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PROJECT CONCEPT NOTE

ON A

PROPOSED LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF 110.00 (US\$M)

TO THE

Republic of El Salvador

FOR A

El Salvador Safer Cities Through Social Resilience (P156864)

Vice President:	Jorge Familiar Calderon
Country Director:	J. Humberto Lopez
Senior Global Practice Director:	Ede Jorge Ijjasz-Vasquez
Practice Manager/Manager:	Markus Kostner
Team Leader(s):	Marcelo Jorge Fabre

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PCN DATA SHEET

El Salvador

El Salvador Safer Cities Through Social Resilience (P156864)

PROJECT CONCEPT NOTE

LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN

Basic Information			
Project ID	Lending Instrument	EA Category	Team Leader(s)
P156864	Investment Project Financing	B - Partial Assessment	Marcelo Jorge Fabre
Project Implementation Start Date		Project Implementation End Date	
15-Sep-2016		15-Sep-2020	
Joint IFC			
No			
Practice Manager/ Manager	Senior Global Practice Director	Country Director	Regional Vice President
Markus Kostner	Ede Jorge Ijjasz- Vasquez	J. Humberto Lopez	Jorge Familiar Calderon

Project Financing Data			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Loan	<input type="checkbox"/> IDA Grant	<input type="checkbox"/> Guarantee	<input type="checkbox"/> Other
<input type="checkbox"/> Credit	<input type="checkbox"/> Grant		
For Loans/Credits/Others (US\$M)			
Total Project Cost:	110.00	Total Bank Financing:	110.00
Financing Gap:	0.00		

Financing Source	Amount
Borrower	0.00
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	110.00
Total	110.00

Borrower: Republic of El Salvador	
Contact: Carlos Saenz	Title: Director de Coordinación
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Responsible Agency: Ministry of Justice and Security and Public Security	
Contact: Javier Martinez	Title: Vice-Minister of Prevention
Telephone No.: 5032526-3093	Email: javier.martinez@seguridad.gob.sv

Institutional Data
Practice Area (Lead)

Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience Global Practice

Contributing Practice Areas
 Education, Fragile, Conflict & Violence, Health, Nutrition & Population, Social Protection & Labor

Cross Cutting Topics

Climate Change
 Fragile, Conflict & Violence
 Gender
 Jobs
 Public Private Partnership

Sectors / Climate Change

Sector (Maximum 5 and total % must equal 100)

Major Sector	Sector	%	Adaptation Co-benefits %	Mitigation Co-benefits %
Public Administration, Law, and Justice	Public administration- Other social services	100		
Total		100		

I certify that there is no Adaptation and Mitigation Climate Change Co-benefits information applicable to this project.

Themes

Theme (Maximum 5 and total % must equal 100)

Major Theme	Theme	%
Social dev/gender/inclusion	Other social development	50
Social dev/gender/inclusion	Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction	50
Total		100

Private Capital Mobilized

Private Capital Mobilized
 No

Gender Tag

Does the activity plan to undertake any of the following? Please select Yes or No for each:

Gender analysis and/or consultation on gender related issues.
 Yes

Specific actions to address the distinct needs of women and girls, or men and boys, or positive impacts on gender gaps.
 Yes

Mechanisms to facilitate monitoring and/or evaluation of gender impacts.
 Yes

Consultants (Will be disclosed in the Monthly Operational Summary)

Consultants Required ? Consultants will be required

El Salvador
El Salvador Safer Cities Through Social Resilience (P156864)

I. Introduction and Context

A. Country Context

1. El Salvador is affected by a general climate of insecurity originating in the enormous prevalence of crime and violent activities. Many believe that the current insecurity originates in the legacy of the civil war (1979-1992), which costed 75,000 lives and displaced about 1 million people, the latter corresponding to about 20 percent of the country's population.

2. By the end of the civil war (after 1992), the return of voluntary and deported Salvadorans from the United States – many of them members of gangs (maras) formed in the United States west coast and the northeastern corridors among Salvadoran migrant communities – gradually fueled renewed criminal activity, stimulated by an increase in drug trafficking through Central America. Gang members were able to lure the youth into their ranks by providing economic – albeit often illegal – opportunities and a sense of identity. Gang members now outnumber police personnel employed to fight them: between 30.000 and 60.000 estimated active gang members versus 22.000 operative and 6.000 administrative police personnel.

3. As a result and since 2000, El Salvador has been among the top 5 countries in the world in homicide rates, with the number of intentional killings always above 30 per 100,000 inhabitants, five times the world average, peaking at over 80 homicides per 100,000 with a brief interlude made possible by the 2012 gang truce. In comparison with the civil war, which cost a total of 75,000 lives, there were 47,000 homicides registered in El Salvador between January 2000 and December 2014, with a peak reaching over 100 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2015. Since 2010, crime overtook economic issues as the number one problem in the country as perceived by the population.

4. Violent acts are concentrated in about 50 out of the 262 municipalities in the country. Furthermore, the most affected populations – and epicenter of gang activity – are concentrated in about 2,500 slums, with an estimated population of about half a million inhabitants. In some of these territories – often becoming no-go zones - organized crime is now ruling and the authorities have limited, if any, access. While El Salvador is a known route for significant portions of world's cocaine going to the United States, Salvadoran gangs are relatively small compared to the narco-cartels of Colombia and Mexico, and derive most of their income from local drug trafficking, robbery and extortion.

5. High political and social polarization remain a critical issue in El Salvador even after more than two decades after the end of the civil war. This makes policy reforms in citizen security and the provision of international assistance more difficult. The traditional two parties, National Republic Alliance (ARENA) and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), remain seen as ideologically opposed to each other as in the past. Given that the FMLN, the ruling party, does not hold enough seats in Congress to reach neither simple nor qualified majority, it is dependent on alliances with the opposition parties to advance its proposed reform agenda.

