhzen because it assumes the total loss of credibility of the ESISC report which was supposed to discredit the Polisario Front. It had been no use to try to silence the Polisario Front by refusing its right of reply. “Le Journal Hebdomadaire”, the most prestigious publication in the diplomatic environment accredited in Rabat, had just dismantled the discrediting operation against the Polisario Front.

Before such a failure, the reaction did not take long: Claude Moniquet, a representative of ESISC, sued Le Journal for considering that the statement about the report having been

41 ESISC, The Polisario Front, credible negotiations partner or after-effect of the cold war and obstacle to a political solution in Western Sahara? (November 2005). Cfr.: (page 73 of the report). The text is no more available in the ESISC webpage.
42 Le Journal Hebdomadaire had a page in Internet. After the closure of this newspaper by pressure of the Moroccan authorities, that page disappeared. Nevertheless, the articles it has published on this issue can be consulted here: http://es.groups.yahoo.com/group/sahara-info/thread/4105
43 http://www.arso.org/esiscpf.pdf
“ordered” by Morocco was defamation⁴⁵. He made this claim before the Moroccan courts. Moniquet’s lawyer recognized that “it was Moroccan staff members who are perfectly integrated in various European countries who instigated the report”. The trial was held in a record time and the result was the expectable one in a country like Morocco, where there is no judicial independence: “Le Journal” was convicted to pay a fine equivalent to 275,000 euros, the highest one in Morocco’s history. Do not forget that the average salary in Morocco is around 200 euros a month. The final result was that “Le Journal” had to shut down because it could not cope with such a payment. The conviction occurred after “Le Journal” accused Moniquet and his lawyer of bad faith. Bad faith was clear as Claude Moniquet did not sue Bernabé López before the Spanish courts for having stated that the report was made “to please Morocco”.

But finally justice did its job in order to put an end to the speculations. On July 13th 2009, the Court of Appeal of Nuakchott tried the Lemgheity case, determined who had carried out the attack against the Lemgheity garrison on June 4th 2005, condemned some detainees and released others. It was proven that there had been absolutely no involvement of the Polisario Front⁴⁶:

“According to an ANI correspondent, the Court of Appeal has made public his verdict on the Lemgheity matter on Monday afternoon, (…) The sentences are as follows: conviction of Taher Uld Biyé and Teyeb Uld Salek for falsification and use of falsifications, belonging to an armed group against Mauritania. Taher Uld Abdel Jelil Uld Biyé was sentenced to eight instead of five years imprisonment. Teyeb Uld Salek was sentenced to seven instead of three years imprisonment. The Court confirmed the three year prison sentence for the convicted Ely Cheij Uld Jaumani and the conviction to two years (on probation) of Mustafá Uld Abdel Kader. It acquitted Mohamed Salem Uld Mohamed Lemín, a.k.a. Al Mashlisi, Sidi Uld Sidina, Brahim Uld Hmeida. It filed, by reason of his death, the accusation made against Ahmed Uld Rahdi. The Court postponed the pronouncement of its verdict with respect to those who were tried in absentia, namely Mohamed Lamin, Uld Yeddu and Mohamed el Mustafá Uld Cheiguer Sidi Mohamed Uld Cheijani, expecting that they may appear according to the laws in force”. The proof that this accusation is based on a clear bad faith is that even after this sentence has proven the untruth of the accusations against the Polisario Front, some people went on keeping them up, thus feeding the spiral of misinformation that was caused to rise by the Moroccan intelligence. So did ESISC on a new report in which it renews the accusations already made in 2005, without any reconsideration in spite of the facts⁴⁷. So did a Spanish journalist too adding some new elements to this fabrication:

“The attack on June 4th 2005 by the GSCP against Mauritanian barracks in Lemgheity, in which fifteen soldiers were killed, seems to announce that beyond logistical work the

 analogous to the security of the Gendarmerie, which had been disorganized in the same way as if there was an attack, the train that was just passing by in the desert did not hear the shots. It was true that the Polisario is quite close to the Mauritanian border. In addition, on the way, the Gendarmerie stopped a car that was going to stop the immigration of the Polisario Front members. Although, this car did not even have any marking, only a woman was inside. Fourteen months later, the Polisario Front was able to organize an attack in the Mauritanian desert. It is true that the Mauritanian Gendarmerie investigates this matter for which no evidence has been found so far.”

⁴⁵ A complete dossier on this process can be found in this address: http://www.arso.org/esiscpf.pdf
Saharawi are directly involved in terrorist attacks. The participation of at least one member of the Polisario Front, Muawia Uld Lamín Labied, was established by the subsequent investigation. Besides, according to the latter, 4×4 vehicles of the Polisario Front were used in the operation and several terrorists spoke the Arabic dialect Hassaniya, typical of the Saharawi.™

It should be noted that, although the judgement by the Court of Appeal of Nuakchott had been issued well before the book was published, the author omits that according to the real judicial investigation there is no Polisario Front member called “Muawia Uld Lamín Labied” convicted, not even prosecuted, because of this matter. On the other hand, it is highly suspicious that an expert in the region argues, in order to accuse the Polisario Front, that the terrorists “spoke the Hassaniya dialect, typical of the Saharawi” when it is well known that same dialect is also spoken in Mauretania. In fact, precisely because they were Mauritanians, all convicted spoke Hassaniya.

Between October 2014 and January 2015, there was a massive leak of secret Moroccan documents through a twitter account (@chris_coleman24). Among those documents there was a number of emails where the cabinet chief of the Director of the Moroccan foreign intelligence launched a campaign against the Polisario Front using this so-called “report”.™

B

Although it was the first time, after the attack on Lemgheity that the Polisario Front was publicly accused of being linked to Islamic terrorism, the ESISC “report” of November 2005 refers to some pretended previous connections in the year of 2004. However, this is a thesis with no basis at all. The ESISC “report” attributes these statements to “a high-ranking Moroccan official who is an expert in this subject matter”:

“1994 the Algerian security services captured, in the hands of GIA terrorists, a few weapons the serial number of which showed them that they had been supplied by their own Army… to Polisario. We have never known whether these weapons have been sold within a context of traffic or they have been supplied to the terrorists by followers in the Tinduf camps. What is true, on the other hand, is that the Algerian military security forces have asked Polisario for explanations and have very seriously intensified their control over the Islamists who belong to the Front…”™

Although the ESISC report only makes an insinuation saying that “we have never known whether these weapons have been sold within a context of traffic or have been supplied to the terrorists by followers in the Tinduf camps”, a Spanish journalist known for his closeness to the official positions of Rabat had no doubt in citing this report to say something much more serious that not even the report of ESISC dared to say. In particular, this journalist said:

48 Alvarado, D. La yihad a nuestras puertas. La amenaza de Al Qaeda en el Magreb Islámico (The Jihad at our doors. Al-Qaida threat in Islamic Maghreb), Foca-Akal, Madrid, 2010, 178. The author adds to this text a footnote (note 81) saying that “a Mauritian soldier who survived the attack declared before those in charge of the investigation that in the terrorist convoy were all-terrain vehicles from the Polisario Front”. Note that the author virtually reproduces what is said by Aujourd’hui le Maroc on June 20, 2005. Among the many emails leaked on this issue, see http://diasporasaharaui.blogspot.com.es/2014/10/document-prouvant-la-relation-entre.html

49 ESISC, The Polisario Front, credible negotiations partner or after-effect of the cold war and obstacle to a political solution in Western Sahara? (November 2005), page 71 of the report.

50 The report, on footnote number 139 says that the source is an “interview with a high Moroccan responsible, Rabat, August 8, 2005”.
“In some cases a direct relationship of the Polisario Front’s young people is established with the GIA terrorists. In 1994 the contacts between both organizations were evident when, (…), the security services seized a stock of weapons from the GIA, which the Algerian Army itself had previously provided to the Polisario Front, this fact being confirmed by the serial number of the arsenal seized”\(^5\)

This statement is rather incredible as the Islamic Front was the not close at all to the Polisario whose ideology was close to the socialist panarabism. Moreover, a good expert of the region must know that the “national emir” of the GIA, Abdelhaq Layada, when he was tried in Algiers in 1994 after being captured, declared that before his extradition by Morocco, high representatives of that State have asked him to eliminate some members of the Moroccan opposition living in Algeria, as well as the Secretary General of the Polisario Front Mohamed Abdelaziz\(^6\).

\(\text{C}\)

After the Lemgheity attack there was a new essay to link the Polisario Front to “AQLIM” after the kidnapping of three Spanish citizens in Mauritania on November 29\(^{th}\) 2009, only a few days after the beginning of the Spanish-Moroccan crisis with the “Haidar case”, mentioned above.

1. Just one day after the kidnapping of the Spanish citizens the disinformation operation began. The office of the France Presse Agency (AFP) in Rabat issued a press release according to which “a Moroccan security source” had told them that “the three aid workers would have been abandoned between the North of Mauritania and the South of Western Sahara” in the region of “Aguoumite” (Agwanit, the part of Western Sahara under control of the SADR/Polisario Front). The same dispatch, however, said that these data had been denied by a “Moroccan government official”\(^5\). In another press release from Rabat, the AFP argued that “one of the kidnappers who respond to the name of “Azzouzz” – according to the source cited by AFP – had a position of responsibility in the Polisario Front, an armed group that calls for the independence of Western Sahara”\(^5\).

Despite the low consistency of these press releases a digital medium close to the Moroccan positions, on the very same day of December 1\(^{st}\) 2009 echoed the information of APF with two articles that fed the idea that the Polisario Front was involved. On one hand, it headlined that “New information points to possible release of aid workers” relegating to the fine print that was partly dedicated to the denial of such release announced by the headline\(^5\). On the other hand, and this is more serious, there appeared another article under the title “Morocco

\(^5\) Alvarado, D. La yihad a nuestras puertas, cit., 175. The author adds a footnote to this text (note 77) citing as source the report of ESISC, but without citing the page of document where that statement is supposed to be found.


\(^5\) AFP (30-XI-2009), “No contact with Spanish hostages in Mauritania: ambassador”. The news has been deleted in the web.

\(^5\) AFP (1-XII-2010), “Los españoles secuestrados en Mauritania habrían sido liberados, según AFP” (The Spanish citizens kidnapped in Mauritania would have been released, according to APF); cf.: http://www.abc.es/20091201/nacional-asuntos-exterior/tres-espanoles-secuestrados-mauritania-200912012037.html

\(^5\) Canales, P. El Imparcial (1-XII-2010), “Nuevas informaciones apuntan a la posible liberación de los cooperantes” (New information points out to the possible release of the aid workers), cf.: http://www.elimparcial.es/nacional/localizados-los-tres-cooperantes-espanoles-secuestrados-en-mauritania-52884.html
insinuates that behind the kidnapping would be the Polisario Front”. In the text of the same article it is stated that

“In the kidnapping of the three Spanish persons in Mauritania “several terrorist groups are involved who operate in the region” and “persons who live in the Tinduf camps”, according to an official release made public this Tuesday by the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs”56.

This digital medium adds the reference of AFP to mentioned “Azzouzz” in order to totally side with the alleged Moroccan thesis, as it subtitles one section of this “information” as follows: “The information confirms that one of the kidnappers belonged to the Polisario Front” (the italic is mine). Only a day later a digital medium close to the Polisario Front published a parody-article commenting the alleged existence of a so-called “Azzouzz” in the Polisario Front and calling attention to the fact that no one is called so among the Saharawi57.

2. After these early skirmishes, a second intoxicating offensive was produced a few weeks later. On February 20th 2010, the government of Mali handed over one of its citizens (who had been detained a short time before) to Mauritania, in order to be judged for his participation in the kidnapping of the Spanish. The individual concerned, called Omar Uld Sidi Uld Ahmed, began to receive the nickname “Omar Saharawi”, despite being a citizen of Mali58. From this time on, a new intoxication process began.

A Web Page (Sahel “Intelligence”), during Uld Hama’s two-day detention began the new intoxication campaign in an article signed by a former lieutenant colonel of the Israeli Army. On the basis of presumed “reliable sources close to the security services operating in the region” this new campaign articulated two points. On one hand, it launched for the first time the a.k.a. of “Omar Saharawi” to designate Uld Hama; on the other hand, also for the first time, it launched the idea that newly named “Omar Saharawi” was nothing more and nothing less than a “staff member of the Polisario Front”. From then on, Benshimon sustains that this detention reinforces the Moroccan thesis that “certain staff members of Polisario glided to Sahel’s Islamic terrorist movements”59.

From this point on the campaign continued. A blog close to the Moroccan intelligence service named “Sahara-retos”, in the beginning of April launched the idea that “Omar Saharawi” and others involved in the kidnapping were Saharawi:

“The aid workers, two of whom are still in the hands of Mokhtar Belmokhtar, Emir of AQIM in Sahel, were kidnapped by Omar Ould Sid’Ahmed Ould Hamma a.k.a. Omar Saharawi, member of Polisario, who has just been accused by the Mauritanian justice as the main author of the kidnapping and therefore imprisoned in the Central Prison of Nuakchot.

56 Canales, P. El Imparcial (1-XII-2010), Marruecos insinúa que detras del secuestro estaria el Frente Polisario (Morocco insinuates that behind the kidnapping would be the Polisario Front), cf.: http://www.elimparcial.es/nacional/marruecos-insinua-que-detras-del-secuestro-de-los-tres-espanoles-estaria-el-frente-polisario-52908.html
I have not been able to locate the official release made public by the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs; therefore I cannot confirm that it actually exists.
57 Beiruk, J. “¿AZZOUZZ?”, blog Sahara Opinions (2-XII-2010); cf.: http://saharaopinions.blogspot.com/2009/12/azzouzz.html
58 ANI (20-II-2010), “L’argentier des enlèvements d’otages européens en Mauritanie entre les mains de la DGSN” (The “money man” of the kidnappings of European hostages in Mauritania in the hands of DGSN); cfr. https://es.groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/sahara-info/conversations/messages/6742
This piece of information is still not known by Spanish society.

Other executive staff members of Polisario

From Mauritania a request was made to Algeria concerning Polisario leaders Mohamed Salem Mohamed Ali Ould Rguiibi, a military belonging in Polisario’s Fourth Region, M’hrez, as well as Mohamed Salem Hamoud, an Algerian guerrilla soldier, and Nafii Ould Mohamed M’Barek, who has been a military at Polisario’s Seventh Region and was released in the smuggling and illegal traffic of all kinds between Zouirat and Atar, in the North of Mauritania.°60

Just a few days after the blog “Sahara-retos” introduced in Spain the intoxication on Uld Hamma, it was the daily paper ABC who disseminated it at national level. An article published on April 12th 2010 under the heading “Mercenary of Al Qaeda”, claimed that “Saharawi who, according to an ABC source, has been part of Polisario Front organization flowchart”°61. Polisario Front’s denial was published on April 18th in the same daily newspaper ABC with following words:

“Concerning the information published last April 12th relating to Omar Sidamed Hama, a.k.a. «Saharawi», in which ABC assigns to Mauritanian sources alleged bonds with the Polisario Front, the Office of the Polisario Front in Brussels makes the following clarification: «The so-called Omar Sidahmed Hama has never been a member of the Polisario Front, and has no bond whatsoever either by consanguinity or of any kind with the Saharawi. According to his own statements to the Mauritanian press, he is a citizen of Malian origin of the well-known Kinta tribe, who has always lived in the limits of Mauritania’s East border, in particular near the border town of Basouknou. Always according to the same person, before being detained he was near the Malian town of Tumbuctu taking care of his herds of camels. We ignore the veracity of the source which ABC refers to but it would have been recommendable to be as careful as to get to know that in Mauritania is acting one of the most abundant and active networks of the Moroccan spying services due to the obvious reasons of geographic vicinity and to the historic relationships with the area of the Saharawi conflict. On the other hand, and in order to dissipate any doubt in this regard, the Mauritanian maintain fluid relations with the Polisario Front and so far we have not received any official communication that credits Mr. Omar Sidamed Hama as having any kind of relationship with the Saharawi. The fact of relating the alleged author of the kidnapping of the three Spanish aid workers betrays the clear intent to damage the margin of sympathy that the Saharawi cause has traditionally enjoyed in wide sectors of the Spanish public opinion».°62

It was presumable that after this complete refutation the intoxication operation would come to an end. Nevertheless, the proof of how much this territory under litigation is worth is provided by the fierceness to impose such intoxication. In fact, after the refutation, the intoxicating offensive increased with the publication in Spain of a book by a journalist posted in Morocco, who has repeatedly defended the official positions of the Moroccan regime. In that book (published in May 2010, I insist, after the refutation of the Polisario Front was issued), this journalist makes allegations the character of which is proven to be clearly de-


°61 De Vega, L. ABC (12-IV-2010), “Mercenario de Al Qaida” (Mercenary of Al-Qaeda); cf.: http://hemeroteca.abc.es/nav/Navigate.exe/hemeroteca/madrid/abc/2010/04/12/023.html

°62 ABC (18-IV-2010), “ABC y sus lectores” (ABC and its Readers); cf.: http://hemeroteca.abc.es/nav/Navigate.exe/hemeroteca/madrid/abc/2010/04/18/016.html
ceitful, by verifying that he goes beyond the article of *Sahel Intelligence* which he quotes to make his allegations. Thus, on one hand, where Benshimon mentions “a Polisario Front’s *staff member*”, Alvarado writes about “a military representative of the Polisario Front”. On the other hand, where Benshimon mentions a “drift of certain staff members of Polisario” towards terrorism, Alvarado affirms that the existence of “close ties between the Polisario Front and AQIM” is being “confirmed”. So, Alvarado produces an affirmation that is not contained in the text he cited as the source on the note. This affirmation feeds the theses of the Moroccan intelligence services. Here is the literal passage:

“By the end of February of this year (2010) Omar Uld Sidi Ahmed Hama, a.k.a. Omar Saharawi, a military responsible of the independence supporting organization, has been detained, thus confirming the suspicions about the existence of close ties between the Polisario Front and AQIM”*63.*

3. The reality, however, was different. When the Mauritanian courts of law opened the process for the kidnapping of the Spanish aid workers there were eleven defendants, (from Western Sahara, Mauritania, Algeria and Mali). On July 21st 2010 the judgement of first instance sentenced Uld Hama to 12 years hard labour and a 75 years old Mauritanian shepherd to one year imprisonment on probation. The other four accused (Mohamed Salem Ould Hmouda, Boukhary Ould Ayssaoui, El Id Ould Ebhous Regragui et Kowriya Mint Issaoui) were acquitted*64.* In this first instance it was definitely clear that Uld Hama, although he was dubbed “Saharawi” by some people, was actually no Saharawi, but a Malian citizen. Furthermore, it was then specified in detail that he came from the “Machdhuf” tribe (present in Mali and Mauritania)*65.* This case was appealed and on August 11th the Court of Appeal pronounced its final judgement which confirmed all former pronouncements and added an

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*63* Alvarado, D. *La yihad a nuestras puertas*, cit., p. 178. The author quotes the article of *Sahel Intelligence* dated 22-II-2010, but he presents allegations that have no factual basis.


*Emjad* (22-VII-2010), “Enlèvement de trois Espagnols en Mauritanie : douze ans de prison pour Omar le Sarhaoui” (Kidnapping of three Spanish in Mauritania: twelve years in prison for Omar the Saharawi); cf.: https://es.groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/sahara-info/conversations/messages/6916


*65* Points Chauds (16-VIII-2010), “Un mensonge grossier et une tentative insidieuse d’impliquer les sahraouis dans une affaire mauritano-malienne “ (A coarse lie and an insidious attempt to involve the Saharawi in a Mauritanian - Malian case); cf.: https://es.groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/sahara-info/conversations/messages/6916
acquitting pronouncement in favour of another implicated person, Joumaâ Al Regraghi.\textsuperscript{66} The conclusion is clear: Uld Hama was Saharawi and no Saharawi had participated in the kidnapping.

4. Despite the objective data, a third intoxicating offensive took place on this subject. A Mauritanian journal published a new intrigue on August 14\textsuperscript{th} just a few days after the appeal judgement. According to this intrigue, when on the very same day of August 14\textsuperscript{th} Uld Hama was taken from the Nuakchot prison, the idea was launched that this had been done to deliver him to Mali... or to Polisario!\textsuperscript{67} This third intoxication had a short range, since the Mali government requested the delivery of its citizen, thus putting a swift end to that speculation.

5. Only a few days after the judgement of the Court of Appeal, a new offensive (the fourth one) was launched in two directions. On one hand, Simon Benshimon, in “Sahel Intelligence”, accused Sleima E’rugibi Mohammed Ali of being a member of the Polisario Front involved in the kidnapping.\textsuperscript{68} Still, it is well known that none of the two process judgements gave any credibility to his insinuations. On the other hand, in a rougher way, an individual in Spain endorsed and published a curious thesis according to which the “proof” of “the common interests that unite Polisario (sic) with Al-Qaeda” is “the absence of a minimum confrontation between both parties and the weapons trafficking in which Polisario leaders are engaged (sic) who then sell them again to Al-Qaeda members”\textsuperscript{69}. Laying aside the fact that, as it has been documented above, the group from which AQIIM proceeds has attacked individuals of the Polisario Front in Algeria, such “proof” has been absurd since both groups are in different territories. As it is known, “AQIIM” acts mainly in Sahel but, as it is also well known, Western Sahara is not part of Sahel, which is the Southern strip of the Sahara desert.

6. The fourth offensive had poor echo and the third one appeared to be groundless as soon as Uld Hamma was delivered to his country, Mali. Then a fifth intoxicating offensive burst out. This time it consisted of a document falsification with the purpose of giving credit to the thesis of the “Saharawi origin” of Uld Hama. On August 18\textsuperscript{th} a web page launched the idea that Uld Hamma “had been given a fabricated Malian identity according to the

\textsuperscript{66} Agènec Nouakchott Info (11-VIII-2010), “La Cour d’appel confirme la peine de 12 ans avec travaux forcés requise contre «Oumar Sahraoui»” (The Court of Appeal confirms the 12 years sentence with hard labour required against «Omar Saharawi»); cfr.: https://es.groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/sahara-info/conversations/messages/6916


PANA (12-VIII-2010), “Confirmation en appel de la condamnation pour terrorisme d’un Malien” (Confirmation on appeal of the conviction for terrorism of a Malian); cfr.: http://www mauritanie-web.com/actualite_7550_1_confirmation-en-appel-de-la-condamnation-pour-terrorisme-d-un-malien.htm


\textsuperscript{69} Gil Garre, J. M. C. Globedia (24-VIII-2010), “El Polisario: treinta años abusando de los derechos de los saharauis (II Parte)” (The Polisario : thirty years abusing the rights of the Saharawi (Part II)); cfr.: http://globedia.com/polisario-anos-abusando-derechos-saharauis-parte
moment”70. Thus, in a Mauritanian publication (CRIDEM), usually very receptive to Rabat the new message transmitted was published on August 28th by someone who calls himself Mohamed Mohamed Lamine. This Lamine, in addition to citing the odd thesis of Gil Garre according to which the “proof” of the collusion between the Polisario Front and “AQLIM” was the absence of conflicts between them, also cited the insinuations of ESISC again in the same sense. In this context, a new “controversy” was aroused on the true identity of Uld Hama. According to this new intoxication:

“Generally well informed Moroccan sources have recently expressed their great astonishment over the extradition of Omar Uld Si Ahmed Uld Hamma, better known under the name of ’Omar Saharawi’ to Mali by the Mauritanian authorities.

(…) Such sources have also condemned the extradition operation by pointing out that the information given by Mauritania about the Malian identity is inaccurate, showing the birth certificate established by Polisario”71

In a blog under the dubious title “Intelligence and national security”, but dedicated to defame the Polisario Front, on September 9th the publication of the alleged documents “as an exclusive” was announced, “to which we gained access through a journey worthy of a movie”, stated the author of the blog, José María (Chema) Gil Garre. The alleged documents appear as certificates issued by SADR, a birth certificate and a paternity certificate. In accordance with the alleged “birth certificate”, Omar, son of Sidamed Hamma and Deina Embarec, was born in Farsia on March 18th 1957 and has SADR’s ID number 7969214672. The next day, September 10th, weekly paper Maroc Hebdo, close to the Moroccan military intelligence, published the alleged birth certificate too73 which, a few days later, on 14th, was also reproduced by Moroccan journal Libération74.

Nevertheless, there are several indications that lead us to conclude that we are facing a gross forgery. Firstly, and considering that even before the documents were published “as exclusive”, there had already been a warning of this operation since August 18th the intent of forgery had already been denounced and it was published that the SADR ID number 79692146 corresponds to that of another citizen, also born in Farsia on a 18th March but of 1978, specifically to Elbu Salahi Moh-Moulud75. Secondly, it is very hard to explain that those “as exclusive” documents are translated into Spanish if, as it is mentioned in same

70 Maghreb Intelligence (18-VIII-2010), “Omar Ould Hamma « Sahraoui », le cadeau algérien à l’Espagne” (Omar Uld Hamma “Sahraoui”, the <Algerian> <gift> to Spain). The article has been deleted from the web.
72 Gil Garre, J. M. C., blog Inteligencia y Seguridad internacional (9-IX-2010), “EXCLUSIVA: El Secuestrador de los cooperantes españoles era un saharaui de los campamentos del Frente Polisario, estos son sus papeles” (EXCLUSIVE : The Kidnapper of the Spanish aid workers was a Saharawi from the Polisario Front Camps, these are his papers); The article has been deleted from the web.
74 Ouchen, S. Libération (14-IX-2010), Les liaisons suspectes du Polisario ne font plus de doute: Un terroriste malien se fait livrer son acte de naissance depuis Tindouf (The suspicious links of Polisario are no longer of doubt: A terrorist安排 arrangements for the delivery of his birth certificate from Tinduf); cf.: http://www.liche.ma/Les-liaisons-suspectes-du-Polisario-ne-font-plus-de-doute-Un-terroriste-malien-se-fait-livrer-son-acte-de-naissance_a13925.html
documents, the original is in Arabic. And this is because the usefulness of such translation cannot be seen if those documents, as argued, were issued to be used in Mauritania and Mali, both French-speaking countries. In the third place, the so-called “certificate of paternity” issued at the request of Uld Hamma’s supposed parents is completely ridiculous\(^{76}\), whose parents allegedly live in the Saharawi refugee camps in Tinduf. For what were the supposed parents of Uld Hamma going to ask for a certificate attesting that they are his parents? In the fourth place, it is odd that whereas the supposed certificate of paternity is dated, there is no date (which is amazing) on the supposed certificate of birth. Taking into account the aforesaid, I think we can have an idea of the credibility deserved by the “in exclusive” publication of such “documents”.

7. The most astonishing, however, is to confirm that a North American professor, certainly used to defend the Moroccan official positions (Peter Pham) was willing to be part of these intoxications. As I say, this professor has lent himself to put his signature to claims, such as that Uld Hamma is an “ex-high representative” of the Polisario Front and that, with the money obtained from ransoms, “AQLIM” recruits “mercenary fighters from Polisario, who have usually more experience than the ordinary recruits of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb”\(^{77}\). The same North American professor is also lending his name to other allegations which, according to the available data, can only be classified as false. It is the case, for instance, of his statement that Mohamed Salem Mohamed Ali Ould Rguibi, Mohamed Salem Hamoud, and Nafii Uld Mohamed M’Barek are “elements of the Polisario Front” who have been “involved in the kidnapping” of the Spanish aid workers and who have been “convicted” by the Mauritanian justice\(^{78}\). As we see, Pham repeats what has been circulated by the blog “Sahara-retos” (cf. above no. 2). However, while the blog “Sahara-retos” launched this intoxication when it had not yet been handed down the sentences of the Mauritanian justice, Pham even asserts, after those sentences have been pronounced, that those three individuals have been “convicted”.

D

The Moroccan thesis of the link between Polisario Front and Islamic terrorism has been pushed with two other “arguments” which, in my opinion, are even more inconsistent.

According to the first one, on December 22\(^{nd}\) 2005 the Moroccan police arrested one Saharawi “in the possession of thirteen rockets” in occupied El Aaiún. This individual who had lived in the refugee camps of the Polisario Front had, however, joined Morocco which

\(^{76}\) http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_RjlqZ8k09nRY/TlK205CznJI/AAAAAAAAAFA/LD1yycF2__PY/s1600/doc+3+omar.jpg

\(^{77}\) MAP (25-VIII-2010), “Con el dinero de los rescates, AQMI recurre a los mercenarios del Polisario para intensificar sus actividades (Experto US)” (“With the ransom money, AQIM resorts to mercenaries of Polisario in order to intensify its activities (US expert)”) ; cfr.: http://www.intelpage.info/forum/viewtopic.php?t=1817&start=160

\(^{78}\) Le Quotidien de Nouackchott (29-IX-2010), “Mercenaires à la solde de Aqmi: Un chercheur américain confirme le recrutement des «vétérans» du Polisario” (Mercenaries in the pay of AQIM: An American researcher confirms the recruitment of “veterans” of Polisario); cfr.: https://es.groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/sahara-info/conversations/messages/7006 and MAP (30-IX-2010), “Al Qaeda a recruté des <mercenaires> du Polisario pour bénéficier de leur expérience militaire (Peter Pham)” (Al-Qaida recruited <mercenary> of Polisario in order to benefit from their military experience (Peter Pham)); cfr.: https://es.groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/sahara-info/conversations/messages/7006
explains his detention in El Aaiún under occupation\textsuperscript{79}. For Alvarado, this fact “opens the debate about Polisario Front’s eventually going for a terrorist turn and the presumed alliance with the then Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), at a time when the Algerian group begins to establish its rapprochement to Al-Qaeda”\textsuperscript{80}.

Nonetheless, the opposite happens. It is clear that this fact does not prove anything for several reasons. The first one is that this detention was followed by neither a trial nor a conviction, not even in compliance with the Moroccan procedural “practice” which is not recognized as very orthodox for the standards of the Rule of Law even within Morocco. The second reason, as already mentioned, is that the GSPC had the Polisario Front among his targets of attack. And the third reason is that this very individual abandoned the Tinduf camps in order to accept the Moroccan offer\textsuperscript{81}, and therefore if there is something demonstrated hereby, it is that the Polisario Front has nothing to do with this.

The second “argument” is quite similar to the former one. It concerns the detention of a “terrorist plot” which was called “Fath Al Andalus” (“Al Andalus Conquest”) in occupied El Aaiún, which was dismantled on \textit{August 29\textsuperscript{th} 2008} (other members of this “group” were arrested earlier in Morocco)\textsuperscript{82}. According to the Moroccan police, among the fifteen detainees there were “several Saharawi” who maintain ties with AQLIM after having been trained by the Algerian GSPC”. As from here, Alvarado speculates:

“This is a fact that goes unnoticed for almost anybody in Morocco, and it comes to shuffle that the command centre of the plot was located in El Aaiún, the administrative capital of the ex-Spanish colony.

After a detailed analysis of the personal paths of those implicated in Fatha al Andalus (“Al Andalus Conquest”), it has even been pointed out that AQLIM infiltration strategy in the country of Mohamed VI was done through Sahara, allegedly making the Saharawi as the vanguard of Droukdel’s organization in the Sherifian Kingdom. Various factors could favour the implication of the Saharawi independency movement in the particular jihad of AQLIM. First, the apparent complementarities between the Maghreb branch of Al-Qaeda and the Polisario Front. The Jihadists need people who know the ground and they need to extend their networks until the South. (…..) Both organizations fight for a common goal of destabilizing Morocco and Mauritania, which could make them strategic allies in the region”\textsuperscript{83}.

It is certainly difficult to accept these “arguments” for multiple reasons. First of all, it is surprising to say that the operation against this “cell” has been “unnoticed for almost anybody in Morocco”, when we consider that the main titles of the Moroccan press have published articles on that (\textit{Aujourd’hui le Maroc, Libération, L’Économiste, L’Opinion}, as well as the

\textsuperscript{79} Morocco offers various economic advantages to the Saharawi who leave the refugee Camps in Tinduf and accept to live in the occupied territory.

\textsuperscript{80} Alvarado, D. \textit{La yihad a nuestras puertas}, cit., 178.

\textsuperscript{81} About the economic advantages offered by Morocco to those who leave the refugee camps to move to the occupied territory of Western Sahara, a good analysis performed with a Moroccan approach can be referred to: Houda Filali-Ansary, “Comment les ralliés du Polisario vivent leur retour au Maroc” (How the Polisario rallies experience their return to Morocco), \textit{La Vie Économique} (12-IV-2010); cf.: http://lavieeco.com/news/politique/16319-comment-les-rallies-du-polisario-vivent-leur-retour-au-maroc-16319

\textsuperscript{82} The ESISC “report” \textit{The Polisario Front and the development of terrorism in the Sahel}, May 2010, says that the “group” was dismantled in “2009” (19.). http://www.esisc.org/upload/publications/analyses/le-front-polisario-et-le-developpement-du-terrorisme-au-sahel/6%20LE%20FRONT%20POLISARIO%20ET%20LE%20DEVELOPPEMENT%20DU%20TERRORISME%20AU%20SAHEL.pdf

\textsuperscript{83} Alvarado, D. \textit{La yihad a nuestras puertas}, cit., 179.
official agency MAP). Second, when Alvarado published his book the detainees had already been convicted of terrorism with sentences between 4 to 15 years of imprisonment (those sentences were reduced in appeal to sentences to 12 years maximum), although he made no reference to the judgements. Third, the bond with GSPC continues to be hard to believe when taking into account that GSPC considered the Polisario Front as an enemy and actually none of the news released by Moroccan media mentioned any links of the “cell” with GSPC (although they revealed supposed links with Al Qaeda). Not only has there been no evidence of ties of the detainees with the Polisario Front: these people are individuals who have not even lived in the camps, and all of them were of Moroccan origin and were “simple traders”. Therefore it is hard to see how it may be an “infiltration” and actually the news of the Moroccan media about the case did not mention such a link. Fourth, it is difficult to accept the argument about people with “knowledge of the ground”, because the ground of the occupied Sahara is now equally known by the Saharawi as well as by the Moroccan settlers who occupy it. Fifth, it is even more difficult to accept that the Polisario (and the Saharawi Republic) could be interested in destabilizing Mauritania. The reason is extremely simple: Mauritania is a State that recognizes the SADR. Therefore, if there is someone interested in destabilizing Mauritania, it is not precisely the Polisario Front … but Morocco. It is well known that the coup d’état on August 6th 2008 that overthrew President Sidi Mohamed Uld Cheif Abdalahi, elected after a democratic electoral process in 2007 (the most impeccably democratic election in North Africa), was supported by Morocco. If the foregoing were not enough, it appears that the data provided by Alvarado are not fully in accordance with those provided by Morocco. Although the first articles in the Moroccan press claimed that the purpose of this supposed group was to attack “Spanish interests”, the judgement said that they wanted to attack touristic places in Agadir and a military casern in El Aaiun: no reference to attacks in Mauritania. For all these reasons it is apparently difficult to understand the laudatory prologue of this book written by Spanish diplomat Gustavo de Arístegui.

However, this could be easier to understand if we consider that according to some secret documents leaked by “Chris Coleman” (the most important leak in the history of Morocco), Arístegui’s wife is an agent of the Moroccan secret service.

For a better understanding of this case it should be noted, on the one hand, that according to an expert in terrorism in the Maghreb consulted by Radio France International at the moment of the detento, this “group” was unknown and even the name “Fatha Al Andalus” seems to be created by the police itself; and, on the other hand that the use of torture to

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88 The foreword of this book written by Spanish diplomat and then MP Gustavo de Arístegui has written a foreword to this book where it says that Alvarado is “one of the youngest and firmest experts we have in Spain” or “this young man but a firm researcher”Alvarado, La yihad a nuestras puertas, cit., 15-19.
extract confessions through has been officially stated by the United Nations, and Moroccan courts might give a sentence with the only “evidence” of such “confessions”.

**AQLIM and Morocco and France**

In my view the most solid thesis about the very nature of “AQLIM” is that of a possible connection with Morocco or France or both of them. There are a lot of arguments supporting this thesis.

1. If we accept that AQLIM is the follower of GSPC and we also accept that GSPC was infiltrated by France and supported by Morocco and France, this would lead us to accept that AQLIM is also an organisation supported by one or both of these two countries.

2. In spite of AQLIM’s being a group that feeds on individuals from Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania and Mali, its criminal activity is focused mainly on Algeria and more recently in Mauritania. It is quite surprising that despite the presence of Moroccans in its ranks, it never acts in Morocco. And this is even more surprising because according to an AQLIM statement, one of its targets is Spain because of its being “a NATO and a USA ally in the war against Islam”.

3. There are direct evidences for the relations between the Moroccan secret service and AQLIM. In February 2015 a document was leaked about a meeting between Moroccan secret officials and a high commander of AQLIM. They arranged a meeting in Nuadhibu, the economic centre of Mauritania, on the Atlantic coast. Hicham Bouchetti, a former agent of the Moroccan secret service declared that the document leaked was “100% original”. He added that AQLIM terrorism is fabricated by the Moroccan secret service, who tries to charge it to Algeria and the Polisario Front.

4. The collusion between Morocco and AQLIM has been pointed by a Malian official in a French magazine very close to the Moroccan regime:

   “Another uncertainty that, from the Malian point of view, weighs on the settlement of the Salafist issue: the tensions between Algeria and Morocco. It is obvious that the Islamic groups benefit from certain supports by Morocco”, accuses a member of the intelligence

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90 As evidence, the Franco-Mauritanian attack against an AQLIM base on July 22, 2010, resulted in the death of several members of the group, among these were identified one Mauritanian, an Algerian and a Moroccan (Béchir El-Maghrebi). RFI (29-VII-2010), “Certains des djihadistes tués lors du raid franco-mauritanien auraient été identifiés” Cfr.: http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20100729-certains-djihadistes-tues-lors-raid-franco-mauritanien-auraient-ete-identifies

91 AQLIM allledged document, see El País (13-III-2010), cfr.: http://elpais.com/diario/2010/03/13/espagna/1268434803_850215.html


services of Mali. According to the latter, that would be an answer to the numerous links that Mali has with the Polisario”94.

5. The fourth argument lies about the important figure of the mediator who has worked the most in “AQLIM” kidnapping cases (his work as mediator with “AQLIM” are at least in number of three). This is Mustapha Chafi (already mentioned), a Mauritanian citizen who was a declared enemy of the deposed Mauritanian President Maouya Uld Ahmed Uld Taya, as well as of the present Mauritanian President (Mohamed Uld Abdelaziz) against whom he conspired by supporting a coup that failed95. Chafi, although he is a Mauritanian, is a special adviser to the President of Burkina Faso Blaise Campaoré, who got the power following a coup and the assassination of the charismatic leader Thomas Sankara. Chafi has also intervened in the crisis of Conakry, Guinea, and Ivory Coast96. What is interesting is that Burkina is one of the staunchest allies of France and Morocco in Africa and that its efforts in Guinea and Ivory Coast have been in favour of the allies of these countries in the region. The assumption appears reinforced by an information according to which Chafi was an agent of the Moroccan intelligence services (actually, of the “Directorate General of Studies and Documentation”-DGED) ever since Driss Basri was Minister of Home Affairs and “number 2” in Morocco97.

6. “AQLIM” group objectively directs the bulk of its attacks against Algeria, thus weakening the great strategic enemy of France and of its main protégé, Morocco. After the attack in Marrakech in May 22nd 2011 some so-called “analysts” tried to impose the thesis that this was an “AQLIM” attack. If it were true it would be the first attack carried out in Morocco by AQLIM. Since the very first moment I have written that this attack presented many shadows around this attack98 and that it did not seem to be an AQLIM attack. Finally, AQLIM released a communicate rejecting the accusation that it was the author of the crime99.

7. It should be noted that “AQLIM” actions take place in Mauritania, in Western Algeria, and in the northwest of Mali, which are areas claimed by Morocco in the framework of the expansionist programme of the “Greater Morocco” that is enshrined in Article 42.2 of the Moroccan “Constitution” (the king “is the Guarantor of the Independence of the country and of the territorial integrity of the Kingdom within its authentic border”).

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95 Chafi was considered “un acérrimo adversario de Abdelaziz, a que el presidente mauritano no estaba dispuesto a hacer ningún favor liberando a presos” (…a staunch opponent of Abdelaziz, whom the Mauritanian president was not willing to do any favour by releasing prisoners) (El País, 24-VIII-2010). Cf.: http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/amenaza/intervencion/militar/francesa/provoco/roces/Espana/elpepiesp/20100824elpepinac_5/Tes
The Spanish press has assigned the idea that there is an “insistent coincidence” to sources of the Spanish intelligence (when Spain has some crisis with Morocco, the threats increase in the Jihadist networks)\(^{100}\). But there is an even clearer and authorized statement. Without clearly specifying who it is, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, has dropped the idea that one of the parties involved in the Western Sahara conflict is behind the terrorism in the Sahel. The Spanish Minister, who due to his position ought to take good information for granted, held a meeting with his French counterpart Bernard Kouchner on September 3\(^{rd}\) 2010. At that meeting, in which both dealt with the issue of security in the Sahel, Minister Moratinos delivered a puzzling phrase: “if the Sahara problem is settled, the Sahel one will be settled as well”\(^{101}\). The statement allowed inferring that any of those involved in the Sahara conflict were using terrorism as a means of pressure to get the satisfaction of their claims. Very soon the Moroccan press close to the military intelligence (the weekly newspaper Maroc Hebdo) interpreted these declarations as a confession of the Spanish Minister on the responsibility of the Polisario Front in terrorism of the Sahel region\(^{102}\). However, the same words could also be pointing to the responsibility of Morocco and it is clear that the Polisario Front is not likely to attack the States of the region that recognize the Sahrawi Republic.

9. One of the most bizarre but significant hints about the very nature of AQLIM came when it threatened the World Football Championship in South-Africa\(^{103}\). It is clear that South-Africa lies in the opposite place of the African continent to the Maghreb, but there are some data relevant to understand this threat: first of all, South-Africa defeated Morocco in the FIFA when this body decided the question in Zurich on May 8\(^{th}\) 2004; and some months later, on September 15\(^{th}\) 2004, it decided to recognize the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.

