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Geographic Trajectories of Al-Qaida and Taliban Terrorist Groups in Pakistan

By Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi

Introduction

Though Western analysts tend to mention al-Qaida and Taliban in Pakistan in the same context, the dynamics of their relationship are far more complex than a cursory examination would reveal. The context of this relationship is best understood within the overarching paradigm of militant activities of post 9/11 Taliban and al-Qaida remnants in Pakistan's tribal areas, where these groups flourish. The military struggle in Afghanistan has significantly influenced the formation of a loosely structured al-Qaida/Taliban "nexus" that was forged in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), particularly Waziristan. In order to survive the ongoing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military operations to flush them out, these groups rapidly devised a symbiotic strategy that characterizes al-Qaida's ability to subsume itself within the ranks of different militant organizations in Pakistan.

The Taliban

After U.S. forces toppled the Taliban regime in Kabul in the aftermath of September 11, the Taliban retrenched a sizable contingent of forces along the Durand Line (the frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan). The Durand Line abuts swathes of rugged mountainous territory, which is a surveillance nightmare. These areas are replete with mountain passes and treacherous routes linking Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are in most cases known only to the locals. It is not a coincidence that the Taliban resurgence in Pakistan has taken place in areas that adjoin the Taliban's traditional strongholds in Afghanistan; the remote southern plains of Helmand Province is one such area, where the Taliban possess the capability to disrupt transport and logistical supply on the highway connecting Kandahar with Herat.¹ This area is contiguous to the Pakistani territory of the Noshki-Chaghai region in Baluchistan Province, where the Taliban have found refuge among dispersed, but sympathetic, local tribes.

Similarly, even though they have largely been prevented from taking over the city of Kandahar, the Taliban maintain a formidable presence in the neighboring Afghan countryside, which is not far from the Pakistani city of Quetta. Quetta and its suburbs, like Pashtunabad, have consequently become centers of Taliban consolidation, with some sources maintaining that Mullah Omar has been hiding in Quetta, Kandahar, or Helmand.² Similarly, Taliban are reported to use the Toba Kakar mountain pass route north of Kandahar to penetrate into Pakistan's tribal areas whenever the Waziristan route is inaccessible because of increased vigilance by the Pakistani military.³

South Waziristan is adjacent to the Paktika Province in Afghanistan, where U.S.-led forces have a large base in the Barmal region, as well as several outlying check posts scattered around the landscape. Similarly, North Waziristan abuts the Afghan provinces of Paktika and Khost. Reportedly, there are 243 illegal passages in North Waziristan by which it is possible to enter Afghanistan, while there are only five check posts on the border in this area.⁴ Whenever the Pakistani army initiates operations in these areas, terrorists move from one side of the Pakistani border to the other, seamlessly and with impunity.⁵

From Afghanistan to Pakistan

After the United States and its allies launched operations in Afghanistan to flush out the Taliban and al-Qaida fighters, many of these militants used their knowledge of the terrain to escape from the American dragnet. The American operations 'Anaconda' and 'Snipe' for example, which were intended to flush out the Taliban in Khost and Shahi Kot in Paktika Province, only managed to push al-Qaida fighters further inside the FATA areas of Pakistan.⁶ Having regrouped from their newly enshrined refuge in the FATA, these cadres soon initiated militant activities against the Americans and the Karzai government. The initial strategy utilized was the kidnapping of American and Afghan government officials, who were used as bargaining tools.

On September 5, 2002, a tribe in the Bannu district of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) forced the Pakistan army to release six prisoners arrested for their alleged links with al-Qaida.⁷ Sometime later, in July 2003, a Waziri sub-tribe in North Waziristan helped al-Qaida terrorists kidnap five U.S. troops, forcing the Pakistan army to launch its first major military operation against the tribes.⁸ The operation masqueraded under the guise of 'routine military exercises.' American kidnappings had by then become a favorite tactic with Waziri tribesmen, reports of which

started cropping up sporadically in the media.⁹ This crisis necessitated a response by Pakistani Government forces in the shape of 'Operation Mountain Lion' in October 2003, which claimed the lives of thirteen al-Qaida militants, tribesmen, and Pakistani Frontier Corps (FC) personnel.¹⁰ Escalating U.S. insistence for decisive action forced the Pakistani Government to pressure the local tribes into releasing the hostages, which prompted a standoff.

The Shawal Region of Waziristan

The mountainous Shawal region of Waziristan, adjacent to the even more inaccessible Afghan Shawal range, came into prominence after the infamous Tora Bora bombing campaign, where ibn Ladin and Zawahiri were believed to have been in hiding.¹¹ The area is extremely remote; the Pakistani Government had nominal influence here even before the arrival of the Taliban. For example, much of the populace was involved in nefarious activities like kidnapping for ransom, heroin trafficking, and carjacking, with minimal or no law enforcement action taken by the state in response.¹² The tribal leaders in these areas were extremely reluctant to hand over the foreign fighters and terrorist facilitators to Pakistan's Government forces. Consequently, joint U.S.-Pakistani military operations became commonplace in these areas, though the United States refuted any claims of being directly involved in anti-militant activities on Pakistani soil.¹³

Official Pakistani estimates of al-Qaida fighters present in Waziristan in late 2003 ranged from 100 to 600 fighters.¹⁴ The local tribesmen, however, were estimating much higher figures: around 1,500 al-Qaida guerrillas; mostly Chechens, Uzbeks, and Arabs, were thought to be present in and around South Waziristan.

Military engagement in the tribal areas intensified in October 2003, when the Zalikhel and Karrikhel tribes blatantly refused to surrender their al-Qaida and Taliban "guests" to government troops. In the ensuing standoff, twenty-two al-Qaida members and seven tribesmen were reportedly killed. When it became evident that Pakistani forces meant business and weren't taking no for an answer, the tribal leaders handed over about a dozen al-Qaida warriors to the army on the condition of a ceasefire.¹⁵ Early on during this operation, the militants escaped to nearby mountainous regions with the help of local woodcutters and shepherds, who are intimately acquainted with the region. These so-called guides were paid,

by local standards, handsomely for their services; 5,000 to 10,000 Pakistani rupees (\$60–120 U.S. dollars) each for a safe passage to the mountains.¹⁶

Fault lines in the NWFP

The high mountain ranges of the NWFP, many of which are covered in ice most of the year, have provided safe haven for militants.¹⁷ These areas abut China and Afghanistan, with a narrow strip of Afghan land, the Wakhan Corridor, separating them from Tajikistan.

On October 5, 2003, Pakistan's security forces destroyed a training camp run by *Harkat ul-mujahideen* (HUM) in Diamir, in the Northern Areas of Pakistan.¹⁸ The camp was ostensibly a terrorist facility involved in training Taliban, al-Qaida, and HUM militants in domestic terrorism, and in the blockading of the Karakoram Highway.¹⁹ Besides the HUM camp, other camps sprang up in Ghowadi village in Skardu, Juglote near Gilgit and Konoda Gilgit. A huge training facility was also established near Mansehra in the NWFP on the Karakoram Highway.

According to the jihadi periodical *Zerb-e-Momen*,²⁰ Americans suspected ibn Ladin's presence in these areas at about this time; the subsequent FBI search operations, however, yielded no positive results. Hazarding an empirical observation, it seems that American intelligence was correlating increased militant traffic in the area with the presence of the supreme leader of al-Qaida; it seems unlikely, however, that he would be directing militant movements at the grassroots level in person at all theatres. His presence has been postulated at different times in places such as Quetta, Peshawar, Chitral, and other areas in Pakistan but has not been substantiated. It seems that whenever intelligence reported increased militant activity in these areas, rumors about ibn Ladin's presence started spreading simultaneously, which may have been conjecture on the part of authorities.

The presence of jihadist organizations like *Lashkar-e-Tayyiba* (LeT), *Tehreek-e-Khudam-e-Islam* (TKEI or Jaish-e-Muhammad), and *Jamiat-ul-Ansar* in these areas is quite well documented. Ostensibly, accessibility to Central Asia is one of the desirable characteristics of this region for these pro-Taliban and al-Qaida organizations. This development has alarmed the Chinese government, which sent a list of terrorist organizations of concern to the Government of Pakistan.²¹ Chinese agencies asserted that more than 1,000 Uyghurs were trained by ibn Ladin's forces in Afghanistan, for fomenting separatist movements in China's Muslim

areas.²² Many of these Uyghurs became active members of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a group Beijing asserts is linked to Usama bin Ladin and Pakistan-based HUM. China has repeatedly warned the Pakistani Government of the potential for these militants to enter its Xingjiang Province to conduct terrorist activities.²³ Pakistan's NWFP could provide the ideal linkage to these areas and beyond. It may be pertinent to mention here that the 'liberation' of the Muslim majority province of Xingjiang is part of the manifesto of many Pakistani jihadist organizations such as *Harkat ul-Jihad-e-Islami*, *Jamat ul-Ansar*, and *Lashkar-e-Tayyiba*.²⁴

Evolution of al-Qaida in Pakistan

U.S. intelligence sources estimated in mid-2008 that "Pakistani military operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas have had limited effect on al-Qa'ida," ever since Pakistani authorities started operations against the organization in response to escalating U.S. pressures in the post 9/11 period.²⁵ The Pakistani military seemingly underestimated the staunch tribal affiliations and the popularity of the *mujahids* amongst the locals. Consequently, military action did not produce the desired result. After sustaining heavy losses, the government in Islamabad concluded the Shakai agreement in mid-2004 with one of the leading militant commanders in Pakistan, Nek Muhammad Wazir, a local pro-Taliban leader. It seems likely that foreign militants were still present in the area when this agreement was concluded.²⁶

Nek Muhammad Wazir was no stranger to anti-government militancy, and had set up two radical organizations; *Jaishul al-Qiba al-Jihadi al-Siri al-Alami*, which was openly supportive of al-Qaida, and *Jundullah*, which was at one time allegedly headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the al-Qaida operational commander of the 9/11 attacks.²⁷ Nek Muhammad provided the Taliban and al-Qaida the requisite logistical support and manpower needed to reorganize in the tribal areas, and helped to establish training camps in Wana and other areas of South Waziristan.²⁸

Baitullah Mehsud also showed up around this time along with several prominent Taliban leaders, such as Maulana Dadullah; Dadullah reportedly met with Nek Muhammad to express dissatisfaction with Nek Muhammad's agreement with the Government of Pakistan. Reportedly, the Taliban high command or *Shura* decided to replace Nek Muhammad with Baitullah Mehsud as the operational commander in Waziristan; Nek Muhammad, however, convinced them of his undying loyalty, and was allowed to retain his command position.²⁹ Baitullah's name had cropped

up as a natural choice because he was the leading commander among the Mehsud tribe. Interestingly, his positional authority was based on political expediency, rather than on any military credentials. Arguably, the scorched earth tactics used by the Pakistani army enraged militant tribals like the Mehsuds, who started joining the Taliban and al-Qaida movements en masse as a retaliatory measure. The terrain in the Mehsud-dominated areas is treacherous, with steep defiles and rugged mountains. Ostensibly, this hostile terrain, along with the common bond of Mehsud hostility towards the armed forces, motivated the locals to provide sanctuary to a large number of al-Qaida and Taliban fighters.³⁰

After the Sararogha accord with Mehsud, it seemed that the shift in state policies regarding the foreign presence in Waziristan was complete; instead of expelling them, the Pakistani state had to settle for tacit agreements from locals that these foreigners would not create trouble for Pakistan. This would prove to be a mistake; a comprehensive counteroffensive initiative was lost in return for short-term peace, which would ultimately prove detrimental to Pakistan.

The Shakai accord created ripples of discontent on both sides of the Durand Line. To prevent al-Qaida and Taliban militants from re-entering Afghanistan from the Pakistani side of the Durand Line, the Americans deployed hundreds of troops in the Birmal, Argoon, and Khost areas of Paktika province at the time the accord was signed.³¹ In short order, Nek Muhammad was targeted by a missile attack and killed; he was soon replaced by Baitullah Mehsud.

Militant Organizations

The Taliban and al-Qaida were not the only organizations which were forced to retreat to Pakistan in the wake of the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan; many Pakistani jihadist groups like *Harkat-e-jihad-e-Islami* (HUJI), along with *Harkat-ul-Mujahideen* and *Sipah-e-Sahaba* militants also found their way back home. Many HUJI commanders and warriors, engaged in the fighting in Kandahar and Qandooz, escaped into Waziristan and Buner in NWFP. HUJI was one of the main Pakistani organizations supporting Arab militants in Afghanistan, with its leader Qari Saifullah Akhtar being held in great esteem by Mullah Omar. HUJI's importance in the eyes of the Taliban was such that Mullah Omar appointed in the Taliban government three Taliban ministers and twenty-two judges who belonged to Qari's HUJI. These linkages would eventually 'al-Qaidaise' HUJI in Pakistan.³² Moreover, HUJI would later cleverly blend in with the more mainstream political scenario in Pakistan by hav-

ing many of its militants drafted into Maulana Sami ul-Haq's *Jamiat ulema Islam Sami ul Haq* (JUI-S) party.³³ This effectively camouflaged HUJI militants from scrutiny later on, in the wake of the Pakistani Government's crackdown against militant groups from January to December 2002; at least 2000 militants were arrested during this operation, very few of whom belonged to HUJI.³⁴ Rana asserts that HUJI was responsible for providing the recruiting and networking facilities for al-Qaida, with cadres being drawn from *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi* (LJ), *Jaish-e-Muhammad* (JM), *Jamiat-al-Ansar*, and *Sipah-e-Sahaba* for al-Qaida's operational divisions.³⁵ To support his argument, Rana mentions that when Qari Saifullah Akhtar was arrested and extradited from Dubai on August 7, 2004, he disclosed these details while being interrogated by intelligence agencies. He also reportedly disclosed that scores of HUJI militants were working with al-Qaida, with several of them actively engaged in fighting against the Pakistani troops in Waziristan.³⁶

Sipah-e-Sahaba

Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) merits a somewhat detailed discussion here, since it is one of the main Pakistani militant organizations supporting the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan. The organization was founded in 1985 with the primary aim of elimination of Shias and Shiism from the society. A causal loop of retribution and vendetta between the Shia militants and SSP ensued, which claimed the lives of Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the founder of SSP, and Sadiq Ganji, the Counsel General of Iran in 1990. SSP was also active on the political scene, claiming political lineage by independently standing for elections in 1992. Moreover, SSP fought with the Taliban against Ahmed Shah Masood and the Shiite Hazaras in Afghanistan, and is thought to be jointly responsible with the Taliban for the massacre of Hazaras and Iranian diplomats in Afghanistan in August 1998.³⁷ After being banned by the Pakistani Government in 2002 because of American pressure, SSP simply changed its name to *Millat-e-Islamia*.³⁸ Its activities went underground but nevertheless continued. This practice of adopting *noms de guerre* in response to bans while continuing activities would characterize many Pakistani jihadist organizations in the post 2002 period. The importance of SSP diminished somewhat after the 2003 assassination of Azam Tariq, its paramount leader, and because of the formation of the more radical breakaway splinter group, *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi* (LJ), from within the ranks of SSP.