6. The effects of crime and violence on the social and economic development of El Salvador are substantial, as the costs of violence are estimated at around 11 percent of the country's GDP, including public and private security costs, material losses, and health costs. Enterprises,

particularly micro, small, and medium, as well as households are heavily affected by extortions and high levels of violence in their commercial activities. In addition to paying for private security costs, which together with transport and energy are among the highest in the world, there is increasing evidence that fear of crime, and in particular extortions, prompts some businesses to exit from the market altogether.

B. Sectoral and Institutional Context

a) The gangs truce – Temporary reduction of violence

7. In March 2012, El Salvador's two main gangs, MS-13 and Barrio 18, agreed on a truce supported by the government of Mauricio Funes (FMLN) and facilitated by a government advisor and a Catholic bishop. Based on the agreement reached, imprisoned gang leaders were transferred from a maximum-security prison to other jails in exchange for a reduction in violence, in which the gangs agreed to end forced recruitment of children and young people, respect schools and buses as zones of peace and reduce attacks on the security forces. In the succeeding months, the gangs surrendered limited amounts of weapons, and the drop in homicides was immediate, from about 14 cases per day to about five.

8. The truce soon became increasingly polarized and criticized by some members of the opposition, representatives of the civil society, and the media for the persistence of extortions and disappearances in spite of the apparent decline in homicides. Concerns also crystallized around the idea that the truce was a legitimization of criminal structures and an opportunity for the gangs to reorganize themselves. In 2013, the truce process entered a second phase supported by the Organization of the American States and the European Commission, centered on the creation of 11 violence-free municipalities gathering a combined population of more than 1 million (out of 6 million) based on an agreement among local authorities, gangs and facilitators to commit to cease violence in exchange for a reduction in police operations and raids and reinsertion programs. In spite of some positive results, in 2014, in the context of a turf war between two factions of Barrio 18, a polarized presidential debate, and weakened government support to the truce, the downward trend in murder rates began to reverse: the levels of crime and violence increased suddenly, with a total of 3,912 homicides, 55 percent higher than the previous year and representing a number of 10.5 homicides a day, compared to 6.8 in 2013. At the beginning of 2015, the new President Salvador Sánchez Ceren (FMLN) announced that he would discontinue the support for the truce, and leaders of the gangs were returned to a maximum security prison in Zacatecoluca. So far more than 3,830 people have been murdered in El Salvador between January and August, indicating a significant increase compared to 2014.

b) Other crime and extended manifestations of violence

9. In spite of their epidemic levels, homicides constitute only a minority of the crimes committed in El Salvador: 80 percent of the registered crimes are theft, robbery, extortion, domestic violence, injuries and rape. El Salvador also witnessed an increase of drug-related crimes by 17.5 percent between January-September 2014, compared to the same period in 2013. Since 2005, the volume of cocaine seized in Central America rose uncontrollably; in 2011 it was three times higher than the volume seized in Mexico. The profile of perpetrators and victims, as well as factors linked to the presence of crime and violence in El Salvador are well identified. The communities at risk are those deprived of access to basic services including running water and education, proper housing and where jobs are lacking. Young males are the most likely population segment to be involved in violence – both as victims as well as perpetrators: in 2012, 92% of the victims of homicides were men.

2. Institutional Context

10. Between 2000 and 2009, the government adopted an iron fist policy (*mano dura*) to deal with elements affecting citizen security, emphasizing persecution rather than violence prevention. Ultimately, these efforts failed to reduce the rates of crime and violence, leading to a remilitarization of the security sector and a strengthening of laws and sentences against gangs. Access to power by the FMLN in 2009 led to the adoption of a different approach on citizen security, with an emphasis on violence prevention rather than repression. Between 2009 and 2012, the FMLN stood out from the previous policies by adopting prevention-based strategies to crime and violence. From 2012 on, it also made use of innovative approaches such as the promotion of the truce between gangs, which led in 2013 to the lowest reported levels of homicides in the country since 2003, with 39.7 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.

11. The end of the gang truce in 2014 was followed by a gradual increase in government-led repressive policies. The government responded to the dramatic surge of violence that followed by increasing the operation of the anti-gang police, and “arresting allegedly more than 4,400 gang members in the first months of 2015.” It increased drastically “the seizure of weapons, drugs and money and passed news laws making it harder to investigate police violence.” In addition, the government encouraged an increase in “the military’s participation in public security by deploying a total of 3,000 soldiers (40% of army personnel) in support of police for patrols, joint operations and apprehension of suspects”.

12. The authorities elected in 2014 and led by President Salvador Sanchez Ceren set citizen security as one of its top three priorities, aiming to make El Salvador more “productive, educated, and safe” by promoting inclusive growth and resilience building. Specifically, the government supports three priority pillars: (a) stimulating productive employment through sustained economic growth; (b) bolstering education with inclusion and social equity; and (c) strengthening citizen security, through an ambitious program of multiple objectives and actions.

13. Given previously mentioned high levels of political polarization, reforms in the sector of citizen security – as in other sensitive sector – require broad support beyond the lines defined by political blocks. In this context, the President announced in September 2014 the creation of the National Council on Citizen Security (*Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana y Convivencia*), comprised of State institutions, different political parties, churches, businesses, and members of the civil society and international community, and mandated it to produce a consensual strategy meant to guide the government actions in the field of citizen security for the next 5 years. In 2015, the work of the Council was subsumed in the *Plan El Salvador Seguro*, a detailed document that recommends a series of actions to improve citizen security.