10. In this context, a careful analysis of the case of Pierre Camatte, kidnapped in Mali by AQLIM on November 26\(^{th}\) 2009 (just three days before the kidnapping of three Spanish citizens in Mauritania) and released on February 23\(^{rd}\) 2010, opens the way to an even more complex relation. Camatte was released following the payment of ransom and the liberation of some terrorists imprisoned in Mali. French citizen Pierre Camatte was publicly considered as an “aid worker” present in one State of the African Sahel, Mali. However, as it was later discovered, he was actually an agent of the French intelligence. After a strong French pressure, Mali released four terrorists who were imprisoned in that country in exchange for the hostage and a ransom had been paid\(^{104}\) as the former US Ambassador in Mali, Vicki J.

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\(^{101}\) Efe (3-IX-2010) “España y Francia presumen de una ‘misma actitud’ contra Al Qaeda en el Sáhara” (Spain and France boast a ‘same attitude’ against Al-Qaida in Sahara); cfr.: http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/09/03/ espana/1283537880.html

\(^{102}\) Maroc Hebdo (no. 898, 10-IX-2010), “Omar Sahraoui: Le lien entre le Polisaire et Al Qaeda”; cfr.: https://es.groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/sahara-info/conversations/messages/7006


Huddleston, confirmed\textsuperscript{105}. The ransom has been estimated at 5 million dollars. The fact is that just a few days after his release, on January 27\textsuperscript{th} 2010, the French press examined the records of the appearance of the national coordinator of the intelligence services in the Presidency of the Republic, Bernard Bajolet before the National Assembly\textsuperscript{106} and drew the conclusion that Camatte was in fact an agent of the French Foreign Intelligence Service (DGSE)\textsuperscript{107}.

This circumstance gives rise to feed some suspicions which, however, are difficult to prove. First of all, the question comes up if the kidnapping of this French agent did happen. The question is relevant because if accepted that there may be a relationship between the French intelligence and “AQLIM” or any groups who take shelter in these acronyms, this alleged “kidnapping” would be the ideal way for the transmission of messages without any kind of suspicion. Secondly, it should be asked if the ransom was indeed that. The doubt arises because if it is accepted that there may be any kind of relations between the French intelligence and “AQLIM”, this alleged payment of a “ransom” could be a form of “legally” financing a group suspected of serving the strategic interests of France in the region. Thirdly, the fact that nothing more and nothing less than a great power as France saw itself “forced” to “yield” to the terrorists is an element of pressure difficult to resist at the time of demanding a third State’s (Mali, in this case) “cooperation” too, by releasing terrorists imprisoned in its prisons. In short, if the assumption of the connection between the French intelligence and “AQLIM” is true, staging a “kidnapping” could constitute a new means for a State to “legally” finance a terrorist group that eventually serves its interests.

11. After the kidnapping of Spanish citizens the Spanish government aligned with France and Morocco and pressed Mauritania to release an islamist terrorist imprisoned\textsuperscript{108} and has also paid high ransoms to liberate the Spanish hostages. For this reason, and also because it is forbidden by the Security Council\textsuperscript{109}, the United States officially protested against the Spanish decision\textsuperscript{110}.

\textsuperscript{105} Le Journal du Dimanche (8-II-2013), «Otages : une rançon de 17 millions de dollars à Aqmi?», cfr.: http://www.lejdd.fr/International/ Afrique/Actualite/Otages-au-Niger-une-rancon-de-17-millions-de-dollars-a-Aqmi-590390


THE SPECTACULAR COUP OF MUJWA/MUJAO IN THE SAHRAWI REFUGEE CAMPS IN 2011

1.

In an analysis of the development of the conflict of Western Sahara, I warned on June 2, 2010: “it is predictable that Morocco tries to regain the initiative by using the terrorist charter. Since the Polisario Front is not involved in terrorist activities, it is predictable that there are circles close to Morocco, or the Moroccan power itself, who may fabricate terrorist threats with the purpose of ascribing the responsibility to the Polisario Front”\textsuperscript{111}.

As we have seen, this was actually the strategy of Morocco. Notwithstanding the absence of any evidence to support its claims against the Polisario Front, the Moroccan secret service pursued its campaign. However, this campaign suffered two setbacks: one secret, public the other.

The first one is that the USA diplomacy did not give credibility to the Moroccan fabrication. This is shown by a cable from the Embassy in Algiers, dated December 16\textsuperscript{th} 2009, where Michael Bosshart, Acting Deputy Chief of Mission, said that: “the Polisario “government” severely punishes anyone caught trafficking persons or weapons that could aid terrorists (...) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that sometime in the past year, the Algerian government detected three or four 4x4 vehicles that it believed were transporting smuggled goods from Mauritania to an AQIM stronghold south of Tindouf. With the Polisario’s approval, two Algerian attack helicopters fired on the vehicles to send a message to Sahrawis and Algerians not to engage in similar dealings. He told of a Spanish man who paid some Sahrawis to smuggle his 14 year old “girlfriend” out of the camps via Mauritania, and said that when the Sahrawi government found out, everyone involved was severely punished and throw in a “dark cell.”

(…)

Extremists in the region have issued threats against Westerners residing in the camps of which the extremists have informed the Polisario. They perceive the Sahrawi people as too close to the West and not pious enough”\textsuperscript{112}.

The second, and public, setback came when Daniel Benjamin, the U.S. State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism, in a press-briefing on November 17\textsuperscript{th} 2010 was asked if “an escalation of violence” in the Western Sahara (in the context of Sahrawi protests against the Moroccan occupation) could have “repercussions in terms of terrorists in that particular area”. His answer was:

“Let me take your last question first. In the West – I mean, my view is that most of the violence we’ve seen in the Western Sahara remains the traditional political violence that we’ve seen for some time. We are obviously always concerned that al-Qaeda in the Maghreb could expand its operations, but frankly, I wouldn’t quite get it if they were expanding into that region. I’m not quite sure I would see what the up side for them would be. And in any case, we haven’t seen the proof that it is – that that is really what’s going on”\textsuperscript{113}.

\textsuperscript{111} Ruiz Miguel, C. \textit{GEES} (2-VI-2010), “Sahara Occidental: la ONU de espaldas a la realidad ¿hasta cuándo?” (Western Sahara: The UN with its back to reality ¿until when?), cfr.: http://gees.org/articulos/sahara-occidental-la-oun-de-espaldas-a-la-realidad-hasta-cuando
\textsuperscript{112} https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ALGIERS1117_a.html
\textsuperscript{113} http://fpc.state.gov/151048.htm
2.

All the attempts to pass the hypothesis of the Polisario Front as a “terrorist” organisation failed so far. And what is more: in those years of trouble the part of Western Sahara under the control of the Polisario Front (known as the liberated territories of the Sahrawi Republic) and the refugee camps in Tindouf (South-west Algeria) were the most secure part of the Sahara desert.

This is the context of the spectacular kidnapping carried out on the night of October 22nd 2011 in the Sahrawi refugee camps by a terrorist group taking hostages two Spanish and one Italian citizen, who were liberated on July 18th 2013. The “Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa” (MUJWA), a new and unknown group, claimed responsibility for the attack. However, it was not until several months after the hostages were released that the United Nations listed the group on December 5th 2012. Two days later, on December 7th 2012, the Department of State listed it.

After the kidnapping, the offensive against Polisario was relaunched. First there was the “enchaîné” mechanism to spread “disinformation” against Polisario. This began with pretended “exclusive” “news” according to which one of the kidnappers was “Aghdafnia Hamady Ahmed Bab” who was a “son” of a Polisario representative in the Spanish region of Cantabria. This “exclusive” was provided by the media (“Correo Diplomático”)

114 whose director at that time was that David Alvarado who tried to charge Polisario with the attack on Lemgheity. The “exclusive news” was signed by Mauritanian journalist Jedna Deida, who just some months before had given publicity to one of the accusations against the Polisario Front (connecting it with “Omar Sahraoui”) mediatised by one of the well-known Moroccan lobbyists in the USA, the already mentioned Peter Pham.

Both, Pham and Deida decided to ignore the fact that those accusations had not only been denied months before by the Polisario Front but also proved false. This “exclusive” was immediately replicated by a Mauritanian webpage close to the terrorist groups, “Sahara Medias”

118. It must be observed that the director of “Sahara Medias” was Abdallahi Uld Mohamedi, a person linked with the Moroccan Secret Service according to the documents leaked by “Chris Coleman”

On July 28th 2012, some days after the aid-workers were liberated, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs gave an order to repatriate ALL the Spanish aid-workers present in the
Sahrawi refugee camps in Tindouf. Taking into account that most of the aid-workers and the cooperation in the camps come from Spain, this measure meant to stifle the economy of the Sahrawi refugee camps were the Polisario Front has its headquarters. The order was not followed by one Spanish aid-worker (Pepe Oropesa) that despite the strong pressure from the Government decided to remain in the camps. Trying to break the resistance of this man the Government issued another warning two days later. However, there were contradictions between the two warnings issued by the Government (28th and 30th July) and the warnings themselves had some inconsistencies. In fact, although the number of aid-workers of other nationalities is inferior, it was remarkable that NO other Western countries ordered the repatriation of their nationals. Finally, there was no attack although the Minister said that it was “verified to exhaustion” and it was “imminent”. Weeks later the Spanish cooperants began to return.

THE “MURABITOUN”, AQLIM AND AL QAEDA. ISIS HASHISH.
A FINAL CLARIFICATION

In August 2013, the BBC reported that MUJWA merged with the islamist group (Al-Mulathameen, Masked Men) of the experienced terrorist “Mokhtar Belmokhtar”, a.k.a. “The one eyed” or “Mr. Marlboro”, a former terrorist in the GSPC and AQLIM. Belmokhtar was the terrorist who lead the audacious attack against the gas facility of In Amenas in the East of Algeria on January 16th 2013. It is very important to note that the only country that has judged and sentenced (in absentia) Belmokhtar is Algeria. In December 2015, Associated Press reported that this “Al Murabitoun” group joined AQLIM, actually the band derived from those other groups. According to this information the attack in the Radisson Blue hotel of Bamako, capital of Mali, on November 20th 2015 was their “declaration of unity”. However, co-founder Adnan Abu Waleed al-Sahrawi declared the group’s allegiance to ISIS in May 2015. Belmokhtar rejected this pledge saying that the group’s advisory council (shura) had not yet ruled on an ISIS alliance. Several times Belmokhtar was reported as killed, the last time after a US airstrike in Libya on June 14th 2015. His death was denied by the group although there were no life-evidences at the time of the group declared itself a branch of al-Qaeda on July 17th 2015, and renamed itself “Al Murabitoon – Al Qaeda in West Africa”. As it has been seen in Northwest Africa, the “Islamic State in Iraq and Sham” (ISIS-DA’ISH) did not enjoy a significant presence, apparently. ISIS has certainly been active in Libya but not westwards, at least publicly.

But two recent events help to clarify what is behind the stage related to these terrorist groups. The first one is related with one of the latest operations of the Spanish “Guardia Civil”. Its agents seized a ship loaded with tonnes of hashish drug, weapons, and ammunition in

123 Middle East Online (15-VIII-2015), “Jihadist group of Belmokhtar: We are part of Qaeda not ISIS!”, cfr.: http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=72696
the southern Spanish Mediterranean waters (opposite to Moroccan and Algerian waters). The cargo was fleeted to Libya to finance ISIS. But the operation provided very useful information according to which the network also used a terrestrial way to transport hashish to Libya along the route: Morocco-Mauritania-Mali-Nigeria-Libya\textsuperscript{124}. Morocco is the first world producer of hashish. This drug is not produced in Western Sahara. The Moroccan border with Algeria is closed, and Western Sahara is nearly fully encircled by a wall built by Morocco itself. The way to transport this drug to Mauritania is to cross Western Sahara, occupied by Moroccan military. To cross the wall of Western Sahara to reach Mauritania avoiding the liberated territory of Western Sahara under Polisario control was only possible through the Guerguerat checkpoint (South-West) before the crisis in the region burst on August 11\textsuperscript{th} 2016 between Morocco and the Frente Polisario. It seems that the protection of this transport was provided by one of the terrorist groups in the region.

The second event is one of the emails of Hillary Clinton recently revealed by Wikileaks. This communication, dated August 17\textsuperscript{th} 2014, reveals that Hillary Clinton is perfectly aware that: “we need to use our diplomatic and more traditional intelligence assets to bring pressure on the governments of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which are providing clandestine financial and logistic support to ISIL and other radical Sunni groups in the region”\textsuperscript{125}.

These events provide clarification about the problem studied. There is no more doubt that Saudi Arabia and Qatar (at least) support radical Sunni groups in the region. ISIS and Al-Qaeda count among those groups. ISIS finances itself with Moroccan hashish transported across Western Sahara occupied by Moroccan military. This is not possible without a complicity of the Moroccan State or Military. The group “Al-Murabitoun” has pledged alliance to Al-Qaeda. ISIS and Al-Qaeda are supported by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. But Morocco is a firm ally of those countries so much as to participate in the Saudi coalition in the Yemen war. That is clear enough.

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Mariann Vecsey:

THE EU’S HAT-TRICK IN AFRICA

Abstract: The article aims to introduce three EU missions which are launched in Africa. These missions are EUTM Mali, EUTM Somalia and EUTM RCA. What do these operations have in common? All of them are mainly military operations with training tasks, which makes them unique among the other EU missions. Hungary deployed soldiers to two theatres of operations from the three. This article will also introduce the current tasks of these contingents to the reader.

Keywords: Mali, Somalia, Central-African Republic, EU, mission

There are a lot of conflict zones on the African continent. In these territories different international efforts are aiming to reduce the damage caused by these local clashes, and trying to restore law and order in most of the affected countries. The European Union takes part in these international military operations. There are a lot of EU missions on the continent, but I only want to introduce the three ongoing military missions operating on African soil. These are EUTM Mali, EUTM Somalia and EUTM RCA. For the better understanding of the missions led by the EU, I will present a brief summary on the origins of the conflicts and the preliminaries of the mentioned military operations.

When it comes to EU, we have to mention Hungary’s role in the operations too. In this article I also want to introduce the Hungarian involvement in these missions.

EUTM MALI

The origins of the conflict

The roots of the Mali conflict dates back to the colonial era. In governing the colonisers preferred the settled black African tribes, who lived in the southern part of the country, and the marginalisation of the nomad Arabic, Tuareg tribes started. Later, in 1960, when Mali gained its independence from France, the new Bamako government continued the segregation policy against the Tuaregs. And the first Tuareg insurgency started in 1963.1 The peace agreement declared that the government would stop the marginalisation of the Tuareg population, and development programs would start in the northern region of the country. However, the agreement was violated soon, similarly to the four succeeding agreements until 2012.2 The northern part of the country remained underdeveloped, the segregation policy has n

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of stopped, and the Tuaregs started an insurgency in 2012 again, to establish their independent country, the Azawad.\(^3\)\(^4\)

The insurgency started at Menaka on January 17\(^{th}\), when the MNLA\(^5\) captured the town. The advancement of the fighting was fast, mainly because of the incapability of the armed forces, in which the better trained Tuareg units refused to fight against their own tribesmen, and deserted the Malian Armed Forces, in favour of the insurgents. Bamako failed to solve the situation this time, and the unease of the population reached a peak on March 22\(^{nd}\), when Captain Armadou Haya Sanogo led a military coup against Amound Toumani Touré.\(^6\) The MNLA and its allied organisations took advantage of the chaos in the south and continued their advancement. By 6\(^{th}\) April the MNLA had captured the three main northern regions, Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu, and the organisation announced that it had achieved its aims.\(^7\)

The MNLA may has been the leading organisation in the beginning of the insurgency, but by April Islamist groups, Ansar Dine, AQIM\(^8\) and MUJAO\(^9\) had hijacked the fighting, and they continued their way to the south. In January 2013 the fighting reached Konna and Mopti, placing Sévaré\(^10\) to immediate danger. At this point Dioncounda Traore, the interim president requested help from France.\(^11\)

The French intervention started on 11\(^{th}\) January 2013. It pulled in the international community into the country. The AU started to deploy troops to AFISMA in January, the EU followed in February, and finally the UN went in to replace AFISMA with MINUSMA in July.\(^12\) In 2013 Dioncounda Traore, with the help of Burkina Faso, started peace talks with the

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\(^3\) The name of the Tuareg state. It contains the northern part of Mali, the southern part of Algeria, the southern part of Libya, the eastern part of Niger and the northern part of Burkina Faso. The area is approximately 2 million km\(^2\)


\(^5\) National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad-Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad


\(^10\) MUJAO-Mouvement pour le Tawhid et du Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest-Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa. The MUJAO separated from the AQIM in 2011-2012. The members of the organisation are mainly Lamhar and Songhai black Africans. The leader of the organisation is Mokhtar Belmokhtar.

\(^11\) Sévaré owns the only airfield on which bigger airplanes can land besides Bamako. It is a strategic site in the fields of logistic support in Mali. Its fall would have meant the fall of Bamako too.


rebel groups. The process resulted in an agreement in July which made it possible to hold elections in August. In September the new president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was sworn in.14

The next milestone was the Algiers Declaration in June 2014, in which the Tuareg organisations declared their will to cooperate with the Malian government. The peace talks started after this process, and the final agreement was signed 15th May 2015 by the Malian government and 20th June 2015 by the Coordination of the Azawad Movements.15 Signing the Peace deal however did not mean that the security situation is stable in the country. The Islamist groups are still active in the northern region of the country and they are capable to commit attacks even in the southern regions.16

The mission’s background

The talks about the possibility of launching a new EU mission started in October 2012 and the mission concept was accepted in December. On the 17th January 2013 foreign ministers’ meeting a decision was made to launch EUTM Mali.17 The claims of the mission were the UN Security Council Resolution 2085, and the agreement signed on 4th April by the Malian government and the EU.18 The EU started to deploy troops to the operational theatre in February. The deployment of the personnel finished in April. Right now there are 580 soldiers in EUTM Mali from which 200 soldiers are assigned to training tasks. 28 nations are involved in the mission: 23 EU member states, and 5 non-member countries.19

The first mandate of EUTM Mali was just for 15 months, until May 2014. Since then the mandate was extended twice. The current, third, mandate lasts until May 2018.20 The original task of the mission was to train 4 battle groups, but with the extended mandate the task system also changed, and the aim was to train 8 battle groups and lead other necessary courses for the Malian Armed Forces.21 During the third mandate of the mission the main effort is on the commanders’ training.22

20 Ibid.
21 Interview with WO Zsolt Holczer, the member of the 3rd Hungarian EUTM Mali contingent. Tata. 2014. July 06.
Hungary’s role in the mission

Hungary has been taking part in the mission since the beginning. At first the contingent consisted of 10 soldiers, 1 liaison officer, 3 medical personnel and 6 sniper instructors. The task of the training team was to lead a 10-week-long course for 27 snipers per battle group.23 The original plan was to do this course in turns with the Portuguese contingent, but since the third 6-month-long deployment the two nations have worked together. At first it was 4 Hungarians and 2 Portuguese, but these figures changed by turns too.24

In the beginning of the mission the Hungarian soldiers faced different difficulties. For example, they had to train the interpreter too, to make him be able to translate the military terms to the trainees. The equipment of the Malian Army is old, and the quality of the ammunition varied. The first three Hungarian rotations had to face the problem of a non-existent shooting range too, which finally became operational when the third Hungarian contingent accomplished its mission. Despite these problems the instructor teams also had positive experience since the trainees were motivated and involved.25

Right now the sniper instructor team has 2 Hungarian, 2 Portuguese and 2 Spanish members, under the command of a Portuguese team leader. Since the training for the battle groups finished, the current task is to help out other teams with the ongoing courses and to train the appointed cadets as snipers at Koulikoro Training Centre.26

EUTM SOMALIA

The brief introduction of the crisis

The crisis in Somalia has cultural reasons, since the clans in the region have never experienced a strong governing power. The Somali culture always consisted of dynamically changing connections within the clan system. This situation did not change after the area became independent in 1960. Former Italian and British colonies united under the name of the Republic of Somalia. But this was not enough, and the newly established country claimed all of the areas in which Somali ethnic groups lived. This openly communicated viewpoint made foreign policy difficult in the region.27

In 1969 a military coup, led by Siyad Barre, ousted the former political leaders. Barre introduced communism in the country, and he wanted to exploit the Somali nationalism at the expense of the still existing clan system. The failed war against Ethiopia led to internal struggle, and in 1991 Barre left the country. That year Somaliland announced its

23 Interview with 1st Lieutenant Richárd Zámbori, the commander of the Hungarian sniper instructor team in EUTM Mali. Debrecen, 2013.October 25.
24 Interview with WO Zsolt Holczer the member of the third sniper instructor team in EUTM Mali. Tata, 2014. July 06.
25 Interview with WO Zsolt Holczer the member of the third sniper instructor team in EUTM Mali. Tata, 2014. July 06.
independence, and later, in 1998 Puntland defined itself as an autonomous region. The southern and central area of the country, however, sank in to deep anarchy and internal war.\textsuperscript{28}

There were several international missions conducted in the country to normalize the situation, but the deeply rooting xenophobia in the Somali community and the fear of neo-colonization made it difficult to intervene successfully.\textsuperscript{29}

The anarchy on land caused problems on the seas too. Close to the Somalian coasts piracy raised its head. This activity meant danger mostly to the East-African region since the pirates captured the food supply ships sent in the framework of the World Food Programme. So besides the military operations which were already operating on land, in 2008 the EU launched a maritime mission by the name of EUNAVFOR Atalanta to defend the WFP ships.\textsuperscript{30}

Besides the difficult clan system religion is also important to the Somalis. They are mainly following Sufi, a tolerant school of Sunni Islam. But, of course, with the modernisation new, fundamental tendencies also showed up in the country and more fundamental organisations were founded. The most successful of them is al Shabaab. The al-Qaeda linked organisation got help from foreign instructors, so their methods and tactics are not coincidentally similar to that of the Afghan organisation.\textsuperscript{31}

Since the international forces occupied Mogadishu and most of the regional capitals in 2014, al Shabaab has had to face another problem too. The radical group is not only suffering heavy losses, but now it is not the only fundamentalist Islamic organisation in the country either. ISIL/DAESH has also showed up in Somalia, and it is trying to recruit warriors.\textsuperscript{32}

The Federal Government of Somalia barely rules the country, and the continuous fighting between AMISOM, the Somali National Army and al Shabaab will mean a threat to the elections planned to take place in September-October.\textsuperscript{33}

The mission’s background

It was clear, that the Somali government needs to take the leading part in the peacemaking process in the country. But for that, Somalia missed a functioning military. The Somali National Army was more or less a complicated system of clan militias fighting not just against al Shabaab, but each other too. To create an effective military, the EU started its training mission in Somalia in 2010. At first, the political environment was positive about EUTM Somalia, however, the security situation did not let the mission operate in the country through its first 4 years.\textsuperscript{34}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Marsai, V. and Hettyey, A. Szomália. Állami összeomlás és konszolidációs kísérletek Afrika szarván. Pécs: Publikon Kiadó, 2013. 23.
  \item “Az EUTM Somalia rövid mérlege”. In Koller, B. and Marsai, V. Magyarország Európában, Európa a világhban. Tanulmányok Gazdag Ferenc 70. születésnapjára. Budapest: Dialóg Campus Kiadó, 2016. 400.
\end{itemize}
In the beginning the headquarters was in Kampala, Uganda, the training centre was in Bihanga Training Centre, in western Uganda, a liaison office was in Nairobi, Kenya, and only an advisory team was deployed to Mogadishu. 12 European nations are taking part in EUTM Somalia, 11 member states, and 1 third state. The situation changed in 2014, when Mogadishu was captured by AMISOM. In the first months of the year the EU decided to relocate the training centre to the safest place in the Somali capital, to the international airport. The mission’s 4th mandate ends in December 2016.

The first courses of EUTM Somalia were successful. The political will aimed to build a strong military force, and president in charge Mohamad Abdullah Mohamad Farmajo implemented a political program to reform the military. The soldiers got their salary on a regular basis, and the weapons storing policy changed, the soldiers could not take them home. Even the introduction of a biometric system was planned. With these favourable conditions the main problem was the still existing clan system, so during the first phase of the training programs the trainers emphasised the development of a strong team spirit among the trainees. This was useful in practice since the soldiers could intervene in inter-clan conflicts with impartiality. But the political situation changed, the government failed, and in late 2011 the supportive environment became non-existent.

During the first three mandates of EUTM Somalia, basic trainings dominated, while specialised courses like engineer, intel and military police courses, and non-commissioned officer’s training, platoon leader, company commander courses, or even train-the-trainer sessions dominated in the fourth mandate of the mission. During these general trainings there were modules where the instructors taught human rights and the defence of civilians to the trainees. Later on higher level trainings and advisory teams were included in the training activities. Because of the lack of information about the usefulness of the specialised trainings the mission will lead basic trainings for complete subunits, since the current security situation in Somalia needs more infantrymen and engineers instead of specialists.

The always changing political situation was not favourable from the training point of view because the trainees came mostly from Mogadishu and the neighbouring areas and not from a large scale of clans as the EU had agreed with the Somali government before. The Somali National Army’s salary is financed by the USA, so the EU could not use any instruments to make a pressure of the government. Although in the past few years the training conditions and the soldiers’ morale was not as good as it was expected in the beginning, the EU has not given up its aims. The mission with almost 200 personnel has trained more than 5,000...
Somali soldiers, in the past six years and the operational capabilities of the Somali National Army are higher than a few years before.\textsuperscript{42}

**Hungary’s role in the mission**

Hungarian soldiers have been involved in EUTM Somalia since the beginning of the mission.\textsuperscript{43} The current Hungarian contingent consists of 4 soldiers, who are based in Mogadishu International Airport. Hungary deployed a legal advisor and 3 logistics NCOs to the mission. These positions make sure that our soldiers are connected with every nation in the military camp, and they maintain a good relationship with all of them.

During the preparation for the mission the soldiers were given briefings about the administrative framework of the mission, the operational theatre, the Somali community and culture, and it even included discussions with some members of the previous contingents. Based on the account of the current contingent the most important was to get familiar with the administrative framework of the mission, the operational theatre and to build personal contact with the former and current contingent members.

The circumstances of the Hungarian contingent are good, not only the working conditions but the recreational opportunities too. Besides the well-equipped offices, in their rooms they have Wi-Fi and they can use the camp’s gym, or they can go to the small beach, which is also in the airport area.

The contingent has contact with every nation in EUTM. The 3 NCOs are responsible for the transportation within the airport zone and they have other logistic tasks too, for example procurement, handling storages, and making minor repairs. They are in contact with the Somali airport authorities. The legal advisor prepares the agreements with other international organisations, reports on contracts and other questions.\textsuperscript{44}

**EUTM RCA**

**The origins of the conflict**

The history of the area is rich in wars and conflicts. The seeds of the ongoing conflict were planted in the one-party system implemented in 1960, when the country became independent. David Dacko, the reigning president kept the influence of the French companies in the country, and the economy started to deteriorate.\textsuperscript{45} Dacko managed to win the 1964 elections, but the country-wide strikes and the bankruptcy led to a coup. But Jean-Bédel Bokassa’s presidency was not better for the country either. Under the Bokassa regime the debt and the unrest grew. Before 1991 there were several coups, and the one-party system was maintained.

\textsuperscript{42} “Az EUTM Somalia rövid mérlege”. In Koller, B. and Marsai, V. *Magyarország Európában, Európa a világban. Tanulmányok Gazdag Ferenc 70. születésnapjára.* Budapest: Dialóg Campus Kiadó, 2016. 403-404.


\textsuperscript{44} On the account of one of the members of the current Hungarian contingent in EUTM Somalia. 2016. August 25.

in the country.\textsuperscript{46} Then the democratic movements grew stronger, and the 1992 multi-party elections were won by Ange-Felix Patassé, but the new government brought no changes in the life of the country and the abuses against the population continued.\textsuperscript{47} The result of the worsening situation was a UN mission, MINURCA,\textsuperscript{48} which started in 1998.\textsuperscript{49} The UN mission was not successful, because a few years after its withdrawal another coup occurred. The new president, Francois Bozizé wrote a new constitution in 2004, but the general situation had not changed in the country and fighting flared up among different militias.\textsuperscript{50} The so called ‘bush wars’ ended in 2007, with separate peace deals with every armed group. The deals were violated and fighting flared up in 2012 again.\textsuperscript{51} When the major militia, the mostly Muslim Seleka captured Bangui in March 2013,\textsuperscript{52} Bozizé left the country. This allowed the Seleka to name one of its members as president so Michel Djotodia became the first Muslim president of the primarily Christian country. Djotodia wanted to secure his power, and soon lost control of the Seleka, who committed massacres among the Christian population.\textsuperscript{53} Self defence groups were organised against the Muslim militia under the name Anti-balaka. The anarchy deepened in the country with the tit for tat killings between the two armed groups.\textsuperscript{54} Djotodia left his position because of the pressure of the international community, and after a short interim period Catherine Samba-Panza became the new leader of the Central-African Republic.\textsuperscript{55} In December 2013, upon the invitation of the interim president, French soldiers arrived in the country in the framework of Operation Sangaris to stabilize the situation, and in 2014 the EU decided to start a mission in the country.\textsuperscript{56} In 2016 elections were held in the country and a new president, Faustin-Archange Touadera came to power. Despite the international intervention, the security situation in the country remained unstable, and atrocities committed by either Seleka or Anti-balaka groups against the population are still ongoing.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{48} UN Mission to the Central African Republic.
\textsuperscript{51} Marsai, V. “Válságok Közép-Afrikában II.: Polgárháború a Közép-afrikai Köztársaságban”. NKE SVKK. 1.
\textsuperscript{55} Marsai, V. “Válságok Közép-Afrikában II.: Polgárháború a Közép-afrikai Köztársaságban”. NKE SVKK. 10.
Introducing a new mission

EUTM RCA is the third EU mission in the central African country. EUFOR RCA started in April 2014, and its aim was to establish safe and secure environment in Bangui and its surroundings.\textsuperscript{57} After the mission’s mandate ended, another EU mission was implemented in the country by the name of EUMAM RCA. Its goal was to support the reform of the security sector, and to establish an effective and modern defence force.\textsuperscript{58}

After EUMAM RCA completed its mandate a new mission was deployed to the Central African Republic, this was EUTM RCA.\textsuperscript{59} The authorities of the Central African Republic invited the EU mission in the country and the new CSDP training mission has its headquarters in Bangui. The mission was launched on 16\textsuperscript{th} July 2016, and its mandate is for two years. The task of the 170-soldier-strong\textsuperscript{60} mission is to provide strategic advice to the Ministry of Defence of the country in order to prepare and implement the security sector reform. The mission also has to provide education and training to the Central African Armed Forces to allow them to meet future challenges.\textsuperscript{61}

THE EVALUATION OF THE EU TRAINING MISSIONS

The EU launched several missions on the African continent, 3 training missions among them. Is this contribution enough? The total personnel of the training missions is below 1,000. In comparison with the AU and UN missions on the continent it is really an insignificant figure, since AMISOM in Somalia consists of 22,000 soldiers alone. But we have to consider the difference between the task systems of the two types of missions.

Besides the obvious, the EU takes part in financing the AU and UN missions, which is a great amount of contribution. Because of this practice the international community often accuses the European Union with buying soldiers’ lives, since the training missions are relatively safe.\textsuperscript{62} For example, in Mali the members of the mission are not allowed to go to the northern part of the country, or in the Central African Republic the mission headquarters is in Bangui, the safest place in the country, and in Somalia the mission did not even start in the country because of the poor security situation. In Somalia AMISOM, in Mali MINUSMA, and in the Central African republic MINUSCA make great efforts to stabilise the situation in the theatre of operations. Despite the occasionally flaring up complaints this practice is favourable to the partner states.

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Interview with 1st Lieutenant Richárd Zámbori, the commander of the Hungarian sniper instructor team in EUTM Mali. Debrecen, 2013. October 25.

Interview with WO Zsolt Holczer the member of the third sniper instructor team in EUTM Mali. Tata, 2014. July 06.


Georg Schmidt:

THE COMPLICATIONS OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR

ABSTRACT: Naturally, emergency management structures are adapted for the major current health problems in the country. Before the conflict the four major health risks in Syria were dietary risks, high blood pressure, a high body mass index and smoking. Consequently, the two major health problems used to be ischaemic heart diseases and strokes before the outbreak of the war. However, the sudden change from normality to a conflict setting, as well as the use of a large variety of weaponry, entails serious problematics for local emergency structures and all involved personnel. Moreover, the Syrian conflict displays the use of high explosives as well as chemical ordnance. Consequently, the major constraints for the Syrian emergency management structures are characterised by a dangerous environment, the need for adaptation to new pattern of injuries, the need for funding new and additional medical material and consumables as well as the devastation of health care facilities. Moreover, health professionals are prone to suffer from general as well as mental health problems due to the stressful and cruel environment. In general, local emergency management structures in countries of peace are not aligned and prepared for the constraints of a full-scale armed conflict. Syrian health professionals need to adapt their emergency management plans frequently, in order to cope with the challenges of the conflict. At the time of writing, international assistance is inevitable in most parts of the country in order to provide minimal medical assistance.

KEYWORDS: Syrian civil war; armed conflict; mass casualty management; emergency management; Syria

INTRODUCTION

The Syrian Civil War

The Syrian civil war is an ongoing armed conflict in Syria with international involvement, killing more than 470,000 people since its beginning\(^1\). Moreover, this conflict created more than 4.8 million Syrian migrants and refugees, adding tension and diversification in the neighbouring countries\(^2\). Additionally, European countries are facing a large number of Syrian refugees and have to deal with the consequences of the influx\(^3\).


The Syrian civil war started in March 2011 within the context of the Arab Spring protests\(^4\). Initial protests were organised against the government of president Bashar al-Assad, and later escalated into a full scale armed conflict. The first protests started in January 2011 in Damascus, and demonstrators demanded democratic reforms, more freedom, end to corruption, and loosening of prison rules. Subsequent protests (started in April 2011) demanded the overthrow of the Assad government, and spread to more than 20 cities within the country\(^5\). The Syrian army answered with deadly military strikes, killing thousands of civilians. As a result, more and more protesters took up arms and formed opposition groups. Table 1 displays the timeline of the Syrian conflict.

### Table 1 - Timeline of the Syrian conflict\(^6\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Episode</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January to July 2011</td>
<td>Initial protests in several cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July to October 2011</td>
<td>Establishment of armed opposition groups and first confrontations with the Syrian military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from November 2011</td>
<td>Intensification of the fighting and escalation into a full-scale armed conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2014</td>
<td>Strong involvement of the Islamic State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2015</td>
<td>Intensification of international military involvement from various countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2016 - present</td>
<td>First ceasefire talks and ongoing fighting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Syrian civil war remains a multifaceted armed conflict with shifting allegiances and boundaries, receiving various influence from diverse armed groups\(^7\). International coalition groups, internal ethnic groups, tribal conflicts, jihadist groups, the Islamic State and several other parties of the conflict are acting in their own interests. Figure 1 shows an overview of the distribution of the parties of the conflict in the year 2015 and highlights the complexity of the situation within the country.

Warfare

The Syrian civil war shows a large variety of weaponry. Small arms, grenades, anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft weapons, mortars, large artillery, aerial bombing, tanks, as well as various explosives are in use. Moreover, the Syrian conflict has demonstrated the use of chemical weapons. Several attacks with sarin and chlorine gas have been reported in the course of the conflict. The largest-scale use of nerve gas sarin happened in August 2013, killing more than 1,400 people. Moreover, various sources document the use of “barrel bombs” by the Syrian military. Barrel bombs, dropped from helicopters, are non-conventional bombs loaded with nails and shrapnel to cause additional injuries after detonation.

This conflict also shows various violations of international humanitarian law and several healthcare facilities have been targeted intentionally. One of the most severe incidents was reported in the north of Syria (the city of Aleppo), when four rockets hit the hospital Al-Quds in the eastern part of the city. Another recent attack happened in June 2016, when two hospitals (Al-Bayan trauma facility and Al-Hakim paediatric hospital) in the Aleppo region where attacked. At the time of writing, both medical facilities are destroyed and out of operation.

The parties of the conflict now apply more often besieging tactics. It is estimated that about 46 communities are under siege and completely blocked from all types of assistance and goods. Also the movement of ill or injured persons can be restricted. One example, highlighting this type of warfare, is the siege of Yarmouk camp. Yarmouk is a Palestinian refugee camp in the south of Damascus, suffering from an ongoing siege since July 2013. Humanitarian assistance as well as medical emergencies are not accepted to these regions.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Emergency management before the war

Local emergency management systems are usually aligned to the current predominant health problems of the country. Before the conflict the four major health risks in Syria were (I) dietary risks, (II) high blood pressure (III) a high body mass index and (IV) smoking. Due to these risks, the two major pre-conflict health problems used to be ischaemic heart diseases and strokes.

The predominant health problems were mostly covered by local medical staff and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent as part of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Comparable to western countries, the local Red Crescent organisation (Syrian Arab Red Crescent) is responsible for the coverage of both immediate and long-term needs. The activities include: emergency response, disaster preparedness, community-based health care as well as first aid training and activities. These activities are mostly performed by volunteers and some permanent staff. In Syria emergency management is performed by the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, upholding the headquarters in the capital Damascus, and an additional fourteen branches within fourteen different governorates. These fourteen sub branches are divided into 75 smaller sub branches. Together with local health facilities, emergency centres and hospitals the country possessed an effective emergency management system to respond to the needs in peacetime. Consequently, there was no need for emergency management structures to receive training in mass casualty management.

Emergency management during the war

After the outbreak of the conflict in 2011, the health challenges changed significantly. Because of the ongoing fighting and especially the use of explosive devices, new patterns of injuries emerged. Injuries now include multiple trauma, gunshot wounds, and various injuries to the extremities. Nowadays the number one health risk in Syria was replaced by the “consequences of the conflict”, leaving dietary risks and high blood pressure in second and third position.

However, local management systems were not able to adapt to these constraints as fast as the conflict evolved. Hospitals as well as the local Red Crescent organisation were still trained

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and equipped for the major pre-conflict health problems. Additionally, the infrastructure of the country and local power structures were heavily disrupted. Emergency organisations needed to reorganise to adapt to the circumstances of an armed conflict. Especially health care facilities suffered from the civil war and in 2015 more than 58 % of 113 public hospitals were either destroyed or only partly functioning\textsuperscript{27}. Many hospitals in Syria (especially in the cities of Aleppo and Damascus) have been established underground to be protected from bombs and mortar attacks. This approach proved to be successful to increase the security of the clinics, however, most of these facilities are too basic to handle mass casualty emergency and perform proper emergency management\textsuperscript{28}. Many underground hospitals do not possess adequate medical equipment and suffer from the lack of experienced and specialised personnel\textsuperscript{29}. Obviously, the local emergency management system is not capable to cover all emerging health constraints due to the conflict. For example, necessary vaccination campaigns cannot be covered by the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and must be addressed by other organisations (e.g. the World Health Organization). However, the task of emergency management remains on the shoulders of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent as well as local health care professionals. Even more importantly, the survival rate of the wounded in action can be improved by a proper pre-hospital care\textsuperscript{30}. Especially the survival of victims of major trauma can be improved by proper pre-hospital care interventions such as endotracheal intubation, ventilation, and intercostal drainage\textsuperscript{31}. Below, the constraints of emergency management within the Syrian civil war will be discussed.

Constraints for emergency management during the war

Various reasons cause tension to the Syrian health system. Some of them are: sanctions and embargoes, a general lack of resources, a changing pattern of injuries, violence against health care, displaced people, low accessibility as well as an unstable security situation\textsuperscript{32}. Most of these constraints have a direct, and some of them an indirect influence on emergency management. Moreover, health staffs are influenced by the parties of the conflict to prioritise their own fighters. Health workers working under such harsh conditions generally suffer from anxiety, depression, and exhaustion\textsuperscript{33}. Below the predominant constraints for the work on the field will be discussed.


\textsuperscript{31} Davis, P. R., Rickards, A. C. and Ollerton, J. E. "Determining the Composition and Benefit of the Pre-Hospital Medical Response Team in the Conflict Setting." JR Army Med Corps. Vol. 153. No. 4. 2007. 269-273.


**Dangerous environment**

Due to the nature of their work, emergency management professionals as well as paramedics and other health staff have to expose themselves to unsafe areas to conduct their duties. The Syrian civil war has a drastic impact on health staff and by November 2015 as many as 48 members of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent have lost their lives on duty. Moreover, general violence against health care staff and medical institutions seem to be on the rise in the Syrian conflict and various reports have documented attacks against health care facilities.

**The adaptation to the new pattern of injuries**

The nature of injuries, now appearing in the conflict, is far away from the usual field of activities before the war. Shrapnel, barrel bombs, airstrikes, mortars and landmines cause devastating harm to the body. The human corpus is often disfigured and found in terrible health states. This places tremendous pressure on emergency management staff since their experience and education were adapted to cardiovascular diseases and small scale emergencies (e.g. car accidents). These types of war injuries would even be challenging in a functioning health system, but now treatment has to be provided in a fully escalated armed conflict. Because of this pressure on health workers, a high level of trauma amongst them is already recognisable.

Because of the use of explosive weapons, Syrian health professionals have to deal with mass casualty emergencies. In the first years, health teams on-site used to work in accordance with a “load and go” (also called scoop and run) philosophy. When applying this technique, health teams aim to bring the patient to hospital as fast as possible with little pre-hospital intervention. Nowadays, more and more triage techniques are applied and over-triaging becomes less frequent. In general, during armed conflicts over-triage should be avoided as much as possible to allocate the minimal medical assistance as best as possible.

**Funding and additional material**

As soon as the conflict escalated, the workload increased drastically. One year after the outbreak of the fighting, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent requested more than 10 million USD in order to cover their current needs. At that time (2012), the most urgent needs were...
ambulance cars, mobile clinics, staff costs as well as general health materials. Throughout the conflict and until today those necessities remain the same.