It is important to contextualize here the continuous evolution of terrorist groups; they are usually in a constant state of flux in terms of capabilities, sophistication, and ideology. Newly emerging groups usually remain

under the tutelage of more established organizations until they develop the required levels of proficiency. Thus, SSP at one time consisted of two loosely allied subgroups, namely *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi*, which acted as a kind of domestic "Shia elimination unit," and *Jaish-e-Muhammad (JM)*, the "externalist" face of SSP.³⁹ Both these groups remained under SSP until they had developed their capabilities, after which they broke away from SSP and emerged as more potent terrorist entities. At least six other splinter groups were formed from SSP, namely *Jhangvi Tigers*, *al-Haq Tigers*, *Tanzeemul Haq*, *Al Farooq*, *al-Badr Foundation*, and *Allah-o-Akbar*,⁴⁰ though JM and LJ are the only powerful organizations to emerge from the SSP schisms. A change in leadership also tended to take these organizations on different trajectories; for example, Masood Azhar and Riaz Basra, the new leaders of JM and LJ respectively, were more radical in their views, and consequently formed more violence-prone factions. Moreover, an organization may become smaller and 'leaner and meaner' after splintering from its parent body, as happened in the case of LJ and JM, or larger groups can be formed by smaller factions, which is what has happened in the case of the Taliban in Pakistan.

The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi model

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi epitomizes a decentralized jihadi organization based on a modern, devolved al-Qaida model. Founded by Riaz Basra, it is "very decentralized and compartmentalized,"⁴¹ and represents the ideal form within which al-Qaida militants can operate freely. Moreover, it is probably based on an organizational model that al-Qaida itself has presumably adopted in Pakistan. The LJ militants took sanctuary in Pakistan after the fall of the Taliban, rather than run the risk of falling into the hands of the Northern Alliance leaders in Afghanistan. LJ was taken over by the 'internationalists' and became irrevocably intertwined with the radical ideologies of the Taliban and al-Qaida. The ideal organizational structure for this kind of decentralized group is the 'cell based' structure. The greatest advantage of this model is security; any given cell, if compromised, ideally does not have information about other cells, and therefore cannot disclose their identity. Moreover, it is impervious to penetration at higher organizational levels, even if compromised at the cellular one. A cell is composed for a particular operation, and is disbanded after the objectives of the unit have been realized. Intelligence estimates put the number of a typical LeT cell at three militants, though it can consist of up to seven persons according to the tactical requirements of the operation.⁴²

Harkat-ul-Mujahideen

The *Harkat-ul-Mujahideen* (HUM) was initially formed as a splinter group of HUJI under the leadership of Fazlur Rehman Khalil. A detailed review of the development of these organizations is outside the purview of this study and many laudably detailed studies, particularly by Amir Rana, cover this area. Our concern here is to demonstrate its link to al-Qaida and the Taliban. In the wake of the American defeat of the Taliban, Khalil took hundreds of HUM militants to Afghanistan, many of whom were killed when the U.S. bombed suspected al-Qaida camps near Khost and Jalalabad in August, 1998.⁴³ Khalil returned to Pakistan in 2002, apparently to resume the struggle from within Pakistan.⁴⁴ He subsequently resigned from the leadership of the organization, but his jihadist credentials entered the international spotlight again when the FBI arrested two American-born Pakistani jihadists in California in 2005.⁴⁵ These men revealed that they had received militant training under HUM tutelage in the centre of the densely populated Pakistani city of Rawalpindi. Reportedly, this covert training facility was being run by Khalil, which suggests that he still retains 'international' jihadist linkages. Thus, even though HUM is said to have been marginalized by newer organizations, its potential for helping Taliban and al-Qaida cannot be ignored.

Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi

Another important organization whose role needs to be examined here is the banned *Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi* (TNSM). The firebrand cleric Maulana Sufi Muhammad formed TNSM in 1989, ostensibly for promoting peace and harmony. However, the movement soon revealed its radical colors when it initiated an armed uprising in the wake of the Pakistan Supreme Court's February 12, 1994, verdict, which nullified the Provincially Administered Tribal Area (PATA) regulations. These regulations had governed certain areas (including Swat and Malakand) since the 1970s, and the governance vacuum created by the cancellation of these regulations apparently encouraged TNSM activists to agitate for the establishment of a Sharia form of government in the Malakand areas adjoining Swat. The state was able to suppress the unrest by a combination of counterinsurgency operations and negotiations, though the Sharia system was introduced in the Malakand area twice in response to TNSM pressure. The flourishing of TNSM was amply demonstrated when Sufi Muhammad crossed over into Afghanistan, reportedly with 10,000 fighters to aid the beleaguered Taliban. His force was routed and disbanded, however, and Sufi was arrested on his way back to Pakistan. Nevertheless, the TNSM movement had already deeply penetrated the tribal systems of

Swat, Hazara, and the Bajaur agency. These cadres would later form the backbone of the Taliban in Swat and Bajaur, where the Taliban effectively hijacked the TNSM movement. Two of the most prominent leaders of the Pakistani Taliban, Maulana Fazlullah in Swat and Faqir Muhammad in Bajaur, were at one time TNSM adherents. Moreover, many of their fighters, particularly in Bajaur, are from the ranks of the TNSM.

Al-Qaida in Pakistan: A Decentralized Organizational Model

The initial euphoria in the wake of the post 9/11 American operations against al-Qaida, in which the organization was presumed to have been seriously weakened, has been gradually wearing off. Al-Qaida seems to be resisting heightened international operations against it by insinuating itself into other militant entities. The radical jihadist organizations in Pakistan have become one of the main hubs of al-Qaida re-entrenchment.⁴⁶ It also seems that the senior al-Qaida command and control structure has not been significantly disrupted, and that recruitment continues unabated.⁴⁷ In the ongoing imbroglio of events, it has become increasingly unclear who exactly is in charge of al-Qaida in Pakistan, and this complicates the counterinsurgency efforts to eliminate the leadership of the organization.

Even though the attacks in Pakistan against al-Qaida have been effective, killing as many as eighty al-Qaida fighters in 2008 alone,⁴⁸ the organization is still presumed to retain a significant strike capability because of better human and financial resource management, as well as its entrenchment in FATA.^{49, 50} Many reports have questioned the counterinsurgency efforts against al-Qaida, pointing out that despite a seemingly all out offensive the organization essentially retains its potency.⁵¹ Michel Hayden, former Director of the CIA, has mentioned on record that al-Qaida's physical safe haven in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area provides it with the physical and psychological space to meet, train, expand its networks, and prepare new attacks.⁵² Evidence suggests that Pakistan's Pashtun-dominated tribal areas are the command and control centre for al-Qaida's core leadership, which was reportedly actively engaged in planning attacks in the western hemisphere.⁵³ This is evidenced by the fact that both the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks were later linked to training facilities in Pakistan that were heavily influenced by al-Qaida ideology.

Al-Qaida remains so elusive partly because of its propensity to rapidly alter its command and control structures in response to changing circumstances. The difficulty in substantiating linkages is that the organization

has become decentralized in Pakistan; as mentioned above, it has been surmised that nobody is controlling al-Qaida, but that it has integrated itself into jihadist movements around the globe.⁵⁴ There have been media reports that Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri has assumed command of al-Qaida, fueled by statements that ibn Ladin has not chaired meetings of al-Qaida's Shura Council since 2007. Purportedly, Zawahiri has been busy rebuilding the organization's logistical and human resource capabilities in Pakistan.⁵⁵ There have also been reports that the Shura Council meets in Pakistan.⁵⁶ Al-Qaida in Pakistan likely exists in a networked structure composed of small 'cells' found in jihadist organizations such as LJ, as well as in 'clusters' of these cells within the larger Taliban umbrella organization.

This is not a new development; terrorist organizations seem to be increasingly adopting a networked structure in response to counterinsurgency pressures, which allows them the freedom from a hierarchical command and control structure. Another advantage is that in this loose network, command and control can be decentralized, and may not even require intimate geographical proximity. It appears that al-Qaida has adopted this sort of network in Pakistan while effectively merging into a network of allied militant bodies.

Moreover, Pakistani intelligence agencies deduce that al-Qaida, in response to increasing pressures, is now conducting "decentralized operations under small but well organized regional groups" within Pakistan and Afghanistan.⁵⁷ Some analysts maintain that even though the organization is under stress, and currently not in a position to carry out a major attack in the United States, it is nevertheless adapting to this hostile environment by shifting to mobile training teams instead of designated training sites. Pakistani intelligence officials maintain that such decentralized training is effective, being conducted by small groups of bomb-making and/or tactical experts in private safe houses.⁵⁸

Fluidity of Structure

Intelligence also suggests that al-Qaida is now replenishing its depleted ranks (killed or arrested) with less experienced, but much more fanatical warriors. These fighters are being recruited in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, concomitant with an increase in funding and logistical support for the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The new al-Qaida militants enter Pakistan's Baluchistan province via Iran, and then report to Waziristan for training. This foreign presence is amply demonstrated in Swat, where Fazlullah, the leader of the Taliban in Swat,

is reportedly supported by about a half dozen seasoned Arab fighters from al-Qaida.⁵⁹

Seasoned al-Qaida commanders continue to be found in FATA, such as Usama al-Kini, a Kenyan, who was alleged to be the mastermind of the terrorist attack on the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad in 2008, and was killed in January 2009 near Wana.⁶⁰ Militants arrested in Pakistan are found to originate predominantly from Saudi Arabia, Algeria, UAE, Morocco, Libya, Kuwait, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, and West Asia, while there have also been a few arrests of nationals from the United States, Australia, and the UK.

As mentioned above, al-Qaida has started functioning as a loose network of groups spread throughout the world. Affiliated 'nodes' include the *Egyptian Islamic Jihad* (EIJ), *Al Jamaya-al Islamia* (IJ: Islamic Group of Egypt), *Armed Islamic Group of Algeria* (GIA), *Islamic Party of Turkestan* (IPT), *Jaish-e-Muhammad* (JM: Army of Mohammad), and the *Abu Sayyaf Group of The Philippines* (ASG).⁶¹ The constituent groups of the network maintain a distinct command, control, and communication structure,⁶² but have the inherent flexibility to incorporate the al-Qaida operational philosophy. Thus, while acting as the second-in-command of al-Qaida, Dr. Zawahiri also leads the EIJ in Egypt.⁶³

Not everyone agrees about the existence of a Taliban/al-Qaida nexus, asserting that al-Qaida and the Taliban are fighting their own separate wars which may overlap but have distinct objectives. "There are two battles going on here," says Ikram Sehgal, a defense strategist. One, he says, involves the American search for al-Qaida operatives hiding in the tribal areas. The other is the Pakistan military's fight against the Taliban movement of Pakistan that has taken root in the northwestern regions of the country.... Though the two have 'linkages,' they are "two separate wars."⁶⁴

On the other hand, it is reasonable to propose a Taliban/al-Qaida nexus in Pakistan; the hostilities between the state and tribesmen began with the demands of the former to the latter to hand over foreign militants. It should be remembered that a formally constituted Taliban umbrella body had not been formed at that time, even though the tribesmen may have been decidedly pro-Taliban. Moreover, many of the disparate groups that would ally themselves under the banner of the Taliban had not yet forged their symbiotic relationships, even though they may have been cooperating in their efforts. Thus, the beginning of the jihad is marked by al-Qaida entrenchment in the tribal areas, and it seems unlikely that the organization would not have participated in the ensuing alliances and consolidation. It also seems unlikely that al-Qaida would have neglected

to reconnect with its former jihadist allies, such as *Sipah-e-Sahaba* and *Harkat-ul-Jihad-ul-Alami*, in order to 'blend in' with the militant landscape.

Conclusion

The Taliban remnants from the Tora Bora and other allied campaigns took refuge in FATA areas of Pakistan which are geographically contiguous to Afghanistan, and provided easy access because of the Pashtun Taliban's familiarity and cultural affiliations with the region. In these areas, particularly Waziristan, the locals were receptive to the influence of these militants. During the Soviet jihad, the state had led these locals to believe that militants in Afghanistan were 'heroes' and 'mujahids,' and the identification of these same men as villains was not well received. The humiliating peace deals concluded by the state with militants such as Nek Muhammad further emboldened these Taliban and al-Qaida remnants, who resumed their activities in the form of kidnappings, which in turn led to military operations by the state. However, the peace accords concluded between the militants and the state gave the former the chance to reorganize, since the army was loath to enter the imbroglio of these areas, after withdrawing consequent to a peace deal. Militancy was further heightened by the support of many militant organizations in Pakistan, which had been in intimate contact with Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan's training camps and battle grounds, and were openly contemptuous of the state's volte face regarding jihad in the post 9/11 scenario.

The cadres of organizations like TNSM and SSP provided the substrate from which the Taliban would recruit; TNSM provided the leadership and cadres in the NWFP, effectively becoming the new face of the Taliban. SSP splintered into more radical groups, which either swelled the ranks of the Taliban, or provided sanctuaries for al-Qaida, or both. As the movement grew in magnitude, many other organizations of various sizes but with similar hardline ideologies joined the ranks of these Taliban; at the same time, independent recruitment also continued. Thus, these organizations continued to grow in their own capacities, particularly in the NWFP, until their trajectories met in the shape of a unified Taliban movement in December 2007. These problems forced the Pakistani state to engage in negotiations with the militants and, consequently, interrupted trend lines of successes of military campaigns. The result led to uneasy peace accords that would break down under duress of the militant propensity to violate the same by continued kidnappings of state officials or enforcement of

their brand of Sharia. This is the chain of events that has catapulted Pakistan to the top of the ladder as the state most endangered by terrorism today.