14. Relying on the recommendations of the *Plan El Salvador Seguro*, the government defined priorities and reforms for the period 2015-2019 in two strategic documents, namely, the Five-Year Development Plan (*Plan Quinquenal de Desarrollo*), and the National Plan on Crime and Violence Prevention (*Plan Nacional de Prevención de la Violencia y Delincuencia de El Salvador*). The latter Plan defines 7 strategic objectives to improve citizen security, which focus on the articulation and integration of the institutions and territorial activities of the executive branch, inclusion and protection from violence of teenagers into a system of schools operating full time, the protection and strengthening of the families most exposed to violence, the strengthening of citizen and business organizations throughout, the strengthening of the capacity of local governments to lead, integrate and coordinate all necessary preventive actions undertaken by the

public institutions on their territory, employment support, and change in the socio cultural patterns of violence and discrimination against women.

15. The National Plan on Crime and Violence Prevention defines a set of 19 institutions included in the sub national system of crime and violence prevention. Please see the Supplementary Project Description (SPD) note for the list of institutions.

16. The Plan El Salvador Seguro is a consensual plan designed by various political and social actors of the Salvadorian society and adopted by the Government as a guiding tool for the design of its violence prevention policies. It considers overcrowding of the penitentiary system and the lack of resources of the police and justice institutions as key factors contributing to a perpetuation of the gang system and related activities. It also considers crime impunity as a major problem linked to and reinforced by institutional deficiencies. The Plan El Salvador Seguro reports that deficiencies in the education, training and promotion criteria of the police contribute as well to crime impunity, and reports that lack of information and database capacity limit the use of scientific evidence. The Plan also reports difficulties of cooperation between the different institutions and the interplay of the drivers of crime, violence and insecurity at the various levels.

C. Relationship to CAS

17. The Government of El Salvador (GoES) has requested WBG support for the preparation and implementation of a new citizen security operation addressing the prevention of crime and violence. This request for a WB credit is oriented to complement and inject fresh resources into a series of activities ranging from psychosocial support to victims of violence and school-based violence prevention, to the implementation of municipal and community-driven prevention activities, such as the recuperation of physical spaces. The loan for estimated US\$ 110 million is already listed in the Government's inventory of activities integrating the national violence prevention plan mentioned above.

18. The proposed project will contribute to create safer communities in El Salvador, which is the first strategic objective of the WBG Country Partnership Framework (CPF) 2016-2019. The 2015 WBG Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) and CPF for El Salvador identify crime and violence as main impediments to boosting shared prosperity and eliminating poverty for the bottom 40 percent in the country. The CPF features a selective program with six complementary objectives, the first of which is to build the capacity to create safer communities for economic development. Progress on this goal will be measured through four objectives:

- Reduced average perception of insecurity in the municipalities where the project requested by the Government is implemented;
- Enhanced and increased access to secondary violence prevention for special target groups;
- Improved community cohesion through employability and community infrastructure; and
- Reduced capture/recruitment of vulnerable youth by gang structures.

19. The project would benefit from (but also reinforce) interventions in complementary objective areas, such as the on-going projects in education, employability and social protection that are also targeted to municipalities with high rates of crime and violence. Moreover, the ongoing Local Development Strengthening Project also provides financing to 262 Salvadoran municipalities for small infrastructure (street lighting, community centers, and paved roads) to improve the quality of life in the community.

20. The proposed project would aim towards the achievement of this objective by focusing on implementing primary, secondary and tertiary prevention activities in municipalities with high incidence of crime and violence. Interventions would be directed towards the youth, women, and children. By linking activities of the Social Cabinet, the program would focus on interventions that improve psychosocial responses to violence among high-risk populations by providing services that are currently scarce or non-existent, and on recovery of urban spaces in communities and neighborhoods with at-risk populations. Additional activities would support improved local-level coordination, capacity to respond to and monitor events, and increased capacity to design policies based on collected crime and violence information.

II. Proposed PDO/Results

A. Proposed Development Objective(s)

The project development objective is to reduce the socio-economic impacts of crime and violence in priority communities by increasing beneficiaries' ability to withstand and recover from insecurity-related stresses (social resilience).

B. Key Results

Success in achieving the results will be measured by the following project results indicators:

- Improved perception of security, as measured by semiannual independent sample surveys track public opinion changes in selected target communities;
- Number of community public spaces rehabilitated in targeted communities;
- Increased access to psychosocial support, as measured by the number of people receiving psychosocial, gender-based violence, and survival assistance or support immediately after victimization events; and
- Number of schools and communities where prevention interventions have been implemented jointly between different institutions.

III. Project Context

A. Concept

1. Description

Component 1: Dynamization of public spaces

21. The dynamization of public spaces is a critical violence prevention strategy defined in the Plan El Salvador Seguro. This dynamization, as conceived in the Plan, integrates elements of traditional strategies of situational violence prevention, with strong elements of community organization and rebuilding social cohesion and promotion of resilience. More specifically, the GoES aims at recovering existing public spaces in the communities through small infrastructure projects, such as the remodeling of schools; the improvement of parks, playgrounds; the restoration of sport facilities, street lighting, and restoration of cultural centers and similar infrastructure. This will be complemented by a strong dynamization process that includes cultural, artistic, and sport activities as well as community mobilization.

22. The main objective of this component is to rebuild the social fabric in the community and transform public spaces in protection and prevention niches in order to impede, and reduce the adoption of a culture of violence and promote a culture of respect and coexistence.

a) Situational violence prevention interventions

23. This includes the remodeling, restoration and improvement of small-scale existing infrastructure. However, it will not include construction of new spaces and infrastructure.

The interventions will revolve around two goals:

- Reduce opportunities for committing crimes and creating safer community spaces; and
- Serve as centers for the delivery of the social services offered by the project.