**Devastation of infrastructure and lack of personnel**

The devastation of the infrastructure led to a collapse of the general health care system. About 78% of public ambulances are out of service and therefore the activities of emergency management are seriously hindered\(^{41}\). Moreover, power and water supply failures are leading to secondary health hazards, in addition to war injuries.

Due to the conflict, a large number of healthcare professionals left the county. This exodus becomes obvious in the city of Aleppo where from the initial 2,000 physicians (pre conflict) only less than 100 remained after the outbreak of the conflict\(^{42}\). Consequently, unqualified persons are forced to perform medical procedures as well as emergency management tasks\(^{43}\).

**CONCLUSION**

Local emergency management structures in countries of peace are not aligned and prepared for the constraints of a full-scale armed conflict. Naturally, emergency structures are aligned to the major current health problems in the country. The sudden change from normality to a conflict setting entails serious problematics for emergency structures and all involved personnel. The adaption to new pattern of injuries, the dangerous environment, the destroyed infrastructure, a lack of personnel as well as the need for funding and additional materials are the major constraints. Moreover, health professionals are prone to suffer from health problems due to the stressful and cruel environment. It becomes obvious that countries at war often have to adapt their emergency management structures. Independently from the governing body, emergency management plans should always include the following points:

- Clear chain of commands
- A funding plan
- Stockpiles of resources necessary for urgent treatment
- Identification of national experts and their involvement in decision making process
- Enabling the communication with international actors to collaborate with them
- Enabling the communication between state offices within the country

The Syrian civil war, just as many other conflicts around the world, displays the need for training to handle blast injuries and gunshot wounds. Moreover, triage management education after incidents with explosive ordnance is in high demand. Lastly, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent displays a high need of mental health training to tackle the adverse conditions in a better way.


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Kobi Michael – Yoel Guzansky:

THE ARAB FAILED STATE PHENOMENON AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER

ABSTRACT: In our today international system, we cannot disconnect geographical and political dimensions any longer; the local cannot be disconnected from the regional and international. The international order is affected by local and distant disorders and chaotic situations, the atrocities conducted by ISIS in Syria and Iraq or the Somali pirates’ raids in the Red Sea are like the "Butterfly Effect" that begins in distant areas and ends with a tornado storm in Europe, America and East Asia. The international order of today is threatened by a spectrum of security threats as well as by migrations flow that begins in the turbulent Middle East and undermines European countries’ internal and societal order and endangers the fragile bond of the EU as such. These trends evoke a "Giants struggle" between Russia and the West (USA and its Western allies) begins in Syria and ends in Ukraine. Is it a common denominator for all these threats? Is there one major generator for them?

KEYWORDS: failed states, fragile states, Arab upheaval, jihadism, crisis export

INTRODUCTION

In my recent book *The Arab World on the Road to State Failure* (2016) I focus on the phenomenon of failed state as an explanatory concept for the Arab Upheaval and its implications over the regional and international order. I do believe that both American presidents (Barak H. Obama and George W. Bush) identified correctly the real danger that America has to tackle. Both declared that the real threat for America's national security is failed states. Failed states export security threats and instability both to their close and distant environments. They become greenhouses for extremist Jihadi terrorism. They are the biggest generator of humanitarian crises, displaced people and refugees, they endanger the regime stability in their neighboring countries, they enable access to wmd stolen from the collapsing state’s military facilities, and they encourage subversive activities among Muslim communities in Western countries in a way that destabilizes the internal social order.

These changes are having a global impact: they are undermining global security and deepening the rifts between the superpowers (such as between the US and Russia as a result of NATO’s intervention in Libya and the Russian intervention in Syria) and between the superpowers and their allies in the region (the crises in US-Egyptian and US-Saudi Arabian relations).

Therefore, failed states become an international challenge to tackle and the response cannot remain only a military one. In order to tackle such a complex political, societal, economic, and security challenge, the international community has to shape a comprehensive...
approach based on broad and deep cooperation between international actors as well as with local actors. Intellectual, operational and economic efforts and resources should be devoted for a long period, understanding that it is going to be a continuing process; there are no magic and rapid moves and solutions.

THE FAILED STATE PHENOMENON AND THE ARAB WORLD

The phenomenon of the failed state in the Arab world is not a new one; it existed even before the current upheaval in the region. However, as a result of the upheaval the situation of states that were already in various stages of failure has deteriorated. The Arab upheaval has undermined the geopolitical logic that structures the Arab world. This logic rests on the organization of states based on the territorial nation-state model, which includes an authoritative central government and clear borders. Several of these states, such as Yemen, Libya and Syria, no longer exist in the form of a functioning state with a central government capable of imposing its authority in most parts of its territory. These states have become arenas of violent and bloody conflicts. The weakness of their central governments has led to the expansion of ungoverned peripheries that have enabled Jihadi organizations and foreign elements to penetrate the territory of these states, to challenge central governments and systematically undermine state structures.

The Arab territorial nation-states were created on artificial basis by the winning superpowers of WW1 that imposed the European nation state model on the region and its inhabitants. The idea was align to the local political culture and from the very beginning the Arab nation states suffered from unrest and instability. The Arab republics remained relatively stable because their dictators ruled with an iron hand. In addition, they tried to achieve legitimacy by establishing social ideologies (such as Nasserite socialism whose central component was the redistribution of wealth in Egypt) and national ideologies (such as pan-Arabism) alongside the reinforcement of national sentiment and historical roots. Thus, for example, Saddam Hussein, the ruler of Iraq, tried to create a myth according to which the Iraqi people are the descendants of the Babylonians. However, the sources of legitimacy and mechanisms of control that developed over the years were not able to withstand the mass protests and the regional upheaval and many "national creations" have now fragmented into their basic components.

The trends of rapid globalization, the collapse of the USSR (which had been a stabilizing global force), the widening of the Sunni-Shiite rift in the Arab world and the rise of the Salafi-Jihadi organizations, including Al Qaeda and ISIS, accelerated the disintegration of the Arab nation-states.

The mass terrorist attacks that took place in the US on September 11th 2001 — following a series of smaller-scale attacks against American targets in the Middle East and Africa — led to the realization in the West, and in the US in particular, that a failed state is in most cases also an international problem since it becomes an exporter of unrestrained terror. As a result of these terrorist attacks, President George Bush Jr. declared war on global terror. In the first stage, the US invaded Afghanistan, where Al Qaeda had found refuge. About two years later, in 2003, the US invaded Iraq on the basis of the belief that the Iraqi regime

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2 The term Arab World actually is not valid anymore, because there is no such an entity these days. I use the term just for generalization I make with regard to the Arab territorial nation states with an emphasis on the Arab republics.
supported global terror and possessed weapons of mass destruction. The invasion of Iraq, the disbanding of its army, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's government, and the US military and civilian presence in Iraq (which lasted eight years) turned Iraq into a failed state and signaled to the Arab societies that tyrants could be removed from power. The disintegration of Iraq reached a peak when ISIS took control of the northwestern part of the country and declared the establishment of a state there in June 2014.

Thanks to the grassroots movements that had developed over the years and the widespread use of social networks, which made it possible to quickly and efficiently organize large numbers of people, a local demonstration in the capital of Tunis became a torch that ignited the flames of protests throughout Tunisia and then the rest of the Arab world. At first, the spreading protests were accompanied by high hopes. This was reflected in the term "Arab Spring" that expressed the expectation of social and political changes in the Arab countries and the adoption of values such as freedom, democracy and equal rights. But eventually, the Arab Spring became a regional upheaval whose end is not in sight yet. It would not be an exaggeration to assume that during the next five years instability will increase in the Middle East and countries that are still functioning at a reasonable level will also deteriorate to the stage of state failure and become areas of intensifying conflicts.

As the nation-states in the Middle East continue to disintegrate, the power of non-state actors, and in particular ISIS and other radical Sunni movements, has increased. These non-state actors are exploiting the vacuum created by the weakness of the central governments in many countries in order to establish their influence. Some of them have even become semi-state that rule territory and provide inhabitants with at least some of the services that a state provides.

The non-state actors are undermining the logic of the Arab territorial nation-state and are seeking to reshape the Arab world (as the first stage of the global caliphate). They are erasing existing borders and establishing new entities, such as the Sunni Islamic Caliphate (the Islamic State) and the independent Shiite enclaves (Hezbollah in Syria and Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen) which are loyal to Iran and benefit from Iranian support. The expected improvement in Iran's economy as a result of the nuclear agreement signed in July 2015 is exploited by Iran in order to undermine the stability of the Sunni regimes in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which in turn is expected to undermine the stability of the region even further.

WHAT IS A FAILED STATE?

The phenomenon of the failed state has received an increasing attention in the professional literature in recent decades. In the professional literature, there are currently several terms to describe the situation of a failed state, a fact that to some extent reflects the nature of the debate among researchers in the field. Alongside the commonly used term of the “failed state”, there are other terms in use, such as “fragile state”, “collapsed state”, “state fail-

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ing” and “crisis state”. A similar term, “fragile and conflict-affected” state, is used by the British government.

A state is defined as “failed” when it demonstrates little or no ability to provide its citizens with human security (the UN’s definition). A failed state is characterized by a weak central government that is unable to govern. A weak government is one whose legitimacy is limited or non-existent and which does not enjoy a monopoly on the means of violence. According to Charles Call, a state becomes a failed state when its institutions and authority, both internally and externally, have collapsed.

The various definitions recognized in the literature are based on the logic derived from functioning states and therefore it is important to also clarify the definition of a functioning state in order for it to serve as a reference point for the discussion of the failed state phenomenon. A functioning state operates on the basis of “stateness” and exhibits its ability to govern. The term “governance” reflects the quality of the functioning of state institutions and the degree to which they enforce laws, rules and regulations so as to enable the state to exercise its sovereignty, enforce its authority, provide security (both internal and external), law and order, healthcare and education and maintain an efficient economy. A failed state is unable to provide these basic services.

William Zartman has analyzed the phenomenon of the failed state, which he views as a risk and a challenge to the international community. According to him, the phenomenon has two dimensions: an institutional-governmental dimension and a social dimension. These two dimensions are intertwined: in the social dimension, the regime loses its legitimacy while in the institutional-governmental dimension it loses its ability to function and govern. As a result, law and order collapse, so that other entities (usually competitors and rivals) attempt to take over the regime or some parts of it.

A state in the process of collapse is characterized by the paralysis of decision making and the disintegration of social cohesion. The state is not able to maintain sovereignty or security within its territory. Under these conditions, the state ceases to be socioeconomically relevant in the eyes of the population. Thus, residents no longer expect to receive basic services from the state which has lost the ability to provide them. Therefore, in a failed state both governance and the civil infrastructure collapse simultaneously.

Michael Hudson has examined the stability and strength of states on a spectrum from fragile states to stable and dynamic states on the basis of two variables: the degree of political fragmentation (which is reflected in identity politics) and the degree of governmental

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7 And paragraph 143 of the “Human Security” section of the UN World Summit Outcome Resolution states as follows: “We stress the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. We recognize that all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential.” https://goo.gl/HPfj5
8 Call, C. ibid., 1492.
effectiveness. Like Zartman, he also comes to the conclusions that when there is a low level of effectiveness and a high level of fragmentation, there is a substantial danger to the stability of the state.\footnote{Hudson, M. “Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy”, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1977, 391.}

Every failed state has three prominent characteristics: weak governance and a lack of legitimacy, extreme poverty and prolonged domestic conflict. According to one of the most important indexes of failed states, 33 states are defined as “fragile” or “in an advanced process of collapse”.\footnote{The Annual Fragile States Index, The Fund for Peace, 2014, https://goo.gl/gMIY5J} The majority of the states in the most advanced stage of failure are Moslem and are located in Africa (sub-Sahara) and the Middle East. The same index for 2015 includes even more Arab states at higher levels of state failure,\footnote{The Annual Fragile States Index, The Fund for Peace, 2015, http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2015} while in the index for 2016, Syria, Yemen and Iraq are at highest levels ever.\footnote{The Annual Fragile States Index, The Fund for Peace, 2016, http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2016}

Another prominent characteristic of failed states is ethnic and religious divisions and the lack of a unifying national ethos. A clear example is Afghanistan which is a culturally diverse state with numerous ethnic groups. The fact that these groups have been forced to live one beside the other in a single state framework has created unending friction and conflicts, which have made the state into a killing field of armed militias continually fighting one another, despite the fact that they have a common denominator, i.e. the Islamic religion. Syria, Iraq, Libya and Lebanon are also examples of this. Each of them is divided along ethnic or religious lines and they lack a unifying national ethos.

The lack of correlation between nation and state, which Benjamin Miller defines as "state-to-nation imbalance", is a major cause of regional instability and domestic and regional conflicts.\footnote{Miller, B. “When and How Regions Become Peaceful: Potential Theoretical Pathways to Peace,” The International Studies Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, June 2005, 229-267, https://goo.gl/wNZOG0, Accessed on: 19. December 2016.} This is particularly true if the various nations or ethnic groups aspire to independence or view themselves as belonging to a neighboring state. In contrast, a country characterized by correlation between nation and territory is more stable from the start.

**FAILED STATES AND FOREIGN INTERVENTION**

A domestic conflict within a multicultural state usually "invites" foreign intervention, whether by neighboring countries or by the superpowers. Examples of this are Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen. Furthermore, state failure tends to spill from one country to another. This is liable to occur due to lax border control or because there are identical ethnic or religious groups on both sides of the border.\footnote{This claims supplements the claim brought up by Zartman with respect to the regional effects of failed states and which were presented in an earlier part of this survey.} This is occurring, for example, in Iraq and Syria where the Kurds and the Islamic State, among others, are operating on both sides of the border.

One of the main indicators of the weakening of the central government is an inability to impose its authority on its peripheral regions and on its borders. Terror groups that are fighting among themselves and with the central government enter the governmental vacuum and the result is often hardship for the civilian population and mass migration to safer locations. A failed state therefore becomes a global problem. Thus, terror never remains within the borders of the failed state and the masses of fleeing refugees eventually are dispersed
among a large number of countries. In other words, every failed state is a threat to the world order to one extent or another.¹⁷

David Reilly claims that globalization, particularly during the last two decades, has been a major factor in the deterioration of Third World countries to the lowest rankings on the functionality index. Because of globalization Third World populations are familiar with the lifestyle in the First World and are demanding that their governments provide them with what they see on their smartphones, on their laptops and on television, i.e. human rights, security, a prosperous economy, education, advanced infrastructure, etc. Third World regimes that are unable to provide this lose legitimacy and encounter growing unrest. In order to survive, these regimes increase their measures of oppression and from there it is a short distance to becoming a failed state.¹⁸

The criteria for identifying a failed state can be divided into two categories: internal and external. The former can further be classified into three main subcategories: demographic, economic and structural. After six years of upheaval in the Middle East, it should be noted that several of the criteria defined as internal are essentially external. Thus, for example, in the case of the flight of millions of Syrian refugees to neighboring countries, the reasons for their flight were mainly internal but they became an external factor undermining the stability of the destination countries.¹⁹

The establishment of the Islamic State and its terrorist regime is what led to the massive exodus of the civilian population. As already mentioned, the refugees are a destabilizing factor. Not all of the refugees leave Iraq for other countries. Many of them arrive in other regions of the country and become an enormous burden on the central government, thus weakening it even further and accelerating the processes of fragmentation and collapse.²⁰ This situation is exploited by other ethnic groups, such as the Kurds, who had established an autonomous region for themselves even prior to the regional upheaval. They took advantage of the upheaval in order to expand their territory and gain control of essential economic resources, thus further weakening the central government and state institutions, and so on. This is essentially a vicious cycle of destruction that fuels itself.

David Reilly writes that the phenomenon of the failed state is not expected to disappear from the international scene anytime in the near future and that the confrontation between functioning wealthier nations and the failed states is inevitable.²¹ Terrorist organizations are able to "export" security threats by terror from the territory of the failed states to the functioning wealthier nations, even when they have no common border with the failed states. Globalization, technology and access to state weapons arsenals, including weapons of mass destruction, enable the terrorist organizations to engage in international terror and to spread chaos at very little cost and with relative ease. As a result, ".weak states, like Afghanistan, ⁰

¹⁷ For more details on the adverse effects of the Syrian refugee crisis, see: Berti, B. “Syrian Refugees and Regional Security,” SADA Middle East Analysis, February 5, 2015, https://goo.gl/mxfHiC. Berti writes as follows: “worst humanitarian disaster since the end of the Cold War.” Indeed, these humanitarian implications are also strategic, both in terms of regional stability and the ability of Syria’s neighbors to be effective partners against the Islamic State.


can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states.” The Islamic State which is operating in the Sinai Peninsula, Libya, the Gaza Strip, Yemen, Nigeria and many other locations by means of its affiliates, that is, local organizations that have joined it and sworn allegiance to its leader, who calls himself "Caliph", is an example. Other examples include the pirates in Somalia, who have disrupted international shipping off the coast of Africa, or the terror exported from Yemen to its neighbors and even to Europe and North America.

As already mentioned, failed states are usually unable to provide human security and this is one of the main reasons for the massive wave of refugees. There are refugees who flee to safer parts of their own country ("displaced") but there are many more, who flee to other countries. The refugees fleeing to other regions in their own country further increase the burden on the infrastructures, which in any case are barely functioning or in a state of collapse. Clearly, they also create pressure on the infrastructures of the destination countries, even if they are placed in crowded refugee camps near the border.24

The refugee camps provide the setting for humanitarian crises. Their occupants suffer from poor nutrition, disease, violence and unemployment. As a result, the refugee camps become centers of unrest that "export" instability to the host country. In Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey there are large refugee camps that contain hundreds of thousands of refugees from Syria. These refugees, and particularly those in Jordan and Lebanon, increase the risk of failure of the host state.

The export of instability by means of waves of refugees threatens not only countries in the Middle East, which even before the civil war in Syria were fragile,25 but also stable functioning states in the EU. Currently, the EU is finding it difficult to deal with this phenomenon, which may eventually lead to its dissolution. There are those who claim that if the EU acts to alleviate the poverty in the regions of instability on its eastern and southern borders, this will reduce the phenomenon of failed states and will diminish the number of refugees. However, this proposal ignores the reality that the hundreds of thousands of refugees from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan are not fleeing poverty.26

Another aspect, and of no less concern, is the export of terror, particularly chemical, biological and nuclear terror. It has been claimed that in July 2014 the Islamic State took control of stockpiles of low-grade uranium in Iraq.27 The main concern is that countries with arsenals of non-conventional weapons will become failed states, which will allow terrorist organizations to take control of these arsenals. There will be almost unimaginable harm to humanity if the situation in Pakistan for example enables Jihadi organizations to get their hands on stockpiles of nonconventional weapons. The threat from the disintegration of Syria would have been much worse if the regime had had the nuclear capabilities that it tried to develop.

FAILED STATES’ IMPACT ON REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INSTABILITY

Eventually, terror, guerrilla warfare and civil wars have become a major security challenge for humanity since the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, since 1945 more people have died in such conflicts that in the wars fought by conventional armies. Another major process since the Cold War is the growing power of non-state armed groups at the expense of state power. This is happening as a result of globalization, among other reasons, and the dispersion of state authority and functions among, for the most part, non-state actors.

Non-state actors that become entrenched in one country seek to expand their influence to neighboring ones as well and to do so they exploit conflicts between ethnic and religious group in those countries. For example, after the fall of Kaddafi, groups of extremists from the Tuareg tribes that had fought on the side of the regime fled to Mali (via Algeria and Niger) and reinforced the local Tuaregs. As a result, secessionist violence against the regime in Mali increased. This led to a military coup and essentially to the splitting of the country into two, a situation that led to the intervention of the French army in order to defeat the extremists and restore stability.

Benjamin Miller analyzed the spread of state failure from one country to another, using images from the world of computers. He compares failed states that are unable to provide basic services or to maintain a monopoly on the use of violence to hardware while the lack of a cohesive and coherent national identity is compared to software. He claims that the combination of hardware and software leads to developments on the following four levels:

1. Local – where a civil war takes place.
2. Regional – the neighbors of a failed state where civil war is taking place are faced with a dilemma of whether or not to intervene in order to prevent the spread of fighting or alternatively the choice of whether or not to exploit an opportunity.
3. Trans-regional – states in the second and third circles of the failed state who must also deal with the effects of its disintegration.
4. International – the international community suffers from the byproducts of the state’s failure (terror, refugees, etc.) and is forced to take defensive and preventative measures.

The growing strength of the Islamic State, for example, is felt on all four levels. It accomplishes this by means of a decentralized network structure through which it activates its allies (Jihadi organizations that operate in various regions, such as Libya, the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip and Nigeria) and its infrastructure of volunteers in Europe and North America, among other places. To a large extent, the Islamic State’s decentralized network structure rests on the social networks which have become so popular throughout the Middle East. Thus, about 40 percent of the residents of Middle East countries currently have access to the Internet, most of them young people who can be influenced more easily.

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30 Miller, B. “A presentation given in Peace Operation and State-Building International Initiatives and Local Perspectives and Responses,” International Conference, October 31-November 2, 2010, Tel-Aviv University.
As mentioned, a failed state “invites” the intervention of other states that have identified either a risk or an opportunity. For example, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf emirates have intervened in the civil war in Yemen since they view the growing strength of the Shiite Houthis as a serious threat to their own interests. In contrast, Iran views the civil war in Yemen as a strategic opportunity to strengthen its ally, the Houthis, and to realize its aspirations for regional hegemony by expanding its presence and control of Yemen and the Bab el Mandeb Straits.

**THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S IRRELEVANT RESPONSE**

The international community cannot ignore the failed state phenomenon, in view of its direct and indirect effects on the stability of regional and international systems. The conventional response of the international community has been to send missions to failed states in order to prevent the “export” of chaos, even though this is never sufficient to accomplish such a goal. In order to get to the root of the problem, failed states need to be rehabilitated. Usually, this requires a complex effort to rebuild a failed state.

The reality of the past two decades shows that most of the active conflicts going on today, including international terror, are the result of intrastate conflicts. These typically develop in failed states and typically lead to a deterioration of their situation and undermine regional stability and security. In other words, the crises that develop in failed states have a kind of viral effect on their surroundings. The Arab upheaval is a clear example of this: it spread from country to country and from East to West, until it encompassed large parts of the Arab world.

The ability of a state to control its population and its territory in most cases determines the level of violence that the state uses against its citizens and its neighbors. Essentially, there is an inverse relationship in this case between the level of the control and that of violence, as the lower the level of control, the higher the level of violence will be. In many cases, failed states “export” their internal crises by directing violence at their neighbors in order to reduce the threat at home (the theory of diversion) and react aggressively to international pressure put on them as a result of this pattern of behavior.

In some cases, the opposite pattern is observed: growing international pressure on a failed state pushes it to use greater violence against its population. This pattern of behavior can be seen in Syria and to a much lesser extent in Egypt after the fall of the Moslem Brotherhood from power.

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The deterioration of many Arab states towards the status of a failed state as a result of the regional upheaval proves that the most serious threats were never external but rather internal. Opposing the new regimes that tried to establish their legitimacy were mainly domestic opponents. This was the case in, for example, Libya, Iraq, Yemen, the Palestinian Authority and to some extent in Egypt.

The chances of the new regimes to establish themselves despite their many opponents were and still are influenced by a number of factors, including national unity (also in the sense of a shared ethos), political and functional stability of the state’s institutions, the state’s economic resources and its military power. The combination of all these factors determines how the new regimes respond in order to consolidate their rule. In all the cases we are familiar with in the Middle East, this combination of factors led to greater violence and the intensification of intrastate conflicts. These became an even greater threat to the stability of the new regimes and served as catalysts of regional instability. This reality led David Reilly to his claim regarding the growing effect of intrastate conflicts on the stability of the international community and on the processes of conflict resolution. He based this claim on a number of studies that deal with major intrastate conflicts in various regions of the world. 37

As mentioned, the regional upheaval accelerated processes and trends that already existed in North Africa and the Middle East. Almost all of the countries in these regions were weak states to some extent even before 2010. The lack of legitimacy of rulers in these regions was to a large extent the result of their autocratic nature and the incompatibility between their borders, which had been determined by the colonial powers, and the local religious and ethnic identities. Essentially, the same state-to-nation imbalance that Miller wrote about existed in many of the Arab countries. 38

As a result of the structural failures and defects described here, it is reasonable to assume that there will not be any major or rapid improvement in the situation of the weak and failed states in the Middle East and North Africa. Furthermore, one can predict that in the short and medium terms instability will spread to additional states and will deepen in states that are already unstable today. 39 This trend does not bode well for the region’s security and might negatively influence international order.

Since failed states endanger stability and security well beyond their borders and since almost all of the superpowers’ past efforts to rehabilitate failed states have failed (the relative success in the Balkans is an exception), the time has come for the superpowers to develop new and efficient strategies through the adoption of more relevant solutions. Thus, for example, instead of clinging to the paradigm of united nation-states, a new paradigm of federated states should perhaps be adopted that will facilitate the expression of religious, tribal and ethnic identities. In Bosnia, this strategy was implemented relatively successfully through the creation of a federation of two autonomous regions: the Serbian region (the Republika Srpska) and the federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina whose population is primarily Bosnian (Moslems) and Croatians (Catholics). These two autonomous entities have only weak ties with one another, which do not require an agreed-upon and shared national ethos. In a similar


manner, ideas have been put forward to establish three autonomous regions in Iraq: Kurdish (which essentially exists already), Sunni and Shiite.

CONCLUSIONS

The regional upheaval, which began six years ago, has left its mark on the Middle East and has entirely changed the logic underlying its structure. The Arab world after six years of upheaval is not in any way similar to what it was previously. Many Arab nation-states, which survived and functioned for years only because they were ruled by autocratic regimes that relied on brutal security apparatuses and on oppression and intimidation, are in an accelerated process of state failure. Several of them are in a process of disintegration and it is reasonable to assume that in the end this trend will lead to their disappearance. They will be replaced by states or other entities that function at various levels of stability and responsibility, which will necessarily influence the stability of the region as a whole.

The escalation of intrastate conflicts into regional confrontations exposes the neighbors of weak and failed states to numerous dangers that can undermine their stability and their security. Thus, for example, we have seen how Saudi Arabia has been affected by the spread of internal conflicts from Yemen; how Mali suffered from the spillover of the civil war in Libya onto its territory; how Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon have had to absorb millions of refugees from Syria; and how Israel is having to deal with terror based in the Sinai Peninsula because Egypt no longer controls most of that territory.

Syria is a prime example of the adverse and large-scale effects that a failed state can have on the region as a whole. The disastrous humanitarian situation in the country has led to a mass exodus of refugees to the neighboring countries. Turkey has absorbed 1.8 million refugees, Lebanon has absorbed 1.1 million and Jordan has absorbed almost one million. Egypt has absorbed about 150 thousand refugees from Syria and Iraq has absorbed about 250 thousand.\footnote{The data relate to refugees who are registered with the UN Refugee Agency. For additional information, see https://goo.gl/VGIiUI.}

The millions of refugees pose not only a huge economic burden but also a difficult demographic problem, particularly in countries that are built on a delicate balance between ethnic groups.\footnote{Ibid.}

Alongside the spillover of intrastate conflicts from failed states, we are witnessing the intervention of external entities within the failed states in order to protect their interests. This includes, for example, Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen against the Houthi-Shiites who are supported by Iran and the dispatch of Iranian forces to Syria in order to assist Assad. This external intervention creates a vicious circle: the intervention escalates the intrastate confrontation and as a result the failed state becomes even weaker, thus “inviting” additional foreign intervention and so on. As a result of this process, the intrastate conflict becomes a regional one and perhaps even an international one and therefore it should be defined as an “interlocked conflict”.\footnote{Kriesberg, L. “Interlocking Conflicts in the Middle East,” Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, vol. 3, 1980, 99-119.}

The superpowers that intervene to support one of the sides in an intra-national conflict are usually convinced that they are entering into a patron-client relationship and that they are in full control of the client. However, in some cases this is no more than an illusion and
we are often witness to cases of "biting the hand that feeds you". This occurs when the cli-
ent ignores the interests or instructions of his patron and adopts an independent course. In
some cases, the client even acts in a manner that is clearly not in the interests of his patron or
even acts against him directly. This is what occurred in the case of Saudi Arabia and Turkey
which supported ISIS in Syria and Iraq but eventually lost control of the organization and
even became the targets of its terrorist attacks.43

According to Michael Hudson's model,44 one can gauge the degree of state failure us-
ting two variables: the intensity of fragmentation of its national identity and the effective-
ness of its central government. If we apply this model in the Middle East, we arrive at the
conclusion that Syria, Yemen, Libya, Iraq and it seems also the Palestinian Authority are
failed states (a failed entity in the case of the Palestinian Authority) due to the combination
of low effectiveness of the central government and a highly fragmented national/political
identity. Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan are in a more stable situation but each of them has a
series of unique problems that place them on the axis of state failure, even though they may
not technically be failed states.

The 12 CAST indexes, which can be used to measure the degree of state failure,45 attrib-
ute greater importance to internal indexes (economic, political and public legitimacy) than
to external ones (intervention by foreign entities), but it appears that the failure of countries
in the Middle East is the result of a complex and problematic combination of both internal
and external indexes.

The failed states and those in the process of failure become the setting for intervention by
state entities, such as Iran, and not-state entities, such as terrorist and guerilla organizations.
The expansion in the activity of external entities is made possible by the weakness of the
central government and the rapid expansion of the ungoverned periphery in those countries.
At the same time, the expansion in the activity of external entities accelerates processes of
state failure. These two interwoven processes eventually lead to the rapid undermining of
regional stability, a growing number of refugees, the collapse of the economic system and
stronger ties between terror and crime.

The state failure process in the region and the total collapse of some countries into chaos
have led to the expansion of ungoverned peripheries. These regions become an incubator
for terrorist organizations and non-state actors of various types and serve as their "launch
sites" to the rest of the region. This expansion is accomplished by establishing a territorial
continuum or by creating a network structure without a geographic continuum (ISIS, for
example).

The international community has only a limited ability to intervene in failed states to
suppress the violent rebel forces that operate in them, and to support the stabilization of the
nation-states and the regional system. These limits are the result of a lack of the political
will necessary to intervene in areas of conflict, the conceptual and operational weakness of
peacekeeping and state building missions and the understanding that there is a limited lifes-
span for intervention in these areas. To these factors should be added the problems resulting
from competition between the aid organizations and the difficulties in coordinating between

43 Kobi M. and Guzansky, Y. "To Take the Air out of the Qatari Balloon" https://goo.gl/FMk3PW (Hebrew)
44 Hudson, M. Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy.
the various missions operating in regions of conflict, which reduce the chances of success even further and in many cases may even exacerbate or escalate the situation.\textsuperscript{46}

The international community's lack of interest in rehabilitating failed countries is also the result of experience—most of it negative—that has accumulated over the years from such rehabilitation missions. These missions are always very expensive and usually also involve combat and causalities that are not acceptable to public opinion in the West. Thus, public opinion in the West will not tolerate terrorist acts against military forces that have been sent to save lives and to provide assistance, as was the case in Somalia in 1993. As a result, the chaos in the Middle East is expected to continue for many more years and the stable countries in the region, such as Israel, can expect to face additional tests in the future.

Despite the geostrategic changes as a result of the regional upheaval, it would be premature to write off the nation-state. Nation-states which are relatively stable today, such as Egypt, will probably continue to exist in the form familiar to us and perhaps new and stable nation-states will arise, such as a Kurdish state. It is even too early to eulogize Syria and Iraq, since the superpowers may manage to impose various arrangements that will preserve the existing frameworks. In contrast, the chances are slim that Syria and Iraq will manage to return to their former situations, primarily because neither an Iraqi nor Syrian people ever existed; both suffer from deep political fragmentation. Their only chance of surviving is probably within a loose federation in which ethnic and religious minorities enjoy broad autonomy. In order to impose such a model in the Middle East two conditions need to be fulfilled which seems unlikely at the moment: a massive intervention by the superpowers and the destruction of the Islamic State.

There is an additional option, which is to create a large number of states along the ethnic and religious lines on the ruins of today’s failed states. These would be relatively small states but more coherent and stable. Thus, for example, Iraq could be split into three states — Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish — and similarly Syria could be split into Alawite, Sunni and Kurdish states.

The Arab world is facing one of its most difficult periods. Up until this point, almost all of the countries that have experienced regime change suffer from one level or another of instability. It is a serious danger and challenge for the regional and international order. It has the potential to drag the entire system to a chaotic and bloody future, but on the other hand it might be an opportunity for a change of the political order and system in a way that will stabilize the region, shaped on an alternative political model, a more suitable one to the local political culture. Only a courageous, determined and unified international leadership would be able to convert the threat to an opportunity. Unfortunately, we are left with the doubt about its existence.

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Zoltán Somodi:

RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN ISLAMIST POLITICS

“Guide us to the straight path: the path of thoseYou have blessed, those who incur no anger and who have not gone astray.”(Quran 1:6-7)

ABSTRACT: Islam defines all other religions and their position in a hierarchy. The attitude of Islam towards other religions is rooted in the life of Muhammad, and the early years of Jihad, the birth of the Islamic Caliphate. These are the roots that modern day Islamists consider to be the perfect example, which should be followed to solve the problems of modern society. Islamism is on the rise today, gaining increasing popular support in the Middle East and in the Western diaspora as well. Therefore, it is worth having a look at these roots, the perfect example of dealing with religious minorities to have an idea of what is to be expected once Islamist forces become a significant political force, able to influence the political life of a nation. It is demonstrated by the examples of already existing Islamic states, governed according to Sharia law – Saudi Arabia and Iran – a country where Islamism enjoys huge popular support, and already got a chance to rule the country – Egypt – and Lebanon, where Islamist forces have not yet been able to take charge, and the proportion of religious denominations is more balanced.

KEYWORDS: Islamism, religious minorities, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Lebanon, Egypt

INTRODUCTION

The motto needs explanation. Who incur anger? Who have gone astray? Who are those people that followers of the Scripture never want to be like? According to the Tafsir al-Tabari, those who incur anger are the Jews, and those who have gone astray are the Christians, although both groups can fit into both categorization. Islam defines all other religions, and considers them inferior and imperfect – to say the least. Some say that Islam is a religion of peace and tolerance, others say it is not worse than Christianity or Judaism, since they stem from the same root, which invented the dualistic division of the world into the creator’s world and the created world. It also has further implications, for example the division of the world into Dar al-Harb, and Dar al-Islam, the realm of evil and the realm of good in Islam.

Islamist political actors base their ideology on the necessity to return to Islam, the real solution to the problems of the world. They would like to base the state and the law on Islamic Sharia which would create a perfect and just society. This, of course, would have implications for non-Muslims living among them. To be able to judge what effect it would cause for them, it is necessary to know what the fundaments of Islam hold for religious minorities.

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In this essay I will examine the doctrinal stance of Islam on religious minorities, including the Treaty of Umar. Then I will introduce how this ideology plays out in real life, when these core tenets are put in practice. For this purpose, I will examine two Islamic states and two other states where Islamism is a significant political factor, having a significant impact on Muslim-non-Muslim relations.

THE QURAN AND THE SUNNA

The sources of Islamic political stance towards religious minorities are twofold: sacred religious texts such as the Quran, and the Sunna – the words of the only God of the Universe, and the words and deeds (Hadith) and biography (Sira) of his last Prophet Muhammad – and treaties made by him and the early Caliphs – the Constitution of Medina, and the Treaty of Umar. It is therefore worth examining what the sacred texts of Islam tell us about the treatment of the religious “other” living side by side with Muslims.

This common life experience was determined by an uneven relationship, meaning that Muslims came as conquerors and non-Muslims were citizens of the defeated lands, hence a subordinated community. Interestingly, in the early period they were typically not a minority – but a majority compared to their Islamic overlords. This is a circumstance of importance when we look at the development of the concept of dhimmi in the early Islamic Caliphate.

When Muhammad started his religious career in Arabia, there were no religious minorities. The pagan Arabs did not know the concept of exclusion based on religion. During those years Muhammad thought highly of the Jews of Mecca, because they kept their traditions and they possessed the Holy Scriptures, and he was more concerned about his pagan kinsmen, the Quraysh. The first conflict arose after the Hijra, when Muhammad faced a well-established and powerful Jewish community in Medina. The Quran can also be divided in two, the Meccan and the Medinan suras. The Meccan suras are more religious and metaphysical in their nature, whereas the Medina part is much more political and also more violent and exclusive. The reader notices a kind of a contradiction within the Quran, and since both parts are the words of God, both are true – depending on circumstances. This is quite hard to explain with the Western, Aristotelian concept of logic, which asserts that two contradicting statements cannot be true at the same time.

“The Muslim believers, the Jews, the Christians, and the Sabians – all those who believe in God and the Last Day and do good – will have their rewards with their Lord. No fear for them, nor will they grieve.” (Quran 2:62)

This citation can be considered as the source of religious tolerance within the Holy Scriptures. However, the Quran is not so clear about tolerance.

“Fight those of the People of the Book who do not [truly] believe in God and the Last day, who do not forbid what God and His Messenger have forbidden, who do not obey the rule of justice, until they pay the tax promptly and agree to submit.” /Quran 9:29

6 Haleem, M. A. S. A., The Qur’an, 118.
This other sura provides the Quranic foundation for the dhimmi concept, with reference to the *jizya* poll tax paid by dhimmis. The general rule here is that a later sura in the Quran abrogates the previous one, just like a later hadith does with an earlier one.

The Hadith is another important religious source of minority laws. Muhammad constructed the Constitution of Medina which is a quite egalitarian and tolerant text, regulating to co-existence of Muslims and Jews of Medina on fairly equal terms on the condition that the Jews accept Muhammad’s prophethood. But this treaty was broken by non-conformist Jews, and later had no effect on the development of minority laws. The main reason for this is that it was abrogated by the final hadith of the Prophet where he said:

> “Expel the al-Mushrikin (Polytheists, pagans, idolaters, and disbelievers in the Oneness of Allah, and His Messenger Muhammad) from the Arabian Peninsula, respect and give gifts to the foreign delegates as you have seen me dealing with them. I forgot the third (order).” (Sahih al-Bukhari vol. 4, 3053)

The Hadith also tells us about the first dhimmis, the Jews of Khaybar, who have surrendered, and then the Prophet ordered their warriors to be massacred and the women and children taken as slaves. He himself captured a new female slave, Safiya on this occasion. After conquering Khaybar, Muhammad planned to expel the Jews from the land, but then they asked Muhammad if they could stay in exchange for half of their income. Muhammad’s answer was:

> “We shall keep you on these terms as long as we wish.”/Sahih al-Bukhari vol. 4, 3152

As this hadith shows, the peace was temporary in nature. It lasted until Caliph Umar Bin al-Khattab eradicated all religious minorities from Arabia. It is worth mentioning that Umar was one of the Pious Forefathers, as-Salaf as-Salih, a role model for modern day Islamists.

**TREATY OF UMAR**

After looking at religious sources, let us have a look at those treaties and pacts that have been signed by the Muslim conquerors. One of these treaties, the Treaty of Umar, is especially interesting for the purpose of this essay. As it is widely accepted, it does not date from the time of the conquest of Syria, but was a result of a later debate about the standardized status of religious minorities within the Islamic empire. It was probably finalized by the time of Caliph al-Mutawakkil in the mid-ninth century, and the process of its finalization focused mainly on how to deal with the dhimmies once the Muslim population became the majority. Are the initial peace treaties (*solh*) dating back to the time of the conquest to be respected forever, or should they be updated as the situation changes?

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10 Khan, M. M. *The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih al-Bukhari*, vol. 4., 239.
12 Levy-Rubin, M. *Non-Muslims in the Early Islamic Empire*, 87.
The final outcome of these debates culminated in the Shurut Umar that was Umar’s treaty in its name only, but it standardized the status of non-Muslims living under Muslim rule in a much more intolerant way than any previous document. It seriously restricted the freedom of practicing the religion of the Ahl al-Kitaab (People of the Book), like keeping silence during religious ceremonies, ban on building and repairing churches, and imposed a series of humiliating regulations on their everyday life – dressing differently from Muslims, shaving the front of their head, forbidding them to ride horses, giving way to Muslims, giving over seats to them, the ban on marry Muslim women but at the same time legalizing the marriage of dhimmi women with Muslim men, etc. The debate also concluded that once the Muslims become majority in the dhimmi populated areas, no previous peace treaty should be observed – which points back to Muhammad’s last commandment.

These religious and early secular sources – which were nevertheless religiously inspired – describe the way how Islam dealt with religious minorities in the ancient past. The glorious origins of the first generation of Muslims and the time of the great Caliphate – an idealized heritage that Islamists look at as the perfect example.

SAUDI ARABIA

According to Peter Mandaville, three states are considered Islamic states: Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan – the fourth being formed even now in Iraq and Syria. The first of them was founded in 1932 under the rule of Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud. The country’s constitution is the Quran, and the royal dynasty’s symbiotic and mutually dependent relationship with the Wahhabi clergy ensures the harsh rule of fundamentalist Islam – with all its implications to religious minorities. It is no surprise that Christians are being denied of even private places of worship (as Muhammad’s hadith ordered), but Saudi Wahhabism takes intolerance to the extreme, and turns it against other Muslims as well.

All Saudi legislation is strictly textual and follows the Hanbali school of jurisprudence. Two important aspects of Wahhabism is the rejection of taqlid meaning that all principles must come from the religious texts and not through the mediation of humans. Anyone who did not adhere strictly to the words of the Quran and the Sunna is an infidel. The second aspect is takfir, or declaring a Muslim an infidel. These are the key aspects of today’s Saudi religious politics.

Saudi Arabia has not signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), instead it proposed a Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR), which closely resembles the statements of the UDHR but supplements it with references to the Sharia – without defining it. This causes ambiguity as far as how the Sharia will restrict basic human rights. The Arabic version of Article 12 states that every person has the right to express his thought and beliefs within the limits of the Sharia law. As discussed above, these limits can be very narrow. In fact, this declaration only reasserts the supremacy of the Sharia law over human rights law, which are incompatible with each other in the opinion of the signatories.