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Global Risk of Nuclear Terrorism

By Emily Diez, Terrance Clark, and Caroline Zaw-Mon

Introduction

The emergence of nuclear terrorism, a threat that President Obama called "the gravest danger we face," has signaled a paradigm shift in international security.¹ Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, sensitive nuclear technologies and materials have become increasingly available. Globalization and the inadequate enforcement of treaties and export controls have allowed the proliferation of nuclear weapons materials.² Today, international terrorist organizations seek to employ weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a means to influence national policies around the world. Al-Qaida spokesman Suleiman Abu Gheith declared that in order to balance the injustices that have been inflicted on the Muslim population worldwide, al-Qaida's new objective is "to kill 4 million Americans—2 million of them children."³ As political scientist Graham Allison notes, this could be achieved with either 1,334 attacks similar in magnitude to those of 9/11, or one nuclear bomb.⁴

Building a nuclear program is an arduous task that requires tacit knowledge, the recruitment of nuclear scientists, engineers, and machinists, and the resources and time to obtain nuclear materials and components.⁵ While it is unlikely that terrorist organizations have the capacity to develop full-fledged programs in the near term, terrorist development and acquisition of nuclear weapons remains a long-term threat that requires international action.⁶

State-Based Nuclear Programs: The Supply Chain

Unstable countries with successful or burgeoning nuclear weapons programs that support or refuse to control terrorism have engendered an ominous security threat to the world community. Pakistan and North Korea's refusal to participate in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has not only disrupted regional security in East and Central Asia, but has also contributed to second-tier proliferation, or the illicit nuclear trade between developing nations with limited indigenous nuclear resources and technologies.⁷ Nuclear proliferation experts believe that second-tier networks are pervasive, interconnected, highly effective, and

possibly linked to terrorist organizations.⁸ These networks have profited from unsecured Russian stockpiles and contributed to the development of illicit weapons programs in non-nuclear states.⁹

Ultimately, terrorist organizations lack the capacity to develop nuclear arms independently and must seek assistance from states, private industries, and individuals. In order to minimize nuclear proliferation to terrorist groups, states should continue to strengthen export controls worldwide, improve incentives for governments to enter into and fulfill their obligations under the non-proliferation regime, and more carefully monitor noncompliant states and individuals. This report considers the roles that Russia, Pakistan, and North Korea play in nuclear proliferation and identifies measures that should be taken to reduce the spread of nuclear weapons and prevent nuclear terrorism.

Case Study: Russia

The collapse of a major nuclear state followed by instability and infighting in the early 1990s resulted in a significant nuclear proliferation problem. Russian leaders faced the challenge not only of securing nuclear material but also of creating a new system of export controls in a newly minted capitalist society. Although Russia has made significant strides in nuclear non-proliferation with its heavy involvement in international agreements and in establishing strong export controls, these measures have proven to be inadequate.

At the end of the Cold War, Moscow controlled only eighty percent of its strategic nuclear weaponry, with remaining materials and supplies located in the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.¹⁰ Today, the Russian Ministry of Defense maintains and consolidates these warheads located in a small number of storage sites and facilities. Russia owns the world's largest stockpile of weapons-usable fissile materials, including at least 950 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and approximately 145 tons of weapons-grade plutonium (plus or minus 30 percent).¹¹ Of this amount, Moscow has 350 tons of HEU and 55 tons loaded on nuclear warheads.¹² Although the government has decreased its number of nuclear warheads since the mid-1980s, Russia's nuclear supply still remains a major security problem.¹³

Moscow revised export legislation in 1999 and established the Export Control Commission of the Russian Federation to coordinate export control lists for weapons materials and dual-use technologies. The Russian Government recently enacted a number of controls aimed specifically at

limiting nuclear proliferation. The passage of these measures demonstrates progress, but Russia continues to support missile programs and civilian nuclear projects in high-risk nations for nuclear proliferation and terrorist activities.¹⁴ Without effective nuclear material safeguards in the Former Soviet Union (FSU), second-tier proliferation will increase.

Although Russia has a strong strategic interest in supporting nuclear non-proliferation, Moscow has not prioritized or provided sufficient resources for effective export controls to stop the unauthorized export of nuclear and sensitive dual-use technology and equipment. Not only does Russia lack political will, but corruption and a scarcity of resources have also hindered non-proliferation efforts.¹⁵ Furthermore, as Russia has attempted to expand its economy, the country has developed a business culture that is averse to regulations, and firms have been slow to implement effective compliance systems.¹⁶ Accountability and control are Russia's greatest challenges, and safeguarding a large quantity of nuclear materials remains a daunting task since Moscow lacks a comprehensive strategy for accountability and security.

Case Study: Pakistan

As a nation racked with security problems, characterized by corruption and instability, and firm in its defiance of the NPT, Pakistan is a particularly high-risk nation for nuclear proliferation. Pakistan is also a front line for the War on Terror with a high prevalence of terrorist organizations operating within its borders. Terrorism experts have long suspected that individuals within the government and the military associate with al-Qaida. Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan's 2004 confession of his involvement in black market nuclear trade unearthed serious problems at high levels of government.

Pakistan is estimated to have 55–90 nuclear weapons and increasing stockpiles of HEU and plutonium.¹⁷ Many of its nuclear weapons are stored disassembled, which increases the risk of theft, smuggling, and illegal export.¹⁸ Although Pakistan is not considered to be a major export nation of WMD-related goods, the country's history of evading international non-proliferation agreements, lax nuclear export controls, and the A.Q. Khan scandal demonstrate Islamabad's high risk.¹⁹ During the last several decades of nuclear development, Pakistan acquired vital information and materials including uranium enrichment from Europe and missile technology and weapons blueprints from China.²⁰ Those involved in the nuclear program used front companies and intermediaries, falsified documents, and purchased critical components for nuclear technolo-

gies.²¹ These capabilities combined with weak export controls and other vulnerabilities make Pakistan one of the most difficult cases for nuclear proliferation. Pakistan is party to such international agreements as the Nuclear Safety Convention and the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Islamabad's export controls are decidedly weak despite the nation's attempts to reorganize and restructure both its nuclear programs and export controls.²² Pakistan participates in other WMD conventions but continues to defy the international community by refusing to participate in the NPT.²³

Pakistan's proliferation history, nuclear capabilities and stockpiles, inability to maintain control over its territory, and the prevalence of terrorist activity within its borders are causes for concern. The U.S. and the international community should work closely with Pakistan to improve security within Southeast Asia and pave the way to Islamabad's acceptance into the "nuclear club." This would increase regulations on Pakistani nuclear and dual-use materials, possibly decrease the availability of sensitive material and technologies on the black market, and potentially reduce illicit activities and terrorist access to nuclear weapons.

Case Study: North Korea

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, commonly known as North Korea) remains one of the most challenging nuclear proliferation cases. Although the United States and other developed countries have banned trade with North Korea, Pyongyang continues to export missiles and other potentially dangerous technologies. North Korea withdrew from the NPT and is currently party to few (if any) international and regional non-proliferation efforts.

Nuclear weapons experts believe that North Korea has developed one or two nuclear weapons, and that Pyongyang has the capability to produce 6–8 more by reprocessing spent fuel stockpiles.²⁴ Pyongyang claims to have acquired significant plutonium stockpiles, but there is debate about the amount and the potential threat posed by this supply.²⁵ The DPRK has also been a major exporter of ballistic missiles since the 1980s. The regime has prioritized this program because it has brought considerable revenue to the isolated country.²⁶ There is great uncertainty surrounding the North Korean nuclear program, but the instability of the nation and Pyongyang's nuclear developments and missile tests are troubling.

North Korea will likely continue to develop and produce ballistic missiles with superior range and sophistication in order to maintain trade and improve economic stability.²⁷ The problem of spent fuel is also worrying for the international community. Excess spent fuel could be sold on the black market to second-tier countries or even directly to terrorist organizations.²⁸ To date, there is no evidence that North Korea has sold or transferred plutonium to other countries, but the possibility remains a concern.²⁹ Six Party Talks have failed to provide adequate assurance that Pyongyang will not engage in such illicit activities.

Recommendations

To mitigate the nuclear proliferation risks posed by Russia, Pakistan, and North Korea, the United States and other NPT nations should work to tighten export controls, more effectively track Russian stockpiles, eliminate nuclear networks, and expand the non-proliferation regime.

Effective Export Controls

In 2003, following revelations that Libya would abandon its nuclear weapons program, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials discovered components for nuclear weapons worth hundreds of millions of dollars including blueprints for a half-ton nuclear weapon in Libya. While it is unlikely that a terrorist organization like al-Qaida will develop weapons independently, small nuclear bombs could be smuggled or purchased on the black market for the right price. It is imperative that export controls be strengthened to limit the illegal proliferation of nuclear materials.

Devising effective export controls that allow nuclear trade for peaceful purposes without increasing the proliferation of nuclear arms is a challenge given the relative ease with which nuclear technologies could be converted for use as weaponry. Although bilateral and multilateral arrangements assist governments in developing and enforcing export controls, it is ultimately the responsibility of an individual nation to limit nuclear proliferation. States will not maintain effective export controls without the political will, incentives, and the resources to enforce them.³⁰ Governments must also balance export controls with international trade, as strict regulations could also hinder trade relationships by making the export process excessively onerous.

Political scientist Matthew Fuhrmann wrote in a 2007 *World Affairs* article, "To be truly effective, non-proliferation export controls must be

implemented globally. Otherwise, a state wishing to acquire sensitive dual-use technologies merely has to shop around to find a supplier with weak or nonexistent controls."³¹ International agreements to curb the illegal trade of nuclear materials such as the NPT, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, and United Nations Resolution 1540, are only as effective as the export controls of Russia, Pakistan, and North Korea, the weakest links in the nuclear supply chain.

Policing non-compliant states remains a serious challenge. International cooperation is just one component in developing a comprehensive non-proliferation export control system. Other important factors include licensing, border and port security and enforcement, and collaboration between national governments and private industry.³²

Russian Stockpiles

Russian stockpiles are a major source in the nuclear supply chain, as terrorist organizations are able to acquire nuclear weapons and materials through a network of providers in the FSU. The Wassenaar Arrangement requires Moscow to be transparent in the transfer of conventional arms and dual-use items and to use export controls as a counterterrorism tool. However, Russia has failed to fulfill its obligations. Moscow has generally prioritized domestic economic development over international security. Encouraging Russia to be more proactive in its counterterrorism and non-proliferation efforts continues to be a challenge.

Tracking Russian stockpiles more closely would enhance non-proliferation efforts worldwide. During the 2000 Clinton-Putin Summit, the United States and Russia agreed to share real-time information on missile launches and weapons-grade materials. To date, the plan has not been implemented. Russia has made some progress in securing nuclear materials by revising export legislation in 1999 and by establishing the Export Control Commission of the Russian Federation to coordinate export control lists for missiles and related dual-use technologies and equipment. However, Moscow has failed to effectively regulate, consolidate, and secure its nuclear materials.³³

Nuclear material accounting is a fundamental measure needed to ensure compliance with international agreements. More stringent safeguards that include containment and surveillance are examples of ways to significantly diminish the threat posed by Russian stockpiles. Developing precision instruments for measuring sensitive materials and a more complex

system to track their movements are other essential steps that can be taken to mitigate this threat.

Illegal Nuclear Supply Networks

While it would be difficult to fully eliminate illegal nuclear supply networks, targeting key elements within the illicit trade would reduce terrorist access to nuclear materials and weapons. Nuclear forensics, cutting supply, monitoring tacit knowledge holders, strengthening regulations, and consolidating materials in Russia are methods that could be used to diminish illegal nuclear supply networks.

Nuclear forensics is a relatively new science wherein analysts collect debris from a bomb explosion or a sample of black market fissile material and trace it to the source by identifying "nuclear fingerprints."³⁴ While this method has improved in sophistication and accuracy over the last several years, there are limitations to its use as a deterrent. In order to be effective, a deterring force must have commitment, credibility and military and/or law enforcement authority over national governments. The current international non-proliferation regime's authority is limited by the states that support it.

Acquiring tacit knowledge, or the expertise to develop nuclear weapons, remains one of the greatest barriers that second-tier nations or non-state actors face in building a successful nuclear program. In the short term, these players lack the know-how to develop nuclear weapons.³⁵ However, this is changing. The consolidation, regulation, and security of materials, as well as the restriction of tacit knowledge transfers, are vital to limiting nuclear proliferation. It is imperative that illegal nuclear networks are destroyed before they expand. International non-proliferation entities attacking these networks must understand their unique structure, and target the critical points within the structure, in order to effectively eliminate them. Nuclear supply networks are becoming increasingly dangerous as they devise new ways to transmit knowledge and technology without detection.

Ultimately, the most effective way to limit second-tier proliferation is to strengthen regulations in Russia and consolidate materials. While nuclear forensics has promise, it faces challenges of credibility, capability, and commitment. Eliminating the supply to second-tier networks is a difficult task, but it could delay nuclear proliferation to high-risk nations or non-state actors. Efforts should be made to expand the nuclear supply regime by offering high-risk nations greater incentives to denuclearize.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

International nuclear non-proliferation efforts are hindered by the refusal of countries such as Pakistan and North Korea to participate in the international regime. These nations continue to produce, sell, and trade WMD technologies without formal constraints, facilitating the emergence of second-tier proliferation networks.³⁶ Diplomatic strategies have been employed with little success, and economic sanctions have yielded mixed results.³⁷

Working harder to expand the "nuclear club" to include Pakistan could motivate Islamabad to become a more responsible nuclear state. If Pakistan were to join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the international community could assist Islamabad in maintaining domestic controls of nuclear and missile technology and more effectively regulate the nation's nuclear trade.³⁸ Reassessing the standards required for joining organizations like the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group would allow more nations to participate.³⁹ The United States should also consider establishing a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). This agreement would require NPT nations to follow more specific arms control measures.⁴⁰

Understanding the diverse motivations that drive nuclear countries to proliferate is key to limiting the spread of nuclear technologies and ultimately combating the threat of nuclear terrorism. Regional security concerns and economic constraints are frequently at the heart of nuclear proliferation. Pakistan developed nuclear weapons to compete with India. North Korea joined the NPT in 1985, abandoned it in 2003, and continues to sell ballistic missiles today because the associated revenue stream is integral to the country's economy.⁴¹ In this case, the Asian nation's economic interests have trumped international pressure.⁴² Islamabad and Pyongyang have supported one another's nuclear endeavors by swapping Pakistani weapons materials and technologies for North Korean missiles.