24. Situational interventions will be carried out following the Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) approach that helps deter criminal behavior through a physical environmental design that influences human behavior and decision making in a positive manner. More specifically, the project will use second generation CPTED which combines the four main principles dealing with opportunity reduction (natural surveillance, access control, territorial reinforcement, and space management) with dynamics of the social realm that aim at promoting the notions of community and neighborliness in order to prevent crime.

25. Jointly with the Component on Education, the project could support school infrastructure upgrades executed according to the CPTED method. The national coverage of the education infrastructure can serve as a vehicle for violence prevention activities. In the case of the World Bank financed “Escuelas a Tiempo Pleno” (EITP) project, 210 schools benefited from new classrooms to support the integrated school system. In addition to this initiative, the construction or improvement of kitchens, bathrooms, and school courts would have the potential to strengthen the school as a space open to extra-curricular activities, which include community members, and possibly out of school youth who are also exposed to violence.

26. In order to get an accurate sense of infrastructure needs, the Project can finance a survey of the spare capacity of school infrastructure, since it is very diverse. There are schools that have extended days; others with multiple shifts; and some with flexible educational activities. Not all schools have health infrastructure (toilets for adults, separate from children to avoid epidemiological problems, changing rooms with showers, drinking fountains, etc.) and sport facilities.

b) Dynamization through social efficacy

27. This includes the design and implementation of community activities that promote social cohesion, engage and empower communities, and most importantly, strengthen the capacity of the community to address issues related to violence prevention. In addition, this sub-component will include training on crime and violence prevention, community mobilization, citizen engagement, and social auditing of the interventions. Type of interventions will feature trainings on core crime and violence prevention competencies, workshops with community members, festivals, sporting events (such as football tournaments); and artistic and cultural activities (art projects, community murals, etc.) This sub-component will be tied to the second generation CPTED approach, since an integral part of those strategies is involving the communities that inhabit those spaces in order to see greater reduction in crime and create safe and enjoyable communities to live in.

28. The prioritization of situational interventions will be done by cross matching the infrastructure inventory of the target municipalities with the violence maps of each of the participating municipalities. The Government has requested that central and local institutions conduct an inventory of the infrastructure and spaces available at the municipal and community levels. A mapping of the areas of highest crime rate by municipality has already been done. Situational prevention interventions will focus on those areas defined as having the greatest risk, and will identify what kind of needs it has in terms of rehabilitation and recovering of public spaces, and will select those that are considered to have greater positive impact.

c) Other international organizations and cooperation are key players in this component
29. Critical aspects addressed by these agencies intertwined with those of the proposed operation, and therefore coordination mechanisms will be established in order to avoid the duplicity of actions: The projects and i) Integrated Support for Violence Prevention Strategy, funded by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); ii) safe living spaces for young people in El Salvador (CONVIVIR), KfW; and iii) solutions and outreach centers, funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

2. Component 2: Psychosocial support

30. A range of psychosocial services to help mitigate the effects of violence and trauma are critical to support building the necessary resilience in communities affected by crime. Most health interventions will be centered on providing primary and secondary prevention services for the highest risk communities. These services will be delivered through mobile units as well as in close coordination with municipal services in health and education. A key coordination mechanisms at the community level will be the “Municipal Violence Prevention Committees”. Each municipality has such committees and the GoES has identified these groups as the key local coordinators. Interventions through mobile units will include health, education, capacity building, and prevention and service delivery elements. Experience from other Latin American countries such as Mexico and Colombia shows that these units can be effective in providing violence prevention services to high risk communities, and are a useful mechanism to improve state presence and foster longer-term provision of services.

31. Actual service delivery will vary depending on the type of intervention. There are interventions aimed at addressing risks and preventing violence in the school setting while there are others more focused on family environments. The combination of such services will allow for a more comprehensive delivery of a variety of psychosocial interventions that have demonstrated evidence of effectiveness.

a) Psychosocial interventions and health care services

32. The strategies led by the Ministry of Health (MINSAL), are focused on the strengthening of resilience among society in general but focusing specially on youth populations ages 12 to 20 years old. Psychosocial interventions are focused on improving social cohesion and trust in communities by implementing specific interventions among individuals, school environments and communities that are at an already high-risk of perpetrating violence and becoming victims of violence. Psychosocial interventions through this project will be focused on the following complementary strategies:

- Modifying risk factors that are associated with increased violent behaviors among individuals in the school, and community environments;
- Modifying risk factors associated with intra-family violence or addressing specific factors that are more present in the home and include children;
- Strengthening home environments with multiple risk factors for violence. Evidence shows that interventions at this level have the highest impact and a long-term effect on individuals and communities alike;
- Modifying community risk factors associated with increased likelihood of violent behaviors or increased lethality of violence by restricting means to commit violence such as alcohol consumption and firearm availability;
- Strengthening education programs with health and psychosocial components by

implementation of preventative measures in school environments.

33. Activities will be concentrated in the school, family and community settings. For the school setting, the focus would be on psychosocial intervention using a curriculum for the development of competencies in class that includes extracurricular home support for youth at high risk, and reinforcements and workshops with families.

34. In the family setting, the focus would be on home visitation programs targeted specifically for high-risk youth and children. This would be accomplished in coordination with health services, including a capacity building component for care delivery using promotores de salud while addressing gender-based violence in the home through home visitation strategies.

35. In the community setting, measures would include restrictions of alcohol sales and enforcement of minimum age for alcohol consumption. Research from Latin America has shown up to 25% decreases in homicide in urban settings with early hour bar closures. Restrictions to carrying concealed firearms in the community have also shown reductions of up to 14% in homicide rates in the community in Latin America. Data collection will enable analyses of local policies to yield results on their effect on violence prevention enforcement and restriction to means strategies. In areas with high rates of violence these interventions have demonstrated considerable effects in reducing overall community violence. Given that actions under this component will be closely linked with schools and health centers, interaction and coordination with the MINED and MINSAL is critical to interventions carried out comply with the provisions requiring each these institutions within their own sector strategy.

