PART I

Introduction and Overview

The continued importance of regional organizations

The UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) provides an increasingly critical framework for governments and civil society. Armed groups continue to illegally access and use illegal weapons to mount mass attacks on civilians and terrorize cities and communities, commit human rights violations and banditry, and incite and prolong armed conflicts. Some 60 million people are displaced due to war and insecurity (UNHCR, 2016). Armed attacks and kidnappings directed at humanitarian workers are at record highs. Armed groups are increasingly disregarding international humanitarian law and, as a result, are blocking much needed assistance to populations at risk.[1] The vast majority of deaths from armed violence do not occur in conflict settings, however. Of the more than 500,000 lives that are lost annually to armed violence, in some countries small arms—many of them illicit—are used in more than three out of four homicides (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015).

Regional organizations (ROs) have an important role to play in helping to implement the PoA. States have the primary obligation to control the proliferation and circulation of illicit weapons. Due to the transnational nature of the problem, however, fulfilling this obligation also depends on the effectiveness of regional cooperation, collaboration, and harmonization. Recognizing this, states used their memberships of ROs to channel their earliest efforts at collective action, and between 1997 and 2000 more

Table 1. Selected regional measures to address illicit small arms prior to June 2001

Year	Regional organization	Political instrument/measure taken
1997	Organization of American States (OAS)	Inter-American Convention Against Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials (CIFTA)
1997	Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN)	ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime
1998	Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)	Southern Cone Presidential Declaration on Combating the Illicit Manufacture and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Related Materials
1998	European Union (EU)	Code of Conduct on Arms Exports
1998	Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)	Declaration of a Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa
1999	Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN)	ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime
2000	Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)	Towards a Common Approach to Weapons Control ('Nadi Framework')
2000	Nairobi Secretariat (now known as RECSA)	Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region
2000	N/A	Antigua Declaration on the Proliferation of Light Weapons in the Central American Region
2000	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)	OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons
2000	Organization of African Unity (OAU, now known as the AU)	Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons

than half a dozen ROs developed and undertook various measures to address illicit small arms (see Table 1). Many of these early regional efforts helped prepare the ground to take the small arms issue forward at the international level, arguably playing a positive role in the subsequent development of the PoA and its supplementary processes and efforts to develop other international arms control frameworks.

The PoA and various regional initiatives and instruments—both old and new—have had some success in combating the proliferation and circulation of illicit weapons. The series of meetings and voluntary national reports under the PoA, for example, have led to an enhanced understanding and awareness of best practices for addressing the problem. The PoA has also helped to rally political will and opened up funding channels for improved programming to counter the threat posed by illicit firearms. ROs have made progress on implementing their respective instruments or have devised new ones. And new ROs specializing in countering small arms proliferation have emerged.

Yet the illicit trade persists—but not because there is a shortage of instruments, knowledge, tools, or identification of best practices. Rather, it is a signal that there is still a stronger need for operationally focused regional and interregional cooperation and action.

The First Edition of this Handbook filled a gap. When states met in 2001 to develop and sign off on the commitments of the PoA, they called on ROs to be a part of the solution, highlighting the positive role that such organizations could play in implementing and providing support to their members to implement the new agreement.

As the First Edition pointed out, despite this recognition and support, a lack of sustained meaningful dialogue with ROs as part of the PoA framework remained. Representatives from 18 ROs met in 2004 and 2008 to participate in interregional exchanges.[2] But apart from positive remarks that such initiatives should serve as starting points for further exchanges, no other platform for interregional exchanges ensued. Between 2009 and 2013 the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) convened nine (intra-)regional-level meetings focused on the PoA, in which a total of 17 ROs participated.[3] The primary purpose of these meetings was more about bringing states together to establish common positions. While important, it was not a platform focused on enhancing or strengthening cooperation and coordination—or exchanging information, lessons, and practices—among organizations. Further, only a small number of ROs regularly received invitations to participate in the Biennial Meetings of States, Review Conferences, and Meetings of Governmental Experts.[4] ROs that do attend PoA meetings provide useful contributions in the form of official statements, informal consultations, and participation in various side events. Greater engagement would undoubtedly be helpful.

It was against this backdrop that the Small Arms Survey set out to look beyond 'the usual suspects' and identify organizations that, to varying degrees, engage on PoA-related issues. While the 52 selected ROs had diverse mandates and priorities in the political, economic, law and order, transnational crime, or regional security realms, they were included in the Handbook if they had PoA-related instruments and structures in place or had stated their intentions to work towards countering the illicit trafficking of small arms.

The realization that so many ROs were contributing to the PoA was an eye-opener as much for the Small Arms Survey as it was for governments, organizations, and practitioners alike. It identified what could be—and should be—an opportunity for enhanced regional cooperation. Awareness of these organizations and their

Table 2. ROs' support for PoA commitments and icons used in this Handbook

Full text reference (PoA section/paragraph)*	Icon used	Examples of relevant activities
To establish or designate, as appropriate, a **point of contact** within subregional and regional organizations to act as liaison on matters relating to the implementation of the Programme of Action **(II.24)**.		■ Identified a POC (person or specific office) and provided contact details
To encourage negotiations, where appropriate, with the aim of concluding relevant **legally binding instruments** aimed at preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, and where they do exist to **ratify** and fully **implement** them **(II.25)**.		■ Concluded or are developing legally binding instruments (e.g. treaties, conventions, protocols) to explicitly counter illicit trafficking of small arms
To encourage the strengthening and establishing, where appropriate and as agreed by the States concerned, of **moratoria or similar initiatives** in affected regions or subregions on the **transfer and manufacture** of small arms and light weapons, and/or regional action programmes to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, and to respect such moratoria, similar initiatives, and/or **action programmes** and cooperate with the States concerned in the **implementation** thereof, including through technical assistance and other measures **(II.26)**.		■ Endorsed self-imposed limitations on transfers and production of small arms (e.g. embargoes) ■ Supported moratoria implementation or similar initiatives (technical assistance/other)
To establish, where appropriate, subregional or regional mechanisms, in particular **trans-border customs cooperation and networks for information-sharing** among law enforcement, border and customs control agencies, with a view to preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons across borders **(II.27)**.		■ Established cross-border databases/information-sharing mechanisms ■ Developed specific policies, standards, or best practice guidelines
To encourage, where needed, regional and subregional **action** on illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects in order to, as appropriate, **introduce, adhere, implement or strengthen relevant laws, regulations and administrative procedures (II.28)**.	TO DO	■ Prepared declarations, strategies, action plans, model legislation, or best practice guidelines on laws, regulations, or administrative procedures
To encourage States to promote safe, effective **stockpile management and security**, in particular physical security measures, for small arms and light weapons, and to implement, where appropriate, regional and subregional **mechanisms** in this regard **(II.29)**.		■ Developed specific policies, standards, or best practice guidelines ■ Provided equipment, software, technical assistance, or financial assistance, incl. supporting the building or reinforcing of armouries and storage containers or needs assessments
To support, where appropriate, national **disarmament, demobilization and reintegration** programmes, particularly in post-conflict situations, with special reference to the measures agreed upon in paragraphs 28 to 31 of this section **(II.30)**.		■ Provided financial or in-kind support
To encourage regions to develop, where appropriate and on a voluntary basis, measures to enhance **transparency** with a view to combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects **(II.31)**.		■ Agreed on measures to share information on small arms imports and exports (either publicly or among members only)
To encourage the relevant international and regional organizations and States to facilitate the appropriate **cooperation of civil society**, including non-governmental organizations, in activities related to the prevention, combat and eradication of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, in view of the important role that civil society plays in this area **(II.40)**.		■ Routinely extend invitations to CSOs to participate in (or observe) meetings (e.g. working groups and technical committees) ■ Signed cooperation or partnership agreements or MoUs with CSOs
States and appropriate international and regional organizations in a position to do so should, upon request of the relevant authorities, seriously consider rendering assistance, including **technical and financial assistance** where needed, such as small arms funds, to support the implementation of the measures to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects as contained in the Programme of Action **(III.3)**.		■ Granted monetary assistance from own budget (including grants and loans) ■ Established or managed small arms funds ■ Provided direct technical guidance and support or in-kind assistance (e.g. lending equipment, secondment)