18 Ruzinski, N. „The Treatment of Religious Minorities in Saudi Arabia”, 43.
Another international document, very similar in its outlook, is the Cairo Declaration. This document again puts the phrase “in accordance with the Sharia law” at the end of the critical sentences referring to universal human rights – which technically makes them null and void. At the same time, it also asserts that “Islam is the religion of unspoiled nature. It is prohibited to exercise any form of compulsion on man or to exploit his poverty or ignorance in order to convert him to another religion or to atheism.” The Basic Law of Saudi Arabia only reinforces this tendency.\(^9\) It seems that followers of other religions cannot really expect much protection from this declaration, and Muslims should think twice before converting, or they will face death penalty.

With these prefixes it is no surprise that non-Muslims face continuous harassment in Saudi Arabia. Places of worship for other religions cannot exist in Saudi Arabia – because Muhammad said so.\(^{20}\) Hence the approx. 3% of the population (mainly migrant workers) can only worship in private, but that is also strictly regulated and constantly checked. Saudi authorities arrest Christians and close down even private services if they are “too loud” (as dictated by the Treaty of Umar), or are held “too often in the same place”. Schoolbooks vilify other religions, and non-Muslims are being pressurized to convert.\(^{21}\)

Shias are also a target for Saudi ulama who constantly denigrate them. Abd al-Wahhab himself was shocked at the “heretic” practices of Shias in Basra and Karbala.\(^{22}\) Today their situation is made worse by current politics and rivalry with Iran, as indicated by the recent execution of the Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr and the uproar caused by it. The ulama issue fatwās against them condemning their practice of *taqiyya* (misleading) and questioning their loyalty. This was especially exacerbated during the Bahrain protests in 2011.\(^{23}\) Their growing numbers – due to high levels of population growth and polygamy – are considered a threat.

Shias are not considered real Muslims, they are heretics, sorcerers, idolaters, but more simply put – *kafirs*. They are harassed, blocked from places of worship, denied fair trial in courts, and face discrimination in employment and education – the ulama is furious about the spread of Shia schools and Shia students “deliberately infiltrating” the higher education and the labor market, especially the government sector. A third field of “infiltration” is economy, where the employment of Shias is part of a conspiracy.\(^{24}\) Nobody talks about equal opportunities with regards to access to higher education or employment.

Authorities are constantly attempting to close down Shia religious centers and arresting Shia religious leaders. In 2009 Shia pilgrims clashed with religious police in Baqi cemetery while visiting the tombs of four imams.\(^{25}\) Of course, the Shias were blamed and after the incident Crown Prince Nayif – then interior minister – accused the Shias for not respecting the majority religion of Sunnis.\(^{26}\) According to the “moderate” cleric Salman al-Awda there is no chance of reconciliation between the two branches of Islam. The only difference

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\(^{23}\) Ismail, R. „The Saudi Ulema and the Shi‘a of Saudi Arabia”, 409.

\(^{24}\) Ismail, R. „The Saudi Ulema and the Shi‘a of Saudi Arabia”, 414-415.


\(^{26}\) Ismail, R. „The Saudi Ulema and the Shi‘a of Saudi Arabia”, 408.
between establishment and non-establishment clerics is that the latter are even more radical towards Shias.27

The exclusive nature of Saudi Wahhabism creates a situation where being a non-Muslim is virtually impossible, while being a Shia Muslim means constant harassment and denigration by the state and the majority.

IRAN

To some extent, Iran plays a similar religious leadership role for Shias as Saudi Arabia means to Sunnis. In this country, Shiism is not an oppressed minority (or oppressed majority) as in the rest of the Islamic world but it has been the predominant sect since the time of the Safavid dynasty, and the official state religion since 1979, so much so that some hardline clerics petitioned Khomeini to declare Shiism as the “true Islam”.28 There are other similarities between Saudi Arabia and Iran if we have a look at the treatment of religious minorities in their societies.

The theoretical foundation of treatment of religious minorities in Iran is Sultanhussein Tabandeh’s A Muslim Commentary on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, put in practice almost verbatim after the revolution.29 To briefly summarize its content it refers to the UDHR similarly as the UIDHR did, “adapting” its content to Islamic standards and claims that the human rights that people are trying to develop have already been in place since Muhammad. However, it uses a strict double standard in dealing with Muslims and non-Muslims. Criminal law punishes serious crimes (murder, adultery) differently according to the religion of the perpetrator and the victim – If a Muslim kills a Muslim, he will be killed by the next-of-kin. But if the victim is a non-Muslim, only a penalty fee and lashing applies. Similarly, a non-Muslim man who commits adultery with a Muslim woman will be executed, a Muslim only receives lashes and one year in prison. Idolaters are “lower than wild beasts”, and marriage between a non-Muslim man and a Muslim woman is strictly prohibited – never can a non-Muslim “rule” a Muslim. The government must be all Muslim, and apostasy is to be punished by death.30 This is how human rights are interpreted to be compatible with Islamic law according to Iranian Shia Islamist ideologues.

In the secularism of the Pahlavi era religious minorities enjoyed a relatively tolerant period. After the Islamic Revolution, however, with the increasing importance of religious discourse in politics, their status and perspectives deteriorated significantly, and face intimidation, discrimination and isolation. This tendency can best be described by Khomeini’s statement: “Every aspect of a non-Muslim is unclean”.31 Even though non-Muslims make up only less than 2% of Iran’s large population, they are still held as scapegoats for many of society’s problems and targeted by authorities. The Iranian constitution recognizes only three religious minorities: Jews, Zoroastrians and Christian Iranians – the former dhimmi groups.32 It must be pointed out that the status of Zoroastrians as People of the Book was

27 Ismail, R., „The Saudi Ulema and the Shi’a of Saudi Arabia”, 418-419.
29 Sanasarian, E., Religious Minorities in Iran, 25.
32 Choksy, J. K., „Non-Muslim Religious Minorities in Contemporary Iran”, 274.
debated in Islamic jurisprudence, and they were only adopted as dhimmis for practical reasons, but the Quran refers to them as pagans.\textsuperscript{33}

The religious minorities are represented in the Majlis by one parliamentarian for Jews, one for Zoroastrians, and three for Christians (two for Armenians and one for Assyrian-Chaldeans), but they are excluded from those positions that hold real political power in Iran, like high government offices and the theocratic branch of state power (Assembly of Experts, Council of Guardians), and cannot become Supreme Leader. Mandaeans are not recognized as a religion, Catholics and Protestants are not considered indigenous Iranian communities hence not protected under the Constitution, and Bahais are considered apostate ex-Muslims, who should be reconverted or persecuted. They are often victims of murders, an act justified by Islamic law against apostasy.\textsuperscript{34} The current Iranian system of recognizing a religious minority as such points back to the 7\textsuperscript{th} century rulings of the founder of Islam – the dhimmi concept. But having the secondary and oppressed position of a dhimmi is still more favorable than not having it.\textsuperscript{35}

Like in Saudi Arabia, religious minorities’ loyalty is questioned – because of their better status in the Pahlavi era, described by Khomeini as “an anti-Islamic regime that wishes to revive Zoroastrianism”\textsuperscript{36}, and connections with Western secularism and liberalism. Authorities harass these communities by confiscating their religious sites, placing Shia clerical and religious pictures in their schools and sacred shrines, or even vandalizing churches during “inspections” to ensure there are no Muslim converts present. On these occasions authorities enforce Islamic regulations within temples of other faiths. The most targeted community in this regard remains the Bahai – they often disguise themselves as Zoroastrians to avoid persecution.\textsuperscript{37}

Education is crucial for the survival of these communities and it is also a field of contestation and influence for state authorities. Recognized minority schools face nationalization attempts and harassment from religious authorities to teach proper Islamic theology as superior to any minority belief, while Bahais do not even dare operate schools because teachers would fear death penalty for being apostates. University students must pass an entrance examination in Islamic theology regardless of their minority status.\textsuperscript{38} Communal rites and religious ceremonies where minorities – according to their own customs – do not follow Islamic rules of gender segregation have become private events, and are often raided by state authorities and participants are detained for not adhering to Islamic standards. These official reactions can get even more violent when Muslim converts are present at these events – the punishment for apostasy is death.\textsuperscript{39} Economic opportunities are also limited for religious minorities. They are discriminated against in the public sector, and entrepreneurs must label their stores properly as “unclean” to let Shias know they are purchasing items from an inferior person.\textsuperscript{40}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{33} Sanasarian, E. \textit{Religious Minorities in Iran}, 21.
  \item \textsuperscript{34} Choksy, J. K. „Non-Muslim Religious Minorities in Contemporary Iran”, 288.
  \item \textsuperscript{35} Choksy, J. K. „Non-Muslim Religious Minorities in Contemporary Iran”, 275.
  \item \textsuperscript{36} Choksy, J. K. „Non-Muslim Religious Minorities in Contemporary Iran”, 287.
  \item \textsuperscript{37} Choksy, J. K. „Non-Muslim Religious Minorities in Contemporary Iran”, 279-284.
  \item \textsuperscript{38} Choksy, J. K. „Non-Muslim Religious Minorities in Contemporary Iran”, 276-277.
  \item \textsuperscript{39} Choksy, J. K. „Non-Muslim Religious Minorities in Contemporary Iran”, 279.
  \item \textsuperscript{40} Choksy, J. K. „Non-Muslim Religious Minorities in Contemporary Iran”, 286.
\end{itemize}
To summarize the situation of the above mentioned religious minorities it seems to be clear that the Islamic Revolution brought a significant setback in the life of all of these communities, but it is the Bahais who suffered the worst persecution and exclusion as the true infidels or apostates and are accused of conspiracy with Zionists and the US. After Khomeini came to power many lost their jobs, were detained or executed, numbering in the hundreds.\(^{41}\) Their persecution was systematic, violent and destructive, supported and conducted by the government. They deserved this treatment because their faith was rooted in Islam – meaning they are apostates. For this same reason are non-indigenous Christian and Zoroastrian communities targeted – many of them are Persian ex-Muslim converts.\(^{42}\)

**EGYPT**

The increasing role of religion in domestic politics can be traced back to the end of Nasser’s regime in Egypt. As opposed to the quick and radical change of the Islamic Revolution the process of Islamization in Egypt was slow but its effect on religious minorities was similar to the Iranian case. The largest non-Muslim religious group are the indigenous Egyptian Coptic Christians, comprising about 6-12% of the population.\(^{43}\) Although a politically diverse community they are united in their fear of Islamic law and political Islam\(^{44}\) and concerned about the increasing religiosity in politics happening since Sadat’s rule in the 1970s.

Sectarian tensions started to worsen in Minya, Sohag, and Asyut provinces in the 1970s, where the Copts’ percentage is the highest in the country, and the Gama’a al-Islamiyya militant Islamist organization was also strongest. Mostly acts of beating and vandalism happened against the “Crusaders” as the Copts were labelled by Gama’a preachers. Copts, just like Iranian religious minorities were accused of collaboration with the West and sycophants of liberal capitalism. The state failed to punish the perpetrators. Sectarian tension continued in the Mubarak era, one of the worst clashes happened in 2005 because of a theater play considered to be blasphemous and propagating apostasy. As an outcome three Christian churches were attacked and 63 people were injured.\(^{45}\)

Article 1 of the Egyptian Constitution declares that the state and its democratic system is based on citizenship, but it is already contradicted by Article 2 stating that the main source of legislation are the principles of the Sharia law.\(^{46}\) Recognized religious minorities (again People of the Book only, and not the Bahais) are allowed to apply their own personal status law in cases between persons of the same sect. Two Christians from two different sects will be judged by Islamic law. The concept of “public order” overrides religious freedom, as in the case of Bahais, who are considered to be an offense to Islam. Personal status law only governs family issues, but inheritance is governed by Islamic law – Bahais cannot inherit, and underage children of converts become Muslims automatically, regardless if the parents convert to or from Islam.\(^{47}\)

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\(^{42}\) Sanasarian, E. *Religious Minorities in Iran*, 124.
\(^{45}\) Scott, R. M. *The Challenge of Political Islam*, 75.
\(^{46}\) Scott, R. M. *The Challenge of Political Islam*, 86.
\(^{47}\) Scott, R. M. *The Challenge of Political Islam*, 86–89.
Even before the Islamization, Egypt was not entirely secular, and personal status and family law was determined by religious identity. The Islamization further strengthened the division within Egyptian society along religious fault lines.48 These tensions increased as a result of the protests of the Arab Spring in 2011, leading to burning and demolishing churches, and the Maspero massacre on October 9th 2011, where 25 people were killed when security forces quelled a Coptic protest demanding punishment for perpetrators of a church destruction in Upper Egypt.49

For Copts, the relation of state and religion is crucial. Whenever religion becomes a determining factor, minorities fear marginalization and threat, as it has been apparent since Sadat’s rule. Copts saw the intent of an-Nour to impose a stricter Sharia as a threat and a tendency of turning Egypt into an Islamic state. It was also underlined by the increasing tendency of blasphemy convictions, especially after the release of the movie “Innocence of Muslims”.50

After 2011, when the Mubarak government was toppled, the number of sectarian attacks rose by 150% in two years, and even the papal seat in Cairo was attacked, which had been unprecedented before.51 Copts were mourning the death of victims of sectarian violence when angry Muslims chanting Muslim Brotherhood slogans attacked the mourners. The incident resulted in police intervention and hundreds of people were injured and two killed. Salafis and militant Islamists demanded that the construction and repairing of churches be banned – just like in the Treaty of Umar. Even occasions of jizya collections were reported. Although these were committed by criminal gangs, they still had bad connotations.52

The Muslim Brotherhood accused the Mubarak government of inciting sectarianism, and indeed the former regime was guilty in not dealing with this problem but rather ignoring it. However, Copts under the Mursi regime were also targeted as a revenge for voting against Mursi.53 The increased sectarian violence was not a deliberate government policy but the inability to provide security and to punish the offenders, added to the boldness of religiously motivated violence and harassment.54 Yet, the government’s actions did not help to get rid of these suspicions: Mursi did not visit the Pope after the attack on the cathedral, but he visited diarrhea victims of Al-Azhar. State officials blamed the Copts for the cathedral attack, claiming that they went to the ceremony armed to the teeth.55

Even if the persecution of Christians was not an overt government policy under the Mursi regime, the general atmosphere, the lack of security and legal action against perpetrators of religious violence made the situation of religious minorities significantly worse than before.

50 Van de Bildt, J. „Egypt’s Copts under Islamist Rule”, 3.
53 Tadros, M. „Copts under Mursi: Defiance in the Face of Denial.”
54 Van de Bildt, J. „Egypt’s Copts under Islamist Rule”, 2.
55 Tadros, M. „Copts under Mursi: Defiance in the Face of Denial.”
LEBANON

The three countries addressed above have an overwhelming Muslim majority, whereas Lebanon is more balanced in demographic terms. Christians are somewhere around 40% of the population, but this is only an estimate because no census has been held since 1932. There is another difference: the Maronite community in Lebanon has avoided dhimmitude and lived as free Christians throughout its history. These two factors create a unique political heritage that has implications for today’s sectarian politics in Lebanon.

Since the state’s foundation, sectarianism has always defined domestic politics. As in Egypt, the constitution has contradicting parts, where one paragraph identifies the suppression of confessionalism as a national goal and provides everyone equal opportunities, while another one divides the mandates of Parliament according to religion. Electoral law is also determined by religious affiliation. Regarding personal status law, each religious community has their own courts, and when the litigants belong to two different sects, then a secular court has jurisdiction – as opposed to Egypt, where in such cases an Islamic court will decide. Changing religion is also possible in Lebanon, and the religion of minors will follow their father’s religion, as opposed to Egypt, where minors will be Muslims regardless whether the father converts to or from Islam. Criminal law also applies to every citizen, regardless of religion. These conditions are somewhat more favorable to religious minorities than in the three countries examined before. This is the historical heritage of the Lebanese sectarian, consociationalistic state structure, dating back to the days of Maronite hegemony.

The sectarian nature of Lebanon’s political and legal system was created to protect the interests of a minority, the Christians. The only democracy in the Middle East had an unfair foundation, the institutionalized prioritization of Maronites that was only corrected after the Taif Agreement. The consecutive Maronite presidents did nothing to integrate the Muslims into the political decision making, instead they tried to further strengthen their power. Then, over the course of the 15 years of civil war, they made several miscalculations (inviting Syria to the conflict, then allying themselves with Israel), which ultimately led to internal divisions and finally the marginalization of the Maronite community in Lebanese politics. Today Maronite domination has faded in the distant past, and a divided Christian community with declining population is on the way to become dependent on the good will of Muslims while Islamism is on the rise.

But the Muslim majority does not form a united block, and regional realpolitik also causes unlikely alliances between Islamists and Christians. With the rise of Sunni Islamism in the region, Shia Islamist Hezbollah and Lebanese Christians find themselves on the same platform, allying with each other against a common, dreadful enemy – the takfiri terrorism incorporated by ISIS. Two thirds of Lebanese Christians support Hezbollah’s anti-ISIS campaign in Syria according to a 2014 survey, and Hezbollah is portraying itself to be the


protector of Christian – and all-Lebanese – interests against the growing takfiri militancy. So the relationship between Lebanon’s Islamists and Christians must be interpreted in the context of the growing Islamist force that casts its shadow on both of them, effectively making them allies against this common enemy. Some Christians, however, do not feel that the solution is an alliance with Hezbollah. Instead they argue that Hezbollah is just as dangerous because it does not allow meaningful democratic progress to happen in the country and opposes the strengthening of the central government – which would decrease their role in domestic politics.

It seems that the well-known pragmatism of Hezbollah is working in this respect. However, if we take into consideration the long-term historical examples and the status of non-Muslims in the ideological “big brother” Iran, it is not impossible that this honeymoon – where the picture of Hassan Nasrallah can end up on Lebanese Christmas trees – will continue with the long-term dullness of everyday coexistence and finally end up with a domestic violence lawsuit. Such a situation can arise, for example, when the long term tendency of political and demographic marginalization of Christians continues, and Lebanese Christians will have to face the same fate as almost every other Christian community in the Middle East – dhimmitude. Nevertheless, today’s Hezbollah-Christian relationship is a unique exception in the long line of conflicts between Islamists and religious minorities. The future of Lebanon depends exactly on the ability of its religious communities to reconcile with each other. Looking at the foundations of Islam as a perfect example how to do this – might not be the best option.

CONCLUSION

The four cases examined in this essay show the tendency that whenever fundamental Islam becomes a determining factor in domestic politics, religious minorities will face exclusion and discrimination. Its degree can vary, but its presence is very hard to ignore. The examples of Saudi Arabia and Iran demonstrate that religious minorities cannot count on tolerance in the spirit of human rights law in a state defined by the textual interpretation of Islam, regardless how much Islam is claimed to be the religion of peace and tolerance.

Egypt shows that even where Islamists are de facto not in power, the relationship between the state and religious minorities are closely connected with the relationship between Political Islam and the state, and when they come to power, violence and discrimination against religious minorities increases.

Lebanon is a special case where the Islamist movement does not consist of a majority and it seeks the support of a still significant Christian community against an even more extreme and intolerant Islamist movement. Until Islam was a minority religion and coexistence did not generate serious concerns and frictions in the dhimmi populated cities, tolerance prevailed in the times of the early conquest as well. But as circumstances changed – especially demography – minority laws started to become more exclusive and intolerant. Those Christian communities that were powerful enough to avoid the second-class citizenship of dhimmitude were very rare. With the exception of Cyprus and Mount Lebanon they had to adapt to a

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majority that despised and excluded them – and this tendency has not changed significantly over the centuries. What is the importance of all this today in Europe? Demography is an extremely important question, especially when the popularity of Islamism is on the rise among the rapidly growing, disillusioned Muslim population. With the number of Muslims growing, dhimmitude will be a less and less tolerable condition for the kafirs.\footnote{Kiss, Á. P., “Islamic Fundamentalism and Political Violence in Europe.” \textit{Academia}. 2010. https://www.academia.edu/645776/ISLAMIC_FUNDAMENTALISM_AND_POLITICAL_VIOLENCE_IN_EUROPE. Accessed on 22. March 2015.}

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THE AUSTRALIA-INDIA-JAPAN-US QUADRILATERAL – A STRATEGIC COALITION IN FORMATION?

ABSTRACT: This paper provides a geopolitical analysis of the increasing strategic cooperation between Australia, India, Japan and the USA, which is apparently in formation with the undeclared aim of counterbalancing the expansion of China's influence. This paper takes an overview of the geopolitical factors and policy trends behind this phenomenon. As we will see, on behalf of both India and Japan, governments that pursue the restoration of their countries' status as leading regional powers are the leading forces behind this coalition. Thus not a commitment on behalf of a US-lead world order, but rather the pragmatic attitude of taking advantage of the increasing China-US rivalry is their main motive in it. The reason why in this situation they seek partnership rather with the USA and not with China seems to be simply that due to historical and geopolitical issues they see more conflicts of strategic interests with China than with the USA. On the other hand, this gives the opportunity to the USA to follow the classical principle “divide and rule” by taking advantage of Sino-Japanese and Sino-Indian disputes and general strategic mistrust. At the same time, the character of this cooperation as a strategic convergence between countries that all pursue an aim of strengthening their own positions as leading regional powers rather than a well-defined common goal suggests a loose strategic partnership rather than a formal alliance between them.

KEYWORDS: Asia Pacific, Australia, India, Japan, USA, strategic rivalry, economic interdependence, rapprochement, normalization policy, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, South China Sea

INTRODUCTION

This paper takes an overview of an interesting trend of today’s Asia Pacific: The ongoing quadrilateral rapprochement between Australia, India, Japan and the USA. This trend accompanies the rise of China and the increasing strategic rivalry between China and the USA. It takes place in a complex international environment, where economic interdependence is the norm, thus Cold War style antagonisms are unlikely, but great power rivalry is commonplace at the same time. This complex international structure characterized by economic interdependence and the lack of ideological antagonism makes the manifestations of great power rivalry and alignment less explicit, less open then it was during the Cold War, but that does not mean that great power rivalry would be of less significance today. The ongoing rapprochement between Australia, India, Japan and the USA apparently pursues the undeclared aim to counterbalance, if not contain the expansion of the influence of China. At the same time however, economic interdependence and cooperation is also ongoing between Australia and China, India and China, and even between Japan and China. This paper takes an overview on this trend, and factors regarding Asia’s second and third largest economies, India and Japan, which drives them into these directions.

An interesting factor in this issue is that this phenomenon is taking place under rather nationalistic governments in both India and Japan. In Japan, Shinzo Abe was elected prime
minister in 2012, and India’s Narandra Modi has taken office in 2014. Both of them pursue a goal to solidify the position of their countries as regional powers, and both of them aim to boost the economy of their country as well. Shinzo Abe is pursuing the so called “normalization policy” that aims to restore Japan’s capabilities to be able to take full responsibility for its own security, while Modi is backed by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Therefore their rapprochement with the USA is unlikely to be a sign of commitment to a US-led unipolar world order, but rather of pursuing a more influential international role for their own countries, and of the recognition of an opportunity for this in the rivalry between China and the USA.

TRENDS IN INDIA AND JAPAN

Trends of strategic partnership between the four countries started to take shape in the mid-2000s. Of course, there is nothing new in Japan and Australia’s being close strategic allies of the USA. The novelty of today’s trends lies in two factors: One factor is that after decades of passivity determined by its so called “peace constitution”, Japan is now having its comeback onto the international scene as a major power on its own right, under the aegis of the so called “normalization” policy. The other factor is the participation of India itself.

Since Indian independence in 1947, in the history of the Sino-Indian relations we have seen a trend that led into a situation where China and India apparently got trapped on a track of strategic rivalry. Conflict of interests soon came to surface between the two countries, despite enjoying a brief period of amity under the aegis of Pancha Shila in the early 1950s. As early as 1962, strategic tensions culminated in a low intensity border war between the two countries. Still in the same year, China and Pakistan established their strategic cooperation that exists to this day.

As China was a communist state by then, and as such, an ideological antagonist of the USA, one could assume that the most rational option for India could have been to seek American support against it. By the time however, when Sino-Indian relations deteriorated into an antagonistic standoff in the early 1960s, anything like that had become hardly possible. In the 1950s, while Pakistan became a US ally in the Cold War by joining the Baghdad Pact (joining forces with Iran, Iraq and Turkey) India committed itself to the non-aligned movement. So, as the USA committed itself on the side of Pakistan, the archenemy of India, it became virtually impossible for India to seek support from the USA against China.

Also, unexpected changes in the strategic environment offered a seemingly unlikely but in fact more willing strategic partner for India: the Soviet Union. While India’s policy of non-alignment combined with the alliance between the USA and Pakistan made the option of a US-Indian cooperation highly problematic, the Sino-Soviet split made India and the Soviet Union natural allies against China. The Soviet-Indian strategic partnership started in the 1960s, and lasted till the end of the Cold War. This partnership became even more suitable with the Soviet engagement in Afghanistan, as the USSR was fighting Pakistan-trained guerillas there, thus making Pakistan and the Soviet Union de facto war enemies, a further correlation between Soviet and Indian strategic interests throughout the 1980s. On the other hand, the anti-Soviet partnership between the USA and China in the same decade

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meant that the USA backed not only Pakistan but China as well thus further alienating it from India in the strategic sense. Therefore throughout the 1980s, a US-China-Pakistan trio was faced by an India-USSR duo.

This geopolitical setting ceased to exist in the 1990s. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a major change was that the USA and China no longer needed each other as partners against the Soviets, and Russia, defeated in the Cold War, started to look for partnership with China from the mid-1990s. This way, as Russia and China started to cooperate with each other, Russia became an unsuitable partner for India to counterbalance China. India has still maintained good relations with Russia ever since then, but this is no longer a strategic partnership aiming to counterbalance China. For such an aim India started to gravitate in the direction of the USA. As the USA and China became strategic rivals, the USA became the most suitable candidate for India for such a role.

After the end of the Cold War another major change on behalf of India was the introduction of the “look east” and later the “act east” policies. These policies aim to increase cooperation between India and the countries of Southeast Asia, in the field of economic and commercial relations as well as strategic and military cooperation, and last but not least, to counterbalance the influence of China in the region. Similarly to the rapprochement between India and the USA, this policy had already been pursued by Congress administrations before 2014, but has further been intensified by the BJP administration of Modi since then. The foundations of this policy were laid by the Congress administration of Narasimha Rao and the BJP administration of Atal Bihari Vajpayee as early as the 1990s. In the economic aspect, this includes multilateral initiatives such as the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation established in 2000, which includes Cambodia, India, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam, and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation established in 1997, which includes Bangladesh Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. At strategic and military levels the policy includes an ever increasing military support to Vietnam, joint patrols with Indonesia on the Andaman Sea, and also competition with China’s influence in Myanmar.

We can see certain ambivalence in Sino-Indian relations. On the one hand, there is an ever increasing economic interdependence between the two countries. On the other hand, the two countries still have not settled their border dispute yet, and also the Sino-Pakistani partnership is still in function. There is also a conflict of interest between the “act east” policy of India, and the policies of China in Southeast Asia and in Nepal, which culminates as a struggle for influence in these regions. The strategic cooperation between India and the USA has been most apparent since the start of the BJP-affiliated Modi-administration in 2014, although it had already started under successive Congress Party administrations. The defense minister of India’s previous government already called the policies of China as a “serious threat” in 2010, and then prime minister, Congress-affiliated Manmohan Singh

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called to strengthen the defenses of India’s borders with urgency. The US-India security agreement was signed as early as 2005, and the two countries signed their nuclear cooperation agreement in 2008.

In case of Japan, there is nothing new about its being a US-ally. What is new, however, is that it is increasingly repositioning itself as a regional middle power on its own right. This includes both the diversification of Japanese foreign policy, and a kind of remilitarization of the country. This is a major difference compared to the decades of the Cold War, when the foreign and security policy of Japan was marked by the Yoshida doctrine, which meant a general passivity in foreign policy, a unilateral reliance on the USA as the sole guarantor of the security of the country, and strictly limited armed forces. This was a consequence of Japan’s role and experience in the Second World War, and only started to ease under the Ohira and Nakasone administrations in the 1980s. The present trend of Japanese remilitarization and foreign-policy diversification is called “normalization” as opposed to the special arrangements that existed before, and has started to evolve since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the start of the premiership of Shinzo Abe.

The normalization process in security policy rests on two pillars: It includes the improvement of the physical capabilities and arms build-up of the Japan Self-Defense Force, and on the other hand, it also includes a legislative process of easing legal restrictions on the use of force by Japan. Arms build-up by the JSDF has especially intensified since the year 2000, with the largest warships of the JSDF navy becoming 20 thousand tons, four times the size of the largest ships it had in 2000, reconnaissance satellites, AWACS surveillance aircraft, and ballistic missile defense system-equipped Aegis destroyers.

The normalization process is accompanied by the diversification of Japan’s foreign policy as opposed to its former unilateral US-orientation. The main scenes of this diversification were India, Australia and the ASEAN.

BILATERAL, TRILATERAL AND QUADRILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS

These trends started to culminate into an informal quasi-coalition of the four countries in the mid 2000s. In fact, for most of the time, the cooperation has been going on in the form of a net of trilateral and bilateral agreements between the members of the group. So far, the only part when a formal coalition did exist was the early phase of the cooperation in 2007-2008. This coalition, called the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue was initiated by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and discontinued due to protest by China.
Bilateral and trilateral cooperation however has intensified between all members of the group ever since then. Among the bilateral cooperation agreements, in a strategical sense, perhaps the most interesting is the one between India and Japan. The bilateral security pact between the two countries was already signed under the Congress government back in 2008. The Modi and Abe administrations also achieved a major boost here, however, and a bilateral Strategic and Global Partnership was agreed during Modi’s first visit to Japan in September 2014.  

Apparentely aiming to counterbalance the economic influence of China, India and Japan also agreed on Japan’ investing 35 billion USD in India during the next five years.

The bilateral arrangements between India and Australia include a bilateral security pact signed in 2009, a security cooperation framework agreement signed in 2014, and an agreement on Australia supplying India with uranium, made in November 2015.

Regarding The US-Indian bilateral relations, the premiership of Narendra Modi gave a major boost with paying five visits in the USA during the first two years of his premiership. Now India also has more military exercises with the USA, than with any other country. As we could see, however, India and the USA have already had a security framework agreement since 2005.

The case is a bit different between Japan and Australia as both of them have been close and formal strategic allies of the USA ever since the early phase of the Cold War, thus being part of the same alliance system for decades now. The new issue regarding these two countries is the bilateral cooperation between them. Their joint declaration on security cooperation was achieved in 2007.

On the trilateral front, we can see cooperation among India, Japan and the USA, and another one among Australia, Japan and the USA. The former started in 2011, and was upgraded to the ministerial level in 2015, while the latter was launched in 2002.

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19 Ibid.
SINO-INDIAN AND SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS TRAPPED IN STRATEGIC MISTRUST

The main question that we can ask is why are India and Japan more willing to align themselves with China, than with the USA. The main reason is that Sino-Indian and Sino-Japanese relations are trapped in strategic rivalry. This trap situation has two levels. A more general level is the mechanism described by Stephen M. Walt as part of the “balance of threat” concept that is countries in general tend to view countries of closer geographic proximity as more a threat, than countries lying in a long distance.24 Thus, since China is in close geographic proximity to both Japan and India, while the USA is not, this will make these two countries view China more of a threat than they view the USA, even if no specific policies of China were more assertive, than those of the USA.

The second level that traps the situation is the level of specific issues. Here we have two major groups of issues. One is the ongoing border disputes. In this respect, between China and Japan, the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea is a well-known issue. Here a strategic significance is given not only by the economic rights regarding the adjacent waters, but also by the fact that the location of the islands could potentially provide for China a naval base closer to both Taipei in Taiwan, Okinawa in Japan, and the open Pacific, than any naval base it owns right now. Between China and India disputed territories lie along their Himalayan boundary. In its eastern section, between the Tibet Autonomous Region and Arunachal Pradesh state, China claims land held by India, while in its western section, between the Tibet Autonomous Region and Jammu and Kashmir states, China holds territories claimed by India. Besides the border disputes there are several complex issues in both Sino-Indian and Sino-Japanese relations that trap them into mutual mistrust.

Regarding Sino-Japanese relations the issue of the so called “peace constitution” and its ongoing reinterpretation, potential future revision and the remilitarization of the country is perhaps the most problematic factor. China is opposing this process out of concerns of a re-emerging Japanese military power and at the same time it is also concerned of Japan’s alliance with the USA. However, in respect to the security of Japan, making concessions for China on either of these issues would need countering China in the other. In the presently unlikely but theoretically not impossible case that Japan ever gives up its alliance with the USA and choses to stand on its own as a middle power balancing in Northeast Asia among three powerful neighbors, China, Russia and the USA, and also in close proximity to North Korea and the Taiwan strait, there is no doubt it would need a formidable military to sufficiently secure its borders and its international status, even if it has no offensive intentions whatsoever. On the other hand, if Japan chooses to maintain its “peace constitution”, then it will not be able to give up its alliance with the USA in such a strategic environment.

In Sino-Indian relations the strategic partnership between China and Pakistan creates a similar trap. This makes China to be de facto involved in the Indo-Pakistani feud, the bitterest issue in India’s foreign policy. China however cannot allow to put an end to its support to Pakistan as long as India is cooperating with the USA and Japan against China. India at the same time cannot allow stopping seeking partners to counterbalance China as long as

China is supporting Pakistan. Even if both China and India would be willing to cease their strategic rivalry, it would be hard to either of them to make the first step.

SIGNIFICANCE AT GLOBAL LEVEL

What gives the significance to the quadrilateral cooperation is the fact that it includes both India and Japan. India and Japan are the second and the third largest economies in Asia. This means that if they identify themselves as strategic competitors of China and strategic partners of the USA, then this gives an advantage to the USA in the alliance-systems, which China can hardly compensate. As of 2016, IMF estimates put the GDP of the People’s Republic of China to 11.4 trillion USD, while the combined GDP of India and Japan to 6.3 trillion USD, the combined value for South Korea and Taiwan (two other US allies) at 1.9 trillion USD, and the rest of Asia 5.9 trillion USD, which is lower than that of India and Japan combined. This leaves little room for China to balance the strategic partnership of India and Japan with the USA, since even in the unlikely case that it can manage to gather all Asian countries as allies, except for the listed four, the combined GDP of its Asian allies would still be less than that of India and Japan. The IMF estimates the GDP of the USA to be 18.6 trillion for the year 2016, which makes the combined GDP of the USA, India, and Japan 24.9 trillion USD, which is significantly greater than the combined GDP of China and the rest of Asia.

Of course, we know that the share of China in the global GDP is likely to increase in the future, but so is that of India. Therefore, while China is likely to surpass the GDP of the USA, it is unlikely to surpass the combined weight of the USA, India, and Japan any time soon. According to the Center for Economic and Business Research, China will have been the number one economy of the world by 2030 with a predicted GDP of 34.34 trillion USD by that year, compared to the 33 trillion output of the then second largest economy, the USA. By then India is predicted to become the third largest economy in the world after China and the USA, with a GDP of 10.13 trillion. Japan, despite of its mostly stagnating economic trajectory, is predicted to keep the fourth place, right after China, USA and India, a GDP of 5.1 trillion USD. Consequently, despite China becoming the largest economy in the world with its predicted 34.34 trillion predicted output it will still lag behind the predicted 48.22 trillion combined output of the USA, India and Japan.

China’s expectations for a superpower status are mostly based on the assumption that sooner or later economic power inevitably is converted into military and political power. However, if this assumption is valid, then it will be valid for the economic growth of India and the normalization process of Japan as well. So, if its economic growth makes China a superpower, India will become a great power as a result of its own economic growth, and if economic power can be converted into military and political power in such a way, then Japan is also likely to become a formidable regional middle power (with its air and naval


power likely becoming the fifth in the world after the USA, China, Russia and India) as soon as the normalization process eliminates constitutional restrictions on converting its economic power in such a manner.

MANEUVERS IN COMPETITION FOR ECONOMIC INFLUENCE

A key issue in this strategic environment is the increasing economic interdependence between the actors. This is often seen as something solely on the side of China, however if we take a deeper look, we can see that the situation is more complex.

FDI is a good example of the competition between China and Japan for the economic influence in India. In September 2014, India reached agreements on significant FDI with both China and Japan. China and India reached an agreement on China’s investing 20 billion USD in India during the next five years, while India and Japan reached an agreement on Japan’s investing 35 billion USD in India over the next five years.2728 This is an apparent competition between the two countries over who can invest more, and thus achieve more economic influence in India, and India is the one who benefits from this competition as investment of 55 billion USD in five years is a significant amount even for a country as large as India.

Another issue is the policy of balancing in regional economic integration. While in the past decade China favored initiatives limited to East and Southeast Asia, such as the ASEAN+3 initiative, Japan usually pursued initiatives to include India and Australia as well, and in many cases, even the USA, like in the case of the East Asia Summit.29 The Trans Pacific Partnership, that includes, among others, the USA, Japan, Vietnam and Australia, but excludes China, can also be seen as an effort to counterbalance China’s influence with the tool of economic integration.

THE SOUTH-CHINA SEA

An issue where the intention to contain China becomes apparent by the four countries is the territorial debate over the islands of the South China Sea. The two countries which have the most severe conflict of interests with China in this matter are the Philippines and Vietnam. In the past years, all and each of these four countries increased their strategic and military assistance to either Vietnam, or the Philippines, or both. The USA and the Philippines have been allies ever since the early phase of the Cold War, and recently they further increased this cooperation by signing an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement In 2014. The USA and Vietnam have a less friendly past, but a strategic rapprochement started between them around 2010, and in 2016 the USA ceased its arms embargo against Vietnam. India and Vietnam already agreed on Indian military assistance to Vietnam in 2014, and they raised their cooperation to the next level when agreeing on the formation of a comprehensive

strategic partnership during the 2016 visit of Narendra Modi in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{30} Australia signed a visiting forces agreement with the Philippines in 2007, which came into force in 2012.\textsuperscript{31} Japan signed a defense agreement with the Philippines in early 2016, which was the first agreement of such a type signed with any country from Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{32}

CONCLUSION

As we can see, despite economic interdependence and cooperation with China, the increasing strategic cooperation between Australia, India, Japan and the USA is constantly intensifying, and though undeclared, its apparent aim is the strategic containment of China. Where this policy is the most visible is the four countries’ attitude to the South China Sea dispute, where they all give significant and ever increasing military assistance to the Philippines and Vietnam, and all the four of them are involved in this. What gives significance to this undeclared coalition of strategic partnership is that India and Japan are the second and third largest economies in Asia, and by the time China is predicted to overtake the USA as the largest single economy in the world, India and Japan are predicted to become the third and the fourth, so – if continued – by then this coalition will include the second, third and fourth largest economies in the world aiming to counterbalance the influence of the first one. At the same time, however, due to the complexity of their relations this is likely to remain a strategic partnership rather than a real alliance.

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Fruzsina Simigh:

THE ISLAMIC STATE ADDS A NEW TWIST TO CHINA’S UIGHUR PROBLEM

ABSTRACT: China has long faced terrorist attacks that she blames on Uighur separatists, the East Turkmen Islamic Movement, influenced by external elements like Al Qaeda and now the IS, as in 2014 300 Uighurs were reported to be fighting alongside the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Therefore now the last thing China wants is to have these militants return home and carry out attacks in Xinjiang or any other part of China. In this article, through the examination of what actual threat these Uighurs from the Middle East could mean, and what kind of antiterrorism measures China takes in order to protect herself, her territorial integrity and foreign interests, I will examine the question whether this kind of new threat from the IS could motivate China to go against her main principle of non-intervention, and intervene in the Middle East as a responsible great power and join the US-led coalition in fighting against IS.

KEYWORDS: China, terrorism, Uighurs, Islamic State, counterterrorism

INTRODUCTION

Both ISIS and Al Qaeda have declared war on China and claimed Xinjiang (under the name of East Turkestan) as part of the Islamic Caliphate. This is a new kind of direct threat, especially with the 300 Uighurs who have allegedly joined the fighting in the Middle East on the side of the Islamic State.

Ever since China realized that her Uighur problem can no longer be treated merely as a domestic problem, there has been an effort to link China’s fight against the “three evils”, separatism, extremism and terrorism, to the international community’s struggle. In the 1990s, however, Uighur separatists and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) bore no explicit support from neighbouring terrorist organizations like the Taliban or Al Qaeda. As Brian Fishman explains in his article, “despite their freedom to train in Afghanistan, the Taliban banned fighters from the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) from attacking China from their territory.” With the US operations taking place in Afghanistan they would have been foolish to anger China and risk a war fought on two fronts. They also thought that the rise of China could be the force to weaken and thus eventually help them topple the US hegemony.

The new millennium, however, brought the realization that – referring to the oppression of the Uighurs in Xinjiang Autonomous Region, specifically after the crackdown on the riot in


2009 – in the eyes of extreme Islamic terrorists China became just another tyrant of the world. Yet they did not consciously aim to invite China to fight against terrorism away from home. The Islamic State on the other hand doesn’t share the Taliban’s cautious approach to China.

In this article, through the examination of what actual threat these Uighurs from the Middle East could mean, and what kind of antiterrorism measures China takes in order to protect herself, her territorial integrity and foreign interests, I will examine the question whether this kind of new threat from the IS could motivate China to go against her main principle of non-intervention and intervene in the Middle East as a responsible great power, and join the US-led coalition in the fight against IS.

**UIGHURS FIGHTING WITH THE ISLAMIC STATE**

In a speech released on 1st July 2014 emir of the proclaimed caliphate, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi called for all the Muslims around the world to pledge allegiance to him, and said that “Muslim rights are forcibly seized in China” (as listed fist among a dozen other countries). He also sent a message to Uighurs, China’s Turkic-speaking, Muslim minority, whose radical organizations had been expecting wide-ranging support in their fight for independence from Al Qaeda, claiming “your brothers all over the world are waiting for your rescue, and are anticipating your brigades.” Additionally, a map also depicted a great part of Xinjiang as a region to be seized by the Caliphate within the next five years.