3. Component 3: School-based Violence Prevention

36. Insufficient staffing, poor access, and downgraded infrastructure are among the main challenges to the education sector in El Salvador. More than 5,000 public schools operate across the country, but only 30 percent of students finish secondary public education. Over 50 percent of schools have less than 5 teachers, and many instructors perform their work in more than one school, thus compromising the link to the community. In many cases, there is no public transportation in the vicinity of schools, exposing students to dangerous roads where gang activities such as extortion flourish. The distance between homes and schools limits the mobility of parents and students, as well as family involvement in education.

37. Most importantly, insecurity inside the schools and in their vicinity undermines the education sector's performance. According to the Observatory for Public Schools of the Ministry of Education (MINED), in 2014 the dropout rates due to the presence of gangs in the vicinity of the schools was 16.5 percent in rural areas and 39.3 percent in urban areas. In the same schools surveyed, the main security problems inside the schools were related to:

- Gang activities: 11.1 percent in urban areas versus 19.8 percent in rural areas;
- Drug use: 7.2 percent in urban areas versus 10.1 percent in rural areas; and
- Theft: 4.2 percent in urban areas versus 14.1 percent in rural areas).

38. In this context, the use of police forces in some schools appears as the only option able to restore order. For example, an agreement with the National Police of El Salvador (PNC) allows police units which meet certain security features in schools to direct physical education activities, which are currently grossly underfunded. Yet police presence has sometimes generated conflict due to direct confrontations with the gangs or gender-based violence stemming from poor

discipline.

39. Against this backdrop, school-based violence prevention has been established as a central strategy within the Plan El Salvador Seguro. The Plan targets young people aged 12 to 18, but also children, parents, communities, school principals, teachers, and youth who have left the education system. Moreover, in March 2015, MINED finalized the National Plan for Prevention and Security within Schools (Plan Nacional de Prevencion y Seguridad en las Escuelas or Plan PREVES) to be implemented between 2015 and 2019. Its main objectives are to strengthen a culture of peace within schools and reduce the external risk factors of violence in the vicinity of the schools such as the presence of gangs, extortion, rape, firearms and drugs, by raising the awareness among the school communities, institutions, and networks, including parents. More information about the Plan can be found in the SPD note.

40. MINED thus considers the Plan PREVES and the Plan El Salvador Seguro as instruments to give scale and territorial coherence to isolated initiatives taken so far by the Ministry and the municipalities to prevent violence. From the perspective of MINED, school-based violence prevention will transform schools into safe spaces for families and communities, bringing national and local actors in joint efforts. MINED believes institutional coordination at central and local levels is essential to implement its policies. To this end, MINED aims to strengthen relationships with relevant ministries such as Health, Culture, the PNC, the National Institute for Sports (INDES), as well as mayors and municipal institutions.

41. Within the scope of this Project, representatives of the MINED and the WB team have identified a number of interventions, which can be delivered in complementarity with the psychosocial support and situational prevention. Component 3 would thus provide:

a) Technical support for the development and implementation of Plan PREVES:

42. The Plan PREVES will be rolled out in 643 school management councils and 163 Municipal Councils of Violence Prevention (“Consejos Municipales para la Prevencion de la Violencia” or CMPV). At the local level, it will be overseen by departmental management units (“Gabinetes de gestion Departamental Sectorial de Seguridad y Prevencion”). However, conversations between the WB and MINED staff revealed that PREVES is at an incipient stage in which a results framework and adequate monitoring and evaluation mechanisms have not been developed.

43. The project will assist MINED in further elaborating PREVES and then in executing activities that are compatible with the Components on Dynamization of Public Spaces and Psychosocial Support. These include:

- Reducing physical and psychological violence in schools;
- Reducing harassment cases between students;
- Detecting of sexual harassment and abuse;
- Diminishing external risk factors of violence;
- Fostering principles and values through sports; and
- Increasing the security conditions around schools.

Workshops and special modules fostering a culture of peace within the school could be integrated to the existing EITP schools. This will contribute to raise the awareness of students, teachers, directors and parents on how to prevent and reduce physical and psychological violence in schools.

Mobile units present in targeted hot spots of the selected municipalities will be used to detect and report any type of harassment happening at school by offering the opportunity to parents, students and relatives to reach out to a representative from the MINED and/or a psychologist, both attached to the mobile unit. The specialists will report the case to the school and relevant authorities while preserving anonymity of the student affected if needed, and offer legal and psychological support to the student and families affected. This detection mechanism will help feed the information gathering efforts and allow to produce maps and reports of unsafe areas by types of crimes, as tools to adapt the efforts of the mobile units to the possible changing nature of the violence threats and geographical areas. The mobile units will also organize community discussions around the topic of violence at school, foster reflections and provide tools and knowledge around mechanisms that can help reduce all types of harassment within the school network.

b) Psychosocial support in collaboration with the Ministry of Health (MINSAL)

44. The project will support joint MINED-MINSAL mobile units active in communities to identify the students with higher risks of being victims or perpetrators of violence, and deliver interventions meant to reduce and protect them from the risks of violence. These interventions will involve the participation of the parents and immediate families, and as such will benefit from a mobile mechanism of service delivery able to act directly within the homes and communities of vulnerable populations rather than in the schools exclusively. With the support of mayors and Municipal Councils for Violence Prevention, the project will also mobilize community leaders to raise the awareness and find common solutions to improve the situation of school-based violence.