* Bold not found in the original text

Full text reference (PoA section/paragraph)*	Icon used	Examples of relevant activities
States and international and regional organizations should, upon request by the affected States, consider **assisting and promoting conflict prevention**. Where requested by the parties concerned, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, States and international and regional organizations should consider promotion and assistance of the pursuit of negotiated solutions to conflicts, including by addressing their root causes **(III.4)**.		■ Consulted, participated in, or led the development of peace agreements, or sponsored or hosted dialogue among warring entities ■ Participated in or sponsored peacekeeping, observation, or monitoring missions ■ Established early warning mechanisms
States and international and regional organizations should, where appropriate, cooperate, develop and strengthen **partnerships to share resources and information** on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects **(III.5)**.		■ Developed or assisted the development of registers, rosters, or databases ■ Signed information-sharing or cooperative agreements
With a view to facilitating implementation of the Programme of Action, States and international and regional organizations should seriously consider **assisting** interested States, upon request, in **building capacities** in areas including the development of appropriate **legislation and regulations, law enforcement, tracing and marking, stockpile management and security, destruction** of small arms and light weapons and the **collection and exchange of information (III.6)**. Note: Commitments covered in this paragraph also pertain to actions addressed in PoA sec. II, para. 29, and sec. III, paras. 5 and 14.		■ Provided technical or advisory support to states to develop, amend, or harmonize legislation, incl. the development of model legislation or regulations ■ Hosted or sponsored meetings ■ Provided direct technical guidance and support or in-kind assistance (e.g. lending equipment, secondment) ■ Provided or financed equipment or software
Regional and international programmes for **specialist training** on small arms **stockpile management and security** should be developed. Upon request, States and appropriate international or regional organizations in a position to do so should support these programmes. The United Nations, within existing resources, and other appropriate international or regional organizations should consider **developing capacity for training** in this area **(III.8)**.		■ Developed or sponsored policy, standards, or best practice guidelines ■ Developed, supported, or conducted specialist training
States undertake to cooperate with each other, including on the basis of the relevant existing global and regional legally binding instruments as well as other agreements and arrangements, and, where appropriate, with relevant international, regional and intergovernmental organizations, in **tracing** illicit small arms and light weapons, in particular by strengthening **mechanisms** based on the **exchange of relevant information (III.11)**.		■ Developed or sponsored specific policies, standards, best practice guidelines, or model legislation, or hosted or supported training ■ Provided or supported the procurement of equipment or software
Upon request, States and appropriate international or regional organizations in a position to do so should provide **assistance** in the **destruction** or other **responsible disposal of surplus stocks or unmarked or inadequately marked** small arms and light weapons **(III.14)**.		■ Provided equipment, software, or technical or financial assistance ■ Destroyed weapons and ammunition ■ Developed or sponsored specific policies, model legislation, standards, best practice guidelines, or training
Upon request, States and appropriate international or regional organizations in a position to do so should provide assistance to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons linked to **drug trafficking, transnational organized crime and terrorism (III.15)**.		■ Directly addressed issues linked with small arms (trafficking of drugs and other commodities, piracy, terrorism, organized crime)
Particularly in post-conflict situations, and where appropriate, the relevant regional and international organizations should **support**, within existing resources, appropriate programmes **related to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (III.16)**.		■ Supported DDR and related programmes ■ Provided in-kind support or technical expertise for DDR or related programmes
States, regional and subregional and international organizations, research centres, health and medical institutions, the United Nations system, international financial institutions and civil society are urged, as appropriate, to develop and support **action-oriented research** aimed at facilitating greater awareness and better understanding of the nature and scope of the problems associated with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects **(III.18)**.		■ Prepared or sponsored research on PoA-related themes

* **Bold** not found in the original text

activities has not only provided a more inclusive picture of actors and regional activities, but has also broadened the scope and expertise available to address broader or more specialized aspects of the issue of small arms control across regions.

A significant objective of the First Edition of this Handbook was thus to provide a tool that could promote and enable further regional cooperation and information sharing, particularly cross-regionally.

The Second Edition: continuity and change

This Second Edition of the Handbook retains much of the content and format of its predecessor. As with the First Edition (2012), this edition examines 19 PoA activities that refer to ROs by name or refer to regional-level action (see Table 2). Nine of these undertakings are outlined in section II of the PoA. The programme identifies eight regional-level commitments (UN, 2001, II, paras. 24–31). Although 'regional organizations' are not explicitly mentioned except with reference to a point of contact (POC) (para. 24), the Survey considers ROs as having, at a minimum, an important role to play in helping member states meet their regional-level commitments. One global-level commitment—cooperation with civil society—is included because the PoA explicitly mentions ROs by name (sec. II, para. 40). The Handbook explores ten additional activities in section III of the PoA, which addresses implementation, international cooperation, and assistance, for which ROs are explicitly mentioned as having a potential role to play (UN, 2001, III, paras. 3–6, 8, 11, 14–16, 18).

The characteristics that define what qualifies as an RO have not changed:

for the purposes of this study a regional organization comprises governments that join together formally to support common economic, political or security concerns in a geographically defined area and whose members are expected to contribute regularly towards the body's operating costs and towards implementing its mandates (Berman and Maze, 2012, p. 4).

No distinction is made between regional and sub-regional organizations. Establishing a permanent secretariat is not a prerequisite.

It is coincidental that both editions profiled the same number of ROs: 52. One did not have to be deleted to make room for another to be added. Two organizations profiled in 2012 (CU and EurAsEC) subsequently merged into a new institution (EAEU), which is now included. Two ROs that had been active in countering small arms proliferation have become largely dormant in addressing this issue and are therefore not included (CAN and CEPGL). And three other bodies previously profiled had either requested not to be included or their level of engagement on the PoA was not considered sufficient to be included in this study (GUAM, SAARC, and UMA). In a few instances profiles continued to be included even though the organizations were either unresponsive or did not participate in updating them (BIMSTEC, CEN-SAD, GCC, and SCO). This is because their continued structures and approach to PoA-related issues remain noteworthy. Table 3 includes the list of ROs covered in the Second Edition, organized by region. A snapshot of changes between the two volumes in terms of the organizations profiled, membership data, POCs, and activities undertaken can be found in Box 1.

Table 3. The Handbook's 52 profiled ROs

Africa (22)	AFRIPOL	African Mechanism for Police Cooperation
	AU	African Union
	CCPAC	Central African Police Chiefs Committee
	CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
	CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
	COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
	EAC	East African Community
	EAPCCO	Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization
	ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
	ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
	G5 Sahel	G5 Sahel
	GGC	Gulf of Guinea Commission
	ICC	Interregional Coordination Centre
	ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
	IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
	IOC	Indian Ocean Commission
	MRU	Mano River Union
	RECSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States
	SADC	Southern African Development Community
	SARCOM	Sub-Regional Arms Control Mechanism
	SARPCCO	Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation
	WAPCCO	West African Police Chiefs Committee
The Americas (6)	AMERIPOL	Police Community of the Americas
	CARICOM	Caribbean Community
	MERCOSUR	Southern Common Market
	OAS	Organization of American States
	SICA	Central American Integration System
	UNASUR	Union of South American Nations
Asia (11)	APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
	ASEAN	Association of South-east Asian Nations
	ASEANAPOL	ASEAN National Police
	BIMSTEC	Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
	CICA	Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia
	CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
	CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
	EAEU	Eurasian Economic Union
	GCC	Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf
	LAS	League of Arab States
	SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Europe (9)	BSEC	Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
	EU	European Union
	EUROCONTROL	European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation
	Europol	European Law Enforcement Agency
	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
	OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
	RACVIAC	RACVIAC – Centre for Security Cooperation
	RCC	Regional Cooperation Council
	SELEC	Southeast European Law Enforcement Centre
Oceania (4)	MSG	Melanesian Spearhead Group
	OCO	Oceania Customs Organization
	PICP	Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police
	PIF	Pacific Islands Forum