In July, China’s former Middle East envoy Wu Sike said that there were about 100 Chinese people fighting for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Since then there have been other Global Times articles, citing sources from security officers in Iraq’s Kurdistan region, Syria and Lebanon, that 300 Chinese extremists are fighting with IS in Syria and Iraq, and that most of these people travelled to their destination to join the jihadist fighters through Turkey, using Turkish passports. “According to a senior security official from the Kurdish region of Iraq, terrorists from the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) […] have travelled to Syria via South-Eastern Turkey’s Sanliurfa Province to join the Islamic State jihadist group.” The same article also claims that ETIM and Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) both pledged allegiance to the IS, as they have incorporated its initials into their name.

On 10th March 2015 Zhang Chunxian, Communist Party secretary of Xinjiang claimed that “there are Uighurs that have fled overseas and joined the Islamic State […] We have also found that some who fought returned to Xinjiang to participate in terrorist plots,” although he didn’t elaborate on these plots or the exact number of those returned. Raffaello Pantucci, a terrorism researcher at the London-based defence think tank Royal United Services Institute, wrote that while he didn’t doubt that people from Xinjiang could be fighting in Iraq and Syria, he had some doubts whether they would be able to make the journey back home; one of the problems stemming from the difficulties for Uighurs to get a passport, and

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also whether IS would let them leave. "We have seen numerous reports of foreigner fighters getting executed for trying to leave, including groups of Uighurs," he said. Yet, this could change with the pressure growing on IS, and the more territory the organization loses the more it might encourage new recruits to rather carry out attacks in their homeland instead of calling them to the Middle East.

**UGHUR WOES**

The lure of the Islamic State could be felt worldwide, but why would Uighurs want to join its ranks? It is worth noting that most Uighurs, who number about 10 million in North-Western China, do not support terrorism or violent fighting for their region’s independence. It is argued that what they really flee from is oppression, limitations in their religious freedom, restriction of the expression of Uighur identity, violation of human rights, or the influx of Han Chinese into Xinjiang. It leaves them feeling discriminated and also left out of the economic boom. Between 2004 and 2009 Xinjiang’s GDP doubled and is still growing over 10% annually, the region also accounts for up to 40% of China’s coal reserves, has the largest stores of oil and natural gas as well. Xinjiang is also one sixth of Chinese territory, which makes separatism more threatening for the central government’s rule.

While the vicious circle of discrimination (slim chances of getting employed compared to Han Chinese applicants are among some of the problems) creates further resentment among the Uighur minority, the government’s controversial policies also give ground for extremist organizations’ propaganda. Al Qaeda’s English magazine *Resurgence* claims that the signs of Muslims’ suppression in China are the aforementioned Han migration into Xinjiang (East Turkestan in that magazine), the restrictions of fasting during Ramadan, the ban on wearing Islamic clothing (veils for women, beards for men are forbidden). Yet, the Chinese claim these accusations as unacceptable and insufficient. The article quotes Ahmed Hashim, a terrorism expert at Nanyang Technological University, who claims that it is China’s general rise and increase in global power that is seen as the oppression of peoples. He also states that it is in great part due to Uzbek jihadists who provide assistance to Uighur jihadists to link them to the international network. Who, now, as they join the Islamic State do not simply want to receive training but also to build connections and be integrated into international networks of terrorism in order to gain support for terrorist attacks they would want to carry out in China.

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9 For example „The government has made token efforts to create job opportunities for Uighurs on the coast, sending busloads of them to work in factories. But employers are wary. In June 2009 in the southern city of Shaoguan in Guangdong province, a brawl between Uighur and Han Chinese workers at a toy factory left two Uighurs dead and dozens injured. This fuelled ethnically charged riots that erupted a few days later in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, in which about 200 died.” Also in greater detail see: Economist. „Don’t make yourself at home”, economist.com, January 17, 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/china/21639555-uighurs-and-tibetans-feel-left-out-chinas-economic-boom-ethnic-discrimination-not Accessed on 5th July 2016.

While there is no doubt that international jihad does influence radical and terrorist groups like TIP and ETIM, it is also important to recognize – as it greatly affects the possible means to battle such issues – the roots of the unrest in Xinjiang. That might be, contrary to what the Chinese government claims, more of the result of misplaced or miscalculated government policies that fail to properly recognize cultural and ethnic aspects of the problem.

CHINA FIGHTS TERRORISM (MOSTLY) AT HOME

There have been several terrorist attacks in China which were mostly blamed on Uighur separatists. However, lately, “in contrast to earlier attacks, which had been aimed at government buildings and security forces in Xinjiang, these occurred in various locations in China, including Beijing, and were aimed at civilians.”

- October, 2013, Beijing, Tiananmen Gate, 5 dead
- March, 2014, Kunming, 31 stabbed to death, 141 injured
- April, 2014, Urumqi, bomb attack, 3 dead
- May, 2014, Urumqi, two cars with explosives drove into a market, 31 dead, 90 injured
- June, 2014, Urumqi, bomb attack, 3 dead (including 15 suspects)
- September, 2015, Aksu mine attack, 16 dead (including 5 police officers), 18 injured. An additional 28 people were killed as a result of the following manhunt for the attackers.

China has long treated her terrorist problem as something coming from the outside, a deliberate scheme to spread radical ideology among the minorities in China to disrupt her territorial integrity, support separatism and religious extremism, and weaken the authority of the central government. The problem of Uighur separatism has been blamed on external forces, terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda, and recently ISIS, such as exile Uighur diasporas and ETIM and TIP (Turkestan Islamic Party) from the nineties. Yet, the first official step to connect Uighur militancy to ETIM and to Al Qaeda was made only in 2001 in a report published by a Chinese mission to the United Nations in November. ETIM was officially placed on the list of international terrorist organizations – by both the United States and the UN – and it served as a means to connect the Chinese struggle against Uighur militants into the international war on terrorism. Especially as the Chinese media continues to group terrorists and peaceful separatists together. This shift if visible also in the labels the official media terms Uighur nationalist movement as well: in the nineties they were referred to as “splittists” (fenliefenzi), then after 9/11 they were increasingly referred to as “terrorists” (kongbufenzi). Even despite that, China remained within her own borders to fight terrorism and ethnic discontent.

China’s continuous operations to restore stability and order in Xinjiang have forced most of the radical militant separatists to Pakistan and other neighbouring states where they – contrary to the authorities’ aims – have also managed to establish links to local Al Qaeda and Taliban organizations. They have succeeded to the point where ETIM leader Abdul Haq gained a significant role within Al Qaeda’s decision making process. TIP also joined Jaish.

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13 Fishman, 2011, 55.
al Fatah, a jihadist-led alliance of rebel groups that also includes the Al Nusra Front, the Al Qaeda’s official branch in Syria, as a founding member.\textsuperscript{14}

After the recent terrorist attacks in Urumqi and various other parts in China, the IS announcement of the establishment of the caliphate, and the reports about Uighurs joining the organization, China stepped up her counter-terrorism activities in 2014. Xi Jinping pledged to build “walls made of copper and steel” and “nets spread from the earth to the sky” in order to capture terrorists.\textsuperscript{15} These efforts are represented at three levels: domestic crackdowns, repatriations from abroad, and remaining true to China’s main principle of non-interference.\textsuperscript{16} “As part of the year-long counter-terrorism campaign, Chinese police said they have confiscated thousands of videos inciting terrorism and blocked online materials teaching terrorist techniques.”\textsuperscript{17} As the Chinese government claims, Uighur youth is corrupted through such materials brought into Xinjiang through the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Even though previously several laws have already provided authorities with necessary means to act against terrorist threats, in December 2015 the National People’s Congress Standing Committee approved China’s first counterterrorism law, which came into effect on January 1\textsuperscript{st} 2016.\textsuperscript{18} It requires tech companies to hand over encryption keys to security agencies on demand, and would also allow the People’s Liberation Army to participate in counterterrorism operations overseas with the approval of the Central Military Commission and the countries involved in the operation. The law was passed amid heightened concerns regarding the unrest in Xinjiang, and reports claiming that Uighurs have joined to fight with the Islamic State, who pose a significant threat if they return to China. The South China Morning Post article quotes retired Colonel Yue Gang, who said military should be involved if countries are threatened who would affect China, “but we should do it without affecting the sovereignty of other nations.”

At multilateral level there is cooperation within the SCO, and joint military exercises (“Peace Missions”). The one in 2014, for example, took place in China’s Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, where 7,000 troops practiced on the basis of a scenario: a separatist group was assisted by international terrorists who plotted a terrorist attack, a coup d’état.\textsuperscript{19} Additionally, last year at the end of the two-day SCO summit Chinese Premier Li Keqiang called for the signing of an anti-extremism treaty which reflects Beijing’s growing worries about the lure of Islamic State.\textsuperscript{20} However, as it is with most of the organization’s work, the agreements signed at the summit are still considered by critics as more form than substance. As, for example, the insufficient and uncertainly set aims and means of operation of the

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\textsuperscript{15} Propper. „The Islamic State: The Danger that China Would Rather Not Name”. 2016, 255.

\textsuperscript{16} Dickey. „Counterterrorism or Repression?” 2016.


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Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) are constantly criticised – especially for a regional organization with a primary aim to guard the region’s stability and present a front against terrorism, extremism, and separatism.

On the other hand, China sees the key to fighting extremism and terrorism through the economic development in the threatened regions. One of these regions is the post-Soviet Central Asia, where China aims to improve economic cooperation within the member states of the SCO, and also through the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative (or New Silk Road), which also would put Xinjiang into a very important transit position in China’s long-term plans. The main idea is that the stability granted by economic development, new job opportunities, and the (forceful) establishment of a national – Chinese – identity would help secure China’s territorial integrity, border security, and would also secure the energy supply both from Xinjiang and from Central Asia that is essential for the Communist Party to retain its power and control. Through the tightened economic relationship with Central Asian countries China also aims to stop the spread of radical Islam and any kind of support for ETIM. It envisions connectivity through infrastructure that runs from China on land through six corridors and one additional Maritime Silk Road. If it succeeds, which both demands and supplies security and stability in the regions which it runs across, it would enhance Chinese power projection, primarily through economic connectivity, but if needed, also through military means.

“By developing extensive gas and oil pipelines, as well as developing a network of transportation links, China is making itself economically indispensable to Xinjiang and the countries lying within the modern-day Silk Road.” While it is favourable for the government, and makes Xinjiang a vital part of China’s future, it also brings controversial consequences for the region, and its Uighur inhabitants as well. They would have to decide whether they support the Chinese Communist Party, which brings economic development to the region, and agree to lose some part of their autonomy, or they can continue to oppose it, which brings the consequences of a continuous iron-fisted rule. The main problem is that there is no middle ground.

WILL THERE BE A CHINESE INTERVENTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

Usually China’s growing interests in Iraq’s considerable oil resources and infrastructure investments are considered a good basis to support Chinese intervention against ISIS. Especially, as despite the attempts to diversify China’s oil import, Iraq still remains a significant (5th largest) exporter to China (where China, too, is the largest importer of Iraqi


22 In greater detail see: Lin, C. „ISIS Caliphate meets China’s Silk Road Economic Belt”

oil at the demand of 22% of Iraqi crude oil in 2014).24 “Although much of the fighting has occurred away from the production areas where Chinese oil companies conduct business, Beijing has kept itself abreast of any developments in the energy and infrastructure sectors where its citizens are involved.”25 Then at the end of 2015 Fan Jinghui, a 50-year-old Chinese citizen, along with another Norwegian hostage, was executed by ISIS. In a speech President Xi Jinping condemned the killing of hostages and said that terrorism was the enemy of all mankind. Also the Chinese State Department vowed that Beijing would bring the criminals to justice – although the means are still uncertain.

There had been reports about the deployment of the Liaoning aircraft carrier to Syria as a sign of China’s willingness to send troops to fight in the Middle East, however, this information was quickly proven as nothing but mere rumours. The Global Times also added that “China has no reason to rush to the frontlines and play a confrontational role.”26 With the execution of Mr Fan, and the large number of Chinese enterprises and Chinese workers present in the Middle East and specifically in Iraq, Chinese interests are directly threatened. However, this still has not solved Beijing’s great dilemma: should China intervene directly, going against her long-standing principle of non-intervention and neutrality, in order to protect economic interests; or should she rather stay away in fear that sending troops would only lead to even more vicious retaliations that would then lead to further and greater losses?27 It further adds to the dilemma, that at home China should also project the capability of the government and the Communist Party to protect Chinese citizens and interests abroad as well.

China is still adamant on her main principle of non-intervention in other countries’ internal affairs. And even though she has shown certain signs of flexibility (especially regarding UN peacekeeping operations and the mandate of the combat troops China started sending), the growing economic interests in Iraq and the region are not a profound enough ground for China to join the USA’s war against IS.28 As it is stated in an often cited article originally published in Huanqiu, “the Chinese power projection is limited, and the Islamic State group has not yet threatened China’s core interests.”29 Also, China views the turmoil

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25 According to Hua Chunying, China Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson, it means about 10,000 Chinese workers in the country. Which brings up the potential need for the PLA to conduct evacuation missions similar to those it had done in Libya previously if the situation deteriorates any further. Some of the companies have already evacuated some of their staff. However, an evacuation of such large scale would threaten the state-owned companies to lose billions of dollars in investment as it did happen in Libya in 2011, the repetition of which would be highly undesirable for the government. Source: Butch, T., „Why China wil intervene in Iraq“. atimes.com, September 9, 2015. http://atimes.com/2015/09/why-china-will-intervene-in-iraq/, Accessed on 5. July 2016.
in the Middle East as a result of American actions, treating al-Qaeda and now the Islamic State as a by-product of the Iraq war, and will continue to treat it as American responsibility until the USA shows willingness to cooperate with Syria (the US government is still adamant on overthrowing Assad’s regime) and Iran. China doesn’t feel responsible for the turmoil of the Middle East, and thus feels no obligation to actively participate in its solution outside of a full-international alliance.

Others, like Tian Wenlin back in 2014, go even further in urging caution and waiting with an intervention:

“According to scattered news sources, this organization is providing water and electricity, wages, and traffic control, and is managing establishments like bakeries, banks, schools, courthouses and mosques within the occupied territories. Therefore, it is still inconclusive whether the Islamic State group is a heinous terrorist group or an inevitable product of the current development in the Middle East. Involvement in strikes against its military is premature given that the key issues have not yet been resolved. This cautious attitude is exactly what China as a “responsible power” is demonstrating.”

Liu Zhongmin, Middle East expert at Shanghai International Studies University says that while Beijing feels the international pressure to act against the Islamic State, it is unlikely that China would contribute to the fight against ISIS by military means, since she does not have military presence in the Middle East. “Even if China would like to [intervene], the conditions do not allow it.”

William Callahan from the London School of Economics claims that the only way for Beijing to take measures against the Islamic State is through Security Council-issued sanctions against Syria – which China is still reluctant to support.

Christina Lin, on the other hand, claims that it became almost inevitable that China would have to step up and intervene in the Middle East, but she also emphasizes that it would be only acceptable under the banner of the United Nations. She maintains that China would never fight US battles, or be involved in a US-led coalition. According to a South China Morning Post article the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in favour of the early settlement of the Syrian conflict, but only as part of the international community, with the support of the Security Council, and only if the future of Syria was decided by the Syrian people – alas the intervention is neutral in nature.

CONCLUSION

In the article it was examined how the Islamic State affects China’s Uighur problem. Even though there are some extremist Uighurs who had reached the Middle East and joined the IS militants, and while there is a certain threat of the spread of radical Islamic propaganda from the Middle East, there is little to worry about the return of these Uighurs to Chinese territory and carry out terrorist attacks there. According to this, China mainly fights terrorism within her own borders and in her immediate neighbourhood. She does so through

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30 Tian. US calls to fight IS. 
31 Liu. China’s limited capacity, 2015, nanzao.com 
32 Liu. China’s limited capacity, 2015, nanzao.com 
multilateral organizations like the SCO, through certain restrictions of the exercise of religion in Xinjiang, the approval of China’s first counterterrorism Act, and through promoting economic connectivity and development. It was also shown that despite the growing pressure, both at home and from the international community, of being a global great power and the need to protect her economic interests there is still little chance of China’s active intervention in the Middle East, or its participation in the coalition against the Islamic State. Especially not in the way the USA does.

If China joined the fight against the Islamic State, she would still have to face the possible consequences of discontent and the limitations of the applied crackdowns in Xinjiang which could result in the radicalization of the otherwise moderate elements within her own society.

Despite her economic interests and energy security being threatened in the Middle East China is more concerned with Uighur extremism and separatism emerging through the umbrella organization of ETIM, which might gather further international support. If it is possible, China would prefer to avoid painting a bullseye on her back, or get tangled up in the conflict of the Middle East, especially as the situation is considered to be US responsibility. An intervention would be only acceptable through the United Nations, with a Security Council mandate, which would also entail the notion that the US admitted that it was no longer strong enough to lead a coalition on its own, and full international support – and most notably China’s – would be needed to tackle this global problem of terrorism. Until then China would remain within her own borders and find common ground in this war with the international community. The reported presence of 300 Uighurs among IS militants further entitles China to her (flexible) iron-fisted ruling in Xinjiang, despite all kinds of criticism of blurring peaceful protestation with terrorism, and using that to violate human rights. These militants should be prevented from returning to China, which needs secure her immediate neighbours, Central Asia, first.

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Lt. Col. András Mező:

SITREP ON THE HUNGARIAN DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

“Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort.”


ABSTRACT: In the Hungarian Army during the country’s Warsaw Pact-membership it became clear that there was no space for independent Hungarian military thinking. According to the Soviet doctrinal approach the satellite countries’ security was not a primary issue. The whole structure, the preparation, and the training of the Pact’s armies intended purely to support the Soviet Red Army in the invasion of Europe. The Hungarian People’s Army was not an exception and as a consequence now there is no tradition of independent concept and doctrine development in the Hungarian Defense Forces. The Author draws attention to a couple of misunderstandings about doctrines, still prevailing in the Hungarian Defense Forces.

KEYWORDS: Doctrine, Strategy, Policy, National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy

The Hungarian People’s Republic had no independent security strategy, consequently the Hungarian People’s Army had no independent military doctrines either. As a matter of fact neither the Hungarian Army nor the Warsaw Pact had any coherent military documents bearing the name “doctrine”.\(^1\) \(^2\) The Hungarian Defense Forces made huge progress since the dissolving of the Warsaw Pact.

In the early 90s, the changed security situation demanded the creation of a new Hungarian national security and military strategy. I use the terms “national security strategy,” “military strategy,” “doctrine,” etc., but these clear concepts were not clear at all that time. The terminology was in total turmoil. Many politicians and military thinkers were confused by these concepts and sequenced them in reverse order: they thought that “military doctrine” was the “master plan” for the Army and the military strategy was subordinated to that. This approach reflected pretty much the prevailing soviet (later Russian) approach.\(^3\)

After Hungary’s accession to NATO, doctrine development accelerated. The expectation was very high, but the role of the doctrine was absolute misunderstood. Many military leaders believed that doctrine was a single, uniform system of thoughts in which both political

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and military-technical elements could be found, and – like a “supreme field manual” – it explained every strategic and operational\textsuperscript{4} and even tactical\textsuperscript{5} aspect in detail.

This was not the only misconception. Military doctrines had different misinterpretations: they were deemed an attempt to produce a higher form of catechism or a codex of general rules from which strategic and operational conclusions could be gained. Both tenets were so ridiculous and absurd that many military thinkers turned away from doctrines altogether, and rejected the need for them. Both opinions fail to consider that doctrines are not a silver bullet, they are not able to answer every question, and there is no ultimate truth, especially not for wars and battles.

WHAT IS MILITARY DOCTRINE?

Both NATO and Hungarian terminology sources\textsuperscript{6} define doctrine as a „Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.”\textsuperscript{7} In order to fulfill its function a doctrine should be based on operational and strategic experience. Experience can be gained from military history, training experience, and the latest lessons learned from campaigns (operations). Doctrines should be intellectually coherent, relevant, and reflect the views of the top leader of the Armed Forces. The doctrines are however not written for eternity, and to make sure that they remain relevant they must be revised from time to time. So the doctrines intend to reflect the latest development of the security environment, the resources allocated to the Armed Forces, the technological advancement, and last but not least the experience from operations.

The doctrines accumulate the common wisdom of the army; they demonstrate the proper attitude and the philosophy of warfare for future military leaders. The doctrines’ aim is to standardize the joint approach for commanders and their staffs, they establish a common basis and provide reference points for military education and training. The common doctrines enhance the interoperability with allied forces, they standardize terminology, symbology, training, and processes.

There is always a potential that the nature of the next armed conflict will be fundamentally different from the previous one. To change the doctrine from operation to operation would undermine their authority, therefore a doctrine describes just generic contexts or principles of long standing. For the same reason, doctrines are not strict rules; they are rather guidelines which tell the Commander how to think and not what to think. Thus doctrines aid the analytical thinking necessary to command various operations and are versatile enough to accommodate a wide variety of situations.\textsuperscript{8}

\textsuperscript{5} To illustrate: the “Light infantry section and platoon doctrine” (!) (No 68/24/2005.HTF) was issued in 2005.\textsuperscript{6} AAP-06 (U) was translated in 1996, the relevant (STANAG 3680) was ratified and implemented in 1998.\textsuperscript{7} Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-06 (2014) NATO Glossary of Terms and definitions, 2014. 2-D-9.\textsuperscript{8} AAP-47 (A) Allied Joint Doctrine Development Supplement to AAP-3 (J). Edition A Version 2. NSO, September 2011. http://nso.nato.int/nso/nsdd/listpromulg.html, Accessed on 05 December 2015. 1-2.
WHO ARE THE AUDIENCES OF MILITARY DOCTRINE?

At this point we have to clarify to whom the doctrines are supposed to be written. The short answer is: for military personnel, but this answer is not so simple. It is clear that in certain situations a „guidance” provided by doctrines is effective enough to achieve a coordinated action. A military doctrine gives guidance to officers, educates them and explains the approach to operations and the nature of warfare. It helps to understand the character of warfare and forms the basis of military training. At the same time, the doctrine helps civilians (politicians, government departments, public administrations, law enforcement agencies, academics, journalists, etc.) to understand the military point of view and approach.

But at a lower level (read: tactical level), it is absolute essential to give more detailed and specific instructions for effective coordination. Doctrines do not cover specific information about military activities, consequently doctrines are rather useful for personnel in the higher echelons of command, and are not intended for junior officers. At tactical level it is vital to explain clearly what to do and what not to do, and the necessary detailed instructions are in tactical manuals, regulations, Standing Operating Procedures, etc. These publications are subordinated to doctrines, they are derived from doctrines, and thus their purpose and intended audiences are totally different. To summarize: doctrines are for high ranking officers about how to think, while the regulations (pamphlets, manuals, etc.) are for junior officers and NCO’s about what to do.

Last but not least, doctrines are publicly available documents and thus clearly express to the country’s opponents that the armed forces are ready, strong and unified, thereby doctrines contribute to the nation’s deterrent capacity as well.\(^9\)

WHAT IS THE LINK BETWEEN DOCTRINES AND POLICY?

Policy and doctrines are very similar therefore it is not surprising that Hungarian politicians and generals confused them in the 90’s, but clearly policy is dominant. National policy leads and directs the development of military doctrines\(^10\) by giving the aims and the desired end states for the means and for the military implementation.

Doctrines, national security, and military strategy interact; they influence the creation of each other. Ideally, policy makers take into account the effective, proven military theories and principles while establishing the Security Strategy and Military Strategy of their nation. Extant and effective doctrines are the best summary of the latest result of military thinking therefore they can promote the military part of these national security documents. Doctrines can help especially by establishing ways necessary to turn the aims of National Strategies into reality.\(^11\) Doctrines provide information to policy makers responsible for the security of the nation about the core competencies of military forces. In general terms a doctrine is the link between the desired end state (what must be accomplished?) and means (what capabilities are available?) by providing the ways (how is to be accomplished?).

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10. MCM-077-00, Military Comitee Guidance on the Relationship between NATO Policy and Military Doctrine.

This logic works the other way around as well: doctrine writers are bound to ensure that the development of an upcoming doctrine is consistent with the established national policy. National security policy guides doctrine development by providing the aims and the desired end state. Thus policy makers and doctrine developers must closely synchronize their efforts in order to ensure consistency between strategy and doctrine.

Hungary’s National Security Strategy (NSS) was written in conformity with the new Constitution (called Basic Law). The NNS reflects the commonly accepted concept of strategy and emphasizes that the national military power is just one component of national strategy. Its most important finding is: “...the danger ... of traditional threats and major military confrontation among states has decreased.”\(^\text{12}\) In the strategy the other components of security (e.g.: political, economic, financial and social dimensions) were given more emphasis than military aspects were. The National Military Strategy (NMS), which is consistent with the NSS, states that “The defence of the country ... rests on two basic pillars: sovereign national force and Allied cooperation.”\(^\text{13}\) Interoperability is of great importance for the collective defence implemented in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which is one of the basic pillars of the security of Hungary. Interoperability must be one their most important characteristics for the Hungarian Defence Forces to fulfil their constitutional obligations.\(^\text{14}\)

In summary, Hungary attributes no importance to the military dimension of security and even in the military component relies heavily on cooperation with NATO. As the relevant strategies suggest the HDF will be likely to operate in the full spectrum of possible operations from low- to high-intensity, and mostly in crisis management operations as part of a NATO-based coalition far from the territory of our country.\(^\text{15}\) Having said this, it sounds very reasonable to adopt NATO doctrines as the cornerstone of interoperability, except where there is a specific national interest or doctrinal need. But do we have any?

Considering these objectives the budget (the means) of the HDF does not seem to be sufficient. Since 2008 the impact of the global economic depression on the national economy has significantly decreased the resources available to HDF. This negative trend aggravated the fact that national defense had been underfinanced in the previous period too. In order to stop and reverse the negative processes, in 2012 the Government of Hungary committed itself in a resolution that the budget of the Ministry of Defense for the years of 2013-2015 will be provided at least at the nominal value of the budgetary allocation for the year 2012. Subsequently, from the budgetary year of 2016, with an annual increase of no less than 0.1 percent of the GDP, the total budgetary allocation will have reached 1.39% of the GDP by 2022, which is close to the average of the European NATO Member States.

In my opinion, this constraint is the only serious national restriction or national limit on doctrine development. Any other argument about our specific national particularity or interest is empty twaddle. It is understandable that under these circumstances it is very hard for a doctrine writer to find the proper way, to write a military doctrine which connects the national goals with the sources available for the HDF. (It is not part of this study but I have to note here, that a longer range strategy may be based on non-existing military capacity,.

\(^\text{13}\) “Hungary’s National Military Strategy”. 2012. 11.
but beware that these longer range strategies require improvements in military capacities and are not usable in short term.)

General Benkő stated in an interview, that the security of Hungary cannot be interpreted without NATO (see box), and therefore it is vital to enhance the effective cooperation with Allied Forces. The efficiency of the cooperation in peacetime, in crisis or in conflict depends on the capacity of the allied forces to operate coherently. Allied operations should be prepared, planned, conducted in a way that ensures the best use of the resources and capacities of member nations. Interoperability is the key for the effective fighting force. Interoperability of the HDF has three levels: technical (e.g.: compatibility criteria), procedural (e.g.: doctrines), and human (e.g.: terminology) therefore the Common NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) are vital for the success of NATO operation, thus vital for the HDF as well.

The HDF is struggling with deficiency in all three aspects of interoperability. No need to mention that there are no financial resources available to replace the combat equipment left over from the Warsaw Pact-era, therefore NATO has to accept the non-standard (Soviet) military equipment. But the other two dimensions of interoperability depend just on the military leadership of HDF and the shortfalls are far more serious in the human and procedural areas.

WHO MAKES DOCTRINES…?

The international examples for doctrine development mechanism are very similar to the Hungarian one and it is regrettable that we did not take over the real essential part of their practice.

The NATO doctrine development process is carried out by the Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Group (AJODWG) under the auspices of the Military Committee’s Joint Standardization Board (JSB). The AJODWG consists of delegates from NATO member na-
tions, the International Military Staff, Centers of Excellence and the Strategic Commands. The AJODWG reviews proposals that identify doctrinal gaps and recommend development of doctrine in order to fill the disclosed gaps. AJODWG associates other NATO elements (Tasking Authority, Delegated Tasking Authority, etc.) and provides guidance on doctrinal and terminological harmonization issues. Their careful work ensures vertical and horizontal harmonization of the NATO doctrines.\textsuperscript{18}

In the British Army the development of doctrines is the responsibility of the Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC). The DCDC provides the United Kingdom representative to the JSB, the head of delegation to the AJODWG, and is custodian for some NATO publication. In order to influence NATO doctrine development process the DCDC directly liaises with relevant elements and organizations. The process of doctrine development is similar to NATO process.

Let’s see how it works in the HDF. Two questions arise: do we really need doctrines and who is supposed to produce it?

... do we really need them?

First of all, even though the process is similar to that in NATO and to international experience, it is very specific. The top leaders of the Hungarian Defence Force do not follow the doctrine development process and do not show the necessary interest in doctrine, therefore their views are expressed poorly in military doctrines.

Although the need for independent doctrines in Hungarian military thinking has been existing for two decades, doctrine development has been a neglected area. One explanation for this contradiction and for the lack of human interoperability is the fragmentation of the Hungarian officer corps. The promotion system does not include or require a rotation among garrisons and units. As a consequence the flow among units, command organization and academic institutions is extremely slow. This low mobility\textsuperscript{19} of officers eventuated that we can distinguish „troop officers”, „central staff officers”, „education officers”. Obviously these categories are neither official nor clearly separated, and as a matter of fact in some cases they are overlapping.

The „central staff officers” usually serve relatively short tours in operational units, and as junior officers they are assigned to the defence staff, one of the military agencies, or some other large military institutions, typically in Budapest. They have a good command of English, many of them have served shorter or longer operational tours, or served in a NATO HQ somewhere in Europe. They have experience of a fundamentally different military leadership style and way of thinking. The comparison between the Hungarian and the NATO approach has convinced them that the adoption of a new philosophy, and of the NATO-standardized doctrinal system is urgent. The other two categories are not so convinced about that.

The „troop” officers have spent the majority of their career in provincial garrisons in various command or staff positions. They are the mainstay of the Army, extremely over-worked, overburdened, exhausted and stuck in hectic daily activities. They are not interested


in theory-heavy books, many of them do not speak English, and their operational experience is uneven.

The „educational officers” are a relatively small caste in the Military University (or NCO Academy) with limited military or operational experience, but their effect on the future generations and thus on the entire officer corps is huge. The performance of the cadre of Military University is especially disappointing. They are supposed to support doctrinal development by identifying those unique national characteristics and interests which require national reservation or comment to NATO doctrines. Instead, the majority of the professors believe (and many field officers share this opinion) that doctrinal thinking is rigid, inflexible, and dogmatic – reasoning that it should be ignored.

This attitude rejects the potential value in a scientific approach to warfare and related activities and concentrates only on practical, daily military activities. Those who are convinced about the uselessness of doctrines consider the officers as just one contributor to the battle, with limited authority and not as rational leaders. This is a „regulation heavy” view: it requires detailed, prescriptive, normative pamphlets and even those only for the lowest (tactical) level. In this „manual-centric” way of thinking the commander’s authority is very narrow and limited just to choose one from the possible course of actions.

To a certain extent even Clausewitz shared this view. At tactical level it is possible to work out a relatively strict, template-based regulation system, because „At tactical level The field of action is more limited, means and ends are fewer in number, and the data are more concrete: usually they are limited to what is actually visible.”

At operational and strategic levels, however, a competent commander has to consider the ends of a battle, the ways for achieving those ends, the available means and the given logistic resources. This puts a military leader into a new dimension and in this much bigger dimension the detailed regulations and rigid standards cannot help, because the operations are full of bilateral interactions which are different from one case to the other and there are no stereotyped solutions for them. One size does not fit for all. Doctrines help the commander to open his mind, to develop his analytical skills, and to achieve a flexible approach, which is a must to adapt to the ever-changing situation.

HOW DO WE MAKE THEM?

In the HDF the Training and Doctrine Center (TDC) is responsible for the standardization and adoption of NATO publications and managing the production of strategic and operational level doctrines, tactical level regulations, manuals, etc. The TDC is also supposed to ensure coherence in both NATO and national doctrine publication. It must be emphasized that the TDC is a so-called „mid-level organization.” This designation clearly indicates that the doctrine development issue is not represented at strategic level, as the TDC has no right to liaise directly with NATO and other international partners, or to co-operate with other relevant counterparts. Under these circumstances it is difficult to influence NATO doctrine development or even to learn about the latest developments.

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21 Idem.
The events of the past two decades indicate and the recent circumstances determine that the likelihood that the HDF will continue to operate as part of joint multinational forces increases, so its doctrine should reflect common NATO practices as far as possible. Therefore it is policy to adopt as many NATO doctrines as applicable. The majority of the NATO doctrines (43 out of the most important 44 AJP-s and ATP-s)\textsuperscript{23} have been ratified and implemented by the HDF, and only four were ratified with reservation or comment.

After this seemingly seamless adoption of NATO’s common thinking, it may come as a surprise that the HDF has a doctrine hierarchy that differs from that of NATO. The function of the Hungarian doctrines is to ensure interoperability and bring together the allied and Hungarian strategic and operational thinking, highlighting the relationship between them and pointing out the national differences. Considering that the HDF has officially declared national reservations on only four occasions, an independent doctrine system seems an exaggeration.

The doctrine development process does not have any written rules. The TDC manages the Standardization and Doctrinal Committee (SDC) which is an advisory body chaired by the Deputy Chief of Defense Staff (DChoD). It gives guidance on doctrinal development, terminology, operational and material standardization and meets every two months. The Committee approves the Doctrine Development Plan (DDP), which is a long term for the regular revision and rewrite of all doctrinal publications. The SDC does not wait for proposal for doctrine, and does not identify doctrinal voids – it works in accordance with the timeline in the DDP. Based on the SDC’s decision in accordance with the plan the TDC Doctrine and Regulation Development Branch manages the projects for each doctrine.

The development starts with a formal invitation to the Project Working Group (WG), which is expected to produce a synopsis. All the relevant military organizations receive an invitation to the WG, which does the actual doctrine development. At the first meeting of the WG the representatives of relevant military organizations discuss the synopsis with the project officer. Once the draft synopsis is finalized, it is submitted for approval to the DChoD. The concerns start here, since the synopsis is prepared by an officer who is usually not an expert of the given specialty, while the members of WG are not released from their primary positions, so essentially they work in two full-time positions. There is no recognition for this extra effort\textsuperscript{24}, therefore they delegate much of their actual work to lower ranking officers with less experience and a more limited vision of doctrinal questions. At this level there is obviously no chance to consult and synchronize efforts with policy makers in order to ensure the consistency between strategy and doctrine, to which I had drawn attention earlier. Doctrine development is just a burden for the participants of the procedure therefore the WG members make shortcuts wherever they can: copy and paste as much as possible. There is no question of harmonization with other doctrines or of using agreed, current terminology.

The first draft is circulated to appropriate establishments and departments within the HDF, but the problem is the same: overworked officers with no time trying to give competent comments and amendments on the study draft. They have no time to acquire an overall view of the whole doctrinal system, therefore there is no consistency among Hungarian doctrines.

\textsuperscript{23} 41 doctrines are ratified and implemented, two ratified and future implemented, three doctrines ratified and implemented with reservation, one doctrine ratified and implemented with comment. One doctrine is not responded up to December 2015.

\textsuperscript{24} The only occasion when recognition was extended occurred in 2012, when the Minister of Defense wrote an acknowledgement in the foreword of the National Joint Doctrine.
The HDF’s Lessons Learned system is not involved in this development process. The operational experience of HDF is rather insignificant and the system is very badly managed. In fact, the Lessons Learned database contains only four strategic level lessons, but these are not campaign- (or operation-) related. Not having a decent Lessons Learned system, it would be advisable to use the Alliance’s Lessons learnt or to use the doctrines containing the processed experiences instead. As an alternative, we are developing our own doctrines without using relevant operational experience.

One example should suffice to illustrate the inconsistency within the Hungarian doctrine hierarchy and between that of NATO and the HDF. In NATO doctrines the land tactical activities are divided into offensive, defensive, stability and enabling activities. In the Hungarian doctrines we find three different groupings for the same. The HDF Joint Operations Doctrine says: offensive, defensive, special (!) and other combat-related activities. In the HDF Land Doctrines there are: offensive, defensive, delaying (!), special (!), and other combat related activities. The Hungarian doctrines are not consistent with the lower tactical manuals either: the Platoon Tactics Manual covers the same subject differently: offensive, defensive, non-war operation (!) and supplementary activities (!). This ought to be a really serious concern: even the basic concepts are not in agreement with NATO doctrine, moreover the HDF has literally no clue about the discrepancy. This is just one of the many instances which reveal that the Hungarian Doctrine system faces many serious problems.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of military activities</th>
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<tr>
<td>NATO doc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Offensive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defensive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stability</td>
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<tr>
<td>enabling</td>
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Figure 2. Inconsistency in terminology within the Hungarian Doctrine system and discrepancy between HDF and NATO doctrines (source: author)

Surprisingly, in spite of the significant inconsistency within its doctrinal system, the HDF does not seem to be concerned about it, there is no sign of any recognition that the system is broken. Presumably the majority of the doctrines were never read by Hungarian officers. This assumption has to be proven by a survey later.

The Hungarian doctrine hierarchy was based on the model of the NATO doctrine hierarchy which was converted into a doctrine architecture in the meantime. The change of designation seemed marginal therefore the Hungarian doctrines did not copy that. The hierarchy is currently based on the standard headquarters staff divisional system. The numbering sequence within provides functional and subject matter linkages.

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25 Ált/38 Magyar Honvédség Összhaderőnemi Műveletek Doktrína (MD 3(1)). Magyar Honvédség, 2013. 1-7.
26 Ált/29 Magyar Honvédség Szárazföldi Műveletek Doktrína (MD 3.2(1)). Magyar Honvédség, 2015. 1-16.
At the highest level we find the (National) Joint Doctrine, which is currently in its third edition. Even this doctrine reveals the HDF’s daily budget problems, the continuous concern about financial restrictions on military expenditures. The doctrine, however, is supposed to find the way (read: balance) between the designated ends and the given means, but we cannot find a clear solution or concept for the implementation of the tasks of HDF. Practically, the Hungarian top military doctrine just repeats the basic principle of NSS and NMS: the HDF is most likely to take part in managing a low-intensity conflict which is expected to take place at far strategic distances, therefore the HDF must have well-equipped, well-trained, flexible and effective, interoperable deployable and sustainable capabilities.

In 2016 a revision process will start, which will probably affect this and five other doctrines.

At the second level of the hierarchy there are the publications containing overarching joint knowledge: Intelligence, Operation, Logistics, CCIS. The substantial differences at this level are that in the Hungarian system there is no Operational-level Planning doctrine,

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28 Ált/43 Magyar Honvédség Összhaderőnemi Doktrína (ÖHD (3)). Magyar Honvédség, 2012.
29 Idem 2-4.
30 Idem 2-10.
31 Idem 2-12.
32 Idem 2-11.
but there are two doctrines which do not exist in NATO’s architecture: one is the Training Doctrine\textsuperscript{33} (revision in 2016) and the other is the Medical Doctrine\textsuperscript{34}.

At the third level of the hierarchy there are also some differences: in the Hungarian doctrine hierarchy there are two extra doctrines (FD-2.4: Geoinformation Support Doctrine and MD-3.3.1: Air Transport Operation Doctrine) which have no counterpart in NATO\textsuperscript{35}. Conversely, there are several doctrines in the NATO doctrine architecture without any similar ones in the Hungarian hierarchy. It does seem logical that since we theoretically ratified and implemented them, there is no need to repeat them. But the problem is still there: we did not incorporate them into our doctrines or manuals therefore the knowledge was not absorbed and this is a significant problem indeed because of the language barrier.

Another serious deficiency is the Host Nation Support Doctrine, or more precisely, the lack of one. Considering that the HDF is not able to defend the country independently (see the words of the Hungarian ChOD) it is a surprise that the Hungarian version of NATO’s Host Nation Support (HNS) Doctrine is not elaborated and the relevant NATO HNS doctrine\textsuperscript{36} will be ratified with reservation and with future implementation\textsuperscript{37}. Hungary has some concerns about the financial status of NATO-suppliers and the tax benefits provided for them. The HNS Memorandum of Understanding is currently under discussion with NATO and depending of the outcome of the negotiations, the HDF reserves the right to announce further reservation.

SUMMARY

In summary, the Hungarian military doctrine system is complete, but is probably not used. No need however pity for it, since their content is contradicting itself and non-standard with NATO doctrines. If we recall General George H. Decker’s cited word at the beginning of this paper about the meaning of doctrines, we can conclude that the HDF has neither common philosophy, nor common purpose, nor unity of efforts with NATO.

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\textsuperscript{33} Ált/24 Magyar Honvédsg Kiképzési doktrína. Magyar Honvédség, 2012.

\textsuperscript{34} EÜ/7 Magyar Honvédsg Összhaderőnemi Egészségügyi Doktrína (MH DOFT-code: EÜD 4). Magyar Honvédség, 2012

\textsuperscript{35} NATO’s STANAG 3998 Tactics, techniques and procedures for NATO Air Transport Operations - ATP-3.3.4.3 (A) is similar to the latter, but it is not a doctrinal publication but a tactical-level manual.

\textsuperscript{36} STANAG 2234 AJP-4.5

\textsuperscript{37} At the time of writing (2015. December) the doctrine has “No response” status from Hungarian side.
Ált/43 Magyar Honvédség Összhaderőnemi Doktrína (ÖHD (3)). Magyar Honvédség, 2012.
A NEW APPROACH TO NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT

ABSTRACT: National and international crises have an influence on one’s sense of security. Therefore, the adequate management of different types of crisis is essential. For choosing the correct methodology, an analysis of the own capabilities (force, power, national interest) is inevitable. The so-called “DIADAL (or DDADAC - Diagnosis, Direction, Alternatives, Decision, Application, Closing)”-methodology offers a possible solution for the general reader.