45. The interventions will be evidence-informed, meaning that the design of the intervention will follow the models of interventions that have been implemented in other areas, within and outside country, and that have proven to be successful. Examples of this is “Aulas de Paz” model, developed by Chaux and colleagues. This model has proven effective at promoting peaceful relationships through a classroom curriculum that fosters socio-emotional competencies and through workshops, home visitation, and phone calls to parents.

46. Other interventions can include “Second Step” and “Miles de Manos, which use socio-emotional learning approaches to teach mental skills that will ultimately improve positive behaviors while reducing negative behavior, not only in the classroom but also outside of it. More information about “Second Step” and “Miles de Manos” can be found in the SPD note.

c) Coordination with mayors, municipalities and key stakeholders

47. Plan PREVES identifies the participation of parents in the education of children and youth as essential to curbing violence. It also advocates for the design of local plans of prevention and security (Plan Local de Prevención y Seguridad) as a strategic action to be undertaken jointly with teachers, parents, and local institutions. The project will support the coordination between the several actors directly relevant in the elaboration and execution of the local strategies of school-based violence prevention, including mayors, Municipal Councils for Violence Prevention, teachers and parents. In particular, it will aim at strengthening the capacity of the Municipal Councils for Violence Prevention, by helping to define technical and financial roles and responsibilities to analyze, manage, and monitor local violence prevention efforts within the schools. The organization of trainings in the communities gathering these various actors will be facilitated by the use of mobile units staffed with MINED and MINSAL representatives or contracted professionals, sharing relevant experience and capacities to design these prevention

plans and share positive experience from other communities, and lessons-learned.

4. Component 4: Project management and capacity building

48. The project foresees strengthening the institutional capacity of the GoES by providing the Ministry of Justice and Security with a Project Implementation Unit (PIU), and preparing and training its personnel. Under the leadership of the Vice-Minister of Prevention, the PIU will be responsible for:

- Managing and coordinating the project, its administrative, logistical and financial support, monitoring and evaluation, delivering reports, and being accountable for the project with the GoES and the Bank;
- The alignment of the project strategies, plans and activities with national citizen security policies and the coordination with the Social Cabinet strategies;
- The coordination with the sectorial ministries responsible for the provision of prevention activities, and services on the ground through the project mechanisms, as well as with other identified support according to prioritized needs;
- The arrangements and coordination with local governments to define and prioritize needs and activities to be performed and provided by the on-ground deployed providers;
- The facilitation of dialogue between municipal authorities, governmental prevention services providers/operators, communities, NGOs and other civil society organization, international cooperation and donors deployed in the affected area, etc.; and
- The provision of due coordination inside the Ministry of Justice and Security to avoid conflicting agendas among its hard-power (intervention) and soft-power (prevention) initiatives.

49. Following the priorities defined by the GoES in the Plan El Salvador Seguro, the project foresees the on-ground deployment of mobile units designed to provide prevention services aimed at building and strengthening social resilience to prevent violence at the local level.

The mobile units will follow the established territorial priorities and will initiate their activities in some of the sectors of the 26 municipalities identified by the plan for 2016-2017, after the exact scope and characteristics of the violence nature will be identified. According to the evolution and evaluation of the success of the implementation, the units may address multiple sectors (some days a week in one and some days in other), include new units or move to the next sector once the correct community appropriation and citizen engagement is reached.

50. The mobile units will periodically revise and adjust with local authorities (municipalities) and community representatives not only the services (variety, scope, intensity, frequency) and provided activities, but also the location of their deployment to fulfil two basic requests: the dynamization of public spaces (the location of deployment) and the proximity to the demand of social resilience-building services.

51. The mobile units were identified and have proven to be the most flexible and adaptable way to adjust provided services, as well as to close the proximity, intensity and frequency gap for providing those services and activities. Those services are expected to be provided and delivered according to the needs of a location where the mobile units will be deployed. Those units are expected to raise attention and services defined in the project, as well as eventually be offered as a platform to provide other services by municipalities, sectorial governmental entities, and other Bank projects that promote prevention and social resilience (employment & employability, local government strengthening, etc.).

a) Institutional Arrangements

52. The project director or general-manager, located within the Ministry of Justice and Security, will be leading and coordinating the project, with the support of administrative staff. His/her responsibility, besides following-up and directing the implementation of the project, includes high level intergovernmental coordination to secure the adequate quality and intensity of the services provided by other entities/ministries and operators on-ground through mobile units. It is important to underline that all additional costs related to the provision of those sectorial services will be covered by the project. If needed, the sectorial entity will be responsible for hiring the required professionals and their costs will be covered by the project.

53. As part of the project and serving on the ground, the mobile units will be managed by local managers or coordinators. Reporting directly to the project director, the local coordinators will be responsible for the planning and scheduling of activities, the day-to-day operations of assigned units, the negotiations with sectorial services providers at local level, the relationship with communities and their leaders, the oversight of the deliverables at his level and, if needed, articulate with the project director ways to solve problems related to reluctance or quality of services provided by local sectorial operators. The local coordinator will be responsible for supporting personnel hired by the project for the mobile units (drivers, IT technicians, etc.), and will periodically report to the project director on performance and results of the assigned mobile unit, financial reports, etc. The local municipalities are expected to assign a focal point official, which will serve as a support-coordinator to acquire know-how and experience to eventually take control of the established resilience-building mechanisms for the municipality, when the project mobile units are redeployed in other municipality or moved.

b) Center of reference and violence data-base

54. Under the leadership of the project director, the sectorial services providers (teachers, physicians, psychologists, counselors, etc.) assigned to deliver services through the mobile units will be required to actively engage in data gathering to develop the violence mapping of the sectors. Besides their professional assistance (appointments, classes, seminars, etc.), they are expected to attend, lead and organize community meetings, as well as conferences with peer professionals to refine that mapping. The data will be collected at the mobile units following directives, procedures and standards provided by the PIU. The PIU will be responsible for collecting, systematizing, analyzing, sharing with governmental entities, communicating and disseminating the data and related findings, as well as promoting interaction with academia, think-tanks and other potentially interested institutions. These mechanisms will act as “mobile observatories of violence,” providing much needed information to program interventions as well as to monitor achievements on violence reduction.