Box 1. Second Edition of the Handbook at a glance

- ■ **ROs profiled**   52

- ■ **ROs removed from 1st Edition**   7

  (CAN, CEPGL, CU, EurAsEC, GUAM, SAARC, UMA)

- ■ **ROs added to 2nd Edition**   7

  (AFRIPOL, EAEU, G5 Sahel, GGC, ICC, MSG, SARCOM)

- ■ **New POCs (not including 7 new ROs)**   33

  (All but CARICOM, CEMAC, EAC, EAPCCO, EUROCONTROL, LAS, MRU, OSCE, SELEC—with 3 'old' ROs still not providing a POC: Europol, GCC, MERCOSUR)

- ■ **ROs with new or fewer members**   16
  (not including 7 new ROs)

  (AMERIPOL, CICA, CSTO, EAC, EAPCCO, ECCAS, EU, EUROCONTROL, Europol, ICGLR, MERCOSUR, OSCE, RACVIAC, RCC, SELEC, SICA)

   Most of the seven 'new' ROs included were formed after the Handbook's First Edition. Five ROs profiled in the present volume became operational after 2012: AFRIPOL, EAEU, G5 Sahel, ICC, and SARCOM. Two long-standing organizations have increased their engagement on PoA-related issues since 2012 and are therefore included in the present volume: GCC and MSG. Two other ROs are of interest concerning PoA implementation—CELAC and LCBC—but are not profiled in Part II (see Box 2).

Seven 'new' ROs profiled in the Second Edition

Among the new ROs included in this edition, the MSG is an older organization (established in 1986) that recently took up the issue of small arms. It proved instrumental in preparing a common position for the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and has increasingly turned its attention to the PoA. In June 2015 its Secretariat agreed to establish a Regional Police Academy and Formed Police Unit in order to provide a platform for capacity building, technical training, and police cooperation among member states. The GGC is another organization established earlier, in 2001. However, it only became operational in 2007 and its mandate for addressing small arms emerged in 2012, upon the signing of the Declaration on Peace and Security in the Gulf of Guinea Region (Luanda Declaration). Although the GGC's activities on small arms remain limited to date, momentum is building, given its inclusion in several regional action plans expected for the region, including the Code of Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa (2013).

   In contrast, AFRIPOL, the G5 Sahel, the ICC, and SARCOM are all recently established organizations that at the time of writing are finalizing (or still to finalize) administrative, financial, or institutional issues for their operationalization, or are still defining their stated focus on small arms. In the case of SARCOM, preparations for the ratification of its status as a permanent body are under way.

   The inclusion of these ROs speaks to the very particular attributes that make ROs central players in addressing the illicit arms trade: flexibility, adaptability, and a greater fluidity of mandate, as appropriate for the region. The MSG appointed a lead negotiator on the ATT for the region, ensuring that Fiji was able participate in a common Pacific Islands position, despite its suspension from PIF at the time (2009–14).

   Both the G5 Sahel and ICC have emerged to counter the rise in regionally-specific threats from the deserts (G5 Sahel) and the

sea (ICC). The G5 Sahel was established in large part to counter the particular—and rising—security concerns of Sahel countries, including the proliferation of weapons, escalating radicalization and terrorism, and the growing impacts of desertification and climate change. Given the increasing focus of global attention on the region, the emerging organization is also intended to help coordinate and provide cohesion among the array of actors and actions increasingly engaging with these issues. In a similar way, the ICC has been created specifically to coordinate the activities of ECCAS, ECOWAS, and the GGC, as well as two regional centres on maritime security to respond to the increasing threats of piracy and armed robbery at sea. It will be responsible for implementing a common strategy for maritime safety and security.

SARCOM was established to operationalize priority areas outlined in the Declaration on the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons across the Neighbouring Countries of Western Sudan (Khartoum Declaration, 2012). Despite each of its members dealing with serious and ongoing security issues, SARCOM provides a mechanism to focus on joint concerns of the illicit weapons trade in a geographically defined area, particularly in terms of border cooperation, tracking down weapons, and the physical security of stockpiles. It provides a particularly illustrative and practical example of cooperation between two states—Sudan and South Sudan (the latter's membership is pending)—dealing with broader political tensions in order to address issues of common concern. Also noteworthy is that SARCOM unites states belonging to other regional groupings, enabling states such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, and Libya to benefit from the lessons and practices of more established instruments on small arms already under way among RECSA members.

Box 2. ROs of interest (not profiled in the Handbook)

Two ROs were not added to this Handbook even though they both have demonstrated the flexibility and adaptability of ROs in tackling PoA-related issues to meet specific objectives.

The first example is the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC). Established in 1964, its members include Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Libya, Niger, and Nigeria (DRC, Egypt, the RoC, and Sudan are observers). The organization's mandate is to oversee water and other natural resource use in the Lake Chad Basin. In an extraordinary measure to counter the rise and threat of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad area, the LCBC countries (also including Benin) agreed to activate the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in 2012. After limited success, the AU and LCBC signed an MoU to strengthen and sustain a renewed version of the MNJTF. The MoU outlined the respective roles and responsibilities of the two organizations in relation to the MNJTF. At the MoU's signing ceremony in October 2015 the LCBC/MNJTF emphasized the need to strengthen governance and economic development as key enablers of sustainable peace in the fight against radicalism. The profile is not included in the Handbook because the efforts represent extraordinary measures, and the mandate has not changed. As the organization's activities evolve, however, important developments may need monitoring.

The second example is the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), established in 2011. By its own definition it is a political platform and not an RO, although it serves as a regional bloc for dialogue and cooperation among its 33 member states. CELAC does not have a permanent secretariat. Instead, its duties are carried out by the member state hosting its Presidency, which rotates on an annual basis. CELAC members select the specific themes to be focused on with the changeover of the Presidency. In 2013–14 its focus on small arms arose largely due to the political momentum behind the ATT. It used its platform to express support for the PoA and ATT, and highlighted the importance of addressing the linkages of arms trafficking to organized crime. CELAC established a working group to better understand the issue for the region. This working group is now inactive because the issue of small arms was not included among the 2015 or 2016 priorities of the subsequent presidencies. Nevertheless, its members may put the issue forward again, as required. In Colombia, though CELAC members can contribute personnel to the UN's political verification mission to support the peace process in that country, CELAC itself will not directly provide experts or observers to this operation.

Source: Maze (2016)

New focus on the Arms Trade Treaty

The Second Edition of the Handbook includes information on RO member states' relationship with the ATT. A listing is included in each profile giving the number and percentage of member states in each RO that are states parties to the ATT, signatories (only), or have not yet taken any action in relation to the treaty

Table 4. Members of profiled regional organizations that are not UN member states

Regional organization	Members of profiled regional organizations that are not UN member states
AFRIPOL	1: SADR
APEC	2: Hong Kong, Taiwan
AU	1: SADR
CARICOM	1: Montserrat
CICA	1: Palestinian Territories
LAS	1: Palestinian Territories
MSG	1: FLNKS
OCO	9: American Samoa, CNMI, Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia, Niue, Norfolk Island, Wallis and Futuna
OSCE	1: Holy See
PICP	7: American Samoa, CNMI, Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia, Niue
PIF	2: Cook Islands, Niue
RCC	15: CEDB, Council of Europe, EBRD, EIB, EU (both DG NEAR and EEAS), IOM, Kosovo, NATO, OECD, OSCE, UK, UN, UNDP, UNECE, WB

('not yet joined'). Annexe 3 has been augmented to include a column on each UN member state's relationship to the ATT (as of 1 April 2016). A new annexe (Annexe 4) compiles the data described above for all 52 ROs. Annexe 4 includes a column noting how many (if any) members in each RO cannot join the treaty because they are not UN member states (almost one in four of the ROs profiled in the Handbook include members that are not UN member states; see Table 4). Together, the text in the profiles and the two annexes give ROs, donors, and practitioners an overarching view on how they may be able to engage on the ATT, ranging from promoting the universalization of the treaty to identifying common areas for strengthened PoA or ATT programming.