There is speculation that Pakistan will continue its weapons trade with North Korea as Islamabad seeks missiles with greater accuracy, mobility, and payload.⁴³ It is important that the international community address the regional nuclear imbalances of East and South Asia to decrease WMD trade between these two nations.⁴⁴ Limiting nuclear weapons material production in Asia could help to mitigate the security concerns that drive illegal nuclear production. North Korean economic interests should be at the heart of the next round of Six Party Talks.

The fight against nuclear proliferation is a challenge on all levels. While supply side strategies directly address the problem of proliferation, a renewed focus on the causes of demand for nuclear weapons would play a critical role in combating future proliferation. A combination of supply and demand side efforts would ideally influence the decision-making processes of current and prospective nuclear states and encourage adherence to the nuclear non-proliferation regime.⁴⁵

Conclusions

The War on Terror is the new Great Game where terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons is the ultimate threat, and our military installations, places of work and homes are the new frontier. Nuclear non-proliferation is a multifaceted problem that requires innovative solutions. To meet this ominous new threat, the United States should lead the international community in strengthening export controls through improved cooperation, expanding incentives to encourage nations to fulfill their obligations under the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime, and policing those states and individuals that fail to meet their obligations.

The United States should layer supply and demand side tactics in order to counter the latest wave of proliferation. Continued support of export controls, agreements, and the establishment of new treaties are effective methods to limit supply. The United States should also address demand by encouraging high-risk nations to participate in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. These measures will likely improve the security of sensitive nuclear technologies and reduce the risk of terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons.

According to former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, the likelihood of a single nuclear bomb exploding in a single city is greater today than at the height of the Cold War.⁴⁶ From "mutually assured destruction" to modern-day suicide terrorism, we have entered a new era in international security. Nuclear terrorism poses a significant challenge to U.S.-led counterterrorism and counter-proliferation efforts. Only international cooperation and proactive measures will effectively limit the dangers of this 21st century threat.

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Intelligence and Its Role in Protecting Against Terrorism

By Richard J. Hughbank and Don Githens

Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain.

- Karl Von Clausewitz
Prussian soldier and intellectual (1780–1831)

Introduction

Intelligence is information that is analyzed and converted into a product to support a particular customer. Intelligence is both a process and a product and has played an important role in diplomacy and warfare throughout history. In the information age, intelligence has taken on an even greater importance. But in the popular media, the role, means, and purpose of intelligence is very often misrepresented at best. Only a tiny fraction of intelligence officers perform clandestine intelligence gathering. They don't assassinate people, carry weapons or even wear trench coats. The vast majority of the intelligence community carries out its mundane tasks at a computer terminal and, while intelligence alone cannot stop the next terrorist attack, it is *the* critical first step in identifying and possibly preventing one.

The art and science of gathering critical operational intelligence has been defined in many ways and is beyond our needs for this writing. Throughout the course of history, many wars have been fought depending heavily on various forms of intelligence. During our most recent actions in the War on Terror, intelligence analysis has played a critical role in both offensive and defensive operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. With such varying fact-finding techniques available and utilized in the defense of our country, it has become an arduous task to collect, decipher, package, prioritize, disseminate, and act upon everything that comes down the pipe.

Intelligence is even more important in homeland defense and security. Our society is suspicious of intrusions on personal liberties. Mandated identity cards, restricted vehicle access and random searches of airline passengers are generally not well received. That makes it especially important to prevent terrorist attacks by interdicting the terrorists and

their resources before they can reach their targets. The primary means of accomplishing this is through a combination of intelligence and law enforcement work.

Military intelligence branches have been extremely effective while operating in various countries with the use of multiple forms of intelligence: Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), Strategic Intelligence (STRATINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), and Technical Intelligence (TECHINT). Simply stated, and reduced to the lowest common denominator, intelligence is information of the world about us. Regardless of the form of intelligence, the world can be divided into short-term, narrow focus, Tactical Intelligence, and long-term broad focus, Strategic Intelligence.

Strategic Intelligence

Strategic intelligence is used for long-term planning and other broad topics such as operational capabilities of a potential opponent and political assessments. With painstaking analysis and the use of computers to produce clear evaluations and concise intelligence assessments, local law enforcement can have a foundational tool to effectively use in an effort to identify potential terrorist operations and targets within their community. It's this functional ability to "predict" when and where future operational terrorist acts might occur and which tactical targets might prove more advantageous for a terrorist organization—whether it is psychological, economical, or political in nature—through the use of gathered and processed data from varying sources that places homeland defense in better offensive and defensive postures to successfully preempt and thwart their next attack.

Tactical Intelligence

Tactical intelligence is used for operational units and includes, among other things, human intelligence, open source intelligence, imagery intelligence, and direct observation. These particular sources require trained and dedicated street cops who can think on their feet and identify the simplest of cultural patterns and behavioral modifications of those who regularly work, play and live within their assigned patrol areas. In this age of technology, we have become so reliant upon computers that we've almost forgotten this most important point. For the remainder of this article, we will focus primarily on tactical intelligence and its critical role in identifying and defeating future terrorist acts in our communities.

Tactical intelligence is crucial in counterinsurgency and asymmetric warfare. Initiative and surprise can be achieved only if the tactical intelligence mission is effective. All possible vetted sources must be utilized to their optimal potential, including those frequently ignored. Therefore, a central clearinghouse should be established that collects and exploits all of the accumulated information then disseminates the assembled intelligence to the shift commanders so they can be passed on either at shift change or during the shift as deemed necessary. The officers in the street, in turn, need to pass on information gathered from their neighborhood sources to their designated information collector in a timely fashion. This is the only way the intelligence mission can have a chance of functioning at a level necessary to identify and possibly stop the next terrorist attack.

Intelligence Application

So, what exactly should you be searching for and passing on to the clearinghouse while patrolling and interacting with the neighborhood on an average shift? Well, you're looking for the same things you've been looking for since you left the academy; anything that's out of place or out of the ordinary; comments from the people on your beat that have a "strange" ring to them. You already know; anything that doesn't quite seem right to you through your training and experience on the street. New people in the neighborhood who avoid patrol cars, groups that break up when you slow down as you drive by, and different attitudes of people you've known over time are just some examples of things and acts to be watchful for. Those mundane reactive shifts *must* turn into proactive conversation and a critical eye for detail.

Having the ability to gain a sense of situational awareness for a certain area within a community will either deter or assist in gaining knowledge of "new" changes that directly impact the initial stages of terroristic-guerilla warfare in your assigned sectors. Remember, you're a trained observer; so observe and report accordingly.

The Army gets this right, as every soldier is a collector of information as part of their basic duties. No one particular unit or patrol is given the individual task of collecting and passing up information while on patrol on any given mission and on varying degrees of terrain and areas of operation. Everyone receives an intelligence brief prior to beginning a mission or shift, and each individual is required to remain vigilant during their patrol with an additional requirement to continue gathering intelligence while out on the streets.

All police departments have the same potential—they rely on daily, personal interaction within their assigned sector of patrol to perform their duties. While the information they "collect" is for the purpose of protecting the populace, enforcing laws and preventing crime, some information can be useful to analysts tracking the potential terrorist threats within our borders. Almost every illegal activity can be given away by indicators. It's the observation of these indicators and the proper analysis of their significance that could directly lead to the defeat of future terrorist acts. Various stages of terrorist operations can be determined by the smallest of indicators provided during that particular operational maneuver. You won't necessarily recognize these indicators for what they are, but to an analyst who has studied a particular terrorist group or individual that indicator can speak volumes. The question is, how do you know what to look for?

In the intelligence community, the process of addressing this question is known as collection management. Analysts who study an intelligence problem (e.g., what are the plans and capabilities of a particular terrorist organization) have the best idea of what intelligence gaps exist. They identify these gaps to a collection manager (CM) in the form of a requirement. A requirement consists of priority and justification, essential elements of information and reporting requirements. The CM then integrates these requirements into a collection strategy. Finally, a collection plan is developed to detail a tactical level course of action and subsequently briefed to operators (e.g., SWAT and daily patrols) to carry out. The interaction of the analysts and collectors is absolutely essential to this entire process.

The Collection Cycle

As a process, intelligence is designed to support a person or organization. It is designed to assist decision makers, planners, operators and sometimes other intelligence organizations. Intelligence is useless if it's inaccurate, or if it is presented in an unusable format when needed. It's imperative the intelligence organization has a clear understanding of the tasking being levied. Tasking is the first step in the intelligence cycle (sometimes referred to as the collection cycle or TCPED cycle).

- **Tasking:** The tasking should originate with the person or organization being supported. The more involved the *customer* gets in tasking, and the more detailed that tasking is, the better the final product becomes. This tasking is referred to as a requirement, and it drives the rest of the collection cycle.

- **Collection:** This is the actual gathering of raw information. It can take the form of imagery (IMINT), a communications signal intercept (SIGINT), or a report from a person (HUMINT).
- **Processing:** This is the stage where raw data is converted to a useable format. SIGINT intercepts are translated, HUMINT reports are formatted and source information added, and IMINT is converted to customer specifications.
- **Exploitation:** Intelligence analysts analyze the information to determine its significance. The final product is created according to the customer's requirement at this stage.
- **Dissemination:** The finished intelligence product is delivered according to the customer's requirement.

The collection cycle for each intelligence discipline differs in timeliness and responsiveness. IMINT is probably the most timely and responsive, since technology allows for rapid processing and dissemination. IMINT is also active—an asset has to go out and take the pictures. SIGINT is not as timely, since signals usually need to be transcribed and/or translated. SIGINT technology is usually more sensitive, and thus access to the collected data is usually more restricted (classified). SIGINT also relies on the target being active in communication. HUMINT is usually the least timely, since collecting usually involves considerable risk to the person doing the collection. Security measures to ensure the safety of the collector definitely slow down the processing stage.

Fortunately, you don't need to be an expert on the capabilities of each intelligence discipline. The intelligence process is overseen by a collection manager (CM), an intelligence professional, usually experienced in a single intelligence discipline that helps the customer craft their requirement. The CM then determines the most effective intelligence discipline to satisfy the requirement, prioritizes it against other requirements, and tasks an intelligence resource to achieve the collection. A CM follows the requirement through the collection cycle, acting as an advocate for the customer.

Intelligence support can be a valuable tool to assist law enforcement agencies in the performance of their daily duties. It's especially relevant in counterterrorism investigations and operations. Terrorist organizations rely heavily on secrecy and anonymity to carry out their religious and politically driven agendas, and intelligence gathering and exploitation is best suited to stripping away this critical layer of protection and making

them more vulnerable to infiltration, investigation and arrest. Intelligence work is a discipline in and of itself, just like police work, and carries its own language, rules, and culture. At times, it can be in direct conflict with law enforcement, but the goal of both remains the same; the protection of every American citizen and our way of life; our very culture, if you will.

As terrorism continues to plague the world through the global Salafi jihad movement, the United States will forever serve as a critical target for various organizations who seek to spread "pure" Islam. Through patience and vigilance, our enemies continue to further their cause through the understanding of our society. Thus, it becomes imperative we do the same. It is imperative we continue to learn about those who choose to attack our freedoms and way of life, and our law enforcement agencies will have to take the lead in this ongoing war. Indeed, the law enforcement community must develop transparent communication and intelligence links. While the days of fighting conventional crime are still at the forefront, our modern foes have defiantly presented us with a challenge that must be met with extreme prejudice if we are to successfully protect our nation and its citizens. The collection of intelligence will prove invaluable in this success, but we must learn to properly use this important tool at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and it starts with training and utilizing every facet of our law enforcement agencies as they continue to patrol and protect our neighborhoods.

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the position of the U.S. Air Force Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

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Variance, Violence, and Democracy: A Basic Microeconomic Model of Terrorism

By John A. Sautter

Introduction

Much of the debate surrounding contemporary studies of terrorism focuses upon transnational terrorism. However, historical and contemporary evidence suggests that domestic terrorism is a more prevalent and pressing concern. A formal microeconomic model of terrorism is utilized here to understand acts of political violence in a domestic context within the domain of democratic governance.

Terrorism is the use of violence and threats to intimidate or coerce for political purposes.¹ Unlike purely conventional military conflict where two opposing armies meet on a battlefield, terrorism focuses violence directly on civilians to affect political change through altering public opinion.² Within the modern day context, terrorism as a calculated political tool must be thought of within democratic institutions, and for good reason. History shows not only that an insurgent or terrorist organization can influence electoral outcomes, but that as a society becomes more democratic rates of terrorism tend to increase.³

This article builds a very basic microeconomic model of terrorist decision making to hypothesize how a democratic government might influence the sorts of strategies that terrorists use. Mathematical models have been used to explain terrorist behavior in the past.⁴ However, the bulk of inquires in this area have only focused on the relationship between terrorists and the government, or amongst terrorists themselves.⁵ Central to the interpretation of the terrorist conflict presented here is the idea that voters (or citizens) are also one of the important determinants of how a government will respond to acts of terrorism.

Domestic Terrorism and Democracy

A major focus of terrorism studies, especially since September 11, 2001, has been on ideologically motivated, transnational terrorism. However,

whether one views this topic historically or in the contemporary context, transnational and religiously motivated incidents are much less frequent than might at first be obvious. An examination of the ITERATE collection of acts of terrorism during the past thirty years shows that a majority of incidents was neither international in scope nor initiated by religiously motivated groups.⁶ Furthermore, most terrorist acts over this period were caused by individuals indigenous to the state in which they occurred, with the victims being largely from those states as well.⁷ Without a doubt, domestic terrorism is as important as the transnational case.

There are distinct features that set domestic models of terrorism apart from transnational ones. First, the idea that the victim and the terrorist are from different populations, or countries, is either the assumption made in an international focus, or the issue is completely ignored. In domestic terrorism it is often the case that clandestine groups recruit from all parts of society and share the same nationality with those that they are attacking.⁸ Second, transnational models of terrorism rarely, if ever, model the main tool of violent political groups, terror itself. It is often treated as an intangible variable that cannot be accounted for.⁹ Indeed, in the transnational context it may very well be impossible to place such a concept into the workings of an economic model, however important it may be to policy outcomes. Finally, asymmetric information and signaling is very different in each.¹⁰ Domestic terrorism, as conceived here, is a method of signaling used by a political dissident to attempt to directly sway a citizenry, whereas transnational terrorism is usually conceived as indirect influence.