c) Training during project preparation

55. The project includes a hiring and training process of the project director as well as the first group of field project coordinators. This training will provide skills on prevention, results oriented management, Bank procedures related to project implementation, mediation and negotiations (with sectorial, municipalities and communities), communication, etc. It is expected that this process can be started with PPA and having available trained people just in time with the approval of the project. The professionals assigned by sectorial entities will be offered to attend a two day seminar, delivered by the project director and local coordinators to share the approach,

mechanisms, explain the goals and train on data gathering procedures and techniques.

d) Other implementation coordination

56. There are three central institutions of government which have been identified as main actors in the local implementation of component 1: i) Social Investment Fund for Development (FISDL) as facilitator of infrastructure projects; ii) Ministry of Culture, as coordinator of the prevention activities related to promoting a culture of peace and coexistence through culture and art; and iii) the National Sports Institute of El Salvador (INDES) as coordinator of those related to sports activities. At the municipal level, the main actors are the municipal authorities and the municipal violence prevention and citizen coexistence committees, both in providing services and existing infrastructure, provision of resources (including financial counterparty), implementing activities, community mobilization and local coordination of actors.

57. From the health perspective, the program will need to include linking and complementing existing data on the incidence and characteristics of violence events and documenting these with basic epidemiological analyses. Data collection, linkage and analyses are key for evaluating the applied interventions as well as the overall program effectiveness. Data collected will allow for process and outcome evaluations to be conducted in initial phases and once set, will facilitate the generation of evidence through impact evaluations using a variety of observational, quasi-experimental and experimental approaches where ever feasible. Data collection of process variables, if deemed appropriate, can facilitate evaluations of system performance such as those involving early responses and outcomes through the local health system.

Mobile observatories of violence will allow for:

- The consolidation of data on services delivery, achievements and selections of key communities of engagement.
- The evaluation of local emergency medical services and existing early response mechanisms for the population
- The integration of information from EMS, hospital and community services
- The integration of health and violence information with other services including police and existing education and cadastral services. The latter may serve to look at other interventions and their effect within the larger scope of the program
- The integration of existing sources from multiple institutions into municipal decision-making processes can strengthen data development. Data can be fed into municipal datasets (if any) and information collected by different sources can be integrated. Links between police, health and urban components can also be integrated to answer questions related to urban upgrading for example.

58. MINED will be responsible for the implementation of Component 3 as part of the broader PIU supervised by the Ministry of Justice and Security. Activities will be aligned with the Plan PREVES and Plan El Salvador Seguro, and executed in close coordination with municipal authorities implementing local plans for prevention and security. The ultimate goal is to provide a set of school-based violence prevention services, including psychosocial support, infra structure upgrades, and family programs. Part of these services will be offered by MINED and contracted professionals directly to schools and communities.

59. However, the overarching delivery mechanism will be that of mobile units hosting representatives from health and education. The purpose of the mobile units is to increase inter-

agency coordination and foster a greater connection between communities and schools, especially in areas where distances between schools and communities are large. This model builds upon similar experiences in the region, such as in Mexico and Colombia. More information can be found in the SDP note.

2. Overall Risk and Explanation

60. The overall risk is considered substantial. Even though the project supports the GoES priorities on citizen security delineated in the Plan El Salvador Seguro there are various risks associated with it, mainly: i) achieving political consensus on the project design and scope; ii) building technical and institutional capacity to implement the project and ensure fiduciary compliance; iii) ensuring the coordination of actors involved in the project. Citizen security is a pressing issue in El Salvador, and although the two main political parties have expressed the importance to address violence prevention, differences between their approaches still exist. Achieving a strong political consensus during project preparation will be of outmost importance in order to secure its approval by the National Assembly, and continued consensus on project scope and activities will be critical during implementation.

61. Although El Salvador has taken important steps on the implementation of violence prevention measures, there is still limited experience and technical capacity on these issues. This weak capacity, both at the national and local level, poses a risk to the success of achieving the objectives of the project. Furthermore, the Ministry of Justice and Security, which will lead the Project and where the PIU will be located, has no previous experience on managing and implementing projects funded by the WBG. Therefore, the Ministry will need to develop the capacity to manage the implementation of the project, while also ensuring the compliance with the procurement, fiduciary, and safeguards policies required by the Bank.

62. In addition, the coordination of actors involved is essential the nature of the project. There will be a large number of government institutions involved in its implementation, and therefore, which can be very challenging. Failure in coordinating these stakeholders will not only result in the delays, but will also hinder a proper response to the needs of the end beneficiaries in the communities and interfere with the optimization of funds.

B. Economic Analysis

1. Briefly describe Project's development impact in terms of expected benefits and costs

63. The size and complexity of violence in El Salvador as described in the Introduction makes it a prime reason for public sector intervention. Using metrics from the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Bank estimated in 2010 that the value of lives lost and disability reached approximately US\$ 271 million, or nearly 2 percent of GDP, higher than any other country in the region. According to data collected for the 2012 Security and Justice Public Expenditure and Institutional Review, nearly 60 percent of the Salvadoran population considered the country's main problem to be citizens' insecurity, and felt that combatting crime and violence should be the most important task of the government. Most importantly for the purpose of this project, the SCD notes that the GoES only spends 3 percent of its citizen security budget in prevention. The project would therefore support the Government in addressing this shortcoming.