One of the ATT's central objectives is to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons, and to prevent their diversion (UNGA, 2013, art. 1). The ATT heralds a new momentum and call to action among UN member states to address small arms and light weapons. There is little doubt among states, organizations, and practitioners of the continued relevance of the PoA in relation to the ATT and of the complementarity of these instruments. The ATT has the added value of being legally binding, while the PoA's value remains the breadth and scope of its commitments, as well as its universal application. Box 3 provides a more detailed outline of the interrelationship of the ATT and PoA.

Both instruments acknowledge the important role of ROs in supporting the implementation of these instruments. For the ATT, this includes 'legal or legislative assistance, institutional capacity-building, and technical, material or financial assistance'. This may include 'stockpile management, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, model legislation, and effective practices for implementation' (UNGA, 2013, art. 16(1)).

The role of ROs is more pronounced in the PoA. In addition to providing assistance to states to implement the much broader range of small arms commitments—covering the full life cycle of small arms, as well as some of the more multidimensional aspects of the illicit trade—ROs are also called on to undertake specific actions. In particular, these include capacity building, designating focal points, and supporting regional-level initiatives (UN, 2001, IV.2.a). As noted above, 19 PoA activities explicitly refer to ROs or refer to regional-level action.

When the authors were engaging with ROs to update the latter's Handbook profiles, the POCs were invited to comment on whether and how the ATT has affected their respective ROs' efforts to support their member states' implementation of the PoA. Most POCs responded either that the impact has been positive or that it is still too early to tell.

The ATT's impact will be experienced differently in several of the ROs included in this Handbook. As of 1 April 2016 more than two-thirds of UN member states had engaged in the process: 82 were states parties to the ATT (or would become so within 90 days) and 50 were signatories. By way of a snapshot, 11 ROs profiled in the Handbook do not have any members that are states parties to the ATT. Three of those ROs do not have a member that has joined the treaty (CSTO, EAEU, and SCO).[5] By contrast, all of the members of two of the 52 ROs in the Handbook have become states parties (G5 Sahel and MRU).

Most ROs that already have significant regional instruments in place (for example, ECOWAS, OAS, OSCE, RECSA, and SADC) highlighted the complementarity of the ATT and the PoA to their existing initiatives. For many, the regional instruments continue to be the primary expression of their members' commitments to addressing illicit small arms. ROs thus have a particular role in

Box 3. The PoA and ATT: the role of ROs

The ATT acknowledges 'the role regional organizations can play in assisting States Parties, upon request, in implementing this Treaty' (UNGA, 2013, Preamble, para. 14). It also provides that states parties may request, offer, or receive assistance through, among others, ROs (UNGA, 2013, art. 16(2)). The nature and extent of the assistance contemplated under the treaty is broad and varied, ranging from 'legal or legislative assistance, institutional capacity-building, and technical, material or financial assistance' to 'stockpile management, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, model legislation, and effective practices for implementation' (UNGA, 2013, art. 16(1)).

The ATT focuses on the legal conventional arms trade. Many elements complement or elevate commitments in other instruments, including the PoA. In particular, the ATT elevates certain PoA commitments on transfer controls to legally binding obligations: regulating international transfers (UN, 2001, II.2, II.11) and the activities of brokers (UN, 2001, II.14) are good examples. It also elaborates on the criteria that states should apply when assessing applications for export licences (UN, 2001, II.11; UNGA, 2013, arts. 6, 7).

On the other hand, the ATT is not comprehensive in terms of the scope of the control measures it covers. Its focus is on international transfers, exports, imports, transit, transshipment, and brokering. In contrast, international transfers are only one element of the PoA, which contains a comprehensive array of small arms control measures designed to guard against diversion throughout a weapon's life cycle. It will be paramount for ROs to remind their member states of this fact. They should also stress the continuing need for the full implementation of the PoA to address and prevent diversion—one of the key obligations in the ATT (UNGA, 2013, art. 11).

Source: Parker (2016)

and, indeed, have been increasingly called upon to elucidate the relationship among the ATT, the PoA, and their respective regional instruments. In this way ROs can help support and make appropriate links between the PoA and the ATT for their members (see below).

ROs are also well placed to promote the full scope of their members' needs. With the new focus on the ATT, there is a real risk that priorities may be skewed, opening a gap between ROs' needs and their ability to meet these needs from internal funding. As donors and external assistance programmes calibrate their funding decisions based on the goals of the ATT, the risk that other PoA issues—including some of greater relevance to ROs and their members—are left by the wayside is greater. Indeed, several organizations profiled in this Handbook noted that donor funding is already channelled primarily through the frame of the PoA and ATT, ignoring the importance and impact of these organizations' regional instruments. In such cases, ROs can serve as a bridge, promoting the minimum criteria of the ATT in PoA-related assistance for states that are not yet states parties to the ATT, but who wish to strengthen their transfer controls.

Promoting cross-regional integration: linking the PoA and ATT

Since the First Edition of this Handbook in 2012, considerable focus has understandably been centred on the ATT. In the course of preparing the Second Edition some ROs commented on this change in focus among donors. Indeed, some ROs continued to benefit from donor interest in the ATT, although not all can or do. A way needs to be found to prevent making the decision to support the PoA an 'either/or' proposition when it comes to promoting the universalization of the ATT. The UN has a leading role to play in creating a 'win-win' scenario for both instruments. The UN's Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament (see Box 4), for example, can provide valuable support to reconcile international

Box 4. UN Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament

The UN Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament were established by the General Assembly between 1985 and 1987 through a series of resolutions following the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly. Of the 193 UN member states, these three Regional Centres cover 130 states.

- The Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC), with headquarters in Togo, covers the 54 African member states;
- The Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC), located in Peru, services 33 member states; and
- The Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPD), in Nepal, provides assistance to 43 member states.

The mandate of all three Regional Centres is similar: to provide, on request, substantive support for member states' initiatives and other efforts to implement peace, arms limitation, and disarmament measures in their respective regions. The financial resources available to the Regional Centres include funding from the UN's regular budget and extra-budgetary funding through voluntary contributions from donor governments, the entities of the UN System, and others. The Regional Centres are under the policy, managerial, and administrative supervision of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, which is part of the UN Secretariat. The General Assembly funds operational costs for the Regional Centres through its regular budget.

The Regional Centres have provided training, capacity building, and policy and legal advice; supported the national implementation of international and regional disarmament instruments; and conducted advocacy and disarmament education. In particular, they have focused on the particular challenges of small arms facing the states of their respective regions, assisting them in implementing the PoA and related regional instruments such as the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms or the CIFTA Convention. Assistance is provided at both the national and regional levels, with direct policy and legal assistance, as well as capacity strengthening for ROs.

- UNREC supported ECCAS and Rwanda in the development and adoption of a legally binding regional instrument to address the proliferation of small arms

in the region (Kinshasa Convention). UNREC also assisted ECOWAS in developing guidelines for national legislation among its members and in conducting national workshops to harmonize national legislations on small arms. UNREC has further engaged in strengthening the capacity of national commissions and national focal points on small arms, such as the Mali an Togo commissions, by assisting with the drafting of national action plans, PoA reports, and national legislation and regulation on small arms. UNREC is also a member of the AU-Regions Steering Committee on Small Arms and DDR that monitors the implementation of the African Strategy on Small Arms.