Research has demonstrated the importance of democratic institutions in explaining the frequency of terrorism. The prevalence of democratic institutions has a positive relationship with incidences of terrorism.¹¹ This is generally ascribed to liberal rules and freedoms under a democratic regime, which allow terrorist organizations to organize freely. Indeed, evidence suggests that as government institutional obstruction to democratic expression decreases, so do incidences of terrorism.¹² One way to think of this is by understanding that individuals will be more likely to take advantage of the political process as opposed to violent opposition to it when the costs of political participation are much lower.¹³ When there are fewer obstructions to participation, its costs are inherent lower.

The model developed below assumes three different agents. There are terrorists (t), voters (v) and politicians (g).¹⁴ Terrorists aim to commit illegal acts to further their political beliefs. Voters want to maximize safety and stability. Politicians desire re-election and will optimize government anti-terrorism policy in order to maximize re-election. A democratic system of

government with direct election for representative government is assumed in the model. In short, terrorists attack voter-citizens, voters decide their government, and the government adopts a policy toward terrorists.

Terrorist Utility

$$T = T(D, \pi, \bar{G}) - C(D^*) \quad (1)$$

A terrorist's utility is a function of three different variables. Where D is some amount of damage that a terrorist would like to commit and D^* is the chosen amount of damage that they will attempt. The cost constraint $C(\cdot)$, is a function of the chosen damage that the terrorists will attempt to commit. π is the probability of successfully completing the intended act or acts of terrorism. \bar{G} is a proxy for the mean government policy in the past. Government policy includes counterterrorism efforts, implementing security measures or any other government activity that was implemented to retaliate against or protect from terrorist activities. We assume that $\frac{\partial T}{\partial D}$ and $\frac{\partial T}{\partial \pi}$ are both > 0 , or that a terrorist's utility is increasing in both the amount of damage that they are able to inflict, as well as, the probability of success. However, $\frac{\partial T}{\partial G} < 0$, or that as the government policy toward terrorists is increased, a terrorist will get disutility.

Finding the first order condition:

$$\frac{\partial T(D, \pi, \bar{G})}{\partial D} = C'(D^*) \quad (2)$$

The first order condition shows that a terrorist is constrained by the cost of their chosen amount of damage. D^* is the theoretical combination of terrorist acts, D_i , ($i = 1, 2, \dots$), that amount to different ways of committing violence, or,

$$D^* = \sum_i^m D_i(G(\bar{D}), \pi) \quad (3)$$

A terrorist will maximize his utility by choosing the optimal D^* that solves equation (2) given a certain probability of success and the current government policy toward terrorism. The government policy from the terrorist perspective is a function of the mean of all past violent activities, \bar{D} .

Voter Utility

$$V_i = V(D^*, \pi, G, \rho, \theta(u, D^*)) \quad (4)$$

Voter, or citizen, utility is some function of the same variable inputs: D^* , π , G . ρ is a theoretical parameter that measures the rate at which voters discount past acts of terrorism over time, where $0 \leq \rho \leq 1$.¹⁵ This models the behavior that a voter weights the future much more than the past. Prior to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, most Americans did not perceive a terrorist threat, though the risk of a successful attack was obviously high. Conversely, the overhaul of airline security regulations, a new emphasis on the threat posed by terrorists in governmental intelligence organizations and the establishment of a Homeland Security Administration have significantly reduced the danger of future terrorist attacks that abounded before 9/11. However, the public perceives that the risk of future attacks is in fact higher. Voters are assumed to place more emphasis on future risks than they do on the whole for past events.

As a stochastic variable, u represents all other things in society that could become more important to a voting public than a threat posed by terrorism, including economic conditions, erosion of civil liberties or corruption in government. The parameter $\theta(\cdot)$ is some function of u between zero

and one, so that $\frac{\partial \theta}{\partial u} < 0$ and $\frac{\partial^2 \theta}{\partial D^* \partial u} > 0$. The first term illustrates that when damage is held constant other issues in the political atmosphere begin to outweigh the importance of inputs D^* , π , G in the voter utility function, sending $\theta \rightarrow 0$. However, the second term denotes that there is a positive second derivative with respect to D^* and u , showing that theta increases when there is a simultaneous increase in both D^* and u . This makes θ increasing in damage even if other political issues are concurrently in the political debate. It is assumed that in the absence of an increase in D , u , will rise over time as other issues enter into the political landscape. For the purposes of explaining the model, θ is set to one in equation (4) so that a focus can be placed on the variables D^* , π , G .¹⁶

Voter maximization is also affected by a chance constraint that takes into account the probability of damage.

$$\Pr \{ D^* \geq \overline{G}(\overline{D}) \} \geq \pi \quad (5)$$

Equation (5) is a probability density function that ensures that the probability of receiving positive damage: $D^* - \overline{G}(\overline{D}) > 0$, is greater than or equal

to π . In other words, the terrorist act is greater than the historic mean of government policy, thereby incurring damage. D^* is a random variable that, while in the voter utility function, represents the amount of economic damage or violence that terrorists have committed during the current round of attacks. Voters have information regarding the historic mean and standard deviation of D^* since they are aware of the terrorist's density function and the variance of their past acts of violence. While past violent acts of terror provide information to voters on the scope of D^* , it should only be regarded as a theoretical general guide to them. For example, if one knows that in the past suicide bombers have ridden buses, this informs one on the inherent risks of riding the bus. However, this general knowledge does not inform one of the specific time, day and place of an act of terror that is random for the typical citizen.

In the chance constraint, $\frac{\partial D^*}{\partial \pi} < 0$, indicating that as the amount of damage increases, the probability of success decreases. This follows from the fact that generally attacks that kill a larger number of people or inflict more economic damage are normally more complex, costly and involve a higher probability of failure. Equation (5) can be re-written as:¹⁷

$$[\Pr \{D^* \geq \bar{G}\} \geq \pi] \approx \sigma^{D^*} \gamma(1 - \pi) + \mu^{D^*} - \bar{G}(\bar{D}) \quad (6)$$

Which combined with equation (4) gives the following voter utility function:

$$V_i = V(D^*, \pi, G; \rho, \theta(u)) + \bar{G}(\bar{D}) - \sigma^{D^*} \gamma(1 - \pi) - \mu^{D^*} \quad (7)$$

Where σ^{D^*} and μ^{D^*} are the standard deviation and mean of D^* ; and $\gamma(1 - \pi)$ is a function that delineates the number of standard deviations that D^* must be from \bar{D} , the mean of all past damage, in order to satisfy the constraint.

Voters are interested in safety and national security. Though D^* , π , G , are exogenous to the voter's utility function, they are seen as maximizing utility when the government pursues a policy, G , that provides for the most stability to society. Following a terrorist attack, voters will evaluate the government based on their perceptions of how the administration responded to the attack. Therefore, voters feel the effect of the following maximization problem:

$$\max_G V_i = V(D^*, \pi, G, \rho, \theta(u)) + \bar{G}(\bar{D}) - \sigma^{D^*} \gamma(1 - \pi) - \mu^{D^*} \quad (8)$$

Solving for the first order condition in equation (8):

$$\frac{\partial V_i}{\partial G} = \frac{\partial V}{\partial D^*} \cdot \frac{\partial D^*}{\partial G} + \frac{\partial V}{\partial \pi} \cdot \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial G} + \frac{\partial V}{\partial G} - \frac{\partial \sigma^{D^*}}{\partial G} \gamma'(1 - \pi) - \frac{\partial \mu^{D^*}}{\partial G} + \frac{\partial \bar{G}}{\partial D} \cdot \frac{\partial \bar{D}}{\partial G} = 0 \quad (9)$$

Equation (9) describes the effect on voters' utility with a change in government policy in response to a terrorist attack. For this example, theta is presumed to be equal to one.

Each term describes how a voter reacts to the damage perpetrated by terrorists in light of the government response to the damage and can be interpreted as either an expression of sensitivity to the terrorist violence (alpha) or as a sensitivity to the government response (beta). Accordingly,

$$\alpha_i = \frac{\partial \sigma^{D^*}}{\partial G} \gamma'(1 - \pi) + \frac{\partial \mu^{D^*}}{\partial G} \quad (10)$$

and,

$$\beta_i = \frac{\partial V}{\partial D^*} \cdot \frac{\partial D^*}{\partial G} + \frac{\partial V}{\partial G} + \frac{\partial V}{\partial \pi} \cdot \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial G} + \frac{\partial \bar{G}}{\partial D} \cdot \frac{\partial \bar{D}}{\partial G} \quad (11)$$

Equation (10) is the summation of partial derivatives that equal alpha or the sensitivity to terrorist violence, and equation (11), beta, represents the terms that are equal to the sensitivity to the government response. The difference in alpha and beta, $\beta_i - \alpha_i = 0$, will always be equal to zero. If it did not equal zero, then the government can be understood as not responding to the political violence in a proportionate and effective manner. Therefore in this model, it is assumed that the government will continue to play the game round to round, and will always have a response. The significance of this measure is where these two sides of voter utility meet in policy space. As shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 below, the important feature of this model is its ability to show why terrorists use the methods that they choose. By expanding the variance and decreasing their mean level of violence, terrorists can decrease government response and increase their signaling potency on the average voter or citizen.

Terrorists are attempting to cause fear and panic in order to sway citizens into pressuring the government into making political concessions. Each one of the expressions in alpha causes negative utility for the voter. The first term, $\frac{\partial \sigma^{D^*}}{\partial G} \gamma' < 0$ is a kind of "terror" term that reflects how an increase in the standard deviation of acts of damage changes with respect to government policy. It illustrates the disutility that a voter receives from an increase in the randomness of violence. The second term, $\frac{\partial \mu^{D^*}}{\partial G} < 0$ represents a "strength" of terror term and depicts the change in the mean level

of violence associated with terrorism. All of the expressions in the α equation are decreasing in government policy.

The β equation models the voter sensitivity to the government policy. The first term, $\frac{\partial V}{\partial D^*} \cdot \frac{\partial D^*}{\partial G} < 0$, can be called the "violence" term and represents the negative utility that voters receive from the act of damage and the government's initial response to the violence. The next term, $\frac{\partial V}{\partial \pi} \cdot \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial G} > 0$, demonstrates that voters' gain utility from seeing the terrorists' probability of success decrease as the amount of government policy toward terrorism increases. $\frac{\partial V}{\partial G} > 0$, is a "safety" term. Voters garner positive utility from the reassuring feeling and stability that an increase in government policy brings to society. The final expression in the β equation, $\frac{\partial \bar{G}}{\partial D} \cdot \frac{\partial D}{\partial G} > 0$, is an "updating" term that represents the way voters garner utility from seeing the government change its policy to match the new threat posed by an increase in the $E(D^*)$, or the new expected future value of damage.

Government Utility

$$P = P(\varepsilon; \delta)$$

$$\text{Where: } \varepsilon = \varepsilon\left(\sum_i^n \alpha_i(D^*, \pi, G), \sum_i^n \beta_i(D^*, \pi, G, \rho, \theta)\right) \quad (12)$$

The government utility function is only concerned with getting re-elected. The incumbent government will optimize G , given D^* and π , which are both exogenous to $P(\cdot)$, so as to maximize ε , the chance of re-election. Delta is a parameter that represents the rate that office holders discount the future, where $0 \leq \delta \leq 1$.¹⁸ Unlike voters, who place more emphasis on the future, politicians are assumed to place more importance on the present. Indeed, if not elected in the forthcoming round of elections, the government will have no say in the policy toward terrorists anyway. In effect, the sum of voters' utility is nested within the government's utility function and expressed by the way that voters feel toward the government. The parameter "n" is any hypothetical number of voters in a state and "i" represents each individual voter.

Government utility maximization is also constrained by a chance constraint that takes into account an incumbent's chances of getting re-elected.

$$\Pr \left\{ \sum_i^n \beta_i > \sum_i^n \alpha_i \right\} \geq \varepsilon \tag{13}$$

Equation (13) is a condition that ensures the government will maximize its counterterrorism policy in an attempt to make the following equality hold: $\beta_i - \alpha_i = 0$. The government desires to make ε , their chance at re-election, equal to one. In other words, the current administration desires to maximize the probability of staying in office. This is dependent on their ability to defeat the terrorists. If the equality stated above does not hold, the government is seen to have lost its ability to fight the terrorists and would thus not be re-elected to office.

Interpreting the Model

An increase in damage only changes the government crackdowns by a marginal amount as compared to a change in the level of α ,¹⁹ which would bring a similar change in G and D . An increase in the probability of success for the terrorists arises from an increase in variance of violence, shifting Beta away from the $G = D^*$ line. The flatter the slope of the Beta expansion path, or the higher proportion of damage D compared to the government policy of $G(D^*)$, the higher the probability that violence will succeed with a smaller crackdown from the government. Alpha represents a constrained probability of success, which is inherently determined by the choices of the terrorists in the strategy they will use. The decision to pursue easier targets versus more complex and dangerous ones alters the level of the alpha expansion path in the policy space.




Figure 1: Graph showing the effect of an increase in variance of violent acts in policy space.

A change in the mean level of violence will raise alpha, increasing D . However, notice that under this form of damage policy the terrorists can expect a substantially larger crackdown from the government than if they had increased their variance. Also, notice that a higher mean lowers the probability of success, which would eventually begin to push the beta line toward the $G = D^*$ line, making the government reaction even closer to being the same as the increase in damage. Or, in terms of Figure 1 and Figure 2, we would say that:

$$D_1^* - \bar{D}_1 > D_2^* - \bar{D}_2 \text{ and } G_2^* - \bar{G}_2 > G_1^* - \bar{G}_1$$

Terrorists will desire to keep their mean level of violence low, so as to avoid a costly government attack. There will be a better chance of committing more violence and terror on the general public by adopting a strategy that increases the variance of attacks while decreasing its mean level.




Figure 2: Graph showing the effect of an increase in the mean level of violence in policy space.