64. In the current country conditions, such an investment cannot be supplied by the private sector. The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011, ranking 142 countries, found El Salvador in the second to last position among countries where people considered that crime and violence

imposes a high cost on business, only above Guatemala. Costs include health expenditures, legal fees, work absences and productivity loss.

2. Rationale for public sector provision/financing, if applicable

65. This has not been planned for at this stage, but may be developed during the project preparation stage.

3. Value added of Bank's support

66. The World Bank Group will bring forward its cross-country experience and regional knowledge, as well as international best practices. There has been a noteworthy work done in crime and violence prevention in the region, ranging from lending, to grants and technical assistance that will inform this operation. These include:

- The Safer Municipalities Project in Honduras;
- The regional approach to Municipal Citizen Security in Central America's Northern Triangle Project, financed by a SPF grant; and
- The JSDF-financed projects "Addressing Youth Violence through Cultural and Music Learning" and "Employment Generation in poor Urban Neighborhoods."

67. The proposed operation will build on the experience gained and lessons learned from these previous engagements. Furthermore, the proposed operation will generate and systematize knowledge for evidence-based interventions, improving the design of these activities, and providing technical assistance to governments to implement crime and violence prevention initiatives. In addition, it will develop the capacity of the Ministry of Justice Security, local governments and municipalities to implement Bank-financed projects, and comply with procurement, fiduciary and safeguard policies.

68. Furthermore, given that the project adopts a multi-sectorial approach, it would benefit from (but also reinforce) interventions in complementary areas. For example the ongoing Local Development Strengthening Project also provides financing to 262 Salvadoran municipalities for small infrastructure (street lighting, community centers, and paved roads) to improve the quality of life in selected communities. Lessons from this operation can inform the rehabilitation of urban spaces component. The Education Quality Improvement Project for El Salvador supports the adoption of the Inclusive Full Time School (IFTS) model, which is consistent with efforts of the Plan El Salvador Seguro.

69. The economic analysis will be based on an ex ante estimate of the net present value of expected benefits. This will be done according to evidence presented in the current literature, and adapting the parameters to the country context. The estimate will examine gross unitary benefits per dollar disbursed by the project, forecast the total number of beneficiaries of the interventions, and scale up unitary benefits in proportion to the projected number of beneficiaries.

70. The anticipated costs incurred in the implementation of the intervention will be deducted from the estimated benefits. The flow of net benefits will be then projected over time, reporting a cost benefit measure. Benefits are individual and social monetized losses averted by the intervention. Costs are direct expenses and investments incurred by the intervention.

4. Brief description of methodology/scope and next steps

71. As key elements of the project are in the process of definition with the relevant authorities, it is not possible at this stage to clearly articulate the methodology that will be used to calculate in

quantitative terms the cost/benefit ratio of the operations. Further information will be provided as soon as the team can continue discussions with the relevant Government of El Salvador Agencies.

C. Implementing Agency Assessment

72. The proposed project will be implemented by the Ministry of Justice and Security at the national level. The project foresees strengthening the institutional capacity of the GoES by providing the Ministry of Justice and Security with a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) under the leadership of the Vice-Minister of Prevention. The Ministry of Justice and Security will be in charge of managing and coordinating the project, its administrative, logistical and financial support, monitoring and evaluation, delivering reports, and being accountable for the project with the GoES and the Bank.

Annex 1 - Systematic Operations Risk-Rating Tool (SORT)

Risk Category	Rating
1. Political and Governance	Substantial
2. Macroeconomic	Moderate
3. Sector Strategies and Policies	Substantial
4. Technical Design of Project or Program	Moderate
5. Institutional Capacity for Implementation and Sustainability	High
6. Fiduciary	Moderate
7. Environment and Social	Low
8. Stakeholders	Substantial
9. Other	
OVERALL	Substantial

Annex 2
Preparation Schedule and Resources

Preparation Schedule			
Milestone	Basic	Forecast	Actual
AIS Release			12-Aug-2015
Concept Review	01-Dec-2015	16-Dec-2015	
Auth Appr/Negs (in principle)	15-Mar-2016		
Bank Approval	29-Aug-2016		
Sector Unit Estimate of Resources Required from Preparation through Approval			
Source of Funds	Preparation Expenses to Date (USD)	Estimate of Resource Requirements (USD)	
		Fixed	Variable
Bank Budget	83,292.07		
Trust Funds			
Team Composition			
Bank Staff			
Name	Role	Title	Unit
Marcelo Jorge Fabre	Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ADM Responsible	Senior Social Development Specialist	GSURR
Daniel Jorge Arguindegui	Procurement Specialist	Senior Procurement Specialist	GGODR
Jose Simon Rezk	Financial Management Specialist	Sr Financial Management Specialist	GGODR
Andres Villaveces	Team Member	E T Consultant	GSURR
Bernard Harborne	Peer Reviewer	Lead Social Development Specialist	GSURR
Carlos Alberto Molina Prieto	Safeguards Specialist	Social Development Specialist	GSURR
Charlotte Lea Yaiche	Team Member	Consultant	GSU04
Erika Eliana Salamanca Duenas	Team Member	Program Assistant	GSURR
Jania Ibarra	Team Member	Operations Officer	LCCSV
Jimena Garrote	Counsel	Senior Counsel	LEGLE
Juan Belikow	Team Member	Consultant	GSU04
Leonie Willenbrink	Team Member	Consultant	GSU04
Luis Alberto Aviles	Team Member	Consultant	LCC2C
Paul Maximilian Bisca	Team Member	E T Consultant	GSURR
Perla Rocio Calidonio Aguilar	Team Member	Consultant	GSURR

Sandra Lisette Flores De Mixco	Team Member	E T Consultant	GGODR
Extended Team			
Name	Title	Office Phone	Location
Additional Information (Optional)			