KEYWORDS: challenge, risk, threat, crisis, crisis management

INTRODUCTION

“....I do not take communion with the frivolous hope that some coincidence will save us...
Carl von Clausewitz”

For the individual, lesser or greater human communities and social organizations – due to their direct or indirect involvement and effects – researching crises, understanding the results and organizing our experience is vital. Efforts made to evade hazards threatening human security have long past in history. Every crisis phenomenon, which affects a community at any level of organization, foreshadows the possibility of damaging the consensual norms formed in it. This could harm the values and/or interests of the given community based on consensus, which also endangers the generally defined sense of security.

The disintegration of the military-power based bipolar world caused significant changes. These include the surfacing of conflicts suppressed – namely repressed by military force – during the years of the brittle Cold War. The menacing peril of a nuclear war had disappeared but the world has not become safer or integrated. Ideological, religious, ethnic, national, or regional disputes had arisen, mainly caused by the lack of stability. The newly occurred crises endangered many regions’ security and inclined international organizations to prevent conflicts, handle emerging sources of stress and crises, recover and keep peace.

Actions related to crisis management – due to the characteristics and complexity of conflicts – sought to explore and terminate the causes, sources and to restore the complete state of peace / peace condition. In the changed environment of security policy – along with the geopolitical and geostrategic challenges – recent crises aimed the surface which were fulminant and had prolonged lifespan. Therefore the methods of prevention and crisis management had to be significantly changed to preserve effectiveness. To be able to manage the crises concerning the military dimension of security new methods had to evolved, not just at federal but national level as well. Besides the former unequivocal military threat countries must prepare themselves to construe assignments deriving from the problem of

migration, drugs, national, religious, ethnic affiliation, terrorists, information technology, finance, or homeland security and to draw action and implementation plans. The Revolution of Military Affairs, (RMA)\(^2\), the efforts to achieve information superiority, the theory of ‘war without death’, and asymmetric warfare demanded new types of armed forces to precisely plan, construe and execute tasks.

SECURITY CHALLENGES, RISKS AND THREATS UNTIL 2030

Theoretical basics

The chapter is based on the 2010s and analyses the security and national security risks and threats likely to occur until 2030, furthermore, it formulates proposals on solving these problems. I analyze the conditions influencing the security and national security of our country in a particular subchapter.

The security challenges, risks and threats „are situations and conditions that bear danger and threat within them, which usually have negative effects on a given country’s overall security or its components, and weaken the internal and external stability”\(^3\). The general definition of risk: An action resulting in the possibility of danger, loss.”\(^4\) A security risk – due to the general definition – can be interpreted in respect of the security dimensions. Threat is the concrete will of action displaying a form of danger, whose purpose is to influence the target country’s behavior in order to endorse its own interests. We can mainly speak of threat if there is a possibility of forcibly extorting or solving the conflicts of interests. When judging military threats we have to take into consideration the being of will of state and politics, and to evaluate their military relations. So we have to make intent and military capability analyses of our environment, reviewing those possible hazards that could affect our country.

The challenges: The complex of situations and conditions at the lowest manifestation level of possible hazards – whose resultants in general adversely influence the internal and external stability and can affect the authoritical relations of a given region – which influence the components of the generally interpreted security.

The risks: The complex of situations and conditions at that manifestation level of possible hazards which influence the components of the generally interpreted security and that could violate national interests, thereby losses occur.

The threats: The complex of situations and conditions at the highest manifestation level of possible hazards which influence the components of the generally interpreted security

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\(^2\) The main stations – by experts – of revolution taking place in military:
1. The cooperation of German branches during the II. WW and in the time of the polish and west-european campaign;
2. The activity of RAF during the Battle of Britain;
3. The activity of German submarines;
4. The apparition and use of American nuclear weapons;
5. The mass use of reconnaissance, electronic war-technical tools in the Gulf War.


and that could violate national interests, and might indirectly influence the preservation of national values. The methods and instruments of representation of interest prefer enforcement or the possibility of forcible solutions. As it marks out of the definitions I regard the challenges, risks and threats as the manifestation of possible hazards, which usually adversely influence the internal and external stability and can affect the authoritical relations of a given region. These definitions built on each other hypothesize increasing stress level in order. Following their nature these can only be interpreted as a dynamic process. Therefore the theoretical interpretation of the definitions is important, but in practice they often appear overlapped, merge with each other, and may vary depending on the external environmental characteristics (such as political and economic conditions). Evaluation and analysis can only be performed retrospectively and often only after the development of an additional stabilization force field. At the level of risks and challenges it mainly concerns the environmental and industrial elements which are connected to the military element’s military-technological dimension.

Challenges, risks and threats

1st illustration
Source: Resperger, I. The changed tasks of armed forces in managing of military crises.152.

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Theoretical principals related to conflict, conflict-prevention, crisis and crisis management

I approach the concepts, definitions on the subject through interstate-relations. In most cases literature basically discerns 4 conditions\(^6\): peace condition, crisis condition, armed conflict and after-crisis-management peace condition (peace-2). Peace condition’s characteristic is that the relations between states and/or the groups of countries based on mutual trust and compliance with taking into consideration common interests and fair values. The characteristic of crisis conditions is that the good relations due to some kind of dispute or conflict of interests/values deteriorates, stress arises between the actors who try to shape the situation by some means. We speak of military endangerment if the efforts (political, diplomatic, industrial and other) proved to be ineffective and the relation between parties continues to deteriorate, which manifest in pressure, force demonstration, provocations, concentration of troops and border violations of military nature. The feature of after-conflict peace condition is that the actions related to conflict management reach their main goal – the recreation of peace – but to keep up and to reinforce the consolidated crisis management measures usually actions are put in place which prevent possible further confrontations. These actions are aimed to reduce the stress level but optionally the longer-than-needed use delays the emerge of peace condition.

Intensity and stages of crisis

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intensity of crisis</th>
<th>Weapons used</th>
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<tr>
<td>10 High</td>
<td>Airplanes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Helicopters</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Tanks</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Armored Infantries</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Medium-caliber weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Light weapons</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>No weapons</td>
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Based on the presumption of Michael S. Lund mainly the diplomatic, political and international organizations and the military force actions given a conflict’s stages could be diagrammatically represented. The first I analyze, in relation with the illustration, is the category of essential (vital) values and interests.

The essential (vital) values and interests

National interest is a term defining a nation’s goods, benefits and needs. It is an essential conditionality regarding the nation’s survival, consolidation and development. It is the decisive factor in the existence of state sovereignty. National interest related to the defense of state can be outlined in the context of hazards and risks threatening the state with armed violence. Some American researchers’7 differentiate the general term (interest) by the potential risks. Thus we can distinguish: the vital interest, the particular interest, the major interest and the interest categories.

Vital interest (crucial national interest): The complexity of crucial, survival ensuring social needs –related to the nations persistency and consolidation – which has considerable importance in national existence. Therefore its enforcing and safeguarding from national side could be associated with radical risk-taking and the maximal, dedicated concentration of national resources which optionally manifest as undertaking a total armed confrontation.

Particular interest (basic national interest): A complexity of vital social needs – determining the national existence – which, to enforce and safeguard, the state undertakes great risk but its level is below nationhood.

Major interest (important national interest): A complexity of social needs which, to enforce and safeguard, the state endeavors without undertaking greater risks (e.g. temporary disposal of the country’s air space or territory to foreign armed forces for trespassing).

Interest (simple national interest): A complexity of social needs which tends to raise the national welfare. The accent is on its enforcing, the safeguarding is usually preventive and indirect without the application of armed forces (e.g. material, technical, financial, training and assistance).

The value: The Concise Hungarian Dictionary reads: ”the attribute of something that reflects importance to society and to the individual”. Experts usually classify here a country’s culture, language, or cultural and artistic heritage, which is linked to the population. Values rather than interests are more persistent in a given social environment due to that the interests are articulated along the values as a result of the internal changes in society. Values are basically redefined only as a result of drastic inner or outer changes affecting whole society.

The debate, The hazard

Security challenges, risks and threats „are situations and conditions that bear danger and threat within them which usually have negative effects on a given country’s overall security, or its components and weaken the internal and external stability.”8 Debate: relation, situa-

tion when the parties conflict their interests (e.g. negotiation). The condition of closure is to have the parties make a compromise in a way to appropriately represent their own interest. The condition of closure is to have the parties make a compromise in a way to appropriately represent their own interest. By danger to society we generally mean the possibility of occurring phenomena that could negatively affect a security dimension. A circumstance related to security that bears the possibility of whole society’s affecting negative impacts. The general definition of risk: „Risk associated with an action, the possibility of loss”.

The Force and Power

Force and power are one of the instruments of armed conflict. „War is the use of force against the other’s will” (Morgenthau). The connection between force and power derives from the fact that every political action directly or indirectly is actually the act of using power, whose form and density depend on the goal desired, and the implementer’s determination. The grades of enforcing force and power are as follows: demonstration, threatening, enforcing, punishing, exerting pressure, use of military force.

3rd illustration Users of diplomatic and material force

Source: Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds a publication of the National Intelligence Council. 17.

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12 Ibid.
CHARACTERISTICS OF CRISES

Initial period

Some kind of dispute could surface between parties over a shorter or longer latency which is usually based on some kind of interest or conflict of interests. This period is highly uncertain. The need of information becomes the most important among directly and indirectly involved parties. The following main questions could be conceived\(^\text{13}\): who are the possible actors, what basic interest they have, what could spring the crisis? Answering questions, drawing conclusions by analyzing intelligence and further information gathering could help the operation of parties. Obviously the opposing sides’ risk-taking willingness – how far they are willing to go in the „grab it, leave it”\(^\text{14}\) game – in enforcing their interests is an important question: will they use armed force or back off due to sanctions.

Eventually the first, the „initial” period is about information gathering, analyzing, processing and planning of further actions.\(^\text{15}\) At the end of the first phase after carefully analyzing the gathered information, the conclusions on various strategies could be set out for taking several political, diplomatic, economic, maybe military actions. The prerequisite of right decisions is the gathering, processing, forwarding of the information needed. After the preliminary processing, an accordingly put together „body” or team mediates the summarized assessment to the decision maker. The „body” helps the processing, filtering of information, compiles the possible action plans for the decision maker, draws recommendations and counsels. It should be noted, that the „body” makes declaration in consequence of its existing knowledge. If there is not enough information or its quality is low, the objectivity of decision-making could become damaged. In an ideal system the decision maker has to be placed as close as possible to the crises to be able to make the right decisions.

In the process the first main phase is planning, which requires appropriate prevision, awareness and analytical skills. During the making the framework of responsibilities and the connection between the decision-making and decision-executing groups are essential. The governmental structure has to be reorganized in the reduction phase if needed, because crises could not always be solved with measures effective in peace status. It is practical to inform the people with the essential information of the situation.

For the method of prevention foresight is a must to be able to recognize the crisis by its initial characteristics in this way to prepare for the probable stress and to be able to plan the response. The effectiveness of response is highly dependent on the estimate of situation, the resistance to the initial instability exciting effects and the dynamism of the system which can react, with optimal effectiveness, to challenges appropriately and timely. The existence and realization of these factors guarantee the implementation of the appropriate action plans. In the solution phase the adequate informing of general public is still important, which could shape the public moral in each phase of a crisis. In analyzing crises the major objective is to categorize it as sophisticated as possible. The seminar of Marshall Center has differentiated

\(^{13}\) Matus J. „Válságkezelés és konfliktusok megelőzése” Új Honvédségi Szemle. 1995/10. 50.


emergencies of „security nature” and „non security nature”. Security natured ones are terrorism, taking hostages, armed conflict, war; while non-security natured ones are disasters (storms, floods, earthquakes) or the collapse of the monetary system. Security emergency directly threatens the existence of a country’s or region’s population. In the other type emergency acts indirectly. Different types of crises require different types of coordination procedures from the crisis-management organizations. A given crisis-management organization has to comprehend the given management levels in crisis managing operations to be able to take further actions. This is essential because an organization with given managing functions is allowed to implement responses on its own and a higher level of management is needed for its operations which gives an overall picture of the whole crisis management procedure. Usually the „non-security natured” emergencies can be treated by previously made and approved action plans, so the organizations directly involved are able to comprehensively implement the management functions (e.g. planning, organizing, coordinating, monitoring). „Security natured” emergencies usually require a higher level approval for the already existing or newly worked out action plans and after that the implementation can take place. Depending on the type of crisis the measures and political goals could be planned and dependent on the situation (non planned). In both cases during the implementation and enforcement we can generate stress increasing reactions which could negatively affect the procedure of conflict management.

The development phase of a crisis

After the dangers and possibilities are clearly drawn and the incentives, sanctions were not satisfactory in restoring the pre-conflict state, the crisis process steps into the development phase. Due to the sustained stress further instruments and methods take place. In this period uncertainty and oversensitivity arise and the need of military and political actions might surface. ”Security dilemma” – that is each party takes the other as „offensive” and all own actions as „defensive” – increases the uncertainty. This is amplified by the fact that the originator’s activity is always more prominent. Usually the originator – to enforce their interests – pressurizes in some way while the other – to enforce their own interests – reacts. In this phase politics – as a primal „pulley gear” – decides how the given state connects its own ”gear” (economical, humanitarian, monetary, diplomatic, military) with that of others. In choosing the right military actions the „Huntington paradox” will always prevail: „The soldiers feel responsible for security and to keep them in the right track in their advisory and executing role the implementation of the so called „civil-control might always cause stress.”

Time factor (war on time) was an essential characteristic of the Yugoslavian war too. „Aggressors” tried to make rapid successes, while the „endurers” tried to inspire the international organizations to intervene as soon as possible. The lack of time is usually described as “decision density”, because the lack of information, or the opposite, abundance of information could cause stress to the decision makers. Besides time, timing can be a crucial factor of conflict management because the so called conflict-curve can be easily analyzed afterwards. It is simple to define the optimal time and spot for interventions retroactively.

but the timeliness and foresight require immediate actions to prevent escalation. That is the inter-process interventions in given time and space have high risks, the exact assessment of their efficiency is only possible after the end of crisis. The power and influence of the parties taking side during the conflict has their biggest role in the development phase. During this phase, the parties use their power and influence constantly.¹⁹

As I have mentioned above, the parties act on each other mutually, so a certain level of resistance is generated against pressure which could deepen the conflict. A solid, real threat assumes the being of actual and needed potentials to come with it. Of these, threat’s most recognizable components are as follows: economic, technological, military dimensions; size of population as a static element. So threat comes with the recognition of aggressor, marking the enemy which leads to the development of the Image of Enemy.²⁰ Daniel Frei was looking for the image of self, the sensed image, and image of enemy while he was researching the US-Soviet relationship from 1980 to 84. The image of enemy and other country’s perceived images affect their relationships. To harmonize these images diplomatic empathy is required from both sides, which is facilitated by mutual trust and open ambience. Their being provides the possibility to clarify interests, mutual persuasion and to make prospective compromises. In many cases the conflict ends, but the interest-collision remains.

The culmination of a crisis

The culmination of a crisis is when the tension level reaches the critical level and so that the processes densify. All this happens in a different dimension at the level of an armed conflict (war). Of course, not all conflicts lead to an armed clash.²¹ During the Cold War the crisis phases were comprehended stepwise and progressively. This was called the theory of „stepwise extension of war crisis“.²²

Reaching the culmination of crisis means the undertaking of an open confrontation, which results in limited diplomatic possibilities. The failure in using incentives and sanctions causes the activation of military potentials. This process comes into being in a dynamic reaction (series of responses) between parties, which is in proportion with the range of threat. The chance of military confrontation stresses the question of justice.²³

End phase

The final phase is where efforts are made to come to agreement, to make peace. It is important, that there is a significant difference between after-crisis peace status („peace 2“) and pre-crisis peace status (peace 1), because “peace 1” and „peace 2” are stabilized on different power and security force-fields. The new „peace 2” circumstances constantly demand the relation and relationship system to be restored onto peace status level. In this spirit constant

²¹ E. g. between 1700-1870 there has been 117 serious conflicts, but only in 10 cases escalated to armed conflict. Berek, L., Hegedűs, R., Héjja, I., Vojnits, P. and Kónya, I. A honvédelmi hadászati művelet. Budapest: ZMKA, 1992. 36.
Contemporary warfare efforts have to be made to normalize and square the relations. This process takes relatively more time, which duration regarding the experience is as follows: To get to armed encounter from „peace 1” – in case of a long lasting crisis – takes approximately 2-6 months, to get to „peace 2” from an armed conflict it takes approximately 3 or 4 times more. The time needed for restoration depends on the intensity of the crisis, number of casualties, the type of applied weapons and the approach of the crisis-managing strategy. Weapons applied during the armed conflict conclude the efficiency of actions in three main ways: the scale of destruction, environmental effects and the elimination of installed, hoarded and illegal weaponry. The scale of destruction depends on the quality, quantity and the inflicted damage of applied weaponry. If sides used highly destructive instruments their strategy would rule victory at all cost, which disregarded the results, then the resettling of displaced population and restoring the damage and destruction could take a vast amount of time.

Environmental effects are closely related to the scale of destruction. Environmental damage caused by chemical, biological or nuclear attacks affecting large areas also makes the reconstruction difficult.

The elimination of installed, illegal and hoarded weapons (minesweeping, finding undetonated weapons, destroying the collected weaponry) is a hard task for the forces taking part in peacekeeping.

The composition of applicable forces in the last phase of the conflict varies from time to time. It is practical to use light weaponry peacekeeper forces at first, later special teams (minesweeper, engineering, logistics and transportation) and police forces come last.

It is important to note that during fierce crises the use of a crisis management strategy could result in fragile peace but the hazard of a renewing escalation is high.

A new approach to crisis management

Based upon two earlier examples I created my own charts one which classifies crises according to their type and another one according to the intensity of the crisis (see charts 3 and 4 describing the Resperger-style interpretation of the step by step nature of crises). While the Lund-chart focuses on peace operations, the current complex security situation clearly proves that we are facing multiple crises at the same time. Another reason for expanding the Lund-chart is that it focuses on clashes between two state actors. However, the ever growing importance of non-state actors like the Islamic State, insurgents, rebels or organized crime in contemporary armed conflicts clearly proves the proposition that in a modern crisis at least one side is a non-state actor. My chart lists various types of operations like anti-narcotics, migration control, fight against organized crime, and finally every element of peace operations including preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peace building. Every level of my chart, which I describe as conflict, crisis, war, stabilization and peace, contains some relevant military, law enforcement and national security measures.

It is important to know about the chart that certain operations, for example the fight against illegal narcotics or organized crime and operations against illegal migration, are not limited to any given stage within the crisis instead they may continue throughout the crisis. My aim was to include every possible contemporary threat on my chart because

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the efficient cooperation of defense, law enforcement and national security organizations is the most important requirement if we want to manage a crisis successfully.

The first stage of a conflict on my charts is peace and the aim for this period is to achieve stability by relying on peacetime training without the use of force. The second stage of a crisis is called conflict when the relevant authorities should focus on anti-narcotics operations and migration control. The third level of the chart describes which military actions are possible during a crisis, while the fourth level is mainly about setting up embargoes or blockades and fighting organized crime and this is the level where peacemaking operations happen. These actions are not the sole responsibility of the armed forces since a multifaceted crisis demands a multifaceted solution. War is the shortest but, at the same time, the most intensive period of the crisis if we take into consideration the number of deployed personnel and weapons. The most important tasks during the period of de-escalation include peacekeeping, peace building, stabilizing operations and setting up advisory and training missions. We have to mention that some issues may last for longer periods and some problems may have to be dealt with multiple times during a crisis. Challenges of such nature include migration control, anti-narcotics operations, the fight against organized crime and terrorism, and setting up and running blockades and embargoes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace-1</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Crisis</th>
<th>War</th>
<th>Stabilization</th>
<th>Peace-2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Period of peace</td>
<td>Training avert disaster</td>
<td>Conflict Preventive diplomacy Treatment of mass migration evacuation operations anti-drug operations humanitarian operations conflict resolution</td>
<td>Crisis Crisis management of law enforcement and military duties Embargo, blockade peacemaking operations against organized crime</td>
<td>War Emergency civil war Local war regional war world war</td>
<td>Period of peace state building</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4th illustration

The Hungarian legal system enumerates a number of crisis types in the Special Legal Orders section of the Fundamental Law of Hungary. The peacetime responsibilities of the Hungarian Armed Forces are described in Article 45 of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, in Act CXIII of 2011 on National Defence and Hungarian Armed Forces and in separate legislation about the use of Hungarian Armed Forces during the period of special legal

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25 Resperger, I. (ed.)

orders. For example the participation of the Hungarian military personnel during the current migration crisis is regulated by the 25/2015 (IX.14) Joint Instruction on the Cooperation of the Hungarian Armed Forces with Law Enforcement Authorities which was issued by the Interior and Defense Ministers of Hungary. The regulations applicable during a terror emergency can be found in Article 51/A of the Fundamental Law, while the rules valid during an unexpected attack can be found in Article 52 of the Fundamental Law. Moreover, the ordinances valid during a State of Preventive Defence can be found in Article 51 of the Fundamental Law while the rules for a State of Emergency are described by Article 50 of the Fundamental Law. Finally, Article 49 of the Fundamental Law of Hungary contains the legal framework for a State of National Crisis. The purely military responsibilities of

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the Hungarian Armed Forces are described in detail by the National Security Strategy of Hungary\textsuperscript{30}, National Military Strategy of Hungary\textsuperscript{31}, and in various military doctrines and regulations. (See Chart 6 for details.)

SUMMARY

A successful management of a crisis which, as we know from ample experience, is an often complex and time consuming process for those military, law enforcement and national organizations responsible for its management. The chances of success can be increased if the participants are aware of those multiple processes and concepts which influence the outcome of any given crisis. The aim of my paper was to focus attention to a crisis management approach which is suitable for any type of crisis.

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\textsuperscript{31} 1656/2012. (XII. 20.) Korm. határozat Magyarország Nemzeti Katonai stratégiájának elfogadásáról (Government resolution 1656/2012 (XII.20.) on the National Military Strategy of Hungary) http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=157721.234310 (accessed on 2016. 07. 28.)


ABSTRACT: By now the United Nations’ peacekeeping activities have become one of the most effective tools of the international community, which is operating to limit the burst of conflicts and restore peace. But what is the measure of success? How can one determine that a United Nations mission achieved its purpose? Not only the UN analyzed the factors and conditions of success, but also many other researchers had interest in clarifying the terms of the success itself. In my analysis, besides summarizing the experience of the first United Nations Chiefs of Defence Conference in 2015, I highlight significant security threats and problems of the 21st century and present the United Nations operations’ success and failure factors. My other objective is to point out that promptly planned missions and rapidly deployed United Nations forces can significantly lower the level of intervention and the associated resource requirements during the management of a region’s conflicts.

KEYWORDS: United Nations, peacekeeping, conference of CoDs, security challenges, international stabilization mechanisms.

INTRODUCTION

I chose to start my thesis with a quote from US diplomat James Dobbins, as it perfectly highlights the dilemma with which the international community is often faced, specifically that the neglect of a conflict results over time in an increasingly growing financial burden on the participants. The achieved result of a pre-planned and quickly accomplished low-budget mission should be recognized and compared to the estimated financial needs of a mission launched after the escalation of the conflict and the radical deterioration of the situation. The differences in spending can be proven by the fact that the United Nations spent on its peacekeeping operations annually as much as the United States spent in Iraq in a month. The UN’s own assessment also points out that UN operations are not only cheaper than other interventions carried out by international players, but the expenditures are also more equally distributed among the member countries. Only a half percent of the world military expenditure is spent on the United Nations’ peace operations, while their effectiveness far exceeds the amount of resources spent on them.

1 James Francis Dobbins Jr. (1942-) American diplomat, The United States’ ambassador to the EU between 1991-93, Deputy Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (2001), Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (2013-14).
THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

Over the past sixty years, the United Nations peacekeeping activities played a decisive role in guaranteeing peace and security. Over the decades, missions included a wide-range of tasks, large numbers of peacekeepers, and substantial financial resources that were used to resolve conflicts in many countries of the world. Therefore, determining the definition of peacekeeping success and failure and the examination of the factors that influence success received great attention from both individual researchers and the United Nations. Yet peacekeeping’s universal recipe has not been crystallized, experience rather confirms that the conflicts are different so they require a different response from the international community as well. The definition of success is not an easy task, the literature is rather diverse in identifying success factors, but one can detect universal characteristics that are measuring the effectiveness of the UN missions.

At the beginning of peacekeeping operations’ establishment, the United Nations intended to effectuate the mandates granted by the Charter of the United Nations in a changing international power structure. Its work was essential, as the organization provided an opportunity for a possible dialogue between the two blocs to stabilize the international relations. According to the principles laid down in the Charter, the member states aim is to "maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace".² For the purpose stability the Charter decided to introduce soft and hard measures for those who endanger international peace. Reactions vary from the peaceful settlement of conflicts (Sixth Chapter) to stricter coercive measures (Seventh Chapter) depending on the characteristics of the arisen conflict.

The document however does not contain a definition or specific details about the mechanism of peacekeeping; it rather gives priority to the co-operation within the Security Council. Powerful measures of Chapter VII, however, failed to settle international conflicts during the Cold War, the original plans – the Security Council decides about further stabilizing actions – were proven to be unsuccessful after a short time as the veto of the Security Council has repeatedly questioned the organization's ability to act effectively.³ States sought to limit the effects of the unstable political decision-making system.

This objective launched the first peacekeeping missions in order to guarantee peace, to moderate conflicts between the two blocs, and to act against the outbreak of local problems. Considering their mandates and principles, peacekeeping operations are unofficially claimed to be based on “Chapter six and a half”.⁴ The limited mandate of the missions under the Sixth Chapter consists of peaceful and soft-policy measures (such as consultancy, support, training operations), thereby active military involvement is only in the portfolio of missions under Chapter VII. The United Nations peacekeeping operations are based on voluntary

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force contributions, minimum and proportionate use of strength, the principle that military intervention should only be used as ‘ultima ratio’, and that every mission must be preceded by the host country’s consensus. The first official UN mission was launched in 1948 (UNTSO5), and since then a total of 63 peacekeeping operations have taken place with the participation of hundreds of thousands of peacekeepers.6

Over the years, peacekeeping operations have adapted to changes of the security challenges with many smaller or bigger modifications. Between the two generations of missions (after the end of the Cold War), similarly to other international organizations, the United Nations also had to change its point of view and methods. Additionally, peacekeeping was influenced by several other factors alongside the collapse of the two blocs. Besides traditional military operations the first generation (traditional) peacekeeping missions also included observer operations. Complementing the UN’s definition, Janos Tisovszky presented a more general definition of the first generation of peacekeeping missions in his analysis "The United Nations and peacekeeping". According to him, the task of missions is to “supervise the ceasefire agreements between the conflicting states, as well as the establishment of a neutral buffer zone.”7 These operations are commonly small, unarmed operations, and most of the 13 operations – launched during the Cold War – may be listed here.8

MODERNIZATION STRATEGIES

UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali further differentiated the previous categorization of the peacekeeping missions in his report, „Agenda for Peace“ in 1992. He complemented the single peacekeeping concept with preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, -enforcement, and peace-building missions.9 Simultaneously with this multi-faceted approach, a need for multidimensional and complex operations emerged during the changed circumstances after the end of the Cold War. The conceptual distinction thereby facilitated to concentrate the work of the United Nations. At the same time – in line with the East-West confrontation’s disappearance – within the UN Security Council, the use of veto decreased, so that effective action could respond to crises. The Agenda for Peace was among the first official documents, which aimed to highlight the success factors in peacekeeping10:

- clear and feasible mandate;
- cooperation among partners in accomplishing the designated tasks;
- continuing support of the Security Council;

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5 According to the decision of the Security Council of the United Nations, military observers were deployed to the Middle East (UNTSO). The main task of the mission was the supervision of the ceasefire agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
- readiness of Member States to contribute;
- effective UN management;
- adequate financial and logistic support.

The traditional first-generation missions’ responsibilities thus expanded with a multifaceted mandate, including political, military, police, humanitarian, reconstruction and development tasks.\textsuperscript{11} Boutros-Ghali’s detailed analysis and subsequent careful planning, however, was not always satisfactory for a successful mission. The UN has failed on numerous occasions. The least successful deployment of international peacekeepers took place in Somalia (the United Nations Operation in Somalia – UNOSOM – launched on the 24\textsuperscript{th} of April 1992).\textsuperscript{12} In addition, the engagement in Rwanda and Bosnia was not fruitful either.\textsuperscript{13}

By the end of the nineties, failures had proved that even extended mandates were not enough for ensuring unstable areas. There was a need for a so-called "robust peacekeeping", the deployment of a sufficient amount of properly armed personnel, where peace is not only achieved and maintained by the military, but also by civil stabilizing and securing methods. The mission ensures the protection of the population within the area of operations, as well as helps the settlement of the conflict with other tasks. The mandate will continue to allow the use of weapons only for self-defense. According to their versatile duties, similar missions are labeled as "integrated operations", referring to civil and military joint coordination. Since the peacekeeping missions received broad functions, United Nations peacekeepers worked in close cooperation with local police forces in the humanitarian and development tasks as well.

In the 2000s, problems rapidly evolved to be multidimensional and international. Moreover, radicalization, territorial, and ethnic disputes combined with local conditions played a deep role, so it was essential to involve civil activities, such as business counseling, humanitarian aid and direct support for the rule of law. The Brahimi report in 2000 discovered several errors in the second generation of peacekeeping mechanisms, for example, highlighted some deficiencies in protecting personnel and stressed the importance of using the soft-policy tools. On the basis of the comprehensive report, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peace-building units worked in closer cooperation. Sharing information, achieving a clearer mandate, providing essential resources to protect the civil population were also aims of the modernization.\textsuperscript{14} Regarding changes in the personnel, former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld claimed: "Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it." The changes were confirmed in 2008, when the UN released another comprehensive document, the Capstone Doctrine, which envisaged a multi-dimensional function rather than an increase in traditional military operations. The new missions had to cooperate with local


actors in order to achieve efficiency and legitimacy, as well as mapping the political and social conditions. The new peacekeeping doctrine highlights the role of the following elements\(^{15}\):

- Create secure environment while strengthening the state's ability to be able to guarantee security, fully respecting the rule of law and human rights;
- Ensure the political dialogue, promote negotiating period and support the development of rule of law;
- Ensure that all UN and other international actors continue their activities in a coordinated way in the given country.

The New Horizon report, published in 2009, complemented the above detailed doctrine by emphasizing the importance of enhanced cooperation with other international and humanitarian organizations involved in peacekeeping to protect civilians and military personnel.\(^{16}\)

Thus the new, third-generation peacekeeping operations’ framework, the recent norms and mandates were created, in which the focus is on parallel application of civil and military capabilities rather than on purely military or diplomatic means. The change in the peacekeeping mandate is an ongoing process, since the system adapts to the local and international political, social and economic conditions, but the awareness of doctrinal changes outlined in this chapter is essential to suggest further development steps.

**CHALLENGES OF THE 21\(^{ST}\) CENTURY**

Today, processes affecting the security of the world are increasingly accelerated, became more complex and less predictable. A wider interpretation of security, including the economic, social, environmental and technological changes and their various interacting processes will significantly transform the security’s previously only political-military dimension. There are however a number of processes, which are very likely to have a significant impact on the world's security.

Such factors are the gradual shift of the global economic power’s center towards Asia and the Pacific region, which entails the strengthening of the region's political lobbying capabilities as well. In response, the United States began to focus on the strategic shift towards the region, which implies a weakening of the attention paid to other regions in the long term. This process presents enormous challenges.

Economic difficulties and the Western (mainly European) countries’ budget priorities (priority on social spending) created a serious lack of resources in the defense sector, the consequences of which will persist for the next 15 years, and the skill shortages are expected to continue to grow, reducing the forces’ fighting ability. Underfunding is not only the consequence of the difficult economic environment. Western (mainly European) countries armed forces’ decreased willingness to use military means after the end of the Cold War contributed greatly to the development of the situation. Conflicts are preferred to be settled by "soft power" tools. The underfunded national combat capabilities cannot be effective, so there is a risk that this will reduce the effectiveness of international organizations as well.

The states are becoming less open to the use of armed forces, instead, they will seek to achieve their goals through the use of pressure, other proxy states or asymmetric ways.


\(^{16}\) New Horizon. „A New Partnership Agenda – Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping”, 2009.
Nevertheless, the traditional interstate armed conflicts’ (wars) occurrence in the next 15 years cannot be entirely ruled out. Although the decline in the number of open conflicts can act as a stabilizing factor in the world's security, "invisible" types of "hybrid warfare" or other factors of uncertainty could generate new conflicts. Support for proxy forces (militias, insurgents), intelligence, special operations and PSYOPS capabilities, asymmetric warfare, the use of sabotage, disinformation in order to deny the intervention are tools of the new types of warfare.

The growth of global population will increase over the next 15 years, but its pace is slowing, and the process is significantly different by geographical location. However, the most important aspect of the changing population will be the altering of the distribution in age groups. These processes may result in internal social tensions, such as the discontent of those layers who are forced out of labor market (see. the "Arab Spring"), strengthening prejudices against and segregation propensity among immigrants, increased conflicts between the majority and minority society (riots), therefore the non-integrated social layer’s increasing poverty, and aging societies’ reduced propensity for violence. The declining population and the demographic problems caused by the aging population are also present in Hungary, serious challenges for population policy of the country can be detected even in the short term.

The increasingly widespread digitalization brings a growth in cyber threats in both the public and private sectors. The rapid development of information technology and applied technologies often enables only reactive response, so generally speaking, the shortcomings in the area of cyber defense is expected to persist in the long term. From this point of view, building up adequate cyber defense capabilities and their effective application is especially important in the defense sector, since the armed forces are one of the largest technology-using organizations in every country.

Among all the threats of the 21st century, however, the most challenging areas are those in which a government is unable to permanently project power over the citizens. In areas where there is no public administration or public policy, a vacuum of power raises actors that are not interested in the establishment of security, cannot guarantee the safety of life and property for a wide range of the population. The resulting chaos may generate a wave of migration, which directly affects remote areas as well. Think of the fact that the security problems of Afghanistan or Syria also affected Hungary thousands of kilometers away, due to the migration flow starting there.

REASONS OF THE 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES

Let us examine what causes the conflicts that despite their regional nature achieve to influence global processes. It seems that the bad economic conditions are the main cause of long-term armed, non-interstate (i.e. civil war) conflicts. Behind this we find the explanation that rivalry for economic profit can be found in poor societies as well, since because of the scarcity of available profits competition becomes sharper and even violence can occur.

Examining the civil wars we find that economic factors have a much greater role than political or social reasons do. The complaints, such as the violation of political or social rights were not included among primary reasons for the outbreak of the conflict. Ethnic divisions alone do not lead to violence (as shown by many cases of multicultural states), but as a reference, it has a major role in increasing the effectiveness of propaganda and agitation as well.
Where there are significant political, economic and social inequalities between groups and these cleavages coincide with ethnic boundaries, conflict probability increases significantly.  

It is widely recognized that democracies do not go to war against each other. However, research has also shown that it is not authoritarian states which are mostly at risk of conflict, but, in general, extremely poor and vulnerable countries (undeveloped) in a state of transition to democracy.  

It should be stressed that not only the appearance of conflicts but also the probability of their recurrence is high. Agnes Bokodi’s research shows that at least a third of conflicts returns within five years. In terms of settlement of disputes, we cannot miss the fact that the stabilizing role of ceasefire agreements is increasingly appreciated over military victory. Between 1995 and 2004 negotiation as a win was three times more frequent than military overcome. It should also be added that their survival probability has increased in recent years, since the parties' disillusionment, a lack of open dialogue and honesty and ideological conflicts within each group further diverse challenges, creating hardly manageable reasons for expanding the clashes.

MEASURING THE SUCCESS OF PEACEKEEPING

Despite the difficulties mentioned above, peacekeeping is still trying to fight against the international conflicts with multidimensional management methods. The presence of peacekeepers in recent times has proved to be essential, and although specific data are rarely available to analyze their effectiveness, some indicators can be made clear to measure the importance of international actions.

Within the legal framework of peacekeeping, modernization plans offer increasingly wider mandates for participants in an operation. This expanding framework may contribute to the integrated handling of problems.

In the case of an international or intra-national conflict, the primary aim is the solution of direct causes (negative peace), but also more attention should be given to the early treatment of other peace-hindering aspects as well as to launch the reconstruction process on time (positive peace). The concept of negative and positive peace was introduced by Norwegian researcher John Galtung. According to a positive peace (fit to the conceptual framework of peace-building activities) it is important to build a stable political, economic and social

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21 Such a framework is for example the ceasefire agreement by the conflicting parties, since based on the Charter VII. Article 7th Chapter, 2nd paragraph, the United Nations have no right "to interfere in issues that are essentially belong within the internal jurisdiction of a State." In addition, as an essential basis for peacekeeping, we have to mention the principle of impartiality, the principle of ultima ratio and the principle of minimum use of force.
According to a UN mission's success, it should be emphasized that negative peace usually provides only a temporary solution, but considering a long-term planning, positive peace is needed to be achieved. In a broader sense, only positive peace is clearly seen as a success.

In a narrower sense, however, a UN mission should demonstrate success by the complete implementation of the mandate, efficacy in the decrease of armed conflict during the period of the mission, of the effectiveness in the detection, monitoring and treatment of the underlying problems. The UN missions’ success indicators include also the level how they were able to guarantee the maintenance of peace and the settlement of conflicts after the completion of the peacekeeping mission.

EVALUATING THE EXPERIENCE OF THE FIRST UNITED NATIONS CHIEFS OF DEFENCE CONFERENCE

Comments of the United Nations’ leaders

The first United Nations Chiefs of Defence Conference took place on March 27, 2015 with an aim to evaluate the results of peacekeeping on both operational and strategic levels. This was the first time, when 107 countries’ Chiefs of Staff were present under the auspices of the United Nations. The consultation is designed to enhance the cooperation among member states in order to reach that countries uniformly engage in the increasingly important UN peacekeeping operations, which will operate with functioning, robust and achievable mandates based on a shared view.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon pointed out that the more efficient and more robust missions involve massive loss of life over the years and require more soldiers to participate year after year. The United Nations stationed the second largest amount of personnel abroad, after the United States’ 200 thousand soldiers. The United Nations has recognized the need for the Security Council – that declares mandate for the missions – to enhance tripartite consultations with actors that provide operations resources (both financial means and equipment) as well as for participant states and the governing United Nations Secretariat.

Deputy Secretary-General Harve Ladsous stressed the significant changes in the classic operational environment. According to his view, crime and terrorism are factors that threaten the lives of civilians and soldiers in UN field operations, and with which peacekeeping principles are not compatible to cope even after the modernization processes. However, he stated, peacekeeping remains the most cost-effective device in the hands of the Member States to treat conflicts at their sources and not to spend billions on the superficial treatment of the consequences. In simple terms, this means that if you do not want the migrants to stop right at the border, you need to help creating a secure and livable environment in the source countries of migration.

Harve Ladsous added, that the complex and difficult tasks not only require crowds of troops from donor countries, but also well-equipped and trained soldiers who adapt to the challenges innovatively and proactively, and who are capable to adapt to changes and work-

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23 Compared to its mandate, an independent criterion must be found to help evaluating and comparing two missions. This may be the length of the durability of the peace or prevention of the spread of violence.
ing for the mission's objectives. Strategic power- and skill-development and planning units, set up by the UN body, is an effective way for making the UN flexible, to help it respond rapidly to changes in the different geographical areas.

Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations Athul Kare unveiled a new operation support system, which significantly facilitates the management of operations corresponding to the comprehensive approach. The new system is called Global Field Support Strategy, which will be more economical and efficient, and help prevent wasting resources, thereby more distant areas will be accessible, even in dangerous conditions. He also reported that the transport routes remained extremely dangerous. Many brave UN soldiers were killed in recent months by IEDs, anti-tank and air defense missile attacks. (Week prior to the conference, two Dutch Apache helicopter pilot had been killed in Mali.)

Lieutenant General Maqsood Ahmed, Peace Operations Advisor of the Secretary-General, pointed out that the Organization will only be able to quickly deploy forces in the region of conflicts if the Member States’ specially trained forces reached a high degree of readiness. Later on he stressed the unevenness in the training of personnel, that it is not easy to demand the same level of service from soldiers with completely different backgrounds. He urged trainings’ unification and deploying not only the best soldiers, but also the best leaders to command positions, because despite all the political and logistic support to a mission, all that can be achieved depends on the commander.

Director for monitoring and evaluation of the training policy David Haer underlined the importance of standards and pointed out that economic reasons play a great role in the durability of conflicts, since maintaining the troubled political, economic, military environment helps transnational crime.

With all the problems and dilemmas, UN operations are still the most "cost-effective" way of conflict management. It is important that operations not only win in reality, but are supplemented by effective communication – which prevents the spread of faulty narrative – the UN's position may achieve global dominance against the false interpretation of local warlords.

Experience of the Chiefs Of Staff

Among the participants, Colonel General Tom Mindendrop, the Netherlands Armed Forces Chief of Staff, addressed the leaders. He thanked for the condolences regarding the two helicopter pilots. He pointed out that the Netherlands has initiated the modernization of UN peacekeeping operations, because the present operational environment not only changed the nature of conventional military operations, but also have a significant influence on peacekeeping. We need to take the initiative and proactive action should be taken during the operation (and the Netherlands, for its part, has already made these steps). This new approach was already launched when selecting peacekeeping troops: there is a need for:

- Massive intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities in operations, thereby units producing intelligence and possess suitable equipment are also needed.
- Special Operations Forces must also be addressed, with the potential to remove the specific people or obstacles, who are hindering peace.
- Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have been effective tools for supporting the troops for a decade, and this ability cannot be given up in UN operations.
- Attack helicopters, which possess enormous firepower and are not highly dependent on weather conditions, comprise important means of air support to troops.
In terms of the success of UN missions, not only the knowledge of local conditions, but also the ability to influence them is crucial. Therefore information obtained from the local media (PR), public administration, governmental and non-governmental organizations will be necessary (CIMIC, HUMINT). The information acquired must be transformed to evaluated and correlated situational awareness by the specialized units. On the basis of a single plan, the United Nations should be able to influence key players and local opinion through media (IO, PSYOPS). The Netherlands has considerable experience accumulated in this field and they are willing to share this experience with Member States during a thematic conference.