Conclusion

Democratic governments should deal with terrorists early and with impunity before they are allowed to gather enough resources for a larger attack. This may seem obvious. However, there is not always the necessary public support to provide resources for a police action against insurgents or to enact the necessary security laws to avert future attacks. What this model suggests is that the government should undertake such actions even when

there is little public support. This conclusion is somewhat at odds with the notion of democracy being a form of government that protects civil liberties. In many respects, this is the paradox of domestic terrorism and democracy: how to provide security for a citizenry when some of those you wish to protect are hostile to their own government.

The connection between electoral government and terrorism is important. The study of how each party involved in the three-way relationship depicted here reacts to the actions of the other two parties can provide insight into how best to manufacture policies aimed at curbing terrorist incidents. One of the most striking results of this investigation is the basic realization that there are trade-offs in a democratic system that a terrorist or insurgent group must make between large attacks which draw the scorn of the public, and thereby the government retribution; as compared to small, more varied, attacks that harass the populace but do not create a large government backlash.

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- 14 Though a democratic regime is assumed in the explicit analysis this assumption could easily be relaxed for an interpretation of the authoritarian case, where citizens' approval of the regime would parallel the voters' electoral decision.
- 15 ρ would appear in an individual voter's utility function in the following form:

$$\rho = \left(\frac{1}{1-r} \right)$$
 It is assumed that $\frac{\partial \rho}{\partial D} < 0$, or that the larger amount of damage terrorists inflict, the less voters discount the past act of violence.

- 16 It is also assumed that the second derivative with respect to damage is positive, or $\frac{\partial^2 \theta}{\partial D^{*2}} > 0$. This condition allows theta to increase at an increasing rate when damage occurs, making larger amounts of damage disproportionately more harmful than smaller ones.
- 17 $\Pr \{D^* \geq \bar{G}\} \geq \pi$, therefore if we treat both G and D as normalized random variables we get the following, $\Pr \left\{ \frac{D^* - \mu}{\sigma} \geq \frac{\bar{G} - \mu}{\sigma} \right\} \geq \pi$, where $\frac{D^* - \mu}{\sigma}$ is a normalized random variable with a distribution of some function $F = F\left[\frac{D^* - \mu}{\sigma}\right]$. Therefore, it follows that we can also say that $F^{-1} = k$. Therefore, our equation can be expressed as $1 - k \left[\frac{\bar{G} - \mu}{\sigma} \right] \geq \pi$, which rearranging once again gives us the following, $\left[\frac{\bar{G} - \mu}{\sigma} \right] \geq k(1 - \pi)$. Finally, through a little algebra we can express the constraint in the following manner: $\sigma \cdot k(1 - \pi) + \mu - \bar{G} \geq 0$, which allows for the voter utility function to be constrained by the terrorists' manner and probability of success.
- 18 The discount parameter delta would appear in the office holder's utility function in the following form: $\delta = \left(\frac{1}{1+r} \right)$.
- 19 The α expansion path is increasing at a decreasing rate because of the nature of the relationship between the standard deviation and mean of damage. Since, $\frac{\partial \mu}{\partial \sigma} > 0$, or as the mean increases so does the absolute value of the standard deviation of violence. However, the second derivative is negative, $\frac{\partial^2 \mu}{\partial \sigma^2} < 0$, because as the mean level of damage increases, its probability of success decreases. Conversely, the β expansion path (the government) is linear and additive.

Toward a New Trilateral Strategic Security Relationship: United States, Canada, and Mexico

**By Richard J. Kilroy, Jr., Abelardo Rodríguez Sumano, and
Todd S. Hataley**

Introduction

The term "perimeter defense" has come back into vogue recently, with regard to security strategies for North America. The United States' concern primarily with the terrorist threat to its homeland subsequent to September 11, 2001 (9/11) is generating this discussion with its immediate neighbors of Mexico and Canada (and to some extent some Caribbean nations—the "third border"). The concept is simply that by pushing defenses out to the "perimeter" nations, then security will be enhanced, since the United States views itself as more vulnerable to international terrorism than its neighbors. However, Canada and Mexico have not been very happy about the perimeter defined by Washington since 9/11. These nations have sought to define the trilateral relationship beyond just discussions of terrorism to include natural disasters and international organized crime as a component of a broader trilateral agenda. Eight years later these three nations continue to look for some convergence of security interests, although there remains a degree of tension and hesitancy towards achieving a "common security agenda" in the Western Hemisphere.

This article examines the concept of "perimeter defense" within the context of the new security challenges that the United States, Mexico, and Canada face today. Questions to be addressed in the article include: Do all these nations share the same "threat" perception? Where exactly is the "perimeter?" What security arrangements have been tried in the past? What are the prospects for the future for increased security cooperation? The main focus of this article is at the sub-regional level in North America and whether a new "trilateral" strategic security relationship between the United States, Canada, and Mexico can emerge in North America.

The Post 9-11 Security Environment

Since 9/11, the United States has reshaped its security strategy and institutional structures in order to respond to the new threat of international terrorism, specifically targeted against U.S. interests at home and abroad. This fundamental shift in U.S. policy directly impacted its security relations with nations around the globe. While many nations echoed support for U.S. and coalition forces' action in Afghanistan, specifically targeted against the Taliban regime and known terrorist bases in that country, they did not weigh-in with U.S. efforts against Saddam Hussein and military action in Iraq. In fact, two nations in Latin America, Mexico and Chile—both United Nations Security Council members at that time—formed a strategic coalition against U.S.-sponsored action in the United Nations and sought an international sanction for military action, because in the view of the Mexican Ambassador to the UN Security Council at that time, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, "there was at stake our relations with the Arab world and the integrity of the international right at the United Nations."¹ Even Canada, a staunch Cold War ally, refused to support U.S. military action in Iraq, instead limiting its military support to the Global War on Terrorism to coalition actions in Afghanistan.

While the Canadian and Mexican Governments took public stands against the United States on Iraq, behind the scenes both countries were moving toward accommodating the United States' view of the threat of terrorism in the Northern Hemisphere (an example being the signing of the Smart Borders initiative with both countries in 2001–2002). On the military side, both Canada and Mexico began to take on new security relationships with their U.S. counterparts, even challenging some old taboos. For example, after 9/11, the United States military stood up a new command to specifically support the Homeland Defense role of the military in support of Homeland Security.² U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) was carved out of the existing U.S. Space Command structure, located in Colorado Springs, Colorado, which also housed the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Canada continued to provide personnel to NORAD even as the United States stood up the new NORTHCOM structure. Defense planners in the Pentagon were also considering overtures to Mexico, based on the new Unified Command Plan architecture that "placed" both Mexico and Canada under the operational area of responsibility (AOR) overview of the NORTHCOM Commander.³

On the political side, there were also changes in Mexico with regard to their view toward security relations with the United States. Prior to 9/11, Mexico appeared to be moving in the direction of recommending that the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty of 1947) and

the Inter-American Defense Board be revoked in their entirety since these structures lacked validity due to the fundamental change in the security relationships between nations in the hemisphere.⁴ However, after 9/11, then Mexican President Vicente Fox took the complete opposite position, citing the need for a second Chapultepec Conference in Mexico City in 2003, to discuss hemispheric security issues. Although he was careful not to allude to the formation of any new formal military alliances and insisted that the real "threat" to the hemisphere was still poverty, for practical purposes, Fox was clearly falling more in line with U.S. interests and desires to expand the security relationship in the Northern Hemisphere. Yet Fox, and his Minister of Foreign Relations, Luis Ernesto Derbez, sought a much broader multidimensional approach on security delineating a sharp distinction with American military emphasis. This became more evident after the departure from the Fox administration of the Mexican Ambassador to the United Nations Security Council, Aguilar Zínser, in November 2003, and the approval of a new law on national security in Mexico in January 2005. This new law reflected Mexico's focus on the threat of terrorism and drug trafficking, which was also addressed with the signing of the Security and Prosperity Partnership between the United States, Canada, and Mexico in Waco, Texas in March 2005.⁵

NORAD

After 9/11, Canada and the United States continued to make significant progress in the realignment of their bilateral security relationships. In December 2002, the Bi-national Planning Group (BPG) was established, after exchanging formal diplomatic notes and terms of reference through diplomatic (Secretary of State and Ministry of Foreign Affairs) channels. The BPG sought to expand the current NORAD agreement to include maritime and land-based approaches to the Northern Hemisphere. Other topics addressed include enhanced intelligence and information sharing, inter-agency cooperation, better situational awareness, and border security. The BPG completed their preliminary recommendations in 2005, and a renewed NORAD agreement, to include a maritime component, was signed in August 2006.⁶

For U.S. Northern Command and NORAD officials seeking to accomplish their assigned mission of providing for the Homeland Defense of the Continental United States and Canada, the prospect of expanding the "perimeter" of defense out beyond the borders of these two nations, to include Mexico, continues to be problematic. Overtures continue to be made to Mexican defense officials through low-level contacts, or through established working relationships, such as the Fifth U.S. Army-sponsored Bor-

der Commanders Conferences. The Mexican Navy has also placed a liaison officer at NORTHCOM Headquarters in Colorado Springs;⁷ however, the prospects of an expanded security relationship that would bring Mexico into either the current NORAD structure or the proposed expanded NORAD agreements is not likely to occur any time soon.⁸

NORTHCOM

On the U.S.- Mexico side of bilateral security cooperation, progress has been much slower. After Mexico's initial show of support for U.S. security concerns after 9/11, political reality set in, with a retrenchment of Mexican nationalism and public concern over Mexico's involvement in any new formal military alliances. The Mexican press ran a number of articles condemning the formation of NORTHCOM in 2002 and the "assigning" of Mexico to its area of responsibility (AOR), arguing that Mexico would soon be "occupied" by the U.S. military on its side of the border.⁹ Pentagon planners exacerbated Mexican sensibilities and history after delivering a presentation of the new NORTHCOM emblem showing Mexico within its AOR; this emblem continues to pose an obstacle to deepening security collaboration with Mexico.

Mexico's Secretary of Defense at the time, General Clemente Vega Garcia, initially indicated a willingness to open channels of communication to this new command and not be constrained by past relationships in military-to-military cooperation with the United States.¹⁰ However, in Mexico, he was reluctant to publicly accept any such collaboration. For example, in October 2004, in his testimony before the Mexican Congress, General Vega argued that Mexico "will never be subordinated to the Northern Command even in its dreams."¹¹ He was adamant that he would not work through a U.S. regional combatant commander, insisting that his relationship with the U.S. military would still be directly with the Secretary of Defense (considered his equivalent cabinet-level officer) or the Chief of Staff of the Army.¹²

The strategic shift from ambivalence to cooperation on defense issues between the U.S. and Mexico has occurred as a result of the October 2007 Merida Initiative, an agreement between the U.S. and Mexico which pledged \$1.4 billion in U.S. aid to help Mexico and Central American nations in their fight against drug trafficking. In March 2009, NORTHCOM Commander, General Gene Renuart, pointed out to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee the historic transformation between the NORTHCOM and the Mexican Armed Forces, "Over the past year, we have advanced our relationship from one of introductions and orientation

visits to one of open, frequent and frank discussions on how we can improve our collective security from common threats...We are now finalizing the requirements for delivery of transport helicopters and maritime surveillance aircraft to the Mexican military under the Merida Initiative."¹³ However, this "clarity" in mission toward the relationship with Mexico from the Northern Command perspective has not been resolved by the Mexican Government.

There were also additional political obstacles in furthering U.S.- Mexican strategic security cooperation. The State Department (still reeling over Mexico's failure to back the United States in the 2003 UN Security Council to authorize force in Iraq) continued to play hardball with the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The State Department also blocked the Department of Defense's desire to increase its Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) budget for Mexico to \$57 million in FY05, reducing it to a meager \$2.4 million. Mexico did receive \$11 million in FMFP funds in FY06.¹⁴ Funding for FMFP dropped in FY07 and FY08, but picked up again in FY09 with a request for \$2 million. The reason for this major shift in U.S. funding for Mexico occurred in FY08 with the Merida Initiative¹⁵ and \$500 million now designated for counter-drug efforts, funded through the State Department, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL).¹⁶

Defining the Threat and the Perimeter

The most successful security agreements have been those shaped by shared threat perceptions and the imminence of attack. The more distant the adversary, the less likely the "home team" is willing to play. Perimeter defense implies that the threat remains "out there" and there is a need to keep it from coming "in here." Clearly, the focus on homeland security and homeland defense in the War on Terrorism conveys this point of view. However, by taking an "all-hazards" approach to homeland security and including the threats from both man-made and natural disasters into the equation, the concept of perimeter defense takes on an internal dimension in addition to the traditional external focus. In other words, the threats that Canada, Mexico, and the United States collectively face, now and in the future, are of such significance to economic security and domestic policy considerations that the response to disasters (whether man-made or not) and other security threats (such as drug trafficking and transnational crime) must also serve to "contain" the damage and prevent the spillover effect beyond the "perimeter" of each country into that of their neighbors.

If the United States, Canada, and Mexico are to form a new trilateral strategic security relationship in the North American Hemisphere, given the large number of impediments previously discussed, another approach may be necessary. It is worthwhile to re-address the security concerns of each nation, in the post September 11 world by re-examining the nature of the threat that each nation perceives and the context of "perimeter" with regard to the security concerns of each.

U.S. Threat Perception

For the United States, the threat of global terrorism, primarily from fundamentalist Islamic groups, is very high. The U.S. State Department currently lists 45 Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), of which 29 are Islamic groups.¹⁷ Some of these groups (Hizbollah, Hamas, etc.) are known to operate in Latin America, but other than Hizbollah's implication in an attack on the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992, they have not actively targeted Latin American or U.S. interests in the region, to include Canada.¹⁸ Some terrorist groups, such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), have been identified as operating in Colombia with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), possibly providing demolitions training, but again, there is no evidence of any of these identified FTOs specifically targeting U.S. interests in the region.