■ UNLIREC cooperates with the OAS, CARICOM, and other sub-regional organizations such as SICA to assist states in practical disarmament measures and training activities on small arms control. In particular, UNLIREC has assisted states in stockpile management and the destruction of obsolete, seized, or surplus small arms, light weapons, and ammunition. UNLIREC has conducted specific training programmes on small arms control with judges and judicial officials, law enforcement officers, and women officers. UNLIREC has also conducted a number of activities to promote the ATT and prepare states for its implementation.

■ UNRCPD has recently engaged ASEAN member states in the areas of small arms control and the implementation of the PoA by organizing national roundtables and training events for national authorities. The aim was to promote the PoA, foster discussion at the national level, and assist the countries in their implementation actions. Some of these activities included information on the ATT. Since 2010 UNRCPD has supported a small arms working group in Nepal, which meets regularly.

The 30-year presence of Regional Centres in the field and their long-standing support by regional member states underscore the importance that affected countries attach to the support received from these offices. The Regional Centres, in close cooperation and partnership with regional and sub-regional organizations, are thus well place to provide support to member states tailored to the regional context and national situation in the implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms.

Prepared by Nicolas Gérard (UNODA), with input from Amanda Cowl (UNLIREC), Anna Marti (UNRCPD), and Marie-Pierre Arnold (UNREC)

and regional arms control instruments, promote best practice, engage civil society, and—very importantly—coordinate a diverse range of actors.

Other organizations are ideally positioned to help link and facilitate the effective implementation of both the PoA and ATT. For example, while not ROs (as defined in this Handbook), several bodies have multi-regional identities and roles to play in this regard. Three of note are the Commonwealth, the International Organization of the Francophonie (OIF), and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (see Box 5). These organizations serve as important bridges connecting regional efforts.

Preparing for RevCon 3 . . . and beyond

Successfully countering the illicit proliferation of small arms calls for regional-level actions and expertise. As we have seen ROs and other cross-regional organizations have an important role to play in addressing this challenge. While some are well resourced and have made important contributions, many others lack resources and have not fully realized their potential. Critical issues concerning political will, accountability, donor-driven agendas, and sustainability merit greater scrutiny. The First Edition flagged a dozen policy-relevant questions for ROs, their members, donors, and the UN to consider moving forward (see Box 6). They remain as relevant today as they did then—and perhaps more so as resources have become increasingly scarcer.

In summary, the international community has been undertaking bold agenda setting. New Sustainable Development Goals,

Box 5. The Commonwealth, OIF, and OIC

The Commonwealth

The Commonwealth is an intergovernmental organization of 53 independent countries and 2.2 billion citizens. Its London-based secretariat provides guidance on policy-making, technical assistance, and advisory services to members, which convene every two years at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) to discuss issues affecting the Commonwealth. Minsters also meet on a regular basis to address specific topics.

Meetings of Commonwealth law ministers, notably in Accra (2005) and Edinburgh (2008), resulted in the Secretariat being tasked to support members' efforts on PoA-related issues. The Secretariat's mandate included monitoring PoA-related developments; summarising member' obligations under international law on the use and transfer of small arms; developing legislative provisions for marking, tracing, and transfer of small arms; cooperating with other organizations to build capacity; and assisting members in efforts to implement the PoA.

In 2011 the CHOGM urged member states to participate in the 2012 Diplomatic Conference to negotiate the ATT. Commonwealth heads of government called for the full and effective implementation of the PoA in all its aspects at their 2013 meeting. In 2015, acknowledging the entry into force of the ATT, they invited members to ratify and urged states parties to fully implement the treaty.

The Secretariat has also published a number of papers and engaged in policy advice and dialogue on small arms issues with its members. Research by the Secretariat has covered ways to strengthen civil society to address gun crimes in Commonwealth cities (2007), analysed the proliferation of small arms (2010), and surveyed members' compliance with the Commonwealth's small arms obligations. This was part of the work in the lead-up to support the establishment of an ATT. The Secretariat also evaluated and advised on strategies to control small arms proliferation in Sierra Leone after the civil war in that country.

The ATT remains a priority for the Commonwealth Secretariat. The Commonwealth high commissioners recently discussed it at a panel discussion on the implementation of IHL, organized in collaboration with the British Red Cross. In June 2015 the Secretariat participated in the conference The ATT and the Commonwealth organized by the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In the wake of the CHOGM 2015 statement, the Secretariat is planning activities to assist members in ratifying and implementing the ATT.

Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie

The OIF was established in 1970 'to maintain active solidarity' among its 57 members and 23 observers. Together its membership represents over one-third of UN members and accounts for a population of over 900 million people. Headquartered in Paris, it has permanent representation at the AU, the UN Economic Commission for Africa (Addis Ababa), the EU (Brussels), and the UN (in both New York and Geneva). There are also five regional offices (in Gabon, Haiti, Madagascar, Romania, Togo, and Vietnam).

Declarations adopted in Beirut (2002), Ouagadougou (2004), and Saint-Boniface (2006) all make explicit references to PoA-related issues: from supporting all efforts to eradicate the illicit trafficking and uncontrolled circulation of arms, to arms collection, destruction, and DDR—particularly with respect to child combatants. The OIF and UNIDIR co-organized awareness-raising and information seminars for member states in Geneva (2011) and New York (2012). In cooperation with the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, the OIF also organized training programmes on arms trading for national officials, civil, and military representatives in Geneva (2014) and Addis Ababa (2015).

The 2012 Kinshasa Declaration called for deepening the OIF's role in building the capacity of francophone civil and military police as a contribution towards democratic governance, strengthened security systems, and developing a more operational role in peacekeeping. Several programmes have aimed to strengthen parliaments and mediation institutions on security sector reform. Further, the Francophone Expertise and Training Network for Peace Operations (REFFOP) engages states, international organizations, and institutional networks to support peace operations. REFFOP focuses particularly on training, advocacy, and information sharing by preparing publications and encouraging the participation of French-speaking military, police, and civil personnel in peace operations, among other activities.

The OIF also supported the creation of, and collaborates with, FRANCOPOL (International Francophone Network of Police). FRANCOPOL was established in 2008 and is headquartered in Quebec. Over 40 national and municipal police entities from 15 countries are represented in the network. Its mandate is to support the training and services of francophone police forces. It also directly contributes to the implementation of OIF programmatic objectives in the areas of development, conflict prevention, and peace building. As such, FRANCOPOL is considering a more operational role in stabilization, peacekeeping, and peace building—be it in active deployment or helping to train international police forces prior to deployment.

Organization of Islamic Cooperation

The OIC, founded in 1969, is the second-largest intergovernmental organization in the world (after the UN), with 57 member states spread across four continents. Over the years it has actively lobbied for peaceful resolutions to conflicts and post-conflict disarmament, as well as arms control measures at the national, regional, and multilateral levels.

Even prior to the PoA's establishment, the OIC endorsed early efforts in Mali to address small arms proliferation, promoted an African Regional Conference on the illegal arms trade, and encouraged cooperation with other ROs on this issue. In 2006 it attended the Conference to Review Implementation of the PoA. In the following years it has drawn attention to the damage caused by arms trafficking, especially across the Sahel and in Somalia and Libya. Joint conclusions coming from the 2012 General Meeting on UN–OIC Cooperation emphasized the need for conflict prevention in the Sahel, particularly in terms of promoting youth employment and assisting states to prevent the illicit trade in small arms. In this regard it called for the appointment of a joint UN–OIC Special Envoy for the Sahel Region. In 2015 a joint UN–OIC–AU high-level meeting on Somalia (entitled Investing in Peace: Priorities for 2016 and Beyond) resulted in several countries committing to support Somalia on security, development, and state building.