It is important that the Mission Commander is able to recognize and supervise events as soon as possible, so he has to be deployed to the conflict zone as soon as possible, to be able to quickly adapt – and if needed – to disposition units. To do so it is essential that besides the logistic support provided by the UN he could use other sources and if needed, reallocate to other missions or cooperate with local non-governmental organizations.

The Dutch Chief of Staff also confirmed that the leadership and the role of the commander is irreplaceable, but just as important is that the military leaders and their units’ further training is done on a unified basis, so that the complex operational environment meet the "comprehensive approach" criteria. Thereby, he welcomed the establishment of the UN training standards. These training requirements should not only teach the selected personnel before the mission, but each nation would be obliged to incorporate requirements in their own national military standards and routinely update such knowledge. It is important that those skills do not wear out, but are updated regularly according to the lessons learned from the past operations. It is necessary for professionals to meet regularly and share their experience.

Processing of the lessons learned requires not ignoring the experience, capabilities and the immediate environment of a conflict. In the regions of operations, in general, better prepared teams are available for the local climatic, geographic and cultural conditions, so it is important to use regional capacities beyond the international capability.

Tom Mindendrop also pointed out that cooperation is vital with the host nations’ authorities, not only for daily activities, but also to make them capable of the "ownership" of nation-building after the UN troops left.

The Indian Chief of Staff welcomed the UN's efforts to forge closer consultation with the Member States involved, but according to him, there are still huge deficiencies in this area. The UN Security Council practically ignores the UN Charter's requirement that "troop-contributing nations participate in the UNSC decision-making processes" during operations. India has supported various operations of the United Nations with 180 thousand soldiers so far, and the importance of his contribution was not in balance with its involvement in strategic decisions.

**SUMMARY OF THE CONFERENCE – COMMENTS ON THE MODERNIZATION OF PEACEKEEPING**

Summarizing the Conference, it can be stated that the UN demands much greater determination and contribution from its nations. It requires a common understanding of the roles and principles, faster deployment of troops, and the provision of accurate equipment and trainings. However, the UN realized the importance of logistical support, so it is trying to strengthen those capabilities.
Following the conference, on the basis of the previous reviews, the Secretary-General prepared his own report, the presentation of which took place at the UN General Assembly in September 2015.

The Secretary-General's report grouped the tasks around the following objectives:

- To increase the operational capacities for prevention and mediation, the primacy of political solutions.
- Closer cooperation with regional actors in the area to be developed, the report highlighted the African Union and ASEAN, the European Union, the Arab League, the OSCE, NATO, the Organization of American States and the Collective Security Treaty Organization.
- A further objective is to apply a wide range of peace operations, to ensure the smoother transitions between them. Each peace operation must apply to the local needs.

The non-stationary problems – such as arms trade and terrorism – require the integrated management of the deep underlying economic and political challenges as well, since challenges are able to extend their duration if only handled by the meager mandate of peacekeeping and relying only on negative security. After the troops’ withdrawal, frozen conflicts may open the way towards radicalization. To avoid this, the modernization of the United Nations peacekeeping tasks require ongoing consultation. The Conference of Chiefs of Staff was a great opportunity to review the stabilization mechanisms of the United Nations and to base the hopefully long-term international peace and security.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Gen. (Ret) Zoltán Szenes:

FORWARD MILITARY PRESENCE: ASSESSING THE NATO WARSAW SUMMIT

ABSTRACT: The NATO leaders in Warsaw discussed not only the traditional threats of the East but the hybrid threats of the South as well, according to the 360-degree approach of the Alliance to security. The study examines the extent to achieve the pre-set goals, balance and adaptation requirements. The author presents the results of Warsaw Summit, evaluates in detail the decisions taken with regard to the management of the Eastern threat. The article points out that the Alliance decisions about the forward military presence has improved the measures of the Readiness Action Plan approved in the Wales Summit. Although the Warsaw Summit is basically dealt with the traditional military issues, the undertaking fighting tasks against the hybrid threats is taking another turn in the NATO strategy.

KEYWORDS: NATO, Warsaw Summit, Reassuarance Action Plan, hybrid threats, forward military presence, resilience

The 28th NATO Summit ended in the capital of Poland on 9th July, 2016, which event was a milestone in the history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Warsaw can be significant indeed in NATO history, since the decisions made there mean the settling of the post-Cold War “peace period”. In the Summit a very strong emphasis was put on the military measures to provide the security of the Eastern flank. These measures improve the military aspects of the organization, which is getting back to serve its original collective defence role. Besides deterrence and defence, NATO has undertaken to act against hybrid threats like terrorism, cyber war, migration and instability which aspects mean a kind of new trend in Europe in comparison with issues discussed at the Wales Summit in 2014. However, this article focuses first of all on the military decisions made in the Warsaw Summit. First the outcomes of the Summit are reviewed, then the results of the RAP (Readiness Action Plan) are described in details, and finally the military decisions of the Summit are evaluated.

THE HISTORICAL SITE

Poland, who hosted this event for the first time, proved to be an excellent site for the Summit. Although the Summit itself was held in the National Stadium, made into a fortress for the event, many significant programs took place outside the football stadium. The NATO member states as well as the international organizations and leaders of partner countries had their working dinner in the ball hall of the Polish Residency on Friday evening, which place was the site for signing the Charter of the Warsaw Treaty, the agreement between the Soviet

2 This was the fourth NATO Summit which took place in the area of the previous Soviet Block countries (2002 – Prague, 2006 – Riga, 2008 – Bucharest)
Union and the communist countries of Eastern Europe in 1955. Almost all reports on the topic emphasized the idea, that the leaders of NATO could literally breathe an air of history while walking in the hall with the gigantic crystal chandelier and huge wall carpets with 185 square metres in size. The National Stadium on the bank of the river Vistula was made into a real fortress for the time of the event, surrounded by high walls, hermetically isolated from the world outside. The safety of thousands of guests from 53 countries, including 18 state presidents and 21 prime ministers, were guarded by 6,000 policemen and soldiers on land, in the air and on the river. Even the mermaid on the logo of the Summit could have not defended the event better than the Polish military force did. The total expense of the Summit was over 0.5 % of the defence budget of the country.³

The Summit proceeded according to the plans and to the usual schedule, but with a new form of partnership. NATO has not used the traditional, existing forms of partnerships during the meetings of the transatlantic state leaders for a long time; instead, it tries to find solutions to fit the goals and the schedule of the Summit. The schedule of the Warsaw Summit was not different either. The NAC (North Atlantic Council) had two meetings and made very important decisions.

Montenegro also took part in the work of the Summit, as an invited member state. There were two more partners, Finland and Sweden, which took part in the gala dinner as well as in the meetings of NAC for foreign and defence ministers as Enhanced Opportunity Partners (EOP). The renewed cooperation agreement with the European Union was signed by the Secretary General of NATO, by the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, and by the President of the European Committee, Jean-Claude Juncker. All the three leaders will have their own tasks for the implementation in their own respective fields. The leaders of the EU also took part in the conference where Afghanistan and her regional security issues were discussed. Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy also attended a meeting of foreign ministers. The Alliance discussed Ukraine’s security problems with president Petro Poroshenko within the framework of NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC), where they also made a decision about an extensive supporting package. The NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC), however, had a meeting only at foreign ministers level and no significant step was made towards the future membership of the Caucasian country. The Defence Ministers discussed the security and military-defence issues against the Eastern and Southern strategic threats within the new and flexible forms of cooperation created in the Wales Summit: Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII), and Defence Capacity Building Initiative (DCBI). However, the planned meeting with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was cancelled, yet the Secretary General of NATO had a chance to talk with the minister of defence of the United Arab Emirates on the security situation in the Middle East on the first day. NATO had very productive talks with the leaders of the Afghan government, President Ashraf Ghani and the Chief Executive of Afghanistan, Abdullah Abdullah about the further steps of the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), as well as the extension of financial support to the period lasting until 2020.

As usual, there were also many bilateral and multilateral meetings, debates, and agreements in the framework of the Summit, as it is very common in conferences of all major and

significant international organizations. One example of this was the meeting of the American President with the leaders of the EU member states, where they discussed the problems of BREXIT, the counter-terrorism issues, the Euro-Atlantic solidarity and trade agreements.4 Barack Obama had a bilateral meeting with the Secretary General of NATO as well as with the Polish, British and Turkish leaders. All countries did the same, including Hungary, when the Hungarian Prime Minister had talks with the Turkish president. The Foreign Ministers of the Visegrád Group had discussions with their British counterpart, where they agreed about a meeting next autumn. They will discuss the situation of employees working in the United Kingdom after BREXIT

BALANCE AND ADAPTATION

About the priorities of the Warsaw Summit, just as about the strategic policy to follow, decisions were made by NAC and the general assembly of NATO together in the middle of February, when NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg talked about the two goals of the consultation: (1) to create balance and (2) to continue the adaptation5

The demand on the balance was progressively growing during the preparations for the Summit as the Alliance was making progress with the agenda. First the balance was focused on the Eastern and Southern threats and their sizes then it was extended to the Baltic countries and Poland and to Southern countries, Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria, in accordance with the requests of South-Eastern countries. A balance was to be found about the proportions of foreign and security policies of Russia as well, because the member states have different opinions about the Russian threat. Due to these internal debates, the principle of the dual track was introduced, which focuses on calming the frightened and worried countries and on sustaining continual political talks and discussions to relieve the tension and conflicts by diplomatic means.6 After the Summit, we can say now, that if the NATO had not been able to find balance, this problem would have seriously questioned the efficiency of the Summit. Before and during the Summit there were many declarations from the member states which did not support the general political attitude of NATO.7


6 Many member state leaders support the dual track approach (Frank- Walter Steinmeyer: “Everything or nothing approach might sound good, but it does not work”; Jens Stoltenberg: „We need power and deterrence on one side and on the other one transparency, predictability and discussions are needed.”)

During the preparations there was another demand on the balance; there was a need to balance the reinforcing collective defence with the European security threats, especially hybrid warfare, fight against terrorism and dealing with mass migration problems. Some member states (including Hungary) suggested that the Alliance should examine its own opportunities and abilities and contribute to the improvement of the European security, dealing not only with the crisis in Ukraine, but protecting the European borders in the south as well. This mission might seem a new one; however it is not new, if we consider the crucial NATO Summit in London in 1990, when the Alliance decided to adapt itself to the changing world and to improve the security in Europe. „Today, our Alliance begins a major transformation. Working with all the countries of Europe, we are determined to create enduring peace on this continent”.

The requirement of adaptation has become very important for the future of NATO. After the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September, 2001 the Alliance realized that it was not enough anymore to focus only on the security of Europe, but the defence had to be extended to any parts of the world where it was needed, to fight the enemies where they appear and to deal with any crisis where that occur. Although since 2010 NATO has been focusing very strongly on the new security threats emphasized in the strategic concept of 2010, it has become clear since the crisis in Ukraine in 2014 that these threats appear simultaneously, at the same time, in a kind of a hybrid way, both in the East and South. Though the concept of hybrid threats is not new for the Alliance, since first it was defined in 2011, dealing with a new type of strategic threats has not been adapted by the political, doctrinal and planning systems and there is a lot to do about the creation of adequate capabilities. What makes things more difficult is that the strategic threats appear in different forms, including the traditional military form (terrorism, migration, piracy, transnational crime and ethnic conflict etc.) and a variety of military-security tasks, including the participants, the rivals, the intensity of operations and missions is also very different. While collective defence can be used in the traditional way, by applying conventional and nuclear military forces, the actions against hybrid threats need the application of a coordinated and complex system of international cooperation and crisis management. Another problem is that the threats in the Eastern and Southern parts of NATO borders have different effects on the frontline countries and the rest of the member states. This is the reason why not only NATO as an organization but all countries need to be adjusted to the new security situation. As a consequence, the Alliance needs to transform not only its own institution system, military force and capabilities, but it should encourage the transformation of all member states, new concepts, new strategic ideas and solutions as well as further resources. It is an outstanding achievement of this Summit

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7 expressed his opinion in the discussion of the Summit, which was published by the Russian media word by word: ”NATO can’t decide about European-Russian relationship. Russia does not mean an opponent or a threat for France, but a partner.” (“Russia Threat Takes Center Stage at NATO’s Warsaw Summit”. The Daily Signal, July 10, 2016. http://dailysignal.com/2016/07/10/russian-threat-takes-center-stage-at-natos-warsaw-Summit/ Accessed on 10. 7. 2016.


10 „Hybrid threats are those posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means in pursuit of their objectives”. See ”NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat”. NATO ACT. http://www.act.nato.int/nato-countering-the-hybrid-threat, Accessed on 12. 07. 2016.
that the Alliance has begun this transformation: it reconfirmed its cooperation with the EU, it declared the cyber area as a military operation domain, and it is getting involved in dealing with mass migration in the Mediterranean Sea.

THE DECISIONS OF THE SUMMIT

The communique\(^\text{11}\) of the Warsaw Summit makes it easier to judge the significant issues of the Summit, which publication describes the attitude of the Alliance to the future. This extensive official publication, however, was only one of the nine documents, which were published on the website of NATO during the two days of the conference.\(^\text{12}\) Whereas the communiqué recorded the standpoint of NAC, the common statements described the details of the cooperation agreements with the EU\(^\text{13}\), Ukraine\(^\text{14}\), Georgia\(^\text{15}\) and Afghanistan.\(^\text{16}\) Just as the Summit in Wales, the Warsaw Summit also admitted the need to enhance transatlantic security, and in achieving this goal, the European member states strongly rely on the USA but Canada also intends to take part in this task.\(^\text{17}\) These publications call the attention to the importance of political concepts and the adaptation to fight with hybrid threats. In the cyber area – also known as the fifth dimension of operation domain, after land, air, sea and space – the Alliance intends to take further steps by implementing the Cyber Defence Pledge\(^\text{18}\) of the member states as well as increasing the defence budget to fight against the new type threats.\(^\text{19}\)


\(^{19}\) Although the Alliance has not published summaries about the obligations undertaken by the member states, certain countries have already revealed their intention for contribution. For example the USA offered his support of 200 million $ in value, including technical devices, know-how, trainings and experts, to NATO, which support will be provided in the framework of bilateral agreements and through the Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence (Tallinn) and the Strategic Commands. This support will be used for improving military training and developing the civilian preparations for cyber defence and for defence against CBRN. Among the decisions about resilience the Baltic States and Poland get a priority. The fight against the transnational threats includes the support of other countries too, like Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria. Hungary (see next page)
The two other documents dealing with the improvement of resilience and the defence of citizens also emphasize the importance of hybrid threat issues. This issue proved to be really important as both announcements were confirmed by prime ministers and presidents. The Summit created a new concept in the terminology of NATO, labelled resilience. Resilience comes from Latin and it means the ability of something to return to its original shape after it has been pulled, stretched, pressed, bent, etc. The word resilience is regarded as an important element of collective defence by the NATO vocabulary and it is outstandingly important to improve this resilience against all different threats, no matter if they are hybrid, cyber, CBRN, terrorist or traditional types of threats.

It is important to examine the decisions of the Summit in an extensive way because this is the only way to separate the achievements of the Warsaw Summit from the decisions of the Wales Summit. Since the tasks are similar, many measures are still improving the RAP (Readiness Action Plan) and its adaptation like the forward military presence. Other decisions, like the fight against ISIS, ballistic missile defence and migration, serve the defence of the Southern Flank. Certain parts of decisions, however, support crisis management like Resolute Support Mission (RSM/ Afghanistan) and the new partnership cooperation with Sweden, Finland, Georgia, Ukraine, Iraq, Jordan and Tunisia.


22 It is important to remark that a similar concept and requirement was already introduced in the Warsaw Pact, called viability (жизнеспособность) but that time it was used in relations of defence against nuclear weapons.


A significant issue of the Wales Summit was the crisis in Ukraine which has not been solved yet, moreover, it has become even more chaotic and complicated. As the Russian issue might divide the member states of the Alliance, during the preparation phase NATO worked out a new concept regarding Russia called *the dual track approach*: it is aimed at avoiding a direct aggression and military intervention but, at the same time, at keeping the door open for negotiations with Moscow. Since 2014 there has been a growing concern about a sudden attack of Russia against the Baltic countries, which would challenge NATO. The fear of Baltic States is based on the fact that a significant number of Russian people live in these countries, particularly in Estonia and Latvia. Furthermore, there is a tension between the Baltic States and armed Kaliningrad presenting a high-level military threat around the Russian exclave. The claims of Baltic countries and Poland were supported by Romania and Bulgaria too, which began to urge new regulations to ensure security.

During the Summit in Wales NATO introduced significant counter-measures, later labelled as *Readiness Action Plan* (RAP), which is demonstrated in Table N.2. The goal of this new plan is to improve the Alliance’s reaction to security challenges and crises in case of a potential attack on a member

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26. The American RAND Corporation Research Institute made a model based on the balance of forces and it studied how the Baltic countries could be defended against a frontal Russian attack. The results of the computer game showed that the Russian forces could penetrate into Tallinn and Riga in 60 hours. A quick and successful Russian attack would create a hard situation for NATO which would be left with poor and limited action possibilities. The researchers suggested that seven brigades and an air force support deployed in the region would be helpful to prevent an attack like this.


29. For many years Russia has been enhancing systematically the Baltic region, especially regarding the Kaliningrad defence region. According to the sources in the area of Kaliningrad land (79. Mechanized Brigade, 7. Mechanized Regiment), artillery and missile groups (244. Artillery Brigade, 152. Missile Brigade), air forces (7054. Air Force Base with bombers, fighters, helicopters, and air defence missile groups) and navy military forces (Baltic Fleet, 336. Marine Brigade) are located. The command of the fleet is based in the city, but the Yantar warship building factory is also operating there. In order to transform the area into a fortress there are plans for deploying the most modern Russian weapons (Iskander M ballistic missiles, Kalibr missiles, S400 anti-aircraft missile systems) in the area. There is a plan to establish a new, mechanized division there as well. See: Kaarel Kaas. "Russian Armed Forces in the Baltic Sea Region". *Diplomattia*. N.130/131. June/July 2014. http://www.diplomattaia.ee/en/article/russian-armed-forces-in-the-baltic-sea-region/; Hawk, J. "Russian Defence Report: Jan. 30, 2016: Fortress Kaliningrad". *South Front*. https://southfront.org/russia-defense-report-fortress-kaliningrad/; Accessed on 21. 07. 2016.
state, or of any other unexpected crisis situation. The decisions make the political aims, strategic and management methods of the Alliance clear. The RAP consists of two different types of measures, one for assurance and the other one for adaptation.

Under the security measures the North Atlantic Committee (NAC) made efforts first to calm the public down in 2014 with using the existing NATO forces like AWACS aircraft and standing naval forces to act in the Baltic region and in the Black Sea. Among these rapid steps there were also measures to enhance the air policing mission in the Baltic countries. Besides the Alliance organised intensive training events in the Eastern member states to prove reliability, solidarity, and capability to defend its members in case of a potential intervention. In addition, the NATO leadership allowed the member states to show their solidarity towards the Alliance. Particularly the United States was very active and introduced its plan called European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) in June 2014. This plan included the transfer of many land and air force units from America to Europe, which conducted efficient exercises and training with the frontline NATO countries. To improve readiness Washington made decisions to transfer military vehicles and equipment to Europe in the framework of the European Activity Set (EAS) which can allow – just in case – to set up a Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) in Eastern Europe. In 2015 the USA took further steps to improve the defence of Europe and to increase deterrence. The ERI budget was tripled to 3.4 billion Dollars showing the determination of Washington to express its solidarity.30

The importance of the Readiness Action Plan, however, demonstrates not just the worries of certain countries about Russia but rather the improvement of real security and deterrence capabilities and adaptation decisions to achieve these capabilities. Even we can make an early conclusion that after a time, when the security of NATO can be as strong as the possible threat, there might be no more steps for enhancing the assurance, as all the taken security measures will have transformation functions to adapt NATO for the tasks of deterrence.

During the past two years NATO has done a lot to implement the decisions made in Wales, targeting the long term adaptation in the area of command and control and ready-to fight military forces. The NATO Response Force (NRF) – which was set up in 2002 – has been increased three times bigger, extended to 40,000 troops from land forces, air force, navy and special operations forces, in order to rapidly deploy whenever needed. The mission of the reinforced NRF has been extended by collective defence tasks. This has produced a fast change in the concept of ready-to fight military forces, since the previous function of the NRF meant only to serve transformation and preparation for outside operations.31 Because of this reinforcement, the structure of the NRF was also significantly modified, as the Wales Summit introduced the VJTF (Very High Readiness Joint Task Force) military force of 5,000 troops, which can respond to threats within 2-7 days.32 The extremely quick and technologically advanced military force, called only the „spearhead force“ by the press, includes 5 manoeuvre battalions, which have the necessary air, naval and special operation

skills and contain combat support subunits. Thanks to this extension the eNRF today includes four echelons: advance C2 group, VJTF, initial follow-on-forces (two brigades) and follow-on-forces.33

The triplication of NRF was achieved by using creative ideas. As the VJTF operates in an annual rotation form, the NRF draw in the standing down VJTF brigade as well as the standing up VJTF brigade of the next year. These two brigades together form the so called Initial Follow on Forces Group (IFFG). The Follow on Force (FOF) includes those forces which are needed for the necessary development of the NRF. The evolution of this conception can be clearly seen if we consider that the forward location of the 4 battalions, which the Warsaw Summit made decision about, can also form ready-to-fight military forces. The setting up of VJTF and its preparation goes back to 2015, and now it is ready for operation. This year Spain is in charge of managing the Spearhead brigade made up by shared contribution of 25 NATO member states. The great powers of Europe have undertaken the job to lead the VJTF until 2022.

The preparation of the VJTF was really intensive in the past two years and it became operational in November 2015. However, its power, command and control system, mobility among member states and its long-term force generation are still disputed. There is a shared opinion about the Spearhead brigade’s role as a kind of „mobile tripwire”, and that it can bear a significant holding power, but decisions about quick actions have not been made yet.34 The crisis simulation exercises have revealed that a potential traverse of the member states would cause difficulties, as parliamentary approval is needed for getting permission to move troops across borders. This problem generated the idea of the „military Schengen area”, which concept needs to be implemented by new national regulations and cooperative agreements of the member states.35 The rapid reaction force capacity also needs to be improved because at the moment each major military operation requests American support. It is important to create the necessary infrastructural, logistic and national support conditions needed for collective defence, similarly to the decision about Cyber defence. Although VJTF looks like a solved problem in mid-term, however, the annual rotation, the three-year serving time in NRF may cause big difficulties for the member states in the future.36 The mid-term consolidation of high readiness forces can only be maintained if the capability development of national military forces will be effective and stable in long term. If this does not happen, the VJTF and eNRF concepts might fail, which was experienced with the first version of NRF in 2010 years. The operational control of NATO Reaction Forces is exercised by two regional operational commands, Joint Forces Command (JFC) Brunssum and Naples alternately. In 2016 the Brunssum Command is the responsible operational headquarters (HQ) in

36 In 2016 the NRF land force is commanded by the Spanish, the air force by the Italian, the maritime force by the British, the special operations force by the American HQs, the logistics by JFCBS, while the defence against weapons of mass destruction by the Polish command, who are also responsible for the training and management of the forces offered.
Holland. The NRF are established on the basis of force generation process in which national decisions and dedications ensure the commands and units in the requested size and structure to deploy wherever needed. The commander of NRF is the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), but the NAC is responsible to decide about deployment. Although there were many political debates about the SACEUR to get permission to use VJTF within its own scopes so that he can make quick decisions or at least to order unexpected tests about the readiness and abilities of VJTF, these efforts have not been adapted yet due to the lack of the necessary political intention. The Alliance has not been able to create the quick decision making culture needed for deterrence, or to provide political guaranty and technical solutions in case of a crisis. It seems the NAC does not want to lose its political control over the employment of the NRF / VJTF.

The reinforcement of collective defence and the new military tasks in the Eastern frontline countries generated a new demand on the modification of the NATO command system. After the reform Summit in Lisbon (2010) the Alliance leadership decided to decrease the size and structure of NATO Command Structure (NCS). As a result, only one component command was left from the land, air and navy HQs which do not provide enough C2 capacity in the new security environment for multipurpose and simultaneous tasks. To improve the situation, the Wales Summit already decided to include into the NCS the Multinational Corps Northeast (MNC-NE), which was settled in Szczecin (Poland) in 1999 to control the Polish-German-Dutch corps. Due to its geographic features the HQ MNC-NE is directly ordered in charge of Joint Forces Command Brunssum (JFCBS). The number of MNC-NE staff was doubled last year – currently 405 soldiers are serving in the Polish city on the German border – and the military barracks was modernized and modified to serve the new C2 mission controlling preparations of the subordinated forces for collective defence tasks in the Baltic Region. Today the soldiers of 25 different nations are serving in this command, including Swedish and Finnish military as well. The duty of the HQ MNC-NE is to control VJTF / NRF forces in the region, to monitor the security situation and to organize the multinational military cooperation. The Szczecin Command is also in charge of operational control of 6 NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU) set up in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, and in Slovakia. The primary responsibility of these units is to facilitate the rapid deployment of the VJTF and other NRF units held at high readiness level in order to enhance Alliance responsiveness.

The NFIU units formed in the South-Eastern countries like Romania and Bulgaria are ordered under the charge of the Multinational Division Southeast (MND-SE) – formed in December 2015 in Bucharest – to serve similar tasks to the ones of Szczecin command in the South Eastern European region. The new, high readiness HQ has been established as part

of balancing efforts in the Eastern Wing, following the Romanian suggestions. Because of the threats from the south and east Romania and Bulgaria are eager to improve their security, especially the security of the Black Sea region. The MND-SE is under the supervision of the Joint Forces Command Naples (JFCNP) which commands and controls the preparations of the new division-level body. According to plans the command needs to achieve complete readiness with 280 soldiers by 2018, and its personnel will also contain 75 NATO soldiers.\textsuperscript{41}

**NATO MILITARY FORCES IN EASTERN COUNTRIES**

The reinforcement of the NATO command system is also necessary to cope with the increased number of rapid reaction force adopted by the Warsaw Summit decisions (Table N. 3). The most effective measure was the reinforcement of land forces including four NATO multinational battalions in the Baltic States and Poland, and one NATO multinational brigade in Romania. The battalion size task group of 1,000 troops will not be permanent forces, but will operate as a persistent forward military force in constant rotation as long as it is needed. The rotational character of the multinational forces is very important because it does not go against the 1997 NATO-Russia agreement. This decision, however, has a crucial importance, since the original effort of Baltic countries was to have a NATO brigade in their territory, whereas Poland wanted to have two NATO brigades in the country. The USA had an important role in achieving the solutions in Warsaw, which was not only making the promise true, but Washington was also able to convince its German, French and Canadian partners to take the lead in forming the multinational battalions in 2017. According to forward presence concept, each NATO unit will be led by the framework nation which is to provide half of the military force, whereas the other half will be covered by another six member states. According to the communiqué, the USA will take the lead in Poland, Great Britain in Estonia, Germany in Lithuania, and Canada in Latvia. In Southern Europe Romania and Bulgaria will take the lead to form the multinational “Black Sea” brigade.\textsuperscript{42} The Romanian government has already started the diplomatic negotiations with the countries which might offer forces to them. Although the exact location of NATO forces is not decided yet, they are subject of further negotiations with the host nation support countries. There is not too much time for defence diplomacy because the NATO multinational units need to achieve their full operational readiness by mid-2017. The framework nations have already started recruiting contributing nations in order to solve the NATO unit formation „puzzle“. According to the media, the Visegrád Group countries

\textsuperscript{41} "New NATO division becomes functional in Bucharest". 

\textsuperscript{42} "Romania to host NATO multinational brigade". 

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Military decisions in Warsaw \\
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- Extended location of 4 multinational brigades to the Baltic region and Poland \\
- The settlement of a NATO multinational brigade in Romania \\
- Improvement of MND-SE Bucharest (readiness 2018) \\
- Reinforcement of SNMG navy forces \\
- Training support projects (TACET, CJET) \\
- The end of operation planning \\
- Enhancement of cyber defence and resistance \\
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will provide a company on V4 rotational basis in the Baltic Region every three months. The preparation of the multinational units will be supported by special capability-building and training support projects.

The Warsaw Summit, however, made decisions not only about the improvement of rapid reaction land forces, but also the increase of the naval force capacity in order to improve the security of the Baltic Sea, Norwegian Sea, Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea facing from hybrid threats. Though the documents published in Warsaw do not reveal details about this idea, the military literature can help in the interpretation of Brussels ideas. The Alliance intends to leave the continental-focused attitude behind, rather it is planning to work out new naval strategies and it supports researches called “Maritime League”.

The Warsaw decision, however, has only a more modest goal, it only wants to increase the number of ships in the Standing Navy Maritime Groups (SNMGs), which efforts, however, need remarkable national pledge. According to the latest news, the USA, Great Britain, and Canada have already offered new ships for the Maritime Command (MARCOM) and the other member states have also committed themselves to give several ships for sea operations. Nonetheless, the Alliance is still not ready to undertake a major naval project. The NATO Black Sea Fleet conception, suggested by Romania, has not been encouraged and Bulgaria discouraged the proposal.

In short, the capability enhancing measurements introduced in Warsaw are to serve the implementation of the Readiness Action Plan and the further development of high readiness NATO forces. There is only one point where the Warsaw decisions are more advanced than the ones of the Wales Summit: the forward rotational presence of multinational units in the Eastern Flank countries, near the Eastern NATO border can indicate a new operational concept of forward defence. It seems that the NATO leadership looks at the VJTF and NRF as a not sufficient solution because the “distant deterrence” by the enhanced rapid reaction force is far from the prospective of the threat-worrying countries. This conclusion is reconfirmed by the American decision too, which intends to deploy an armoured brigade on rotationally basis in Eastern Europe from February 2017.


military capabilities of the other member states, not only the threatened member states, we can see an increasingly strong military defence and deterrence posture in the Eastern Europe.

CYBER DEFENCE AND RESILIENCE

Besides the traditional military threats, cyber defence also got a major role in the Warsaw Summit discussions, both separately by NATO and in cooperation with the EU. If we add to this, that the OSCE also introduced new information security regulations in March 2016 as confidence and security building measures (CSBM), a coordinated international effort can be seen against cyber threats. The phenomenon of cyber warfare is not kinetic, rather extremely changeable, unpredictable, hardly interpretable and dissolvable. NATO experiences 200 million incidents on its computer network system every day and around 200 more serious intrusion attempts every month. This level of hostile activity looks like “new normal” in the cyber domain. During the Wales Summit the Alliance made decisions about a potential cyber war and the adaptation of Article 5, and it accepted the enhanced cyber defence policy and action plan.

Many NATO decisions had been made about the defence of information technology since 2014, but the Warsaw Summit introduced further actions in this field. It regarded especially important to reconsider the lessons learned from cyber war in Ukraine and Crimea, review the opportunity of using military and civilian means in a combined way, and share information with members and partners. Brussels is now planning to establish an integrated intelligence and information processing centre in the HQ. NATO signed a cooperation agreement with the 28 member states, and also signed a technical cyber defence agreement with the EU in February 2016. The NAC in Warsaw declared the cyberspace as a military operation space, which might have effects on cyber defence planning, organization of operations and

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47 Angela Merkel German chancellor announced the increase of the defence budget until 2020 following the Summit. David Cameron British Prime Minister announced the modernization of the British Nuclear Submarine Fleet (Trident).

48 According to NATO accounts the military budget of the European member states have already increased by 3% in 2016. Although now only 6 countries spend more than 2% of their GDP on defence, the increase of expenses can be seen in 16 countries. 9 countries spend more than 20% of defence budget is on the supply of new equipment, military technology, research and development. "Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2009-2016)". NATO. 04 July, 2016. http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_01/20160129_160128-pr-2016-11-eng.pdf Accessed on 15. 08. 2016.


missions, as well as on preparations and training. This decision, however, does not change the defence character of NATO’s cyber policy in spite of the opinion of certain experts, who are suggesting some modification in the policy. According to the experts of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence it is not enough to focus only on defence, but offensive capabilities and skills are also needed, which allow NATO to respond properly to a potential threat from cyber space too. *A new kind of approach and mentality is needed* to implement this idea, which accepts cyber-attack in a way like attack from the air.

The Warsaw Summit called the member states to make pledge to improve the cyber defence capabilities and the joint innovations, which will all be reviewed at the Brussels Summit in 2017. The promises about cyber defence include seven areas: 1. develop the fullest range of capabilities to defend national infrastructure and network; 2. allocate the adequate resources nationally to strengthen cyber defence capabilities; 3. deepen coordination and the exchange of best practises; 4. improve understanding of cyber threats, 5. enhance skills and awareness of „cyber hygiene”; 6. foster cyber education, training and exercises; 7. expedite implementation of agreed cyber defence commitments. It is obvious that for success international cooperation is necessary – especially cooperation with the EU and Five Eyes countries, as well as governmental, industrial, and scientific cooperation, which is to be achieved by implementing of *NATO Industry Cyber Partnership* projects.

At the Summit the problem of resilience was discussed in association with cyber security, although it is well-known that proper resilience is much more crucial than to discuss only in cyber-space. The commitment to enhance resilience approved by the heads of state and government underlines that “resilience is an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence and effective fulfilment of the Alliance’s core tasks.” As NATO faces the new security challenges and threats it is important to maintain and protect critical civilian capabilities, alongside and in support of military capabilities, and to work across the whole government and with the private sector. It also requires the Alliance to continue to engage,

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56 The USA, Great Britain, Australia, Canada and New-Zealand agreed about a joint secret technical military intelligence and share of information 70 years ago. The Alliance had been operating in secret until 1999, but its global feature had not been revealed until the Snowden scandal in 2013. The joint activity today – which is mainly carried out by technical intelligence agencies and units – includes not only the global technical intelligence, but the monitoring and controlling of cyber space as well. The cooperation of the five countries is constantly expanding, and nowadays the Alliance is called as „9 Eyes” (+ Denmark, France, The Netherlands, Norway) and „14 Eyes” (+ Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Sweden) because of the involvement of these countries. Within the framework of the so-called „focused cooperation” 20 more NATO member states and partner countries take part in the collaboration. During the ISAF operation in Afghanistan the „41 Eyes” collaboration proved to be really successful and now it is regarded as a „pilot program” by the Alliance. The reinforcement of the secret intelligence organizations is crucial now, mainly because of the Russian hybrid war and international terrorism (ISIS). ”The Five Eyes”. Privacy International. https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/51, Accessed on 17. July, 2016.

as appropriate, with international bodies, particularly the EU, and with partners. As the civil preparedness is a national responsibility above all, NATO will strive to achieve the agreed requirements for national resilience. As the Alliance is to enhance resilience against the full spectrum of threats, the Warsaw Summit introduced the NATO Policy for the Protection of Civilians,\textsuperscript{58} which focuses on the increased protection of civilians during NATO operations, missions and other activities. This document emphasizes that the tasks – just as in the case of resilience – can only be fulfilled in the framework of international cooperation and with the adaptation of a comprehensive approach. The improvement of resilience takes a major part in the long-term NATO adaptations, and the Alliance intends to achieve this in cooperation with the EU. An important part of resilience is cyber defence, but the resilience also includes the defence against weapons of mass destruction and the decrease of dependence of the Eastern European member states on Russia. The improvement of resilience is first of all a national challenge, especially in concern with civilian issues.

The resilience is an important consequence of the defence and deterrence measures because the system of conditions for the adaptation of NATO military forces to their future operations must be guaranteed. During the Cold War resilience was a part of the „preparation of war theatre“ both in the West and East, mainly within national borders, in accordance with the nuclear threats. The civilian infrastructure building, economic production, development of war industry, and the accumulation of war reserves were all carried out according to military requirements. The network of transportation (railway network, motorways, ports, airports), the healthcare system (hospitals, hygienic capacities, patient accommodation capacities), the energy network, the material capacities, the military technology repairing plants, the organization of transportation were all parts of warfare preparations of the countries.

Today, by contrast, a significant part of supplies of NATO forces depends on the private sector: 90% of the logistic supply comes from private companies, whereas 75% comes from host nation support of the receiver countries. Air transport, telecommunication, and information technology services and different IT systems depend almost exclusively on the private sphere. It is evident that because of privatization, globalization and economic profitability the vulnerability of social-economic systems has increased, while the resilience capacity has decreased. The forward military presence in the East needs to reorganize all these tasks and all the conditions needed for the operation of NATO forces and have to be provided and guaranteed, especially in endangered countries. This challenge can only be solved by NATO with the assistance of member states. First, to ensure that it can speedily move all forces and equipment required to any part of the Alliance facing an imminent threat or attack, ensuring full and unimpeded access to all the infrastructure and supply it needs for this purpose. The new NFIUs in Eastern countries will have a major role in these tasks, because these units are going to organize the reception, the staging and onward movement (RSOM) of the new NATO ready-to-fight and rapid reaction forces. Second, NATO

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{resilience_requirements}
\caption{Resilience Requirements}
\end{figure}

\begin{itemize}
\item assured continuity of government and government services
\item resilient energy supplies
\item ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people
\item resilient food and water resources
\item ability to deal with mass casualties
\item resilient communications systems
\item resilient transportation systems
\end{itemize}

Source: Jamie Shea: Ibid. 3.

Forum

members must be able to anticipate, identify, mitigate and recover from hybrid attacks with minimum disruptive impact on the Alliance’s political, economic, social and military cohesion. Although resilience is a national responsibility, NATO must ensure adequate cyber defence for their critical infrastructure (Table N.4). This said, Allies’ security relies on individual nations upholding this commitment; and NATO has an interest in obtaining as much transparency as possible. Avoiding unpleasant surprises in crisis situations when the Alliance needs swift and reliable information and the capability to analyse, decide and respond quickly has to be the goal. Therefore NATO should practise these issues in the annual crisis management exercises focusing on assessing and accurately measuring potential vulnerabilities and civil preparedness. It will be an important challenge for the countries to create an appropriate legal environment for NATO operations in their own territories, so that the national and Alliance forces can take actions without breaking the rules of Article 5, against any forms of hybrid threats, and let them do even sovereignty-offending covered military actions. The creation of resilience means a long-term challenge, and its realization requested to develop NATO civil crisis management institutes as well.

CONCLUSIONS

The Warsaw Summit – just as almost all major NATO conferences – had had great expectations. The decisions about the assurance of deterrence and defence in the Eastern Flank countries have proved very popular, as they continue to intensify the military features of the Alliance returning to its initial collective defence mission. The forward military presence, however, can threaten the ideas saying that NATO needs – sooner or later – to replace the Readiness Action Plan with forward defence doctrine. Nevertheless, the persistent forward presence cannot be labelled as permanent military deployment as it used to be in the Central-European region during the Cold War, when major efforts were concentrated on border defence. Today, NATO is making efforts to create a balance between the expected effects of deterrence and a minor escalation of forces. Although the operation planning process will have been completed by the end of 2017, further forward presence decisions in Brussels will rather depend on the political-military situation, than on the military operation plans prepared on the worst-case security scenarios.

Besides deterrence and defence NATO is planning to cope with the hybrid threats like terrorism, cyber warfare, migration and regional instability too, which represents a new trend compared to the decisions made in the Wales Summit. The implementation of a dual track political approach to the Russian challenges has also proved a correct decision because the different and controversial statements of the member states’ leaders could only be managed with this attitude. Only in this way was possible to avoid qualifications like „division“, „cracks“, „faults“, which labelling have lately been so popular in international media. NATO has also recognised the need to enhance cooperation with the EU against hybrid dangers and threats, just as to collaborate with the reliable Arabic partner countries. This new strategy also includes the projecting stability concept, which makes efforts to improve the security of the challenged countries beyond the NATO borders – like Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Syria, Iraq and Libya – by implementing non-kinetic means and forces.

While at the Wales Summit NATO made a “half-turning” — like the return to the direction of a new Cold War — the Warsaw Summit produced a complete turn. New NATO now is not only about the reinforcement of the Eastern border, but about the return to the traditional defence of the European borders. Many decisions made by the Alliance in Warsaw try to work out new solutions for internal European utilization of NATO military forces for security tasks. The modern security approach is about the fusion of external and internal security representing the need to fight against hybrid threats. In a new security environment the tasks of the military forces need to be clarified in connection with nationwide and international community defence efforts. It is unquestionable that NATO will take further steps this way at the Brussels Summit in 2017.

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NATO RESERVISTS IN THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The World's Largest Organization of Reservists Held a Security Forum and a Winter Meeting

ABSTRACT: The article reports on the Bonn Seminar followed by the Brussels Winter Meeting, organized in February 2016, by the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers. The article evaluates the two events and also provides an insight into the broader activity of the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers at a time when the role of the reserve forces is changing and becoming increasingly important all over the world. In addition, recommendations are formulated to make a more efficient use of the potential collaboration opportunities.