Since the inauguration of President Barack Obama, the United States has focused less on the terrorist threat which could come through either Mexico or Canada, and more on the threat of Mexico's war on its drug cartels which spilled over the border into the southwestern United States. In light of the emergency situation, the United States has refocused its efforts on countering the threat of drugs and related criminal violence. To their credit, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and President Obama both acknowledged that Mexico's internal security problems due to drug violence were fueled by arms trafficking coming from the United States and that the U.S. shared in the responsibility to help stem the violence.¹⁹

Mexico Threat Perception

Certainly, for Mexico, the threat is not so much terrorism, but rather Mexico's drug cartels, the nature of transnational organized crime, and the economic crisis. Mexican President Felipe Calderón realizes that Mexico faces increased instability due to the growing power of drug cartels and political violence if economic hardship were to escalate, and the "pressure valve" of the U.S. border were to be closed off over U.S. fears of undocumented immigrants and terrorists crossing the border. If the United States were to attempt to close the border, the impact on both nations'

economies would be enormous, primarily on Mexico, which has seen its trade with the United States grow exponentially in the last 14 years of NAFTA (\$234 billion in exports in 2008).²⁰ The economic impact on Mexico would also be staggering should the United States attempt to limit the amount of foreign remittances from illegal Mexicans working in the United States being sent back to Mexico (estimates of \$25 billion annually, second only to oil, as Mexico's major export earning commodity).²¹

Viewed in this light, Mexico can't afford for there to be another terrorist attack on the United States, particularly if it appears that the terrorists used Mexico as the infiltration route. Thus, the drug trafficking issue, due to its transnational nature, is a shared concern which compromises the security of both the United States and Mexico. For Mexico, the United States needs to address domestic consumption and illicit gun sales. For the United States, Mexico needs to reform the judicial system, public security and the entire intelligence, defense, and national security structure. Blocking impunity and corruption is also valid concern for the United States. In the end, there is at least a consensus among the three countries on the transnational nature of organized crime and the negative impact for North America. Terrorism is not an equally-shared threat in the region; however, drug trafficking and the growing power and influence of complex transnational criminal organizations is a shared concern.

Canada Threat Perception

For Canada, the threat of a loss of sovereignty to the United States appears to be the greatest stumbling block to increased security cooperation. Under Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, Canada refused to support the United States and the war in Iraq. Under Prime Minister Paul Martin, Canada further refused to support the American National Missile Defense plan. Conservative Party Prime Minister Stephen Harper (elected in 2006) has attempted to draw Canada closer to the United States on security cooperation and undo some of the hostility encountered during the previous administrations, such as supporting Canada's involvement in the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP). The SPP, signed in Waco, Texas, in 2005, is viewed skeptically by Canadians and Americans both, who believe it is a cover for ushering in a North American Union (NAU) under a shroud of secrecy.²² Ironically, Canadians view it as a loss of sovereignty to the United States, while American citizens view it as a loss of sovereignty to Mexico.²³

Framework for Cooperation: Common Threats

Three areas that have witnessed an increase in security cooperation among the three countries involve natural disasters, pandemic influenza, and drug trafficking. After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in September 2005, both the Canadian and Mexican militaries sent uniformed personnel to the United States to aid in disaster relief. For Mexico, the sight of Army convoys, traveling north across the U.S.- Mexican border signaled a new era of security relations with the United States and a new role for the Mexican military, operating outside its borders.²⁴ For Canada, it was a routine deployment, providing humanitarian assistance, this time to its southern neighbor.²⁵

In May 2009, the H1N1 swine flu outbreak in Mexico threatened to become a pandemic, with cases spreading to the United States and around the world. Mexico moved quickly to control the disease by shutting down the country for up to three weeks, closing schools, restaurants and even suspending Cinco de Mayo celebration gatherings. Although some U.S. members of Congress called for a closing of the border, the Obama administration refrained from taking any extraordinary measures to halt travel or commerce between the countries. The sense of cooperation in the public health sector rapidly escalated as a priority for all three governments. In fact, they had already developed tri-national instruments to advance communication and the necessity of rapid coordination linked to the World Health Organization.²⁶ For the United States, this was done through the Department of Homeland Security; in Mexico, the Ministry of Public Health; and in Canada, the Public Safety Office. This demonstrated the ability of all three governments to reach a level of cooperation and convergence toward a common threat.

The recent spike in drug-related violence along the U.S.- Mexican border has caused serious concern for the United States and Canada. In March 2008, Mexico sent five thousand soldiers and federal judicial police to Ciudad Juárez, across from El Paso, Texas, to help the beleaguered municipal police combat the drug cartels and stem the homicide rate. Despite their presence, homicides reached a record 1600 deaths in the city by December 2008.²⁷ Another five thousand troops were sent to Juárez in March 2009, taking control of the city and all law enforcement and government operations in the city. On May 14, 2009, President Calderón visited Juárez, meeting with military and state and local government officials. Calling it the "epicenter" of Mexico's war on drugs, President Calderón's decision to "militarize" the conflict in the state of Chihuahua has caused some Mexican Government officials to worry about the strategy, warning that if they do not succeed in controlling the violence in Juárez,

then other cities and states throughout the country will fail as well.²⁸ Canada has also experienced a spillover effect on its border with the United States when there has been increased attention placed on the U.S. southern border or Caribbean trafficking routes. It is extremely likely that Mexican drug trafficking organizations are expanding their operations in Canada today, where they see the U.S.- Canadian border as more porous and easier to penetrate.²⁹

The Road Ahead: August 2009 North American Leaders Summit

In August 2009, Guadalajara, Mexico, hosted a North American Leaders Summit attended by Barack Obama, Felipe Calderon, and Stephen Harper. The two-day event focused on the swine flu (H1N1 Virus) pandemic, economic and trade issues, transnational criminal activity, and global warming.³⁰ Although the leaders did not specifically address the need for a new strategic security relationship, perimeter defense and regional security cooperation will remain a key component of the trilateral relationship between Canada, Mexico, and the United States for many years to come. A catastrophic terrorist incident at the border, pandemic flu, the rise of powerful drug trafficking cartels, or even a major natural disaster are not isolated events which impact only one nation. They pose a series of challenges to the region as a whole and recognition that the growing interdependence, which is still primarily economic, has created a security dimension of its own, whereby a threat to any one of the three countries has to be considered a threat to all three. The challenge this new reality poses is key to developing a trilateral strategic security relationship, one that is yet cognizant of the relative power of each nation within the international system. The weight and dimension of each nation and their particular views on national security concerns are still very different, which makes security cooperation a complex task, although a much needed one for the future of North America.

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administered through the U.S. Southern Command, which had moved its headquarters from Panama to Miami commensurate with the handover of the Panama Canal in 1999. Canada, as part of NATO, was essentially part of U.S. European Command's "Area of Responsibility" for all intents and purposes, with the exception of Canada's involvement in NORAD, which came under SPACECOM, which was functional, rather than geographic Combatant Command.

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Strategic Asymmetric Deception and Its Role in the Current Threat Environment

By Seth A. Gulsby

Introduction

President Bill Clinton's Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, once stated that the post-Cold War world of the 1990s was a "paradox [where] American military superiority actually increase[d] the threat of... attack against [the U.S.] by creating incentives for adversaries to challenge us asymmetrically."¹ He was alluding to the fact that the Cold War's closure was supposed to bring about a situation that encouraged peace, nation-building, and unilateral comfort for the United States.² The reality that America has come to know is quite different, and some might even argue that, given the option, many people would return to a security situation comparable to the bipolar world of the Cold War.

A newly materialized (or at least recognized) "asymmetric adversary" is the current source of this uneasiness and virtual disorientation in Western societies.³ Asymmetric warfare is as old as warfare itself and revolves around the weaker entity (state or non-state actor) using its strengths to exploit the apparent weaknesses of the stronger entity. Rod Thornton, author of one of the definitive books on asymmetric warfare, comes to the conclusion that finding a singular, end-all-be-all definition for this "term du jour" is pointless. He claims that each published definition is relative to the sphere of influence where the conflict originates; specifically the protagonist's home nation and the realm of security in question (i.e. land warfare, naval warfare, human intelligence, geospatial intelligence, etc.).⁴ Though it is largely slanted towards the viewpoint of the United States and other democratic nation-states—and therefore ethnocentric to some extent—the following is a proposed working descriptor for *asymmetric warfare*:

"Asymmetric warfare comprises attempts to circumvent or undermine an opposing force's strengths while exploiting his weaknesses and vulnerabilities. The weaker party does this using methods that differ significantly from the apparently stronger party; the weaker party typically employs innovative, non-traditional tactics, weapons, or technologies that can be applied

at all levels of warfare—strategic, operational, and tactical—and across the spectrum of military operations."⁵

Thornton would argue that this definition is still deficient because it fails to mention the "inability to mirror" created by asymmetric approaches.⁶ This idea indicates that the targeted country (i.e. the stronger state-actor) either cannot or will not exercise the same practices as his asymmetric foe. This may be due to some level of moral or ethical rectitude.⁷ Asymmetric warfare plays on and tests American expectations as determined by cultural values, norms, and mores plus the tendency to transpose Western ideals on to the enemy. In short, what may morally compromise any given member of Western society might not have the same effect on the asymmetric actor. A clear cut example of this principle is the practice of Iraqi insurgent groups coaxing mentally-handicapped Arab men and women to don explosive-laden suicide vests and "martyr" themselves in local marketplaces. Americans and other Coalition members on the other hand expect competitors to "follow the rules of the game."⁸ However, the capable asymmetric fighter seeks "ways to turn our strengths against us," as Congressman Ike Skelton so fittingly described.⁹

The weaker party's strengths may and often include:

1. Familiarity with and ability to traverse local terrain
2. Ability to easily mesh with the local populace, but claim non-affiliation if necessary (foreign fighters, freedom fighters/mujahedeen, jihadist, insurgents, guerillas, etc.)
3. Apparent disregard for Laws of Land Warfare; both Jus ad Bellum (justice of war) and Jus in Bello (justice in war)
4. Ability to affect social and domestic support for the opposing force (media images, black propaganda campaigns, etc.)
5. External support (monetary, weapons, training, logistics) from more robust State-Actors (e.g., Iranian support for Hizbollah); asymmetric adversaries are often the tip of the spear for offensive operations conducted in proxy warfare

Given that the primary goal of the weaker party is to exploit the opposing force's vulnerabilities, then it is highly probable that asymmetric approaches will employ deception as part of their strategy. One of the central themes of deception in military and intelligence undertakings is to increase the quantity and visibility of an opponent's weaknesses.¹⁰ The

goal is essentially to expose the enemy to further danger and exploitation in a willful manner. More importantly, this goal is achieved in a way that is unwitting to the enemy. It is clear that deception measures can be useful in asymmetric warfare; so the next issue to address is how one might encounter asymmetric deception and at what echelon: tactical, operational, or strategic.

The weaker asymmetric adversary may use deception measures to skew the information received by the opposing force. Consequently, the information becomes compromised, diminished or misleading for purposes of misdirection. In the current threat environment, coalition forces face significant challenges in the education and practice of theater Rules of Engagement (ROE). If the asymmetric enemy can deceive the ground troops into an armed engagement based on flawed or false scenario information (i.e. a potential ROE violation), it is likely that the on-scene commander will be publicly ostracized by the likes of Al-Jazeera and liberal Western media sources. This vignette would precipitate a major propaganda success for the weaker asymmetric actor and the deterioration of public support for his opponent. Thus, the situation evolves into a victory for the weaker asymmetric opponent regardless of the result at the tactical level. If related scenarios transpire without interdiction, then momentum increases and the weaker protagonist achieves success on the Strategic level. Hearts and minds are lost on both sides based on the weaker actor's ability to "increase uncertainty" through the use of asymmetric deception.¹¹ At some point, the larger nation-state's war effort will ultimately fail if national support ceases for the conflict. This scenario has a very real-world salience as demonstrated by historical examples such as Vietnam.

Operational level asymmetric deception may be an even more daunting challenge. The reason being that planned and executed operations are fewer and further between within non-linear, asymmetric organizations such as al-Qaida. One might argue that the 9/11 scenario was a full-scale asymmetric operation and offensive in nature. The September 11 attacks took years of planning, logistical support, and training in order to bring about the end-state of the operation. Correspondingly, the deception associated with these events took place at the tactical and operational levels. At a tactical level, the young al-Qaida operatives training at American aeronautical institutes had to have credible cover plans with fortified backstopping. On the operational side, cells within the international terrorist network were "splintered" away from each other; isolated and unbeknownst to the overall cause in order to maintain operational security. Upon completion, the *immediate* fall out of the events was a strategic victory by all accounts for al-Qaida and all other global Islamic jihadists.

Evidence of authentic strategic deception measures is hard to discern and document in the world of asymmetric warfare. Perhaps there will never be a clearly defined strategic-level deception effort carried out through asymmetric means, or maybe the efforts are so keenly planned and executed that no observable intelligence subsists near the cloak of deception. Yet if the observer can change his lens slightly and focus on the endgame, it is rational to say that *all* asymmetric warfare efforts and associated deception measures aim to yield strategic results.

Given that the nature of military and intelligence doctrine is to provide sound, principled guidance for proactive and responsive action, then how does one counter an adversary who utilizes asymmetric measures, which are inherently obtuse and unique to each application?¹² Especially with respect to asymmetric deception, every individual situation is bound to leave the ground commander or intelligence analyst saying, "I have never seen anything like this before. I do not know how to effectively respond."

How, then, can a strong state-actor counter asymmetric deception at all levels? One need only look to the Socratic philosophy that said "Know thyself." In defeating an opponent and re-leveling the playing field, it is important to look inward and understand one's own weaknesses. The goal is to identify any outstanding or prospect vulnerabilities. The protagonist nation-state must be humble throughout the process or it will ultimately be humbled by a lesser adversary. The next step is to risk mitigate the apparent vulnerabilities before the enemy has time to exploit them. Without flagrantly compromising moral fortitude, the stronger protagonist state must adapt and fight the enemy by employing tactics and methods that may be non-traditional. Here, the adage of "fighting fire with fire" may ring true. In deception and counter-deception, a greater presence of personnel from clandestine intelligence, paramilitary, and special operation organizations is also necessary. Conventional, linear units are not ideal for defeating or even matching asymmetric deception threats.

The corollary axiom to the "know thyself" credo of course is to "know thy enemy" as well. One of the greatest historical proponents of both deception and knowing the enemy was Sun Tzu. His seminal work, *The Art of War*, advocated several derivative questions for use in counter-deception efforts: Does the enemy have a history of using deception? Is there an inherent cultural bias either for or against the use of deception by the enemy? If such a template exists, how would it fit the current problem?¹³

Conclusion

In summary, the defeat of this newly materialized force may hinge upon the larger nation-state's ability to make honest assessments of itself and know its own weaknesses. Furthermore, that nation must understand that every action taken by the asymmetric adversary, especially in the realm of deception, is geared toward strategic conquests. There are no small victories in the asymmetric fight; winning the conflict may be accomplished off the classical battlefield. And though strategic deception may be a most inscrutable and almost intangible concept, the stronger protagonist state can achieve success by locating and foiling the tactical and operational deception efforts of a capable asymmetric enemy.