The OIC has also approached the issue of illegal arms proliferation from a counter-terrorism perspective. In 1999 its convention on Combating international Terrorism made the explicit link between arms trafficking to terrorist groups and organized crime. The convention called on members to promote information exchanges on a variety of topics, including the means of acquisition and sources of weapons; the types of arms, ammunition, and explosives used by such groups; and information that could lead to the confiscation of arms, weapons, and explosives likely to be used to commit terrorism. In addition to several previous resolutions on the issue, at its 42nd session of the Council of Foreign Ministers (2015) the OIC adopted resolution on Combating Terrorism in Sahel-Saharan Countries (Res. 21/42-POL). The resolution also called on its members to support Libya in protecting its borders against, among other illegal activities, terrorist gangs and weapons proliferation (Res 5/42-POL). The OIC has worked jointly with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate on building national capacities to fight terrorism, together with the role of cultural dialogue in countering incitement to commit terrorist acts. The OIC has also signed an MoU with the AU on projects to counter-terrorism and extremism. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia funded the project (USD 10 million).

Source: Maze (2016)

Box 6. 12 RO-related questions from the First Edition that are still relevant

RO–member relations

- Are member states' dues sufficient to fulfil the expectations placed on the RO for implementing the PoA?
- Do the activities of the RO sometimes inadequately replace or diminish a state's national-level action?
- Do states provide the RO with enough clout or independence to undertake supportive regional actions in the area of small arms?

Donor–RO relations

- Will the assistance that is being offered address what is most pressing or appropriate for the RO and its members?
- Does the support, whether proposed or requested, correspond to or follow up on established action points?
- Do receiving ROs have the capacity to absorb the assistance?
- What expectations can be placed on ROs' members to reduce their organizations' dependency on external funding?

UN–RO relations

- How can PoA meetings better engage ROs, including those focusing on counter-terrorism, customs, and narcotics?
- How can UN regional meetings more constructively engage ROs?
- How can UNODA's three regional centres be used more effectively to assist ROs to implement the PoA?

RO–civil society relations

- How can ROs that do not yet benefit from civil society participation be encouraged to do so?
- How can members of civil society better take advantage of the unique role of ROs and more ably build on the latter's accomplishments?

Source: Berman and Maze (2012, pp. 14–16)

Figure 1. Information regarding each profiled RO

Within the figure:

Regional Organizations and the PoA

Handbook

Name
African Union (AU)

Headquarters
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Website
www.au.int
www.peaceau.org

Short description
The AU seeks to promote political and socioeconomic integration, peace and security, democratic principles and institutions, sustainable development, and respect for human rights among African states, and to raise the living standards of Africans.

Membership
54 members
(53 UN member states)

Notes
The AU began in 1963 as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) with 33 members. It became the AU in 2002. With South Sudan joining the organization in July 2011, the AU's membership has grown to 54. The SADR is the only AU member that is not also a UN member. It joined the OAU in 1984, which resulted in Morocco choosing to withdraw from the organization. As of February 2016 CAR, Somalia, and STP were under sanctions for failure to pay their arrears. CAR was also formally suspended from the organization for political reasons, but after the successful February 2016 elections, on 31 March 2016 the AU Peace and Security Council decided to lift CAR's suspension and readmit it.

Funding
The AU's budget for 2016 is USD 417 million. Assessments from AU member states cover about 40 per cent of

this amount, which essentially covers the organization's operating budget. Programming funds come almost entirely from international partners (more than 90 per cent). The EU is the AU's largest external contributor. Germany (along with its international development agency, GIZ) and the United States are among other bilateral donors that also provide substantial assistance to the AU.

RO members and the ATT
☒ States parties: 34% (18 states)
☑ Signatories: 40% (21 states)
☒ Not yet joined: 26% (14 states)

Notes
SADR is not a UN member state and cannot join.

PoA POC
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🖷 +251-11-551-9121   A C D E F G R E S *

PoA-related activities
The OAU adopted the Bamako Declaration in 2000, aiming to develop a common position and generate support for the 2001 UN Conference on Small Arms, which led to the PoA. In 2008 the AU established the AU-Regions Steering Committee on Small Arms, made up of the AU, the 8 RECs, RECSA, ICGLR and observers. The committee seeks to enhance capacities, and harmonize and coordinate initiatives to address small arms-related issues. In 2013 the committee's mandate expanded to include DDR. Responsibility for implementing strategy is at 3 levels: states, RECs and regional bodies, and the AU. The AU engages in peace and security affairs via APSA. APSA outlines the roles, instruments, and procedures by which the AU, RECs, and regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, and resolution (RMs) fulfil their mandates. It embraces a comprehensive agenda for peace and security, including includes early warning and preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping and building, promoting democratic practices, intervention, humanitarian action, and disaster management. The AU conducts

28

Emblem
The official flag, symbol, or visual image that identifies the RO.

Name
The name of the RO in English and its abbreviation/acronym, if applicable.

Headquarters
The location of the office where the head of the RO is based. Several ROs have bureaus in more than one state. The PoA-relevant POC may work in a bureau and not at the RO's HQ. The HQ are marked with a seven-pointed star on the map.

Website
The RO's main website. If there is a separate site in English, the URL is listed, as are relevant websites of PoA-related programmes and agencies.

Short description
The RO's main missions and objectives. The description is meant to be indicative and not comprehensive.

Membership
The number of full members of the RO is provided, as well an indication of how many are UN member states. Background on the RO's origins is given, along with changes to its membership, when applicable. Information on other affiliations is included when space permits.

Funding
When available, information on the RO's budget for PoA-relevant activities is described. The financial value of external support to the RO, including for PoA-related activities, may also be provided.

RO members and the ATT
The chart shows the status of RO members (even those that might be suspended) with regard to the ATT as of 1 April 2016. The number of RO members that were states parties by that date—or had ratified the instrument by then and would become a state party within 90 days—is represented by the symbol ☒. Those that were signatories, but had not yet ratified or acceded to the instrument, are represented by ☑. Those that have not yet 'joined' (i.e. signed, ratified, or acceded to the treaty) are represented by ☒. Other relevant information is included in the 'notes' section, where space permits.

PoA POC
The RO's official and working languages are highlighted in white. All six UN official languages are included, as are Dutch, German, and Portuguese, designated by the first letter of the language (in English). If the RO has official and working languages not in this list, this is flagged with an asterisk (*) and the information noted.

PoA-related activities
Activities relevant to PoA Parts II and III (see Table 2, pp. 4–5).

The map shows a profile box with the following content:

small arms collection and destruction activities through its peace support operations. In the 2016–2020 APSA Roadmap, the AU Commission plans to support members in areas to include: legislation, developing of NAPs, establishing national commissions, and arms marking and tracing. The AU Commission is developing guidelines on arms and explosives management for peace support operations and the ASF. The AU is implementing the Silencing of the Guns: Prerequisites for Realising a Conflict-free Africa by the Year 2020 initiative, aiming to tackle the SALW issue and African ratification of the ATT. The AU plans to commission research on arms marking and record keeping, and craft-produced small arms.

PoA-relevant cooperation with other ROs
The AU-Regions Steering Committee on Small Arms and DDR consists of ECCAS, CEN-SAD, COMESA, the EAC, ECOWAS, IGAD, the ICGLR, RECSA, SADC, and UMA. (The AU has approached SARCOM to engage in this process, but SARCOM has not yet responded formally.) The EU is an observer (as are the UN and the WB). The AU and RECSA administer relevant EU-funded projects together.

Legally binding regional instruments
■ None

Other official documents of interest
■ African Union Strategy on the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (2013)
■ African Common Position on an ATT (2013)
■ *Silencing the Guns, Owning the Future: Realising a Conflict-free Africa* (2015)

PoA-related programmes and initiatives

■ **Current members**
Algeria, Angola, **Benin**, Botswana, **Burkina Faso**, **Burundi**, **Cameroon**, Cape Verde, **CAR**, **Chad**, **Comoros**, **Côte d'Ivoire**, Djibouti, **DRC**, **Egypt**, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, **Ethiopia**, **Gabon**, Gambia, **Ghana**, **Guinea**, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, **Madagascar**, Malawi, **Mali**, **Mauritania**, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, **Níger**, **Nigeria**, **RoC**, **Rwanda**, SADR, STP, **Senegal**, Seychelles, **Sierra Leone**, **Somalia**, South Africa, South Sudan, **Sudan**, Swaziland, **Tanzania**, Togo, **Tunisia**, **Uganda**, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Bold = founding member
■ **Former members:** Morocco
■ **Membership pending:** None

Profile updated April 2016

29

PoA-relevant cooperation with other ROs

Examples of cooperation with other profiled ROs on PoA-relevant themes. Information about cooperation with international organizations or other groups is included in parentheses where space permits.