KEYWORDS: CIOR, CIOMR, NATO, international cooperation, reserves

THE INTERALLIED CONFEDERATION OF RESERVE OFFICERS AND ITS MAJOR EVENTS OF THE YEAR

Between 31 January and 3 February 2016, the NATO-affiliated Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (CIOR)1 held its traditional Winter Seminar in Bonn, followed by its annual Winter Meeting between 4 February and 6 February 2016, with the participation of its sister organization, the Interallied Confederation of Medical Reserve Officers (CIOMR).2 The Winter Meeting was organized at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels.3

In NATO, the significance and prestige of reservists and reserve officers, along with the organizations founded by reservists, are best illustrated by the fact that among a great number of non-governmental organizations, dedicated to advance the cause of defence, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization maintains a special relationship with only four parliamentary and non-governmental organizations.4 One of them is CIOR, the other is CIOMR,5 which gives both these associations and their national member organizations special legitimacy.6

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1 Confédération Interalliée des Officiers de Réserve. For more information, see: Ujházy, L. 2013, 167–184.
2 Confédération Interalliée des Officiers Médicaux de Réserve. For more information, see: Ujházy, L. "A NATO Tartalékos Egészségügyi Tisztelet Szövetsége". Honvédérvos, 2010/1–2. 66–72.
3 The authors attended the Winter Meeting on behalf of the MoD Public Relations Office and the Association of Hungarian Reservists.
5 The other two organizations are: NATO Parliamentary Assembly (PA) and Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA). CIOR and ATA work in close cooperation.
6 For more information on international reservist organizations, see: Ujházy, L. "A nemzetközi tartalékos szövetségekről". Hadtudomány, 2010/4, 89–101.
The idea of CIOR was first conceived by Belgian, French and Dutch reserve officers and CIOR was eventually founded in 1948. Now an organization working alongside other associations of reserve officers affiliated to NATO, CIOR represents a total of around 1 million reserve officers and has become the largest organization of its kind worldwide. CIOMR is the sister organization of CIOR. The two associations work closely together.

CIOR and CIOMR are both non-profit, non-governmental organizations unrelated to party politics. Their activities are based on a constitution. Both CIOR’s and CIOMR’s objectives are to strengthen cooperation between the national reserve associations of member states and also to enhance solidarity with NATO. The highest priority on CIOR’s list of commitments is to advocate NATO’s policy. Apart from all its other objectives, CIOR serves as a connecting link between regular forces and the military reserve forces of NATO member states. The activities of CIOR and CIOMR were officially recognized by NATO’s Military Committee in MC 248/1 of 27 March 1988. The permanent representation of the organization at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels is the responsibility of a staff consisting of one individual. Similarly to NATO, English and French are the working languages. Simultaneous translation into English and French is a service provided at major CIOR events. All important documents are also available in those languages.

Only NATO member states can obtain full membership. Every member state can be represented by one reserve officer association alone. States outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization can participate in the activity of CIOR as associate members, members in observer status or members in visitor status. Information regarding the activity of CIOR first reached Hungary in the mid-1990s. Having first joined NATO and after a long period of preparation, Hungary eventually obtained full membership on 10 February 2000. Today Hungary is represented in CIOR by the Association of Hungarian Reservists.

CIOR’s two main annual events are the Winter Meeting and the Summer Congress. Traditionally, the former event is held at the NATO Headquarters in the early days of February, while the latter is usually organized in one of the NATO member states and is attended by approximately one thousand participants. A high-level Military Competition and the so-called Young Reserve Officers’ Workshop are organized simultaneously with the Summer Congress. These events specifically target the most important category of reservists: young

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9 Permanent Representative CIOR at NATO. This task is generally assigned to a Belgian reserve officer who can speak good English and French and lives in or near Brussels.
10 Any national reserve officer association should be authorized by the Ministry of Defence of its home country. In addition, during the approval process of an application for full membership, CIOR will scrutinize the operational constitution of the association applying for membership to see whether its operational rules conform to CIOR specifications (they are democratic, they are open to all branches etc.) During the process, a CIOR delegation comprised of a few members makes an official visit to the country applying for membership, as was the case with Hungary.
11 Currently Austria, the Republic of South Africa, Finland, Macedonia (officially: the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Moldova, Slovakia, Switzerland and Sweden are associate members of CIOR.
13 Magyar Tartalékosok Szövetsége – MATASZ
14 Military Competition – MILCOMP
15 Young Reserve Officers’ Workshop – YROW
and active reserve officers capable of exploiting in various theatres of operations knowledge and skills acquired during these events along with experience gained via international cooperation. Delegate at Large\textsuperscript{16} is another programme alternative geared to the needs of older reserve officers. A symposium, which is part of the congress itself, is an event open to all participants and external specialists. All other congress-related activities are pursued within the framework of plenary sessions or committees.

Another event held during the spring and autumn seasons is the so-called In-Between Meeting, which is organized with the participation of a limited number of attendants at a venue provided by the member state currently in presidency. Participants of this event are the presidency, vice presidents of national reserve associations and committee chairs. In-Between Meetings last for 2 or 3 days.

The association has a presidency, a council and various committees. Every two years one of the member states takes over the presidency composed of a President and a Secretary General. The Secretary General also performs the task of the treasurer, thereby assuming responsibility for the finances within CIOR.\textsuperscript{17}

The work of the Council is helped by committees and working groups supervised by the President. These committees and working groups are responsible to the Council via the President. Today a total of ten committees or working groups participate in the work of the association\textsuperscript{18} (Public Affairs Committee, Language Academy Committee, Civil Military Co-operation Committee,\textsuperscript{19} Defence Attitudes and Security Issues Committee, Legal Committee, Military Competitions Committee, Partnership for Peace and Outreach Committee, Symposium Working Group, Seminar Committee and Young Reserve Officers Committee).

**FORUM ON SECURITY ISSUES HELD IN BONN**

CIOR’s annual Winter Seminar held in Bonn is a forum devoted to security issues with the participation of experts and reserve officers, focusing on current issues. The event is sponsored by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and the meeting is conducted in accordance with Chatham House rules.\textsuperscript{20}

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\textsuperscript{16} Delegate at Large (DAL): Self-financed participants having no specific function, participating with the approval of national reservist associations. They are allowed to take part in general programmes. Their presence at the Congress will help familiarize their home country with the messages coming from NATO and CIOR and will also help make the Congress profitable. See: CIOR at a Glance. Coordinated by the CIOR Strategic Planning Working Group, 2008. 14.

\textsuperscript{17} The financial resources of the association are comprised of membership fees paid by national reserve officer associations, subsidies, donations and the sale of memorabilia. Annual membership fees are determined by the Council.

\textsuperscript{18} The structure of CIOR committees has undergone substantial changes in recent years. See Dikácz Csaba. "A NATO országok tartalékos tisztjeinek szövetsége, a CIOR". Új Honvédési Szemle. 2004/6. 91–94.

\textsuperscript{19} Civil-Military Co-operation: an activity supporting a military operation with the aim of ensuring co-operation between the operations headquarters, local authorities and international, national governmental and non-governmental organizations and agencies and the local population. NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine AJP-9 2013.

THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE SO-CALLED ISLAMIC STATE

This year the forum focused on the threat posed by the terrorist organization called Islamic State (hereinafter: IS) and the various ramifications of that threat. For the first time, the venue of the annual seminar on security policy issues was Bonn.21

On the first day, slightly out of character with the nature of these events, a round-table meeting was organized with the participation of those scheduled to give a speech during the seminar. These experts were all trying to throw light on IS as a phenomenon, viewing the whole issue from various angles. The complexity of the problem was absolutely clear, given the fact that on the one hand there is a fairly strong urge for us to adopt an interpretation which describes the events cloaked in a cultural or religious narrative, whereas vested interests are unequivocally reflected in the way international relations are perceived in the context of the phenomena accompanying the activity of IS. Special emphasis was laid on the economic and financial environment in which IS pursues its activities. In the course of the discussion it became clear that several speakers regarded that particular environment as a wide window of opportunity for the terrorist organization to be weakened and eventually defeated. Naturally, the discussion did not stop short of looking at the larger picture as there are countries to be reckoned with both at a regional level (Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia) and at a global level (Russia, United States, Europe).

On the second day, a recap on past events associated with IS was followed by common reflection with the participation of those attending the seminar. The emergence of IS is by no means a surprise event. Its origins can be traced back to the Iraqi terrorist organization Al-Qaeda, formed after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. However, the genesis of that organization stems from its roots in Afghanistan. A group made up mostly of foreign mercenaries and jihadists had embarked on a process of “Iraqisation” towards the late 2000s under the name Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen. This group was later transformed, mostly as a response to the excesses of the Shiite-led government encountered by Sunnis, into an organization called the Islamic State of Iraq which, from 2012 onwards extended its influence into the eastern parts of Syria. Meanwhile, tension between Al-Qaeda and this new formation was building up, particularly because the methods used by those organizations were different. The attitude of the Islamic State was characterized by a considerable lack of respect for the lives of other Muslims during its terrorist activities, which Al-Qaeda found inappropriate. This led to a split between the two organizations as early as 2006 or thereabouts. IS announced the establishment of a caliphate in 2014, which meant that the animosity between the two groups was by now irreversible. At the same time, the relationship between IS and other Islamist organizations was undergoing change as well. In the words of one of the speakers, just like “Kremlinology” – a well-known term and a field of political research in the Cold War period – “brotherology” (who considers who as their brother at a particular moment) could be a new branch of study aimed at monitoring the fast-changing relationships between these organizations.

21 This event goes back a long way. From the late 1980s, items on its agenda have, almost every year, been current issues related to security policy matters discussed in front of an audience of reserve officers. The timing of the forum makes it possible for participants to attend the CIOR Winter Seminar starting on the day following the date upon which the forum ends. In this way, the location of that event would still be North Rhine-Westphalia. The venue of the event in 2015 was Königswinter, while in 2016 it was Bonn, the former seat of government in the Federal Republic of Germany.
This was followed by several speeches on the religious and cultural aspects of IS, all of which emphasized the eclecticism of IS ideology in the sense that it resorts to cherry-picking by using only those thoughts and ideas in Islam from which it can benefit or which it finds suitable to describe current issues. IS, therefore, can be described neither through Salafism nor through Wahhabism, despite the fact that it appears to have borrowed various elements of both. A key element of their teachings roots in Wahhabism, the core idea being the Ten Nullifiers of Islam, which places Muslims outside the Ummah (the community of believers), thereby paving the way for Muslims to be considered Takfir and thus becoming legitimate targets.

When examining the broader context of cultural issues, it becomes clear that globalisation is not necessarily conducive to convergence when it comes to the values rooted in the social norms of a particular society. This is true even of the European Union, where 2 or 3 groups of countries with markedly different social values can be distinguished. (In his lecture, the speaker examined existing social values according to five different paradigms: distribution of power in a society, individual and group loyalty, reaction to the unknown, motivation to achieve success, notion of time.) Although the participants seemed to disagree on whether culture or religion are of greater significance here, most participants were of the view that the activity of IS is a phenomenon determined by a cultural rather than religious subtext.

According to some, IS is a trend that seamlessly blends in with the context of Islam, representing a long tradition going back 300 years, the foundations of which can be traced back through the early history of Islam.

Possible ramifications for Europe

Inevitably, this topic brings us to the issue of migration into Europe and the problem of immigrants. Several participants underlined that, given the fact that even Western Europe appears to be increasingly short on universally accepted values, immigrants might find it difficult to conform to any set of values believed to be appropriate for the purpose of assimilation. Moreover, people who come to Europe from a Middle Eastern culture expect to be told by some authority, as it were, what to do, which Europe is neither willing to do nor capable of doing. This will lead to a kind of voluntary isolation and the emergence of enclaves similar to those in Berlin’s Kreuzberg district, which in turn will reproduce the original problem.

Alarming as it is, data available suggests that IS might have dormant agents in the immigrant communities of around 60 countries worldwide, while at least 30 regional “franchise” organizations have been identified. (As a matter of fact, IS has already assumed the role of Al-Qaeda in this respect.) In 2014 and 2015, acts of terror were prevented on 32 occasions by law enforcement agencies in Western Europe alone, with 58 individuals having been taken into custody in the process in a total of 10 countries. Those arrested were the citizens of 14 countries. Worse still, 29 percent of those involved were not born Muslim, they were young people from Europe who later converted to Islam. While the reason behind these high percentage figures has generated various theories, there seems to be general consensus that in today’s rootless European societies, emotions stemming from a perception
driven by an attitude of protest among young people translate into religion-driven ideas similar to Islamism rather than secular ideologies (e.g. Marxism).\textsuperscript{22}

Finally, an interesting comment made on the subject of the rule of law highlighted the fact that although there is no terminological difference in that area, the actual interpretation given to the notion of human rights in the western world is markedly different from the way the Islam world interprets that notion. The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, adopted in 1990, clearly shows how differences regarding certain subjects (gender, church and political power etc.) lead to incompatibility between the western perception of those issues and the traditions and the interpretation of law in Islam.\textsuperscript{23}

Bearing in mind the semantic diversity of certain words when it comes to the legal system of various countries, let alone different cultures, one cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that the term “terrorism” is interpreted quite differently in NATO and in EU member states, which sometimes makes cooperation (e.g. in the procedural aspects of extradition cases) rather difficult. Fortunately, the international legal environment provides us with the facility of applicable common rules which offer guidelines as to the legal framework available when dealing with IS. Apart from the general rules and criteria of ‘\textit{ius ad bellum}’ and ‘\textit{ius in bello}’, mention must be made of United Nations Security Council resolution 1368\textsuperscript{24} along with articles 42.7 and 222 of the Treaty of the European Union, which France invoked after the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris. At the same time, the coalition against IS was formed neither under the auspices of NATO nor those of the European Union. It was formed in an \textit{ad hoc} manner, although both the EU and NATO have provided the coalition with certain capabilities which coalition members are entitled to exploit.

The involvement of NATO would, among other things, contain an element of risk as Turkey itself is a NATO member with active involvement in the region, whereas its objectives and interests are not entirely identical with those of other member states. Among the topics discussed during the seminar, Turkey and Russia’s activity in the region were the most contentious issues. For Turkey the highest priority among all the problems to be dealt with is to prevent a Kurdish state from being formed along its borders, one that would be capable of providing effective support to the Kurdish minority in Turkey in its separatist fight. Some participants expressed the view that because of this, some form of economic cooperation with IS or at least some degree of tolerance towards IS cannot be ruled out on the part of Turkey, given the fact that in the present situation this seems to be the most efficient way for Turkey to counterbalance the Kurds. However, Turkey’s attachment to the EU manifests in its various interests as – unrealistic as it may appear – Turkey has long considered itself a candidate for EU membership. Besides, terrorism is a growing problem for Turkey as well. In the last year alone, there were arrests with a number of people having been taken into custody on grounds of terrorist activity. Despite all these efforts terrorist acts did occur. They were usually committed by returning IS fighters. The reason behind this is that both Turkey and Russia are involved in fairly complex activities in which the Middle East is only one factor. Also, the military forces used by these two countries comprise not only their own armed


forces but armies known as client forces. Rather than using their own regular forces, there is a tendency for these countries to back an increasing number of non-government armed units and this is how they achieve their political objectives.25

This kind of warfare has its advantages. First, it is cheaper (both financially and politically) than regular forces. Second, any relationship between the government and these non-government armed forces can be denied in case of a botched operation. Another interesting aspect of this proxy warfare is that – broadly speaking – such military units do not necessary have to carry out their acts voluntarily; often, what one state does is profit from the activity of another state (or that of non-government fighters), as was the case with the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which Iran managed to take advantage of. Another way to benefit from client organizations is to have them engage in activities that a regular army would refuse to be involved in, not least because media interest in their activity is usually less intense. When we apply the above client warfare theory to the situation in Syria, we can see that the conditions there are of a multifaceted and fast-changing nature, while in various areas of cooperation even contradictions might emerge. The Assad regime, for example, is at war with the Islamic State, but continues to buy oil from IS. The payment by the Iraqi central government of public servants working in regions controlled by IS seems to have continued until recently, while the salary of those employees has also been taxed by IS, whose revenue from that tax is a significant source of cash etc. At the same time, warfare via clients has its risks. An armed unit of fighters having previously been provided with arms by their patron might become hostile over a longer period of time and turn against that same patron. Another disadvantage of this type of warfare is that it is less effective than one in which regular forces are involved. Also, it generally results in a protracted conflict and violence. In many cases this does serve the interests of a client as both the significance of that client and the support provided by the patron will only last as long as the armed conflict lasts. The escalation of a conflict might often lead to an unexpected (unintended) chain of events as was the case in Libya. Finally, a client sometimes becomes self-employed. Moreover, roles might change and a client becomes patron. This is what we have seen in the context of the Assad regime and Hezbollah.

What does the future hold?

Finally, on the third day, a fair amount of attention was paid to IS finances. There are some encouraging new developments in this area: as opposed to its revenues of around 2 billion dollars in 2015, IS can expect less than half of that amount for this year, although IS is in no need of creativity when it comes to generating sizeable sums of money (“oil refinery” through small-scale production methods, sale of works of art, collection of protection money, various sharia-related taxes, fees charged for the escort of foreign media staffs, collection of donations from European shops in Muslim ownership etc.) As for IS expenditure, most financial resources available in 2016 will only cover costs incurred by the operation of the “State” armed forces, as opposed to the period of 2014 and 2015 (when the “welfare state” was in a position to pay relatively high army salaries to its fighters and offered free-of-charge public services). First, due to a more efficient control system along the Turkish border, a

number of smuggling routes have become useless. Second, the infrastructure of smuggling has been seriously damaged (bombardment of trucks transporting oil). Third, certain items on the list of revenues from previous years are no longer an option to use (robbery, selling of objects of arts). Infrastructure on occupied territories is deteriorating for the lack of maintenance, while a growing number of people are fleeing these regions, causing, for example, the number of professional health workers to drop to critical levels. When looking for feasible alternatives to defeat IS, finances appear to be the answer: currently no one at a global or even regional level is likely to embark on a large-scale military operation against the Islamic State, while by cutting off the resources crucial for the operation of the “terror state”, a slower process of annihilation seems a viable option and the signs are that sooner or later, it will eventually fall apart.

Some aspects of the ideology associated with IS are expected to survive its demise, partly in regional “franchise” organizations, partly in the form of “lone-wolf” terrorism.

To eliminate the indirect effects of terrorism, the following recommendations have been formulated by speakers:
- the influx into Europe of migrants whose intention is to make trouble should be prevented or at least reduced,
- the integration of European Muslims should be facilitated, thereby preventing the emergence of parallel societies which can easily become the hotbed of radicalization and a hiding place for terrorists. This, at the same time, entails unequivocal self-definition for Europe, resulting in a set of values providing a benchmark for integration,
- extremism should be confronted even if it is not (yet) manifested in violence,
- all this can only be achieved by working together, given the fact that because of the openness of our societies the strength of the West is to be measured through that of its weakest link.

This is where the role of reservists becomes a key factor. They play a part in the solution of this conflict not only as soldiers. Their contribution in tackling the social problems referred to should also be defined by their role as active, responsible citizens.

The seminar itself was meant to help achieve this objective partly by providing detailed information on the security policy aspects of the challenges currently posed by IS, thereby giving assistance during the preparatory work of reservist based in that region and often entrusted with various, culturally sensitive assignments (CIMIC, legal or cultural problems.)

Ideas were also exchanged on how civilians in their home countries can help eliminate the threat posed by IS.

Another oft-repeated objective of the seminar was that knowledge acquired by reservists should be passed on to their own armed forces and reserve organizations, thereby enhancing the culture of security policy perceptions both in their home countries and in the armed forces.

CIOR WINTER SEMINAR – RESERVISTS’ CONTRIBUTION TO THE SECURITY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC REGION

February 4th was the opening day of CIOR’s Winter Seminar. The morning programme was organized jointly with the closing event of the NATO National Reserve Forces Committee,

held in the building of NATO Headquarters. Following the opening ceremony of the session, the most significant event during the plenary meeting was an update on NATO current issues by General Petr Pavel, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. The speaker underlined the role of reservists in dealing with new challenges. At the initiative of the Permanent Representative CIOR at NATO, a working lunch has, since 2011, been yet another opportunity for the members of national CIOR delegations to meet national NRFC representatives. Work then continued in the CIOR Executive Council and the committees. Hungary was represented in the Council as well as the CIOR Legal Committee. The Council is the highest-level decision-making body in CIOR. Apart from a debate focusing on CIOR internal affairs (new CIOR strategy, financial situation, upcoming events, member states to take over presidency in the future etc.), both the NRFC Chairman and the representative of the International Military Staff gave an update on key developments affecting their organizations.

The Legal Committee is CIOR’s most important legal workshop as well as the legal advisory body within the association, providing assistance for the activity of the Presidency, the Council, the committees and working groups, CIOR and CIOMR. The Committee also deals with issues related to the employer support system and is involved in the organization of the military competitions. The Committee’s work efforts were directed partly towards the technical aspects of certain resolutions made in Sofia in the summer of 2015 aimed at specific modifications, partly towards the finalisation of lectures on the law of armed conflict and of tests, to be implemented during events accompanying the 2016 Summer Conference in Madrid such as the Military Competition and the Young Reserve Officers Workshop.

A POTENTIAL ROLE FOR RESERVES

Reservists can play a crucial role in several aspects when dealing with the consequences of the actions of the Islamic State: First, in the more traditional role, they can fill gaps in the capabilities of NATO member nations' armed forces in areas where a specific set of civilian expertise is needed. For example, in countering the media presence of IS, professional communicators are needed in Western armed forces and other government agencies. Another key area could be finances, one of the weak spots of IS. These experts are more easily found in the reserves than in the regular forces of NATO.

Another aspect of utilizing reserves is the maintenance of border security within Europe. As it was demonstrated, IS uses the waves of migrants to smuggle its operatives into Europe. Standing police are hardly capable of managing increased border security operations for an extended period of time, therefore it is of utmost importance to properly control borders and this can only be done with the support of reserves.

Regarding migration, the special skills of reserves also play a role, for example, in CIMIC activities or using linguists to communicate with incoming people. Finally, reserves are also

27 National Reserve Forces Committee (NRFC). Formerly NATO was not particularly concerned with issues related to the organizational aspects of the reserve forces in member states. However, this attitude changed by the 1980s. A sign of this change was that NRFC, an informal, independent group of senior officers responsible for the national reserve forces of NATO member states, was formed in 1981. In 1987, CIOR and NRFC signed a memorandum of understanding.

28 On more information regarding the potential role of reservists and reserve associations today, see: Ujházy, L. "A tartalékosok és a tartalékos szövetségek szerepe napjainkban". Honvédségi Szemle, 2014/1, 41–45.
crucial in dealing with the aftermath of terrorist attacks, as they can provide numbers for quickly enhancing security, then maintaining a high level of it.

**SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS**

The significance and prestige of reservists and reserve officers, along with the importance of organizations which they have set up, are a remarkable contribution to achieve the objectives envisaged by NATO. CIOR is an organization established on the foundations of an appropriate structure and philosophy across the whole spectrum of reserve officers ranging from second lieutenant to general. CIOR provides an excellent international environment for the activity of all reserve officers to be harmonized both at a mental and at a physical level (CIMIC, law of armed conflict, military sports events, Young Reserve Officers Workshop, symposium, Delegate at Large programme). During the readiness period, participation by our Volunteer Operational Reserves in CIOR committees, sports competitions\(^{29}\) and the Language Academy would be an excellent opportunity for improvement in skills related to the professional, physical and linguistic aspects of their activity.

Meanwhile, the values represented by reservists and their associations have excellent opportunities to resonate with those segments of the society which the messages of official politics, diplomacy/military diplomacy can hardly find their way to\(^{30}\) or do it with considerable difficulty.

The CIOR Winter Seminar is a useful security policy forum with current issues on its agenda to be discussed every year. CIOR’s Winter Meeting is a less comprehensive event than the Summer Congress. An event with a more visible focus on specific problems, it is possible for issues affecting the Hungarian association to be debated. The permanent presence of the representatives of Hungarian reservists at these events is a vital factor for maintaining international relations. The need to safeguard the interests of reservists and to enhance the capability of armed forces to retain reservists has become something of a priority for CIOR member organizations. The Association of Hungarian Reservists should, perhaps, also consider that option as a direction to take by providing legal assistance aimed to tackle special problems that reservists encounter, and by doing so, earning as much credibility with them as possible. CIOR is an organization with a structure having been refined and fine-tuned during several decades of operational experience, one which helps maintain required standards, both mentally and physically, among reservists during the readiness in an international context. This might serve as an example for any national association of reservists upon which to shape their internal structure. It is through participation in the work of committees that a highly effective representation in CIOR can be achieved. To have reserve officers capable of representing both Hungary and its national association of reservists in various committees (Legal, CIMIC, Public Affairs, Language Academy, Young Reserve Officers’ Workshop, Military Competition etc.) is an idea worth putting into practice. We would also benefit from

\(^{29}\) The advantages of participation in CIOR sports competitions, made possible through national competitions held with the aim of selecting competitors, were underlined by András Kladek as early as 1999. Kladek András. “A tartalékos koncepció”. *Humán Szemle*, 1999/1. 31.

having delegates in CIOMR as it offers a variety of high-level professional programmes and forums designed for an exchange of information.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Lt. Gen. Zoltán Orosz:

REVIEW OF “DARFÚR, A LÁNGOLÓ TARTOMÁNY” (DARFUR, THE FLAMING PROVINCE)

Publikon Publisher has recently issued a new monograph on the history of the Sudanese mission of the African Union from a very unique viewpoint with the title "Darfur, the flaming province" ("Darfúr, a lángoló tartomány"). The author, Colonel János Besenyő, who is the head of the HDF General Staff Scientific Research Centre, has written several books concerning Africa's conflict zones in the past years (e.g. "Western Sahara" from the same publisher in 2009). This time the author analysed the emergence of the Darfur genocide, its progress and the attempts of crisis management.

This niche work is not only unique for being a late follower of Rudolf Anton Carl von Slatin's (commonly Slatin Pasha) book in 1896 on this topic, which was the last study about Darfur in Hungarian for more than a century.

The head of the General Staff's Research Centre does not only present us a simple description of the crisis that determines the political life in Sudan and the Darfur region, but his work is also based on personal experience, using and publishing hardly available primary sources (parts of diaries, reports etc.). As a soldier, serving a long time in the region, his personal notices (his diary is partly published in the book) and perceptions make the text more expressive and joyful. The peculiarity of this work hails from the author's first hand experience and his personal thoughts about the crisis he lived through.

Colonel Besenyő's work aims being more than a knowledge basis for the regional history, geography and economy. It brings the facts into causal relationship, comprehensively showing the territorial, ethnic and political problems that led to the development and escalation of the crisis. Besides general information, the author reveals the attempts of the regional and international communities for solving the Sudanese crisis. We can also find reasons for the failure of these efforts in the book. The author's notices are noteworthy, not only for being very readable, but also because they indicate the growing interest of the international power factors and the increasing geopolitical role of Africa in our globalized world, where the traditional definition of borders is significantly transformed.

Crisis processes analysed in this book highlight the weaknesses of the African state building processes, the specific interpretation of the concept of nation that is very different from the European viewpoint – and, of course, their security policy challenges. The insecurity of tribal and ethnic-based political entities can generate crises not only at a regional level as their effects can reach Europe and within that, Hungary, too. The Sudanese genocide and the incomplete crisis management may be a good local starting point for migration processes that should challenge European states. Handling the dilemmas generated by the linguistic and cultural differences is not a simple task, especially if it is pervaded by violence.

This monograph's real value is its universality: personal thoughts and memories make this text very pleasantly readable, even it declares serious conclusions and proposals for the European Union and Hungary, too.

This book will definitely be very useful as a university textbook, moreover, the monograph is highly recommended to anyone who are dedicated to the improvement of the Hungarian-African relations, or those, who are interested in Africa's contemporary history and security policy. I highly recommend the translation of this book into English in order to make the international research community familiar with it soon.
Col. (Ret.) Philip Wilkinson:

WINNING WARS AMONGST THE PEOPLE: CASE STUDIES IN ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT


Peter Kiss proposes that his lessons for the future are laudable and timely for a particular generation of military leaders. While conflict is a normal human condition, the context, ways, and means by which we conduct conflict in pursuit of goals must be constantly evaluated and our resolution techniques refined if our responses have any chance of success. The threat we currently face from Islamic extremists mutates faster than our doctrinal responses, and Kiss should be applauded for trying to throw light on that deficit. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have posed a very real danger since the mid-1990s; however, the ongoing conflict in Syria and the potential for violence from returning homegrown Islamists expands that threat profile and takes it to another level. Therefore, all attempts to broaden the political debate on this new threat of domestic jihad, whether described as “asymmetric conflict” or not, are helpful.

While it is now widely acknowledged that the response to an insurgency or what we might call a “domestic jihad” should be comprehensive, the examples Kiss discusses shed new light on the challenge.

He emphasises the potential advantages and pitfalls of strategic communications. The persuasive use of the media by the Kosovo Liberation Army was the decisive factor in drawing in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces and ultimately the withdrawal of Serb forces. The use of social media, as a means to mobilize and coordinate the masses, was taken to new heights in the Arab Spring. As Kiss implies, information technology and social media are essential elements of a modern strategic communications strategy of both governments and insurgents.

In light of Kiss’s observations, this reviewer wonders whether he would use the same four case studies today. I suspect the answer would depend on his target audience. While the author looked back to identify lessons for the challenge of domestic insurgency, the specifics of that threat have mutated at a pace almost inconceivable three years ago. In his French case from 2005, Kiss gave us a glimpse of the type of complexity presented by the mob in a modern inner-city context. This poses the question of whether we could now see groups of combat-hardened jihadists returning from Syria to Western cities and attempting to establish and defend “no-go” areas where sharia law reigns supreme. During the 1970s, the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland established no-go areas in Belfast and Londonderry in which they maintained their own rule of law. The troubles in Northern Ireland beginning

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in 1969 make an interesting study on a homegrown domestic “insurgency,” as does the Palestinian Intifada in 2001 that Kiss mentions in passing. While the British Army has a tendency to promote success in Northern Island as directly related to their tactics, techniques, and procedures, perhaps the real lesson is that only after the Royal Ulster Constabulary was given the security lead in 1975 was real progress made.

While the author acknowledges the need for a comprehensive multifunctional response to insurgency that addresses both its causes and symptoms, the emphasis of his research is on the military element of that multifunctional response. In virtually all counterinsurgencies where success has been defined in terms of self-sustaining peace rather than military victory, the role of the military may be to ensure that government forces retain a monopoly on the use of organized force; however, long-term peace and stability require re-establishing the rule of law and access to justice, which is the job of the police. Initially, military activities will inevitably involve combat operations, but they must be conducted with restraint as “collateral damage” is the most effective recruiting tool for insurgents. It is not enough for security forces to operate within the law, but their actions must be seen by the people as being legitimate. Kiss was ambiguous on this point (p. 188).

Perhaps it is not within the scope of the book, but from a political strategic perspective, the domestic challenge of today’s counter-jihad strategy requires additional elements than those more traditional to counterinsurgency. For example, a successful counter-jihad strategy, whether in Hungary or any other Western country, must ensure an inclusive form of governance, the redress of feelings of exclusion and disadvantage that feed terrorism, and a counter to the distortion of Islam as preached by those who promote jihad against the West.

This book is not only very interesting for what it says about domestic insurgency but also what it says about the approach that the U.S. military takes to military operations other than conventional war—operations collectively known as asymmetric warfare. The case has often been made that the lessons of counterinsurgency and peace or support operations went out the window like the proverbial baby with the bathwater in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In this context, the U.S. military’s ability to reinvent counterinsurgency doctrine was a huge and necessary shift, and in this book, Kiss takes that doctrinal debate to another level.

My only disappointment is that the utility of Kiss’s observations is limited in a non-military and international context due to his adherence to current U.S. military language, definitions, and conceptual constructs. But, of course, this is not a surprising result from a recently retired military officer. Others might take issue with three other areas. The English and French, who fought their Hundred Years’ War in 1328–1453, might not agree that first-generation warfare came about after the Peace of Westphalia (1648) or that today’s fourth-generation warfare or asymmetric conflict is not a new phenomenon unless seen in a post-GWOT context. The Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual makes that clear. The use of the strategic, operational, and tactical are seen by many as counterproductive to understand the conduct of counterinsurgency and peace support operations when the “strategic corporal” is so important (p. 181). And finally, as it was pointed out to me by a retired U.S. police chief in the occupied Palestinian territories in 2011, using such common phrases as Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) is not helpful within the civilian interagency context or even with the police because most rely on their own specific language. That criticism aside, I would recommend this book for students in Western command and staff colleges as a useful addition to current doctrine regarding homegrown domestic jihad.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Abdessamad Belhaj, PhD
belhaj@migraciokutato.hu
Abdessamad Belhaj earned a PhD in Islamic studies at the University Mohammed V, Rabat, Morocco (2001) and a second PhD in Political and Social Sciences at the Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium (2008). In 2014, he joined the MTA-SZTE Research Group on Religious Culture, and in 2016 the Migration Research Institute.

Yoel Guzansky, PhD
yoelg@inss.org.il
Yoel Guzansky is a research fellow at INSS and W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellows, Hoover Institution in 2016-17. Before he joined the Institute, he was in charge of strategic issues at the National Security Council in the Prime Minister's Office, coordinating work on the Iranian nuclear challenge. Dr. Guzansky is a member of the Strategic Assessment editorial board, a member of the management team, head of the program for interns, and the INSS representative at EuroMeSCo. He is the author of the recently published book The Arab World on the Road to State Failure (co-author with Kobi Michael).

István Harkai, dr. jur.
harkai.istvan89@gmail.com
Dr. István Harkai is a PhD student at the University of Szeged, Faculty of Law. He graduated as a lawyer from the University of Szeged in 2014. After obtaining his degree he worked for the Office of Immigration and Nationality of Hungary. As a researcher, his sphere of interest covers the field of International Public Law, International Humanitarian Law, European and International Intellectual Property Law and Copyright Law.

Csaba Barnabas Horváth, PhD
keluolang@hotmail.com
Csaba Barnabas Horváth is an external researcher of the HDF General Staff Scientific Research Center, as well as of the Modern East Asia Research Group of Pazmany Peter Catholic University. He has a PhD degree in International Relations from the Corvinus University of Budapest. The focus of his research is the geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific. He carried out research under different fellowships in Singapore (NUS, ISEAS) Australia (ANU) and in Taiwan (National Chengchi University).

Péter Álmos Kiss, PhD
kiss.almos@hm.gov.hu
Péter Álmos Kiss, PhD served 20 years in the United States Army as a parachute infantryman, intelligence specialist and psychological warfare specialist. Apart from short interruptions, he has lived in Hungary since his retirement in 1999. He spent a lot of time studying asymmetric warfare throughout his military career, and continued this line of research in an academic setting after his retirement. He published a number of
books, book chapters, research papers and journal articles on the subject in English and Hungarian. He is a senior researcher of the Research Centre of the General Staff of the Hungarian Defence Forces.

**Ms Petra Kiss**
kiss.petra@hm.gov.hu
Ms Petra Kiss is a desk officer at the Defence Planning Department of the Hungarian Ministry of Defence. She has been responsible for NATO Defence Planning issues and coordination of Hungarian contribution to multinational initiatives. Ms Kiss has a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations and a Master’s degree in Security and Defence Policy. She is currently working on her PhD thesis; her research focuses on the development of NATO’s strategic thinking. She has published several articles about NATO-Russian relations, as well.

**Lt. Col. András Mező**
andras.mezo@hm.gov.hu
Lt. Col. MEZŐ works for the Hungarian Defence Forces, Military Administration and Training Command as Senior Desk Officer (acting Deputy of Department). He graduated from Kossuth Lajos Military College as an infantry officer, later he attended an Infantry Officer Basic Course in Fort Benning, USA, and a Platoon Commander Battle Course in Brecon, UK. He has a postgraduate master’s degree in the field of Security and Defence Policy from Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University in Budapest. He served in several training-related positions mainly in the NCO Academy, Szentendre. He had one operational tour as executive officer to deputy commander in Szarajevo, BiH, and one mission in Vyskov, Czech Republic as a visiting instructor. Since 2011 he has been responsible for management of doctrine- and terminology development.

**Kobi Michael, PhD**
kobim@inss.org.il
Kobi Michael is a senior research fellow at INSS. Dr. Michael served as the deputy director general and head of the Palestinian desk at the Ministry for Strategic Affairs. He was a member of the faculty at Ben Gurion University (2008-2011), a senior faculty member at Ariel University (2013-2015), and a visiting professor at Northwestern University in Illinois (2006-7). He has published widely in his field - including 14 books and monographs and over 50 articles and chapters in books – and has been awarded several academic prizes. His most recent book *The Arab World on the Road to State Failure* (in Hebrew, co-authored with Yoel Guzansky) was published in July 2016.

**György Nőgrádi, CSc**
gyorgy.nogradi@uni-corvinus.hu
György Nógrádi, CSc is a university professor at Corvinus University. He earned his MA in economics with a specialization on international relations in 1972. Holds his doctoral degree in economy (1974) and habilitated in military sciences in 1986 at Zrínyi Miklós Military University. He is conducting researches on international relations, macro economy, defence economy and security policy.
Lt. Gen. Zoltán Orosz, PhD
hvkfh@hm.gov.hu
Lt. Gen. Zoltán Orosz, PhD is the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Hungarian Defence Forces, holding his doctoral degree in Military Sciences from the National University of Public Service since 2012. As Deputy Chief of Staff, he is the Head of the Scientific Committee of the General Staff of HDF. His main research areas are Aeronautical and Aviation Science and Management.

Col. István Resperger, PhD
resperger.istván@uni-nke.hu
Col. István Resperger, PhD is a former amour commander, and an expert of the General Staff. He is also an alumnus of the German Military Command and Staff College, an experienced university lecturer, leader of military executive trainings, and researcher for security policy issues. He was a recipient of the Bolyai János Researchers Fellowship between 2008 and 2011, and his main fields of research are crisis management, terrorism, asymmetric warfare, Islam fundamentalism, and new generation war.

Prof. Carlos Ruiz Miguel, PhD
carlos.ruiz@use.es
Carlos Ruiz Miguel, Professor of Constitutional Law and Director of the Center for Studies of Western Sahara in the University of Santiago de Compostela (Spain). His main research areas are fundamental rights, European Law, and Law and Politics in North Africa.

Georg Schmidt
spl406@alumni.ku.dk
Georg Schmidt is a PhD candidate at the Alfred Nobel Open Business School. His focus lies on the management of health systems in times of armed conflict. He acts as a disaster manager for the International Committee of the Red Cross, holds a degree in biomedical engineering, and has over six years of work experience in the health sector. Furthermore, he holds a BA and MA in Disaster Management with a focus on international humanitarian work.

Fruzsina Simigh
simigh.fruzsina@pageobudapest.hu
Fruzsina Simigh is a junior China analyst at the Pallas Athéné Geopolitical Institute, has a BA degree in International Relations from Budapest Corvinus University, and studies Eastern Asia Studies at Pázmány Péter Catholic University.

Cpt. Zoltán Somodi
somodi.zoltanpall@gmail.com
Cpt. Zoltán Somodi is an operations officer in the 88th Rapid Reaction Battalion, where he has been serving since the start of his career in 2005 as an infantry officer. He holds a master’s degree from the University of St. Andrews in Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia Security Studies. He has been deployed twice to Kosovo as an infantry
platoon leader and company executive officer, and twice to Afghanistan as an operational advisor to the Afghan Security Forces.

**Bianka Speidl, PhD**  
speidl@migraciokutato.hu  
Bianka Speidl works as a senior researcher at the Migration Research Institute in Budapest. She earned her PhD at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies at the University of Exeter. Her field or research includes Political Islam, Shiite revivalism, and Muslim communities in Europe. Currently she is conducting research on the religious and psychological factors of integration.

**Lt. Col. Endre Szénási**  
endre.szenasi@mod.gov.hu  
Lieutenant Colonel Endre Szénási is a Senior Desk Officer at the Defence Policy Department of the Hungarian Ministry of Defence. He has been responsible for NATO and EU partnerships since 1997, focusing on the post-Soviet space since 2002.

**Prof. Gen. (Ret.) Zoltán Szenes, CSc**  
szenes.zoltan@uni-nke.hu  
Dr. Szenes is a graduate of the Russian Military Academy (MSc), the Budapest University of Economics (MSc, dr. univ) and the Royal College of Defence Studies (London). He has been affiliated with education and research in military sciences since 1982. He served in various commanding and staff positions in the Hungarian Defence Forces and NATO (Brussels, Naples) and was the Chief of Defence Staff of the HDF (2003-2005). After retirement he dedicated his knowledge and expertise to educating future generations of military officers and public servants in the defence sector. He was Head of the Military Sciences Committee of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (2008-2014). General Szenes is a member of various international military, professional associations and societies in the field of security and defence and is a visiting professor at the Baltic Defense College.

**Cpt. Gergely Tóth, dr. jur.**  
dr.gergely.toth@mil.hu  
Cpt. Gergely Tóth works for the Hungarian Ministry of Defence, with a Legal background. He has a doctor of law degree from the Eötvös Loránd University of Sciences in Budapest. He worked as a Legal Advisor for the International Committee of the Red Cross. He worked as a brigade legal advisor, and is the author of numerous publications regarding the law of war. He currently serves at the Department for Coordination of Public Relations of the Hungarian Ministry of Defence.

**Lt. Col. László Ujházy, PhD**  
ujhazy.laszlo@uni-nke.hu  
Lieutenant Colonel László Ujházy is an Associate Professor and the Head of the Department of Military Leadership and General Subjects at the Institute of Military Leadership Training of the National University of Public Service, Faculty of Military Sciences and Officer Training. He started his military career as a conscript in 1983. Two
years after completion of his university studies he was recalled to active duty and trained as a reserve officer. He served in a number of (compulsory) reserve officer positions before becoming the first volunteer reserve in Hungary in November 2002. Between 2001–2005 and 2010–2013 he was the vice-president of the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (CIOR). He has published several articles on military and security issues. Lieutenant Colonel Ujházy has an M. A. in History and English and a Ph. D. in Security Studies.

1st Lt. Mariann Vecsey
vecsey.mariann@mil.hu
1st Lt. Mariann Vecsey is in position in the 25th Klapka György Infantry Brigade. She has a postgraduate master’s degree in the field of Security and Defence Policy from the National University of Public Service in Budapest. 1st Lt. Mariann Vecsey is currently an Analyst of the J2 section of the Joint Forces Command. She has started Phd course recently.

Col (Ret.) Philip Wilkinson
prwilkinson48@gmail.com
Philip Wilkinson is a retired British Army colonel with 32 years of military service, 12 years of counterinsurgency experience, and doctrine writing experience. He has also served as an academic and policy advisor to the government of Rwanda and in the occupied Palestinian territories, Kabul, and Baghdad. He is currently a research associate at Chatham House and a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences.
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**Abbreviations and acronyms**

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