About the Author

Seth A. Gulsby is a Captain in the Aviation branch of the U.S. Army. He received his commission from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 2006 where he was a four year letter recipient in Varsity Football. After West Point, Gulsby completed rotary-wing flight training at the Army's flight school in Ft. Rucker, AL, and now flies OH-58D Kiowa Warriors in the Air Cavalry. He completed his first tour in support of OIF in 2008 and is ramping up for a second deployment in March 2010. CPT Gulsby has thus far completed six courses in pursuit of a Master's in Intelligence Management through Henley-Putnam University.

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Book Reviews

***The History of Camp Tracy: Japanese WWII POWs and the Future of Strategic Interrogation.* By Alexander D. Corbin. Fort Belvoir, VA: Ziedon Press, 2009. ISBN: 978-0-578-02979-5. Maps. Photographs. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 189. \$15.95.**

The History of Camp Tracy, which received the Joint Chiefs of Staff History Office's Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz Archival Research Award, is an illuminating and educating read. The book is written by Alexander Corbin, an intelligence officer in the U.S. Army with military intelligence experience. Corbin combines his understanding of intelligence collection with an historical examination of the interrogation of Japanese POWs to produce a work that should appeal to intelligence professionals and people who wonder how we can prevent incidents like those at Abu Ghraib.

Corbin begins by exploring the dilemma the nation faces in detaining and interrogating terrorists with an Islamic fundamentalist bent. Not only do our values and religious beliefs greatly differ, but there also exists a language barrier and differences in physical appearances. Corbin persuasively argues that the threat posed by terrorists is actually an experience that the country has already faced, albeit in a different guise. Corbin relates that Japanese POWs in World War II were also viewed through lenses accentuating their differences in values, culture, appearance, and language.

Despite the strangeness associated with captured Japanese soldiers, the U.S. military was able to successfully collect intelligence from them. This contrasts from the military's recent experiences in Abu Ghraib where its failures have been widely publicized, and also the detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Camp Delta. Corbin briefly examines the faults associated with these interrogation centers and then launches into a case study of Camp Tracy, the American World War II joint interrogation center where Japanese POWs were successfully interrogated.

Although Corbin persuasively demonstrates that Islamic jihadists are akin to Japanese soldiers, some of the historical parallels are not equivalent. American society has changed since World War II, and it could be debated whether Americans today would tolerate terrorists being imprisoned on U.S. soil, close to where they live. The author also states that there has yet to be proof that the intelligence gathered at Camp Tracy led directly to any intelligence breakthroughs. This is not to say that a lack of evidence presupposes that it does not exist, but it does weaken arguments

which seek to accentuate the importance of Camp Tracy and the value of intelligence gathered at that location.

While not everything that has worked in the past can be transplanted today, Corbin impressively describes in great detail the tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by the interrogators at Camp Tracy. These techniques, such as pre-screening POWs, false ceilings, the use of stool pigeons, and applying intelligence already known to psychologically intimidate POWs, can be successfully incorporated into America's intelligence community. The interrogators at Camp Tracy, unlike many of America's human intelligence interrogators at Abu Ghraib, received an extensive education in Japanese language, culture, and interrogation training. These intelligence professionals continuously modified their techniques as they sought to improve their intelligence gathering. Most important, the interrogators at Camp Tracy never resorted to physical coercion or torture when interrogating Japanese POWs because of their education, expertise, and moral values.

Another major reason Camp Tracy succeeded was the total secrecy involved with the site. Not even people in the community of Byron Hot Springs and Tracy, which were very small towns, knew that Japanese POWs were being quartered there. It seems in this Twitter age we live in, that a facility such as Camp Tracy on American soil would eventually be exposed.

America's human intelligence collection could be greatly improved if the training, techniques, and culture which existed amongst the interrogators at Camp Tracy were replicated. *The History of Camp Tracy* succeeds in mining an historical vignette such as Camp Tracy to great depths, and then elucidating how this experience can benefit intelligence professionals. Corbin has ensured that America will not forget the lessons learned from Camp Tracy. Hopefully, these lessons will at least be partially implemented so that America can successfully collect intelligence while also disassociating itself from torture.

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***Spaces of Security and Insecurity: Geographies of the War on Terror.* Edited by Alan Ingram and Klaus Dodds. Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009. ISBN: 978-0-7546-7349-1. Pp 288. Plates. Figures. Index. \$114.95 (hardcover).**

This volume is part of a series on "Critical Geopolitics" edited by Klaus Dodds, an editor of the current volume, and Merje Kuus. The series seeks to examine the field of geopolitics, which the editors place as a sub-discipline of human geography. The approach of the series as a whole is highly multidisciplinary, encompassing popular culture as well as issues of security, international relations, and global power projection.

There are several main themes that wend their way through this book, such as the spatial vocabulary of international relations—words and concepts like "homeland," "international community," "failed state" and, of course, "terrorism." Another theme concerns the way ideas of security invoke particular kinds of politics; exceptional prerogatives and recourse to violence that would otherwise not be possible. At the same time, security is as much about the routine as well as the exceptional.

Geography is the effort of humans to seek or impose order—geometries or power—on the world and its various topographies, or simply find meaning in them. In so doing one tries to establish rules by which those orders function, rules which are constantly re-imagined and contested. This paradox lies at the heart of the War on Terror and the changing landscapes of security.

Questions of national sovereignty and the rights of one nation to intervene in the affairs of another make up some of the most controversial aspects of the larger debate, and the essays in this book make an excellent primer on this topic. The authors take a realistic view in the sense that while the rules of international relations demand adherence to concepts like territorial integrity, national self-determination, and rights of self-defense, cornerstones of international relations, these are also routinely violated on both small and large scales. The build-up to the war in Iraq is examined from several perspectives as a case study to such exceptions. For the most part they follow the debate to explain or define the "failed state" that is often used to justify intervention—and as the authors freely admit, for the purposes of enabling self-serving agendas of those who would intervene. The question of the extent to which the build-up to the Iraq War was based on intentional deception on the part of both the Bush and Blair administrations is examined.

Most of the essays that make up *Spaces of Security and Insecurity* were originally presented as sessions at the annual conference of the Royal Geographical Society with the Institute of British Geographers in London. These sessions, which took place in September of 2007, sought to evaluate the ways in which geographers had contributed to the analysis of the U.S.-led War on Terror, as well as the larger picture of contemporary landscapes of security. The papers contained in this volume cover a wide range of geographies, both physical and metaphorical; Afghanistan, the European Union, Iraq, New Zealand, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and the United States. The article on Sri Lanka, while informative and worth reading, is nonetheless dated due to the conclusive end of the civil war there, which was declared ended by the Sri Lankan government in May of 2009.

In each of these cases, one finds stimulating and well-researched examples of ways in which one party or another's dominant vision of security in the War on Terror has woven into (or collided with) a variety of geographies, and thus become subject to scrutiny and criticism. It is clear that for some parties the War on Terror is incidental to the opportunities it creates, namely to facilitate moves towards a preferred state of affairs. For instance, in the "Introduction" by Ingram and Dodds, they point out that for certain radical Christian Evangelical groups the War on Terror is viewed not as a path towards security, but a plan to kill non-believers. Taking up this theme in a later chapter, Jason Dittmer ("Maranatha! Premillennial Dispensationalism and the Counter-Intuitive Geopolitics of Security") shows how the apocalyptic leitmotif of global destruction, or at least coming years of "Tribulation," are viewed with enthusiasm by some members of that community, and how this is driven both by belief and by external circumstances of economic security as well as the clash of values between their own traditional beliefs and the modern world.

Another interesting article is by Nick Megoran concerning "Colonizing Commemoration: Sacred Space and the War on Terror" in which the author examines the use of religious ritual, particularly that of commemoration and memorial, as a means of defining the War on Terror, as well as how the War on Terror has intruded into religious discourse. It is a fascinating study on a seldom-seen aspect of modern geopolitics and the sociological use and abuse of the grieving process.

For this reviewer, the title of Megoran's article was evocative of older paradigms, specifically the concept of "sacred space" described in studies of both ancient and modern comparative religion and championed during the previous century by a number of scholars, of whom Mircea Eliade was perhaps the most prolific and articulate spokesman. This idea, briefly stated, is that the traditional, myth-based nation was a heirocentric state

in which its moral, political, divine, and even cosmic integrity were defined and maintained by the presence of sacred areas such as temples, shrines, and other holy sites to which the social literally owed its existence. Parallels with modern notions of boundaries and national sovereignty are not hard to find.

To conclude, although there are some articles which may appear to have been rendered outdated due to the onrush of world events, this is not a book that should be ignored. *Spaces of Security and Insecurity* constitutes one of the better discussions of the many issues surrounding the task facing any nation that wishes to co-exist with eccentric or troublesome neighbors, especially in a world where globalization makes virtually all nations neighbors, whether they like it or not.

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***The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture.* By Ishmael Jones. New York: Encounter Books, 2008. Appendices. Notes. Bibliography. 383 pp. \$27.95. ISBN: 1-59403-223-8.**

The Human Factor is not the ordinary 'kiss and tell' memoir and is unlike the flood of books assigning blame or credit to the Intelligence Community for the intelligence failures of 9/11, the second Iraq War, the rise of radical Islamism, and the spread of nuclear technology to rogue states such as Iran. It also is not a deeply analytical study of how these failures occurred or how they could be prevented in the future. This volume is less of an academic study of the Clandestine Service than an extended self-reported psychological study of how at least some of America's best, brightest, and bravest have been systematically demoralized and driven quietly from public service.

Ishmael Jones is a *nom de plume* for a clandestine case officer in the most secret part of the Central Intelligence Agency, the non-official cover operatives, known as NOCs. These officers operate overseas without diplomatic immunity, often in the most dangerous assignments. If caught they are disavowed by the Agency, although they are often traded for foreign spies arrested in the United States. Without diplomatic immunity, NOCs lack the protection of international conventions covering treatment of diplomats caught "spying" and can be tortured, imprisoned, or even executed. It would be an understatement to say that this is an inherently stressful job. Divorce, alcoholism, infidelity, and confusion about self-identity are standard hazards of the job. As one former colleague of mine told me after his cover was blown and he had to seek other employment, "your entire life is a lie. You use your family, your assets/agents, your friends and your colleagues all to persuade the citizen of another country to betray his homeland. His life is in your hands, but the *persona* that you reveal to him is a lie and you are supposed to remember which side you are working for."

Jones' book was not authorized for publication by the CIA. He admits that he cannot fathom why. This makes it all the more intriguing. Who is Ishmael Jones and is anything in the book verifiable? Except for some extensive quotations from the public record—much of it well trod ground—the answer is no. This limits the utility the book might have had as an accurate guide to what really are the problems faced by the Clandestine Service and how they might be remedied.

Instead, we are left with what appears to be yet another anonymous book of gripes by an unhappy ex-employee. Yet the vividness of the narrative of

Jones' career bears a whiff of truth when we compare it to other sourced and CIA authorized accounts that are every bit as scathing of the intelligence community's shortcomings. Many of his stories demonstrate a wry sense of humor in difficult circumstances and are quite amusing. As one wag said, 'even if these stories aren't true, they ought to be.' What we do know from the public literature is that the Agency has been the source of enormous wasteful spending, poor accounting, sloppy security practices, and heavy handed self-serving management. Jones gives us a rare bottom up view of these problems, in contrast to the more top down academic critiques produced by college and university professors.

The biggest failure of the book is that Jones, writing at the end of his career, comes across as embittered, arrogant, self-serving, vengeful, and potentially violent. In a word, he is the perfect target for recruitment by a foreign intelligence service. This is a shameful situation for an individual who was (supposedly) a Marine officer, a genuine patriot who put his country's interest above that of himself and his family. He proudly makes the point that he was scrupulously honest with government money, when many of his colleagues were enriching themselves. Even if many of the details of the book are fanciful or have names changed to protect the innocent, and, by the way, to comply with the law, Jones' story is a mandate for corrective action. For this we are indebted to him for baring his soul publicly.

Unfortunately, Jones' self-professed aversion to virtually any kind of management, which he lambastes on almost every page, makes his proposals of correction of Agency management practices of limited value. He admits that he never personally served in any senior management post. Therefore it is not surprising that he fails to connect the pressures that senior management faces to the operational frustration he and others are forced to endure. His lack of experience in the maelstrom of the Washington interagency process leaves him insensitive to the conflicts among intelligence agencies and between the Intelligence Community and the Executive and Legislative branches. This is undoubtedly the product of being at the bottom of the food chain. Nonetheless, Jones gives totally unjustifiable short shrift to the value of technical means of collection, such as space based assets, signals analysis, military collection, and the rest of the collection apparatus of the U.S. Government. This leads him to commit factual errors in his book, such as his inaccurate allegations about the state of knowledge of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs—matters well documented in the press critiques and the post 9/11 Congressional investigations.

Jones is right when he states that heavy handed management led to intelligence failures, but that is true of almost every failure of large institutions. His suggestions for flattening management have already been implemented in the wake of criticism of the CIA restructuring in the wake of 9/11, although not as thoroughly as many would prefer. His notion of shifting all domestic based intelligence to the FBI demonstrates his lack of understanding of how dysfunctional the FBI is as an intelligence agency when it comes to foreign threats. The 9/11 disaster was ample proof of that, as is the continuing bleed of vital technology information to Chinese intelligence operatives and agents in the United States. His suggestion to shift foreign intelligence to the military is undercut by the example of Pearl Harbor.

In conclusion, Jones has written an entertaining and instructive volume which has a definite place in the study of the intelligence process. Like every other study of what is inherently a secret business, it must be taken with several grains of salt. It is a pity what happened to Jones. He, and we, deserve better. The numbers of stars in the foyer of the CIA headquarters testify to the ultimate sacrifice of many brave and competent CIA personnel from every branch of the Agency. Unlike the dead, we fail to honor the 'walking wounded' who should not also have suffered in vain.

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