Legally binding regional instruments

Examples of the RO's legally binding PoA-relevant instruments are noted, including charters, protocols, and treaties. The icon is only used to denote those instruments that make explicit reference to countering small arms proliferation, trafficking, or illicit possession (regardless of whether the instrument has entered into force).

Other official documents of interest

Selected examples of other PoA-relevant documents, including such things as codes of conduct, declarations, reports, standard operating procedures, and strategies.

PoA-related programmes and initiatives

See Table 2.

Map

The map shows states that are members of the RO, were members of the RO, or whose membership is pending (see below) as of 1 April 2016.

Current members

Distinguishes RO's founding members (in **bold**) from members that joined after the RO was established (not in bold) or are currently suspended (in red). Founding members correspond to members at the RO's creation. If an RO succeeded a previous RO or relaunched itself as a new RO, then founding members refer to the predecessor RO. This information is current as of 1 April 2016.

Former members

Lists states that were RO members but have formally left the RO. A member of an RO that unilaterally disengages from the RO may still be a member. Similarly, a former member that declares itself ready to rejoin the RO does not mean it is listed as a member. Former members that were founding members are listed in **bold**.

Membership pending

Records states or other entities that have formally applied to join the RO in question.

A guide to the symbols used in the profiles can be found on the fold-out flap on the Handbook's back cover.

Table 5. Icons 'awarded' to profiled ROs

Icon used	ROs
■ PoA	All ROs have received a POC icon, with the exception of: ■ **Africa (3)**: AFRIPOL, GGC, ICC ■ **The Americas (1)**: MERCOSUR ■ **Asia (2):** EAEU, GCC ■ **Europe (1)**: Europol (This may be by request or because the POC changes according to the rotational presidency of the organization or because the POC is not yet designated).
	■ **Africa (4)**: ECCAS, ECOWAS, RECSA, SADC ■ **The Americas (2)**: MERCOSUR, OAS ■ **Asia (3)**: CIS, EAEU, SCO ■ **Europe (3)**: BSEC, EU, SELEC
	■ **Africa (1)**: ECOWAS ■ **Europe (3)**: EU, OSCE, RCC
	■ **Africa (13)**: AU, COMESA, EAPCCO, ECCAS, ICGLR, ICC, IGAD, IOC, MRU, RECSA, SARCOM, SARPCCO, WAPCCO ■ **The Americas (4)**: AMERIPOL, CARICOM, MERCOSUR, SICA ■ **Asia (5)**: ASEAN, ASEANAPOL, CIS, CSTO, EAEU ■ **Europe (5)**: Europol, NATO, OSCE, RCC, SELEC ■ **Oceania (3)**: OCO, PICP, PIF
	■ **Africa (11)**: AFRIPOL, AU, CCPAC, EAC, ECOWAS, GGC, ICGLR, IGAD, RECSA, SARCOM, SARPCCO ■ **The Americas (4)**: CARICOM, OAS, SICA, UNASUR ■ **Asia (6)**: APEC, ASEAN, CICA, CIS, EAEU, SCO ■ **Europe (5)**: BSEC, EU, NATO, OSCE, RCC ■ **Oceania (3)**: MSG, PICP, PIF
	■ **Africa (4)**: EAC, RECSA, SARCOM, SARPCCO ■ **The Americas (2)**: CARICOM, OAS ■ **Asia (1)**: APEC ■ **Europe (5)**: EU, NATO, OSCE, RACVIAC, RCC ■ **Oceania (2)**: PICP, PIF
	■ **Africa (5)**: AU, COMESA, ECCAS, ECOWAS, ICGLR ■ **Europe (3)**: EU, NATO, RCC ■ **Asia (1)**: LAS
	■ **Africa (2)**: ICC, SARPCCO ■ **The Americas (1)**: SICA ■ **Europe (4)**: EU, NATO, OSCE, RCC ■ **Oceania (2)**: MSG, PIF
	■ **Africa (11)**: AU, CEMAC, COMESA, EAC, EAPCCO, ECCAS, ECOWAS, ICGLR, IGAD, MRU, RECSA ■ **The Americas (4)**: CARICOM, OAS, SICA, UNASUR ■ **Asia (2)**: ASEAN, LAS ■ **Europe (5)**: EU, NATO, OSCE, RACVIAC, RCC ■ **Oceania (2)**: MSG, PIF
	■ **Africa (5)**: AU, EAC, ICGLR, RECSA, SARCOM ■ **The Americas (1)**: CARICOM ■ **Asia (2)**: ASEAN, ASEANAPOL ■ **Europe (5)**: EU, Europol, NATO, OSCE, RCC ■ **Oceania (2)**: PICP, PIF
	■ **Africa (9)**: AU, CEMAC, CEN-SAD, COMESA, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD, ICGLR, SADC ■ **The Americas (1)**: OAS ■ **Europe (4)**: EU, NATO , OSCE, RCC ■ **Oceania (1)**: PIF
	■ **Africa (15)**: AFRIPOL, AU, CCPAC, EAPCCO, ECOWAS, G5 Sahel, GGC, ICC, IGAD, IOC, MRU, RECSA, SADC, SARPCCO, WAPCCO ■ **The Americas (6)**: AMERIPOL, CARICOM, MERCOSUR, OAS, SICA, UNASUR ■ **Asia (10)**: APEC, ASEAN, ASEANAPOL, BIMSTEC, CICA, CSTO, EAEU, GCC, LAS, SCO ■ **Europe (9)**: BSEC, EU, EUROCONTROL, Europol, NATO, OSCE, RACVIAC, RCC, SELEC ■ **Oceania (4)**: MSG, OCO, PICP, PIF
	■ **Africa (7)**: COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, MRU, RECSA, SARPCCO ■ **The Americas (5)**: CARICOM, MERCOSUR, OAS, SICA, UNASUR ■ **Asia (2)**: CIS, LAS ■ **Europe (3)**: EU, OSCE, RCC ■ **Oceania (2)**: OCO, PIF

Icon used	ROs
	■ **Africa (8)**: AFRIPOL, EAPCCO, IGAD, IOC, SADC, SARCOM, SARPCCO, WAPCCO ■ **The Americas (5)**: AMERIPOL, CARICOM, MERCOSUR, OAS, UNASUR ■ **Asia (5)**: ASEAN, ASEANAPOL, CICA, CSTO, SCO ■ **Europe (4)**: EU, Europol, RCC, SELEC ■ **Oceania (3)**: MSG, PICP, PIF
	■ **Africa (3)**: EAC, RECSA, SARPCCO ■ **The Americas (2)**: CARICOM, OAS ■ **Europe (4)**: EU, Europol, NATO, RCC
	■ **Africa (5)**: AU, EAC, ECOWAS, RECSA, SARPCCO ■ **The Americas (2)**: CARICOM, OAS ■ **Europe (4)**: EU, NATO, OSCE, RCC ■ **Oceania (2)**: MSG, PIF
	■ **Africa (3)**: EAPCCO, SARPCCO, WAPCCO ■ **The Americas (2)**: CARICOM, SICA ■ **Asia (1)**: ASEAN ■ **Europe (2)**: Europol, RCC
	■ **Africa (9)**: CCPAC, EAPCCO, G5 Sahel, GGC, ICC, IGAD, IOC, SARPCCO, WAPCCO ■ **The Americas (3)**: AMERIPOL, SICA, UNASUR ■ **Asia (8)**: APEC, ASEAN, BIMSTEC, CICA, CSTO, GCC, LAS, SCO ■ **Europe (6)**: BSEC, EU, Europol, NATO, RACVIAC, SELEC ■ **Oceania (1)**: OCO
	■ **Africa (5)**: EEAC, ECOWAS, ICGLR, IGAD, RECSA ■ **The Americas (3)**: AMERIPOL, CARICOM, UNASUR ■ **Europe (6)**: EU, Europol, OSCE, RACVIAC, RCC, SELEC ■ **Oceania (1)**: PIF

responding to climate change (COP 21), and revising the humanitarian architecture—including financing ('the Grand Bargain')—demonstrate a strong commitment to meeting the challenges that beset the world. Addressing the illicit proliferation of small arm *in all its aspects* is more than a security issue: it is at the core of realizing humanitarian and development goals. The UN recognized as much in explicitly making the significant reduction of illicit arms flows a part of Agenda 2030 (Target 16.4, UNGA, 2015; see also DeMartino and Atwood, 2015). Moving towards the Third Review Conference, it is critical that arms control instruments and frameworks are seen as part of this broader global agenda. As long as the illicit trade in small arms persists, the goals of these other frameworks will not be met.

ROs arguably served as catalysts for establishing the PoA and developing numerous tools and best practices that have proved to be instrumental in addressing many PoA commitments. Information is being shared more effectively; and the wasteful duplication of efforts, while not eliminated, is less problematic than it was. As we move toward RevCon3 it would be useful and timely to focus less on norm setting and more on practical implementation, coordination, and cooperation—not just within regions, but between regions. In essence, this is the prime concern of the Handbook.

How to use this Handbook

It bears repeating: this Handbook is primarily intended as a helpful guide on ways to share useful information in a user-friendly format to support the implementation of the PoA. It is definitely *not* a critique of ROs, their members, or the donors

that support them. While such a critique may be a worthwhile exercise, it is not the objective here.

Part II comprises the bulk of the Handbook and includes two-page profiles of the 52 ROs mentioned above. Each profile has three parts: 1) information of a *general* nature on the organization; 2) an account of its PoA-related activities and commitments; and 3) an overview of its membership. (See Figure 1 for a fuller explanation of each template's contents.) The profiles are organized in five geographic regions: Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and Oceania. The UN Statistical Division's regional listings are used to determine geographic placements for the UN's 193 member states. Many of the profiled ROs include members from more than one region. In these instances, the RO was placed in the region in which most of its members 'resided'. This approach was deemed to be worthwhile because it facilitated the overview of states' multiple affiliations in Annexe 2.

As with the First Edition, the template does not use in-text citations or notes, and many acronyms and abbreviations are not spelled out in the individual profiles. (One can consult 'Sources' at the book's end, organized by 'Part' and by profile, for information on materials and officials consulted. The 'List of Abbreviations and Acronyms' at the front of the volume will answer any other questions.) A key to the icons and symbols used appears on the fold-out flap on the back cover, with fuller explanations of the icons available in Table 2.

ROs that have more icons are not 'better', 'more effective', or 'more deserving of support' than those with fewer. Different ROs have varying mandates and areas of expertise. The 'awarding' of icons gives some indication of ROs' engagement in PoA implementation and is based on the content of the profile. For example, if as a result of compiling the Handbook the RO identified a PoA POC, the organization was deemed to have fulfilled its commit-

ment and a was awarded. Whether this person had officially been 'designated' or 'appointed' (UN, 2001, II, para. 24) was not an issue.

The icons are not meant to portray every possibility activity covered in the profiles, but to helpfully identify in a visual way the main areas of the ROs' work to support the implementation of the PoA. However, it is important to emphasize that the icons do not speak to the nature, extent, or scope of engagement in that activity area. Indeed, they might indicate a previous rather than an ongoing activity. Thus, an effort was made to strike a balance in awarding the icons, with an emphasis on supporting PoA implementation and providing a useful service. The wording of the PoA—words such as 'encourage', 'support', and 'facilitate'— make it hard to determine appropriate or expected actions and activities. When awarding the icons, overly strict requirements would only reduce the activities covered in the profile, leaving out important initiatives. At the same time, overly permissive parameters would not be helpful either, suggesting actions and engagement on issues that were misleading or stretched the truth in terms of their impacts or motivations.[6] That said, at least one of the ROs profiled has in some way addressed each of the 19 PoA commitments covered in this volume. Overall, Table 5 should be considered less of a 'check list' and more a 'conversation starter' regarding these ROs' roles and activities.

The Handbook also contains five Annexes. Annexe 1 lists the members of the 52 profiled organizations: 191 UN member states (all but North Korea and the Maldives);[7] 17 other states, territories, polities, and economies; and 14 organizations, banks, and institutions. Observers and other affiliations of these ROs are not included. Annexe 2 provides a cross-listing of ROs and member states by region. Annexe 3 records each UN member

state's membership in the 52 profiled ROs. It also records the relationship of the UN member state to the ATT: whether it is a state party, a signatory, or has not yet joined (as of 1 April 2016). Annexe 4 provides an overview of each RO's members' relationships to the ATT, noting how many members are ineligible to join. Annexe 5 provides the full text of the PoA in English. (The profiles of the First Edition included a summary of 'Overlapping memberships with other ROs'. This was removed in order to accommodate a summary of ROs' ATT memberships. A reader interested in obtaining information on comparative memberships can still do so by utilizing Annexes 2 and 3.)

Endnotes

1   According to Humanitarian Outcomes, there were more than 250 attacks on humanitarian aid workers in 2013 (the highest number ever recorded), resulting in 155 people being killed, 171 seriously injured, and 134 kidnapped. These attacks occurred in 30 countries, of which five—Afghanistan, Pakistan, South Sudan, Sudan, and Syria—accounted for three of every four recorded incidents. According to Humanitarian Outcomes, attacks in 2014 (the last year for which data has been compiled and published) decreased slightly from 2013's record levels, but were still higher than any other year for which it had collated data. The Central African Republic overtook Sudan to join the list of top five countries (HO, 2015).

2   The 18 ROs were ASEAN, AU, CAN, CARICOM, CIS, EAC, ECOWAS, EU, LAS, MERCOSUR, NATO, OAS, OSCE, PIF, RCC, RECSA (formerly the Nairobi Secretariat), SARPCCO, and SICA (see Berman and Maze, 2012, p. 3).

3   UNODA convened five regional meetings for: 1) Central Africa; 2) the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States, and Southern Africa; 3) Latin America and the Caribbean; 4) the Pacific; and 5) South-east Asia) during 2009 and 2010 in Bali, Kigali, Kinshasa, Lima, and Sydney (see Berman and Maze, 2012, p. 3). In 2012 and 2013 UNODA convened four more in Bali, Cairo, Kingston, and Nairobi. The 17 ROs comprised ASEAN, ASEANAPOL, AU, CAN, CARICOM, CCPAC, EAPCCO, ECOWAS, ICGLR, LAS, MERCOSUR, OAS, PIF, RECSA, SADC, SARPCCO, and WAPCCO (Berman, 2016).

4   An RO—with UN Economic and Social Council standing—can attend PoA meetings without an invitation if it registers in advance. However, invitations are important reminders and help set agendas.

5   The seven other ROs that have no members as states parties are ASEAN, ASEANAPOL, BIMSTEC, CICA, EAC, IGAD, and MSG.

6   In general, habitual and sustained action is sought when awarding an icon. For example, sending an official to attend a seminar, conference, or training session on stockpile management or brokering controls does not qualify as 'implementing'

this objective. In such a case the activity might be noted in the 'PoA activity' narrative, but would not merit an icon.

7 The Maldives remains a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which was profiled in the First Edition. As noted above, SAARC is not sufficiently active on PoA-related activities to merit its inclusion in the Second Edition.